PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1944
Testimony in Pearl Harbor inquiry
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff for Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Area.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?
A. During January, I was Operations Officer on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force, and from 1st of February to the end of the year, I was War Plans Officer for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
3. Q. As War Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did you attend the Staff conferences?
A. Yes, almost without exception.
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4. Q. Were your relations with the Commander-in-Chief close?
A. Very close. I had his complete confidence and I believe that I knew his views extremely well, advised and consulted with him with the greatest freedom, and was nearly always present at any important conferences with his Flag Officers or with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
5. Q. Did the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, welcome the expression of your views and opinions with respect to matters as they came up?
A. I definitely felt so, and certainly had no hesitancy in expressing my views to him, whether or not he was in accord with those views.
6. Q. Admiral, about when did you receive the basic war plan, Rainbow 5?
A. It may have been immediately on joining Admiral Kimmel's Staff. If it were not, it was immediately thereafter. No, that was Rainbow 3; Rainbow 5 was not received until about June.
7. Q. Do you recall the nature of the tasks assigned the Pacific Fleet in that Plan; that is, particularly whether they were offensive or defensive in nature?
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A. The Pacific Fleet was charged with maintaining the security of the territory of ourselves and Allies in the Western Hemisphere, safe guarding our communications, etc. The primary offensive mission was to divert Japanese forces from the Malay Barrier by the activities of our Fleet forces in the Japanese Mandate islands through denial and capture of Marshall positions and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.
8. Q. Did you feel at that time that you had adequate forces available to you, or rather to the Commander-in-Chief, for the fulfilling of these tasks? By "that time", I refer to the time leading up to Pearl Harbor when the planning was at its height.
A. Realizing that enemy raiding forces, or even strong Fleet forces could strike over very wide areas, and that the offensive tasks assigned to the Fleet were few, I felt that we could carry out the missions charged, although there were many marked deficiencies, particularly in anti-submarine craft. I felt, of course, the definite lack of suitable craft for amphibious operations toward the Marshalls and was very much concerned over lack of suitable craft for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier to furnish adequate anti-submarine protection. I appreciated the scarcity of carriers and of aircraft and knew of various elements of weakness. But I also knew of the power in our Fleet and expected it to be effective.
9. Q Were you sufficiently familiar with the views of the Commander-in-Chief at that time to state how he felt in this respect?
A. Yes. I believe that he felt that far larger forces could be employed and that certain weaknesses with regard to aircraft and light forces were very marked. He was concerned also because the plan called for the probable detachment of a portion of the Fleet for transfer to the Atlantic; and for the movement of a division of cruisers to the southeast Pacific. I believe, however, that he considered we did have strong naval forces that could be effectively employed, notwithstanding some handicaps.
10. Q. At the time, how did you feel with respect to logistics support of the Fleet in carrying out its war task; the sufficiency of the logistics?
A. I felt that our tasks would be made more difficult because of the current logistics situation and that we might, from time to time, have to [235] determine the operations that would be possible with the logistics support at hand. I was not happy over the logistic situation, but certainly not discouraged over it.
11. Q. Will you please state, if you can, the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the several months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, with respect to the carrying out of the war plans in the event of war?
A. To clarify this, and any possible future remarks, it should be mentioned that the plan, Rainbow 5 I believe it was, made provisions both for our entering the war with Japan a neutral or with Japan in the war. My remarks will deal only with the aspects of Japan in the war. His intention was to, at once, sweep for any Japanese merchant ships that might be at sea, unless intelligence had shown that such an operation would probably be fruitless. It was the intention to make an immediate reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. While it was not expected that the main part of the Japanese Fleet would be encountered in such an operation, it was intended to have
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the entire available strength in easy supporting distance of the reconnoitering forces. Operations to establish ourselves in the Marshalls were to be carried out as expeditiously as possible. Patrol plane searches in approaches to Hawaii were to be inaugurated.
12. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at that time, feel that the units of his Fleet were ready to carry out such tasks?
