Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. MoreHide
Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. MoreHide
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe aThe American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe and Asia. Thus, any threat by the Axis Powers to invade the mainland United States or other areas was considered negligible, allowing for American resources to be deployed in overseas theaters.
This article includes attacks on continental territory, extending 200 miles (320 km) into the ocean, which is today under the sovereignty of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and several other smaller states, but excludes military action involving the Danish territory of Greenland, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Aleutian Islands. The most well known battles in North America during World War II were the Attack on Pearl Harbor (the first attack on US soil since the Battle of Ambos Nogales), the Aleutian Islands Campaign, the Battle of the St. Lawrence, and the attacks on Newfoundland.... More
Memories Seven minutes after she opened fire, she was hit by a torpedo; within the next 3 minutes, she was stSeven minutes after she opened fire, she was hit by a torpedo; within the next 3 minutes, she was struck by two more. Almost at once she began to jackknife. Below, she was flooding rapidly even before she broke up and sank stern first. In a well-drilled manner, Helena's men went over the side.
[edit] Rescue of the crew and aftermath Helena's history closes with the almost incredible story of what happened to her men in the hours and days that followed. When her bow rose into the air after the sinking, many of them clustered around it, only to be fired on there. About a half hour after she sank, two American destroyers came to the rescue. ... More
Description This operation was fought during the Pacific war on this group of islands situated in the central Solomons. US forces invaded them as part of an American offensive (CARTWHEEL) to isolate and neutralizThis operation was fought during the Pacific war on this group of islands situated in the central Solomons. US forces invaded them as part of an American offensive (CARTWHEEL) to isolate and neutralize Rabaul, the main Japanese base in their South-East Area.
On 20 June 1943 a Raider battalion (, 5(f)) landed at Segi Point on the main island, New Georgia, and during the next two weeks there were other landings by US Marines and 43rd US Division on Rendova and Vangunu islands, and on western New Georgia, to seize a Japanese airstrip at Munda point. Despite the US Navy's intervention, which resulted in the battles of Kula Gulf and Kolombangara, 4,000 reinforcements were successfully dispatched to the commander of the 10,500-strong Japanese garrison, Maj-General Sasaki Noboru. Most reinforced Munda, which became the focus of Japanese resistance, and their night infiltration tactics unnerved the inexperienced US troops. Non-battle casualties, caused by exhaustion and ‘war neuroses’, increased alarmingly, and when the commander of 14th Corps, Maj-General Oscar Griswold, arrived on 11 July he reported the division was ‘about to fold up’. The 37th US Division was brought in, Griswold replaced the worst affected units, and he then launched a corps attack on 25 July. Fierce fighting followed but by 1August the Japanese, outnumbered and outgunned, had withdrawn inland. This time US Navy destroyers prevented more reinforcements reaching them when, on the night of 6/7August, they sank three Japanese transports (battle of Vella Gulf).
Munda now became the base of Marine Corps squadrons which supported landings on Vella Lavella on 15 August. These bypassed and isolated Sasaki's garrison now gathering on Kolombangara after further US reinforcements, elements of 25th US Division, had failed to destroy them on New Georgia. On 15 September Sasaki was ordered to withdraw. In a brilliantly organized evacuation 9,400 men out of the 12,500 on Kolombangara were rescued by landing craft, and the following month those on Vella Lavella were also evacuated.
The campaign proved costly for the Americans who had 1,094 killed and 3,873 wounded with thousands more becoming non-battle casualties. Excluding the fighting on Vella Lavella, 2,483 Japanese bodies were counted. Planned as a one-division operation, the Japanese garrison's ‘skill, tenacity, and valor’—to quote the campaign's official US historian—eventually made it one where elements of four had to be used. ‘The obstinate General Sasaki,’ the same historian concludes, ‘deserved his country's gratitude for his gallant and able conduct.’... More
Memories After overhaul in Sydney, Australia, she was back at Espiritu Santo in March to participate in bombaAfter overhaul in Sydney, Australia, she was back at Espiritu Santo in March to participate in bombardments of New Georgia, soon to be invaded. The first goal on New Georgia proper was Rice Anchorage. In the force escorting the transports carrying the initial landing parties, Helena moved into Kula Gulf just Before midnight 4 July, and shortly after midnight on the 5th, her big guns opened up in her last shore bombardment. ... More
Description The naval Battle of Kula Gulf took place in the early hours of 6 July 1943 during World War II and was between United States and Japanese ships off the coast of Kolombangara in the Solomon Islands.
