CincPac File No.
A16(4)/Coral Sea
Serial 01704 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF JUNE 17, 1942
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Naval Action in Coral Sea Area, 4-8 May, 1942.
Forwarded with pleasure. The reports by unit and force commanders on the Coral Sea engagement from 4-8 May not only give a good picture, albeit befogged in places, of the action itself; but they bring out strongly the splendid spirit and resolution of officers and men that contributed so markedly to the succession of smashing victories.
Preliminary Operations
The actions reported upon in the basic letter climaxed an extremely long period of operations for Task Force SEVENTEEN as originally composed under Rear Admiral Fletcher, i.e. Yorktown, Astoria (flag of Rear Admiral Smith), Portland, Chester, Morris, Anderson, Hammann, Russell, Hughes, Sims, and Walke. This force had departed from Pearl Harbor on February 14 and, except for one week's upkeep in the undeveloped harbor at Tongatabu, had remained at sea continuously prior to this battle. The air group had taken part in the very successful attacks on shipping at Lae and Salamaua on 10 March when Vice Admiral Brown of Task Force ELEVEN commanded the combined forces.
Task Force ELEVEN, commanded by Rear Admiral Fitch in Lexington, Minneapolis (flag of Rear Admiral Kinkaid), New Orleans, Phelps, Dewey, Worden, Farragut, Dale, Aylwin and Monaghan departed from Pearl Harbor 16 April, initially to join Task Force ONE near Christmas Island, but before completing this rendezvous was diverted to the Coral Sea to join Task Force SEVENTEEN. Task Force SEVENTEEN, in the meantime, had been directed to return to the Coral Sea area from Tongatabu because there were excellent indications that the Japanese intended to make a sea-borne attack on Port Moresby the first week in May. These forces arrived in the area on 1 May, so it can be seen that the timing was very close. Task Force SIXTEEN, which contained two carriers, had also been despatched to the area but, due to the Tokyo operation, could not reach there in time. Fleet oilers Neosho, Platte, and Tippecanoe serviced Task Forces SEVENTEEN and ELEVEN.
Before and between engagements these Forces in the Coral Sea cruised out of range of enemy shore-based aircraft, in readiness to seize such opportunities to attack as offered on 10 March and in the battle reported herein.
Such extended periods at sea, as have been the rule in this war, were not visualized prior to its outbreak, but training in fueling at sea was well advanced. That Task Force SEVENTEEN was able to endure this prolonged period and then give such an excellent account of itself in combat is a tribute to its personnel from the highest to the lowest, and is a remarkable record of seamanship, airmanship and operation of material. In this the personnel of the fleet tankers employed should come in for their full share of appreciation.
The operations of the task forces were in coordination with aircraft of the Southwest Pacific Area based in Australia, Port Moresby and Tulagi, and with fleet patrol planes at Noumea. (Australian forces evacuated Tulagi two days before Task Force SEVENTEEN struck the enemy there on 4 May). It is true, as Commander Task Force ELEVEN has stated in his report, that this coordination may be called strategical rather than tactical. In other words, the information as to enemy concentrations obtained by shore-based aircraft was of much value, and the almost daily attacks on shipping were undoubtedly of cumulative assistance, but the furnishing of air support in tactical situations is a problem which for various reasons has not been solved for that area. Two evident drawbacks are the inadequate numbers of planes and the remoteness of the Australian bases. Difficulties as to communications are in the process of being cleared up. There is still much to be done in providing for the readiness and training of shore-based aircraft to coordinate their operations tactically with fleet units. Such coordination is essential in order that carrier based planes may be relieved of long range scouting and be ready to attack, with full groups, any targets located by shore-based craft.
The Battle - Phase One
As noted in the basic letter, the operations in the Coral Sea area were divided into three phases. On 4 May the Yorktown Air Group made three attacks on enemy vessels at Tulagi Harbor. In this attack a total of 22 torpedoes and 76 1000-lb. bombs were released, resulting in 5 and 11 hits, respectively. Considering that there was practically no air opposition and very little anti-aircraft fire, the ammunition expenditure required to disable the number of enemy ships involved is disappointing. This is particularly true in the instance where 11 torpedoes were fired against a maneuvering aircraft tender without any hits. Although fogging of sights and windshields affected accuracy of the first attack, this condition did not apply in subsequent ones begun from lower altitudes.