A. He undoubtedly recognized many weaknesses and strenuous efforts were being made to improve the efficiency of both materiel and personnel. Perhaps no Commander is ever completely satisfied of his complete readiness to fight, but certainly he felt that a fairly high standard of efficiency was being developed. There were large numbers of green officers and men, and the complements of most, if not all, ships were lower than was to be desired. The anti-aircraft batteries were, in general, far weaker than we desired, and they were being improved as rapidly as material could be made available and the yards could take ships. There was much concern over lack of radars and the requisite skill in their use. There was also weaknesses in certain carrier aircraft and some difficulties were experienced with patrol planes; engines, I believe. The lack of skilled crews in the patrol planes and the lack of replacement crews was very keenly felt. Transports and amphibious craft were lacking; and there were disturbing deficiencies in auxiliary craft and in some materials. Notwithstanding matters of this sort, however, it was felt that the handicaps were not too great to cope with such situations, as were envisaged as arising if war commenced.
13. Q. Did you, at that time, sir, concur in the views of the Commander-in-Chief as you have expressed them?
A. Yes, and it may be that in answering the preceding questions that I have erred somewhat toward giving my own views rather than those of Admiral Kimmel, although they were probably substantially in accord. He was inclined to be somewhat more pessimistic in that regard than myself.
14. Q. Did you, at the time, feel that everything was being done, either locally or by making recommendations to higher authority, to correct the deficiencies and weaknesses that you referred to?
A. We certainly felt that there was much to be done and all hands were working very hard to overcome deficiencies. I believe that, in general, suitable representations had been made to higher authority and that the [236] Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates were taking all corrective measures that they felt within their own power to accomplish. It is doubtful if any were entirely satisfied with the rapidity of progress.
15. Q. Admiral, going back to the basic Rainbow 5 war plan, what was your opinion at the time as to how that plan contemplated that war with Japan would start?
A. The plan itself may not, probably did not, directly give such an indication, but it certainly must have contemplated that such a war would probably not have been preceded by a formal declaration but rather that it would arise from such hostile attack on the part of the Japanese.
16. Q. In estimating the situation with respect to the Pacific Fleet, was a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor considered as a course of action available to the Japanese to initiate such a war?
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A. Probably not. At least, I, as War Plans Officer, did not hold such a view with respect to the Hawaiian Area, although I did consider such an act possible in the Philippines or even against Midway or Wake. It may have been that such a possibility was discussed with the Commander-in-Chief or with other members of the Staff. Probably some such discussions may have taken place, although I have no specific recollection of such a one.
17. Q. Do you recall that during this planning period any consideration was given to the efficiency of the Japanese naval air forces?
A. Yes. While specific data was lacking, I, and I believe others within the Staff, felt that there was a rather high degree of proficiency in Japanese naval air organization.
18. Q. Do you recall any discussion as to the ability of the Japanese naval air forces to conduct such an attack as they did on the 7th of December?
A. I think perhaps some such discussions, informal discussions, took place. I do remember giving consideration to dangers of torpedo attack to ships in Pearl Harbor, particularly after the British night attack on the anchored Italian ships in the heel of Italy; but even though some thought and consideration was given to the possibility of a raid such as occurred on 7 December, I, personally, never considered it as more than a remote possibility.
19. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, held at that time in this respect?
A. I feel that if he had entertained the idea a that there was serious danger of that nature, I would have heard of it in every emphatic terms. I am certain that he was not anticipating any such attack.
20. Q. Admiral, in your thinking and planning at that time, that is the six months leading up to the attack, do you recall what consideration was given to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders particularly Admiral Yamamoto?
A. The leadership in the Japanese Navy was discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, myself, his Chief of Staff, his Operations Officer, his Intelligence Officer, and perhaps others. As I recall now, the general impression that obtained was that in case of war we would have to contend with rather capable and aggressive leadership on the part of the enemy.
21. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar with the character of Admiral Yamamoto?
A. Not especially so, but I did consider him capable and bold.
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22. Q. Do you recall discussing him with Commander Rochefort, while you were serving together on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force?
A. While I have no specific recollection of such discussion, I feel that it is almost certain that a number of such discussions did take place; not only when Rochefort and I were serving together in the Scouting Force, but also after I came to Admiral Kimmel's Staff and Rochefort was serving with the Intelligence unit in the Fourteenth Naval District.