BaThe naval Battle of Kula Gulf took place in the early hours of 6 July 1943 during World War II and was between United States and Japanese ships off the coast of Kolombangara in the Solomon Islands.
Background
On 5 July, United States Navy Task Group 36.1 (TG 36.1)—commanded by Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth and consisting of the light cruisers USS Honolulu (CL-48), USS St. Louis (CL-49), and USS Helena (CL-50), plus four destroyers, had received word of another "Tokyo Express" mission down "the Slot" in the Solomon Islands, and the task group proceeded northwest past New Georgia Island.
The Allies were in the process of launching their next offensive in the Solomon Islands, having just landed troops on the island of Rendova as a preliminary step to seizing the major Japanese airstrip at Munda on New Georgia Island. In support of this landing, which was to set up an initial beachhead for moving U.S. troops across Blanche Channel to New Georgia, Admiral Ainsworth had the night before conducted a cruiser bombardment of Vila on Kolombangara Island and Bairoko on New Georgia and, short of fuel and ammunition, was in the process of retiring to the Coral Sea to replenish. A U.S. Marine landing was scheduled on the northern shore of New Georgia on 10 July, that would require further naval support.
Battle
At 01:06 off Kolombangara, the task group came into contact with a Japanese reinforcement group commanded by Admiral Teruo Akiyama which consisted of ten destroyers loaded with 2,600 combat troops that were bound for Vila, which they used as a staging point for moving into Munda. The Japanese were divided into two forces, a formation of three escorts trailing the main column first came under attack.
The U.S. ships opened fire at 01:57, firing 612 shells in 21 minutes and six seconds, quickly sinking the destroyer Niizuki and killing Admiral Akiyama. However, Helena had expended all of her flashless powder the previous night, she was forced to use smokeless powder, thus illuminating herself to the Japanese ships with every salvo. Two of the Japanese destroyers launched their Long Lance torpedoes and hit Helena, fatally damaging her. The main Japanese force, which had countermarched away from Vila with the first contact, then broke away, having landed only 850 of the 2,600 troops. The Japanese destroyer Nagatsuki ran aground, while Hatsuyuki was damaged.
Both forces began to withdraw from the area, but one Japanese and two American destroyers remained to rescue survivors. At about 05:00, the destroyers Amagiri and USS Nicholas exchanged torpedoes and gunfire. Amagiri was hit and retired. The beached Nagatsuki was abandoned by her crew in the morning, she was bombed and destroyed by American aircraft.
Aftermath
The destroyers USS Radford and Nicholas both stayed behind to rescue survivors from Helena. While rescuing over 750 men, Radford and Nicholas had to reengage the enemy three times, they were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their rescue. Amagiri escaped and later rammed and cut in half the motor torpedo boat USS PT-109, captained by future President of the United States John F. Kennedy (1917-1963), in Blackett Strait southwest of Kolombangara on August 2. ... More
Memories The landing of troops was completed successfully by dawn, but in the afternoon of 5 July 1943, word The landing of troops was completed successfully by dawn, but in the afternoon of 5 July 1943, word came that the Tokyo Express was ready to roar down once more and the escort group turned north to meet it. By midnight 5 July, Helena's group was off the northwest corner of New Georgia, three cruisers and four destroyers composing the group. Racing down to face them were three groups of Japanese destroyers, a total of ten enemy ships. Four of them peeled off to accomplish their mission of landing troops. By 01:57, the Battle of Kula Gulf had begun, Helena began blasting away with a fire so rapid and intense that the Japanese later announced in all solemnity that she must have been armed with "6 inch machine guns". Ironically, Helena made a perfect target when lit by the flashes of her own guns. ... More
Criteria The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not suff... The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not sufficiently to justify the award of the Presidential Unit Citation). It may also be awarded to a unit that distinguishes itself by extremely meritorious service not involving combat (but in support of military operations), which renders that unit outstanding when compared to other units performing similar service. MoreHide
Description Lexington and Yorktown strike the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua
As Lexington and Yorktown, screened by a powerful force of eight cruisers (including HMAS Australia) and fourteen destroyers, steamed acLexington and Yorktown strike the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua
As Lexington and Yorktown, screened by a powerful force of eight cruisers (including HMAS Australia) and fourteen destroyers, steamed across the Coral Sea toward New Guinea, Vice Admiral Brown received word of the Japanese landings at Lae and Salamaua. This was welcome news, and caused an immediate cancellation of the plan to strike at Rabaul and Gasmata. The Allied task force could now strike the Japanese when they were most vulnerable - engaged in unloading their transports at the beachheads.