The Tulagi performance emphasizes how much proficiency drops off in wartime and the necessity for target practices at every opportunity in order to keep pilots completely trained in all phases of aerial warfare. Despite their lack of training, the Yorktown Air Group demonstrated very creditable willingness and effort to keep after their enemy objective until it was destroyed. It is gratifying that heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy with very small loss to our forces.
Phase Two
In the second phase on May 7, the combined Lexington and Yorktown Groups attacked enemy forces whose composition is not entirely clear. The Yorktown reports the enemy as consisting of 1 carrier, 1 very large heavy cruiser, 3 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruiser, whereas the Lexington Group reports the enemy as 1 carrier. Reports also conflict as to damage caused, probably because without realizing it both air groups attacked the same carrier simultaneously. This seems a logical explanation of why the Lexington, which attacked first, reports 7 bomb and 9 torpedo hits, while the Yorktown Group, which followed in the attack, reports the carrier with only one small fire aft standing into the wind to launch planes after the Lexington Group had completed its attack. The Yorktown Group then reports 14 bomb and 10 torpedo hits on the same carrier. The Yorktown Group also reports sinking the light cruiser in company with the enemy carrier.
It seems from these two reports, which correspond quite closely in times as 1145, that the attack was made simultaneously by both air groups and that probably in the excitement neither one appreciated that the other was involved in the same attack. One thing is certain, however: the carrier was sunk, and there is substantiating evidence that the light cruiser was also destroyed. No mention is made of the other enemy ships which the Yorktown Group reported. As at Tulagi, the enemy losses were enormous in comparison with our own.
Phase Three
The final action occurred on 8 May and involved not only a simultaneous attack by enemy planes on our own carriers but also an attack by our planes on enemy carriers at about the same time. It is significant that there is no mention of attack groups engaging each other in the air enroute. The enemy group reported by the Yorktown scouts consisted of 2 carriers, 4 cruisers and 3 destroyers. The reports of the attacks by the two air groups do not clearly prove that both carriers were attacked and damaged. It is possible that only one enemy carrier was hit on 8 May and that the air groups from the Lexington and Yorktown attacked the same carrier. The second carrier may have taken advantage of cloud concealment and thereby escaped. If the number of hits made is approximately as claimed (8 torpedoes and 8 heavy case 1000 pound bombs fused with Mark 21 and Mark 23 one-hundredth second fuse), both bomb and warhead must be improved.
In the attack on our carriers the hostile planes were picked up by radar at a distance of about 70 miles. In spite of this warning and of the fighter protection over the carrier, only one group of our fighters was "vectored" to a successful interception before the enemy planes reached their attack point. Considering the tremendous odds against them, the performance of the SBD's in the anti-torpedo plane patrol was highly creditable.
It is of interest that either due to intensive anti-aircraft fire, or to a change in procedure, the Japanese torpedo plane approach on our carriers differed greatly from the approach used in the attack on the Prince of Wales and Repulse. The approach against the British ships was made in squadron formation. In the Coral Sea action, however, squadrons broke up into small groups which attacked from various directions. Some came in at a constant low level and dropped torpedoes 150 to 200 feet from the water at a relatively high speed; others approached in a high speed glide and dropped from heights of as much as 500 feet.
General Comments
On the evening of 7 May enemy planes attempted to land on our carriers, indicating that enemy carriers may have been in close proximity to our own. The Task Force Commander in his remarks on this matter shows that he gave full consideration to the desirability of making a surface force night search and attack on these enemy forces. It is probable, in view of the Neosho - Sims sinking to the southwest of our carriers, that another carrier was in that area. The unknown position, however, made it difficult for the Task Force Commander to institute a search with any reasonable chance of success. It is considered that his decision not to attempt such an attack was sound and that he was correct in not dispersing his forces at that particular time when he did not know the composition of the enemy force.