23. Q. Admiral, during this planning period leading up to the attack, do you recall occasions on which the Commander-in-Chief communicated with naval aviators with respect to the ability of Japanese naval air forces and the possibility of such attack as occurred on 7 December?
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A. No, although it is quite possible that I was present at some such discussion with Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger or perhaps other aviation personnel, including Captain Davis, the Staff Aviation Officer; but I have no recollection of any discussion with any of them with the particular idea in view that we should have to contend with such an attack.
24. Q. Did you have knowledge of any aviator whatever who really foresaw the raid of 7 December and so expressed himself before that time?
A. No, sir.
25. Q. Admiral, in the preparation of the Commander-in-Chief's Contributory Rainbow 5 War Plan, was it contemplated, at the time, that it might be placed in effect either in its entirety or in part by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to the start of actual war?
A. I believe it was not contemplated that the plan be placed into effect, either in whole or in part, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, without reference to higher authority, because of the rapidity of communications; but, on the other hand, I do not believe that that plan circumscribed the Commander-in-Chief's in any way toward taking any suitable action to meet whatever circumstances that might arise.
26. Q. At that time, then, what methods did you contemplate using for alerting ships, should the international situation so require and before actual start of war?
A. By preparatory or warning message.
27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your previous testimony, it was your estimate, as well as the estimate of practically all of Admiral Kimmel's Staff, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility. Will you state the basis for that conclusion?
A. For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict.
28 Q. Do you recall that your thinking along those lines gave due value [238] to the power of initiative if employed by the enemy in a surprise attack?
A. I don't think so now; I did think so then. We did anticipate that heavy submarine concentrations would be encountered in this area and had considered it quite possible, if not probable, that a mass submarine attack about the time that considerable forces were sortieing or entering Pearl Harbor might be the commencement of the war.
29. Q. Admiral, under the Joint Action, Army and Navy, what service was primarily responsible for the defense of Oahu?
A. The Army.
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30. Q. Were you, in the months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, familiar with the Army's ability to fulfill its commitments prescribed by that document?
A. In a general way, yes. I had made a tour of the Island of Oahu with the Commanding General and some members of his Staff to see the defenses, and, as a part of that tour, attended a short presentation at Fort Shafter with particular reference to AA defenses. With my limited knowledge of the Army requirements and methods of defense, I, personally, felt they were good and adequate, although I knew, and the Army authorities too felt that certain improvements should be made, particularly as to AA.
31. Q. Were you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's opinions with respect to the ability of the Army to defend the Island?
A. I believe that he felt that there was some deficiencies, particularly if the Fleet were absent from the area, and I include in the Fleet, the shore-based aircraft. He had been concerned over the AA defenses and talked with the Commanding General and with the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject.
32. Q. Who acted for the Navy in coordinating efforts toward the defense of Pearl Harbor?
A. In general, the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
33. Q. Would you explain, please, just how the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that he belonged in the picture of the coordination of the efforts of the Army and Navy in the defense for Oahu, while he was present here at Pearl Harbor?
A. In general, he looked to the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier to accomplish that, but recognized the necessity for utilizing whatever Fleet units might be present to assist in the defense. He viséd the arrangements because the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was a part of his command and because of his immediate concern for whatever Fleet units might be present, aside from his general concern of maintaining the safety of his primary base. He was particularly active in developing coordination of air operations and communications between the same.
34. Q. Were your plans, during the weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor based on the premise that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, would remain in Pearl Harbor after start of a war with Japan?
A. The Commander-in-Chief, himself, had always been very reluctant to accept the idea that he must remain ashore. He had an operational staff that accompanied him when he went to sea. He was slowly accepting the fact that if war came, he would, of necessity, have to be continuously shore-based. That was a matter that I discussed with him a number of times; for I never believed that he would, during war, exercise tactical command at sea but felt that he would be habitually shore-based. The plans, however, were not premised on having the Commander-in-Chief tied to any shore base.
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35. Q. Did this belief on the part of the Commander-in-Chief cause him to feel any additional personal responsibility for the defense of Oahu, and particularly Pearl Harbor?