The first hurdle facing Admiral Brown was how to avoid early detection of his task force by vigilant Japanese patrol planes of the kind that had defeated his attempt to strike Rabaul in February. The most direct route across the Solomon Sea and up the north-eastern coast of the New Guinea mainland posed a real risk of early detection by Japanese patrol planes flying from airfields on the island of New Britain.
Vice Admiral Brown resolved that TF-11 would mount its attack on the Japanese beachheads from the Gulf of Papua on the southern side of the New Guinea mainland. Although the actual flying distance was not great, this route would require the carrier attack groups to cross the towering central mountain feature of New Guinea - the rugged Owen Stanley Range. The many ridges of this range were cloaked by dense rain forest and often obscured by cloud or mist. Experienced New Guinea pilots regularly flew from Port Moresby to Lae by a carefully defined route. They took care to avoid being trapped in the mountains when cloud closed in.
Naval charts offered little guidance to the American pilots who were about to cross the Owen Stanleys, and the vital guidance needed to cross the massive range was ultimately provided to Commander William B. Ault, Lexington's air group commander, on 9 March by experienced Australian civilian pilots at Port Moresby. Vice Admiral Brown fixed the raid for the following day. To cover his flank to the east and the arrival of the American troop convoy at Noumea, Brown dispatched Rear Admiral Crace with four cruisers and four destroyers to the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern tip of New Guinea.
To cover their landings at Lae and Salamaua, the Japanese had bombed the Australian military airstrips at Port Moresby, Bulolo, and Wau. They met no Allied fighter opposition. Their long-range Kawanishi H6K flying boats had patrolled the Solomon Sea and Coral Sea intensively for American carriers, and had found nothing. They believed that they had nothing to fear from Allied aircraft, and had grown complacent. Admiral Brown's ruse had succeeded beyond his wildest expectations.
In the pre-dawn darkness of 10 March, as the two carrier task forces stood off the southern coast of Papua, Yorktown and Lexington went to general quarters. Lexington began launching her air group at 0749. Yorktown began launching her own air group at 0803. Both carriers launched fifty-two aircraft. By 0849, all aircraft were on their way with Commander Ault from Lexington in overall command, and having authority to proceed or abort the strike.
Lexington's attack group comprised eighteen Dauntless SBDs of VS-2, twelve Dauntless SBDs of VB-2, thirteen Devastator TBD torpedo bombers of VT-2, and an escort of eight Grumman Wildcat F4F fighters of VF-3 led by Lieutenant Commander John "Jimmy" Thatch.
Yorktown's attack group followed, and comprised seventeen SBDs of VB-5, thirteen SBDs of VS-5, twelve TBDs of VT-5, and ten F4F fighters of VF- 42.
While the strike was under way, the task force was protected in the Gulf of Papua by a combat air patrol of twelve fighters and nine SBDs flying an anti-torpedo patrol.
Having reached the vital gap in the range that gave access to the northern coast, Commander Ault circled to oversee and coordinate the passage of both air groups.
VS-2 from Lexington initiated the strike at Lae. The SBDs pushed over at 0922 and attacked two Japanese transports and an armed merchant cruiser. Fire from a shore battery downed one SBD, but escorting F4F Wildcats of VF-3 quickly put the battery out of action. Lexington's VB-2 followed VS-2 and attacked a mine-layer and third transport. Hampered by fogged windshields and telescopic sights, all SBD bombs missed their targets. Off Salamaua, three torpedo bombers from VT-2 had one success. A torpedo hit a Japanese transport which began to sink. The remaining torpedo bombers from Lexington attacked the transports off Lae, and holed one transport and the armed merchant cruiser. The escorting Japanese cruisers and destroyers weighed anchor, made smoke to provide cover, and headed for open water.
Yorktown's air group then took its turn at 0950. The SBDs of VB-5 concentrated on the fleeing Japanese escort cruisers and destroyers. One division from VB-5 attacked Rear Admiral Kajioka's flagship Yubari and claimed three hits on the cruiser. Another division from VB-5 attacked the destroyer Asanagi and knocked out her boilers. A bomb hit the destroyer Yunagi and damaged her engines. The SBDs from VB-5 then strafed a Japanese gunboat, and set it on fire.
At 1005, the SBDs of VS-5 struck the relatively unscathed transports at Lae. The Yorktown SBDs scored direct hits on three transports, leaving all three on fire and beached.