The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concurs in the opinion expressed by the Executive Officer and Commanding Officer, USS Lexington, regarding the cause for the sudden and terrific destruction of that ship. The presence of such large quantities of high octane gasoline on board a carrier is a menace which must be accepted but it is imperative that means be provided to prevent a repetition of the Lexington condition. That so few members of the crew of that ship were lost is a credit to the organization of the ship, the spirit of the crew, and the courageous assistance of accompanying ships. The seamanlike performance of the destroyers of Task Unit 17.5.4 and the cruisers of 17.2.1 is in keeping with the highest traditions of the Service.
The outstanding material defect of the three day action is the fogging of bomb sights in dives from altitudes of 17,000 feet or more. Efforts now underway to solve this problem should be urgently pressed. It is gratifying that otherwise there were few material failures. Bomb release mechanisms operated well and there was practically no jamming of machine guns in the fighters. The 5" antiaircraft batteries performed excellently. Casualties to antiaircraft automatic weapons were fewer than in the past. Most of those that did occur were loading-stoppages which can be reduced only by frequent firing practices. Task Force Commanders are stressing such practices in their daily training underway.
Experience strongly supports the recommendations of Commander Task Group 17.5 that the number of fighters on carriers be immediately increased to 27 and that the present torpedo planes be replaced by the ones of greater speed and longer range. Both of these recommendations are now being accomplished.
Both the report and the recommendations of the Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, are superior. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, considers these recommendations to be basically sound and concurs wholeheartedly in them.
It is recommended in several reports that the "V" disposition be a tighter one, cruisers and destroyers taking station on a 1500 to 2500 yard circle around the carrier. The outboard guns thus protect against low approaching torpedo planes, while at the same time the inboard guns lay an anti-aircraft umbrella over the carrier and the disposition as a whole. This seems an excellent plan. The tighter screen has been recommended by despatch to Task Force Commanders. It will be noted that this antiaircraft disposition is at complete variance with observed Japanese tactics. Their cruisers and destroyers screening a carrier dispersed widely, with no coordinated antiaircraft fire for themselves or the carrier.
The improvement in anti-aircraft gunnery in ships of these task forces is gratifying. Important gunnery lessons of the engagement have been issued in a special bulletin to the Fleet.
Summary of Battle Lessons.
The more important lessons from the engagement and comments concerning them are summarized in this paragraph for ready reference:
Proficiency of both aviation and gunnery personnel drops off badly in war because of training difficulty. Not only must Task Force Commanders increase training but shore training must be broadly expanded.
Fogging of sights and windshields seriously affect accuracy of dive bombing. Early correction of this defect is urgent.
Insufficient fighters prevent suitable protection of either our attacking squadrons or ships of the Task Force. Carrier allowance is being increased from 18 to 27 VF.
Obsolescent torpedo planes reduce effectiveness of our VT squadrons. These are being replaced by a later type.
Torpedo plane attacks are most effective when closely coordinated with dive bombing attacks. Much of the success in the Coral Sea lay in this coordination.
Automatic weapons urgently require the directors and lead computing sights under manufacture, in order to be able to shoot down planes before they release their missiles.
All carriers must have 2 long range radars equal in effectiveness to the CXAM.
Operations of land based aircraft and fleet units must be better coordinated by intensive combined training.
Aircraft bombs and torpedoes must be made more effective. Too many hits are required to destroy an enemy carrier. Larger aircraft torpedo warheads should be given priority in shipment to this area. A more suitable bomb than the present 1000 pound type is necessary for our dive bombers.
The brunt of our offensive effort is now being carried by our aviation personnel in a courageous and devoted manner. Full provision must be made for replacement units in order that plane crews may not be pushed beyond reasonable endurance.
Means must be provided for reducing the menace to carriers of the large quantities of gasoline carried.
Screening ships provide best protection for carriers against torpedo planes when stationed on a 1500 to 2500 yard circle. Such a disposition is now being used in this fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, considers that Rear Admiral Fletcher utilized with consummate skill the information supplied him and, by these engagements in the Coral Sea between 4 and 8 May, won a victory with decisive and far reaching consequences for the Allied cause. Recommendations as to awards will be made in separate correspondence.
C.W. NIMITZ
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