A. That would be difficult to say, although I doubt if he ever felt that he was divested from the overall responsibility for safeguarding the Fleet. He did, however, look to the duly constituted authorities
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to protect Hawaii, namely, Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
36. Q. Did you, at that time, contemplate that the Fleet would take any part in the defense of Oahu, other than the use of the anti-aircraft batteries of the vessels of the Fleet in their own defense and the use of shore-based aircraft located at Pearl Harbor?
A. We certainly contemplated that any Fleet units that could be brought into contact with enemy forces actually attacking or threatening the Hawaiian islands would be employed as effectively as possible. That would be true whether the units (when the enemy was first discovered) were in port or in the coastal waters or further afield. Moreover, it was realized that some of the shore-based Fleet aircraft would have to be made available to the Coastal Frontier Commander even though employment for them would be desirable further afield. Such plans or thoughts were necessitated because such aircraft were not available within the Coastal Frontier for its Commander's use. It was also realized that some Fleet destroyers would have to be sacrificed by the Fleet for local anti-submarine protection, even though the Fleet was far short of the numbers desired. In short, if the Fleet left Pearl Harbor it would have to be weakened by leaving behind some aircraft and destroyers. If it were in Pearl Harbor, it would be used to get at the enemy.
37. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this letter 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination?
A. Yes, I remember this letter. Although it was prepared by the Operations Section of the Staff, I had opportunity to review it and recall having initiated some minor changes in the earlier drafts; although, at this time, I have no particular recollection of what those changes were.
38. Q. Were there, so far as you can recollect, any other directives of a general nature affecting the security or providing for the security of vessels in Pearl Harbor in effect in the months preceding the attack?
A. I do not now recall whether or not there were. In general, such directives, if there were any, were prepared by the Operations Section and I would have seen them and had opportunity to comment before their issuance.
39. Q. Do you recall whether, at the time, that is, in the months preceding the attack, you considered this letter, Exhibit 4, to adequately provide for the security of the Fleet units at Pearl Harbor, had the instructions therein been fully complied with?
A. I recall that we were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore and the like, and that some discussions and conferences to better perfect arrangements were in progress under the general guidance of Captain DeLany, the Operations Officer. On the whole, however, I must have thought that the security arrangements set forth in this letter were satisfactory, else I would have initiated action to effect a change.
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40. Q. Admiral, do you recall the Joint Coastal Defense Plan which was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. I remember that there was such a plan, although whether that was the exact title or the principal provisions of the plan, I do not remember.
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41. Q. Do you recollect whether Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, approved the plan to which I have just referred?
A. Probably, although I can not now say "yes" or "no".
42. Q. Were you familiar at the time with an annex to that plan known as the "Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan, No A-1-41", of which I show you a copy, which was signed by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin?
A. I do not now have specific recollection of this particular plan but it is almost certain that I did see it, and acquiesced in its provisions.
43. Q. Were you, at the time, familiar with the annex-I think it is No. 1-of that plan which is an estimate of the situation, prepared by, or under the direction of, Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, which is Exhibit 24 before this examination?
A. After examining this paper, I have no particular recollection of it, although it is not only possible but highly probable that I did see it and probably before it was signed or approved. Admiral Kimmel frequently conferred with Admirals Bloch and Bellinger and Army authorities and pressed for development of plans for coordinated action and for drills by joint forces to test them and to develop skill in their use.
44. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not this operating plan, including the proposed use of aircraft, was approved by Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Although I do not have any specific recollection, I would expect that the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, was familiar with its general terms and indicated his acquiescence even though there may have been no formal approval.
45. Q. Admiral, under the plans in effect just prior to the December 7 attack, what was your understanding at the time as to the responsibility for obtaining early information of the approach of any possible enemy engaged in conducting a surprise attack on the Fleet and installations at Pearl Harbor?
A. It was, in general, a naval responsibility. Forces available for such detection, in general, were the Fleet patrol planes of PatWingTwo, but the extent of any search that they might carry on was determined by the number available for that purpose and that determination was in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. As a practical matter, it was impossible, with forces and material at hand, to maintain an effective patrol for any but a brief period.