The twelve TBDs of Yorktown's VT-5, each armed with two 500-pound bombs came upon the seaplane carrier Kiyokawa Maru and an escort destroyer just north of Lae. The TBDs had been armed with bombs instead of torpedoes for this operation, and lacking experience in high level bombing, the air crews failed to score a direct hit on either ship. However, a near miss damaged the seaplane carrier, allowed water to enter the engine room, and left her dead in the water.
The Wildcats of VF-42 strafed ships and shore installations, drew fire away from the dive bombers, and dropped fragmentation bombs.
When the last of the attack group left the Japanese beachheads, the score was three transports on fire and beached at Lae, a seaplane tender damaged and dead in the water, the light cruiser Yubari damaged sufficiently to require dockyard repairs in Japan, two destroyers damaged and stopped in the water, one transport listing heavily and another sunk off Salamaua. The final score was four transports sunk. One American SBD was lost in the raids on Lae and Salamaua. The approach from the Gulf of Papua had provided security for the task force and ensured complete surprise. Japanese Zero fighters arrived over the beachheads from New Britain too late to protect their ships and shore installations.
Of the 104 aircraft launched by Lexington and Yorktown, 103 planes were back safely on board by noon. The raid on Lae and Salamaua provided many of the pilots with their first experience of action against warships and ground targets defended by anti-aircraft fire, and although the torpedo and bombing accuracy of some squadrons left a good deal to be desired, the raid gave the fliers valuable experience for later major actions at Coral Sea and Midway.
Although Rear Admiral Fletcher urged a second strike, Vice Admiral Brown considered that the strike had been highly successful and that it was time to withdraw. Task Force 11 retired on a south-easterly course until dark, when the ships turned eastward and joined Rear Admiral Crace's squadron of four heavy cruisers and four destroyers.
The Lae-Salamaua Raid in retrospect
Admiral Nimitz did not award the Lae-Salamaua raid the same high praise that he had lavished on the Marshall-Gilbert raid. Nimitz was disappointed that the attacks on Lae and Salamaua had failed to dislodge the Japanese from their beachheads on the New Guinea mainland. President Roosevelt did not share Nimitz's reservations, describing the Lae-Salamaua raid to Winston Churchill as "the best day's work we have had."
President Roosevelt's assessment of the Lae-Salamaua raid turned out to be the correct one. The raid produced deep alarm in Tokyo, especially at Navy General Headquarters where it was becoming apparent that the carriers of the US Pacific Fleet could punch holes in Japan's eastern and southern defensive perimeter at will and with impunity.
The American carrier raids in the first three months of 1942 were causing deep concern to Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet. He was particularly concerned by Vice Admiral Halsey's raids on Wake Island and Minami-tori Island (also known as Marcus Island). Minami-tori Island was only 700 miles (1,125km) from Japan, and Yamamoto feared that the American carriers had the capability to raid Tokyo. An American air raid on Tokyo was something that Japan's military leaders had assured their emperor could never happen. To ensure this did not happen, officers of the Combined Fleet began to plan a complex operation to destroy the American Pacific Fleet at Midway in the central Pacific.
For the Navy General Staff in Tokyo, the Lae-Salamaua raid reinforced its view that Japan's main strategic priority in the Pacific should be to cut the lines of communication between Australia and the United States. That plan had been assigned the code reference Operation FS, and involved Japan capturing and fortifying the chain of islands between New Guinea and Samoa. The Lae-Salamaua raid had demonstrated the urgent need for Japan to capture Port Moresby in the Australian Territory of Papua and Tulagi in the British Solomons as quickly as possible. On 15 March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters agreed that Operation FS was to be Japan's strategic priority in the Pacific and would commence with the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi. This initial operation was asigned the code reference MO.
In retrospect, it can be seen that the Lae-Salamaua raid was of vital importance to the Allies for a number of reasons. It was a severe blow to Japan's plan to isolate Australia from the United States as quickly as possible, because the Japanese had intended to use the sunk and damaged transports as part of the invasion force to capture Port Moresby and Tulagi in April 1942. The Japanese were forced to postpone the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi for one month to replace the sunk and damaged ships, and because they realised that these operations would require support from their own aircraft carriers. In this way, the Lae-Salamaua Raid set the stage for the Battle of the Coral Sea.
The Lae-Salamaua Raid also laid the foundations for Allied victories later in 1942 at Guadalcanal and Kokoda. By delaying for one month the capture of Tulagi, the establishment of a Japanese forward airstrip on the northern coast of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands was also delayed. The delay in establishing that airstrip on Guadalcanal provided the Americans with more time to prepare a landing force to capture the airstrip that later became famous as Henderson Field. Even so, the Americans barely made it in time. When the Americans landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, the Japanese were ready to bring this forward airstrip into operation. If the Americans had not seized that strategically vital Japanese airstrip when they did, the Guadalcanal operation could not have proceeded as it did, and would almost certainly have been deferred to much later, probably 1943.