46. Q. Did you, at the time, contemplate any other means of obtaining such information prior to declaration of war?
A. No, it was not contemplated that any surface vessels would normally be used for that purpose. Lack of coastal frontier craft that might be used for pickets was recognized, but it was felt that destroyers or cruisers could be more profitably employed in offensive operation. Advantage would, of course, be taken of any intelligence information, but it certainly was not contemplated habitually using Fleet forces for picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii.
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47. Q. Admiral, do you feel that the provisions made for obtaining such early information of the approach of a possible enemy were the best that could reasonably be made consistent with training and other demands on the units of the Fleet?
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A. Answering now from hindsight, the answer is, "No." At the time, the answer is, "Yes." The number of patrol planes was very limited. Some difficulties were being experienced with engines. An extensive patrol planes training program was in progress. Many of the pilots and crews were green and there were very heavy demands for furnishing nucleus personnel for new patrol craft being built. The extent to which searches could be carried on was a matter of serious consideration by the Commander-in-Chief, his Aviation Officer, and his Operations Officer, and I was frequently brought into the discussion. With the number of search planes available and the number of crews available, it was felt that only limited sectors could be searched. At one time some sectors were searched one day, other sectors another, in order not to hold to a set pattern in case enemy agents were aware or might become aware of the details. To carry on any reasonable effective search would have necessitated complete disruption of the highly necessary training program, and it was strongly felt that many engine hours would be put in at a time when the need was not extremely urgent, and that as a result when the planes were most needed many of them would be due for engine overhaul. At the time, the most serious menace was expected to be submarine activities in the Fleet operating areas, and, as a consequence, the searches were very largely limited to the Fleet operating areas and the approaches thereto, rather than to distant searches. Subsequent events have shown that the decision in that regard may have been unwise. It is my personal belief that had training been discontinued and the searches been conducted to the maximum degree possible of continuous maintenance in what was regarded as the more probable sectors of approach, that the sector from which the attack on Pearl Harbor was actually made might easily have been one not covered. In any event, knowledge of the tenseness of the situation, the availability of forces, the intelligence at hand, and the factors which I have mentioned were given careful consideration in the days immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was felt we were using good judgment in making our dispositions and searches.
48. Q. Admiral, are you able to state whether or not Admiral Kimmel's views at that time coincided with those which you have just expressed as your own?
A. I believe that he had about the same considerations in mind.
49. Q. Did you continue to hold those opinions which you have just expressed throughout the period October-November-December despite dispatches from the Department which were more or less warnings of impending dangers?
A. Substantially, yes. There had been a greater or lesser degree of tenseness from the time I joined the Staff on 1 February, and several times training was curtailed in order to increase the searches. In the latter part of November, a warning was received that indicated the Situation was particularly tense and the considerations mentioned were considered anew about that time.
50. Q. Admiral, during the period from the middle of October until the time of the attack, what were your views at the time with respect to the accuracy and sufficiency of intelligence available to you for use in connection with your planning?
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A. We felt that we would like to know lots more than we did. I would say that on the whole that we felt that it was somewhat insufficient, but did not see the probability of achieving improvement.
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51. Q. As War Plans Officer, did you conduct a continuing study of the plans then in effect in the light of such intelligence, particularly with respect to the international situation, as you received it?
A. Yes, and I had been making a habit of giving the Commander-in-Chief, sometimes daily, sometimes every other day a brief memorandum as to the specific action that I thought should be taken if war eventuated in the succeeding twenty-four or forty-eight hours.
52. Q. Were any major changes effected in the Contributory War Plans, based on the intelligence you had as to the international situation during that period?
A. No.
53. Q. Did you feel that the basic plan of the Department, Rainbow 5, continued to meet the international situation as it developed from the middle of October on?
A. Rainbow 5, in brief, called for the major effort of our forces to be in the Atlantic. I was not in a position to determine the merits or demerits of that; but accepting that, then the mission given to the Pacific Fleet was not one upon which I felt that I could improve.
54. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in this respect?
A. My impression is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that it might be highly advantageous to American interests to make an early all-out effort in the Pacific.
55. Q. Were you in touch with any informal communications between Admiral Kimmel and higher authority, either written or oral, which bear upon the subject of this examination, of such importance that you think a record of what you remember should be made?
A. Yes. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, exchanged a number of personal letters that bore on the general situation. This was a practice that existed throughout my period of service in the Staff. As these letters frequently dealt with matters of the utmost importance, I, once or twice, suggested to Admiral Kimmel that communications of that nature between the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the Chief of Operations were necessarily official letters rather than personal ones, as they dealt with official matters of the utmost importance. Although they were written in a personal vein, they did deal with official matters and could be and should be treated as official, and suggested that it might be well to have them in the usual official form; that their secrecy could be safeguarded just as well and that they would become matters of permanent record. Those letters frequently referred to the tenseness of the situation. It was important that the Commander-in-Chief receive such information as was contained in those from the Chief of Naval Operations. I believe that I read every one of the letters in question, both incoming and outgoing. Some of the letters dealt with difficulties in obtaining personnel or materiel and the reasons therefor. Some of them gave highly secret information with regard to discussions on international matters taking place in Washington or elsewhere among important officials. As to the specific
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parts that bear directly on this discussion, I would say that many of the letters indicated a continuous degree of tension between the American and Japanese Governments, with the situation being more critical at some times than at others. They definitely gave the impression that a Japanese war with Great Britain was highly probable and that we might or might not be drawn into it from the beginning. In the latter part of the year, there were more frequent indications that we would be in at the very start.
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56. Q. Admiral, I show you a paraphrase copy of a dispatch which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Are you able to identify that dispatch?
A. Yes, I remember this dispatch.
57. Q. With respect to the wording used, it directs the taking of certain precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative action. Will you please state the meaning that you gained from these expressions at the time that you first saw this dispatch.
A. I felt that war was likely to eventuate on short notice and that if we came into it, it seemed quite possible that the initiation would probably be the result of hostile action committed by the Japanese. I considered we should maintain adequate security measures and be prepared to commence our offensive operations as promptly as possible.
58. Q. Were your plans restudied at that time in the light of information contained in this dispatch?
A. Presumably they were. I suspect that the consideration was primarily given toward making the plans effective with least delay.
59. Q. Do you recall the decisions made as the result of this study?
A. It was about this time, possibly somewhat earlier, possibly somewhat later, that Flag Officers were advised of the necessity of being ready to move to distant service on very short notice. They were enjoined to keep certain limits on their fuel supply, below which ships should not be permitted to go. They were cautioned to examine anew their provisions for finally stripping ship, if it were not already completed. Use of aircraft and submarines for protection of Midway was increased and submarines were dispatched to cover Wake. I believe the Commander, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, was enjoined to push the construction work at Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra as rapidly as possible. Consideration was given to putting aircraft on Wake, but the construction work there at that time would not permit that Island to receive them. I do not now recall whether or not any additional Marines were sent to those places, or not, but certainly the matter was given consideration.
60. Q. Admiral, were you present at any conferences at which this dispatch, Exhibit 6, was discussed with the Army High Command on Oahu?
A. At this late date, it would not be possible to say, with reference to this particular dispatch, but during the Fall of 1941, I was present at a number of conferences in Admiral Kimmel's office when General Short and possibly other Army officers were present. It is quite probable that one of those conferences was a result of this dispatch.
61. Q Admiral, do you recall any major matters that were causing Admiral Kimmel concern at this time, other than matters you have discussed; causing him grave concern at the time?
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A. He was very much concerned as to the safety of Midway and Wake, particularly the latter. He was continually concerned, to a very great degree, at the lack of anti-submarine craft available in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The situation, which, despite numerous and vigorous protests, did not improve.
62. Q. In your planning, was the discussion of war tasks or such security matters as the lack of patrol craft for Oahu given the major consideration during these months leading up to the attack?