The Guadalcanal Campaign had a direct impact on the equally bloody fighting between the Japanese and Australians on the Kokoda Track. The Japanese outnumbered the Australians by five to one, and had pushed them back to a ridge overlooking Port Moresby. Here the Australians dug in to make a final stand. Major General Horii's starving and exhausted South Seas Detachment on the Kokoda Track was in sight of Port Moresby and begging for reinforcements for the final push to capture the vital Allied base. Because of heavy Japanese losses at Guadalcanal, Major General Horii was denied reinforcements and he was forced to retreat to his beachheads with the Australians in hot pursuit.... More
Memories On 2 February 1942, Chicago departed Pearl Harbor for Suva Bay where she joined the newly formed ANZOn 2 February 1942, Chicago departed Pearl Harbor for Suva Bay where she joined the newly formed ANZAC Squadron, later redesignated as Task Force 44. During March and April, the cruiser operated off the Louisiade Archipelago, covering the attacks on Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea. In a position to intercept enemy surface units which attempted to attack Port Moresby, Chicago also provided cover for the arrival of American troops on New Caledonia. ... More
Description The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought during 4–8 May 1942, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and naval and air forces from the United StaThe Battle of the Coral Sea, fought during 4–8 May 1942, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and naval and air forces from the United States and Australia. The battle was the first action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other, as well as the first in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon the other.
In an attempt to strengthen their defensive positioning for their empire in the South Pacific, Japanese forces decided to invade and occupy Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands. The plan to accomplish this, called Operation MO, involved several major units of Japan's Combined Fleet, including two fleet carriers and a light carrier to provide air cover for the invasion fleets, under the overall command of Japanese Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue. The US learned of the Japanese plan through signals intelligence and sent two United States Navy carrier task forces and a joint Australian-American cruiser force, under the overall command of American Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, to oppose the Japanese offensive.
On 3–4 May, Japanese forces successfully invaded and occupied Tulagi, although several of their supporting warships were surprised and sunk or damaged by aircraft from the US fleet carrier Yorktown. Now aware of the presence of US carriers in the area, the Japanese fleet carriers entered the Coral Sea with the intention of finding and destroying the Allied naval forces.
Beginning on 7 May, the carrier forces from the two sides exchanged airstrikes over two consecutive days. The first day, the US sank the Japanese light carrier Shoho, while the Japanese sank a US destroyer and heavily damaged a fleet oiler (which was later scuttled). The next day, the Japanese fleet carrier Shokaku was heavily damaged, the US fleet carrier Lexington was critically damaged (and was scuttled as a result), and the Yorktown was damaged. With both sides having suffered heavy losses in aircraft and carriers damaged or sunk, the two fleets disengaged and retired from the battle area. Because of the loss of carrier air cover, Inoue recalled the Port Moresby invasion fleet, intending to try again later.
Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk, the battle would prove to be a strategic victory for the Allies for several reasons. The battle marked the first time since the start of the war that a major Japanese advance had been checked by the Allies. More importantly, the Japanese fleet carriers Sokaku and Zuikaku – one damaged and the other with a depleted aircraft complement – were unable to participate in the Battle of Midway, which took place the following month, ensuring a rough parity in aircraft between the two adversaries and contributing significantly to the US victory in that battle. The severe losses in carriers at Midway prevented the Japanese from reattempting to invade Port Moresby from the ocean. Two months later, the Allies took advantage of Japan's resulting strategic vulnerability in the South Pacific and launched the Guadalcanal Campaign that, along with the New Guinea Campaign, eventually broke Japanese defenses in the South Pacific and was a significant contributing factor to Japan's ultimate defeat in World War II.... More
Memories On 1 May, Chicago was ordered from Nouméa to join Commander, Southwest Pacific, and on the 4th she On 1 May, Chicago was ordered from Nouméa to join Commander, Southwest Pacific, and on the 4th she supported Yorktown in her strike against the Japanese on Tulagi, Solomon Islands during the Battle of the Coral Sea. On 7 May, she proceeded, with the Support Group, to intercept and attack the Japanese Port Moresby invasion group. The following day, the group underwent several Japanese air attacks, during which Chicago suffered several casualties from strafing, but drove off the planes and proceeded ahead until it was clear that the Japanese force had been turned back. ... More