A. Our major consideration as to employment of the Fleet was to use it effectively to reduce the pressure which we anticipated the Japanese would [244] be exerting in the China Sea by so operating our forces as to cause them to divert important portions of their own force to oppose us. The lack of anti-submarine craft, whatever deficiencies might have existed in the local defenses or even in the outlying bases under construction, did not deter the Commander-in-Chief from giving his principal consideration toward utilizing the Fleet offensively as quickly and as much as possible.
63. Q. It appears that over five weeks elapsed between this dispatch of 16 October and the next similar dispatch from the Navy Department, to which we will come in a moment. During that five weeks, was anything received from the Department which rescinded the directive in this dispatch of 16 October to take preparatory deployments and so forth?
A. No.
64. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, Exhibit 7 before this examination. Were you familiar with that dispatch at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Yes, I remember this dispatch without having specific recollection as to the date of it.
65. Q. Do you recall the meaning that you attached at the time, or the significance you attached at the time, to the statement that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction might be a possibility?
A. My reaction was, I think, that it contained no new information.
66. Q. Did this dispatch cause you to make any changes in your current plans at the time?
A. I think not.
67. Q. During the period between these two dispatches mentioned in the evidence, did there become known to you any change in the distribution of Japanese naval forces which, to you, seemed significant?
A. Until sometime in the early Fall, I, personally, had felt that a Japanese war was certain; but felt that her probable enemy would be Russia and did not believe that she would take on more than one major Power. But the situation gradually changed; and sometime in the late Fall, possibly in late November, our intelligence activities reported not only a large number of transports in Indo-China Sea, but indicated that very large numbers of combatant ships were moving to the southward. I believe that my recollection in the respect is correct.
68. Q. But you do not remember, other than what you have just stated, any specific change in distribution of major units which came to your attention in late November?
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A. I feel quite sure that I recall the movement of important units, approximating fleet size, as being reported moving to the southward and, if recollection serves, battleships were sighted toward the Indo-China area, or were reported as sighted. Our information as to location of all Jap naval forces was incomplete, but we thought we knew the general location of his principal strength.
69. Q. Do you remember if, at the time, you connected up in your OWN mind that intelligence with this particular dispatch of 24 November?
A. I may or may not have connected the two, but probably did. And I do recall that it was about that time that I became convinced that the Japanese war would be directed toward the Malaysia area; and speculated as to whether [245] the Japanese would dare risk moving into that area without attacking the Philippines, and reaching the conclusion that it was improbable.
70. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 27, 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Do you recall having seen that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Yes, I remember this.
71. Q. Will you please state, as near as you can remember, the meaning which, at the time, you gave to the clause or phrase in there calling for the execution of appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out certain tasks?
A. The question that you have just asked was one that within the Commander-in-Chief's Staff was frequently propounded for some days, and the general conclusion was that we were practically already so deployed and that what we should really do was to stay outside of the Marshalls area rather than to move immediately into that area. In short, we construed it to mean that war was imminent but not certain and that we were to avoid taking a deployment to commence offensive operations until there were further developments.
72. Q. You mean that you were not to undertake offensive operations after a declaration of war or start of war?
A. To amplify: Our plan called for reconnaissance, including attacks in force, on Marshall positions. We felt that we should not move within easy striking distance where we might be sighted and possibly disturb any remote chance that still remained of averting war. As a consequence, our forces were held in close proximity to Hawaii where they could be kept fully fueled and ready to move toward the Marshalls. Two groups, each of which included a carrier that had been carrying aircraft reenforcements to Wake and to Midway, were exceptions. They were to return to Pearl Harbor as soon as possible after completing their assigned task.
73. Q. Do you recall whether or not Task Force One entered Pearl Harbor subsequent to the receipt of this dispatch?
A. Yes, it did.
74. Q. Did you consider that the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor was consistent with the understanding of defensive deployment which you have outlined?
A. We determined that we should continue training operations in the vicinity of Oahu and considered that forces either within Pearl Harbor or in the general vicinity were in consonance with this directive.
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76. Q. When you state "we," are you including the views of Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Yes, I think so.
76. Q. Was any other action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, based on the dispatch, Exhibit 8?
A. The matter was discussed at considerable length, both on receipt of this dispatch and on subsequent days, and it was determined that existing plans, operations, and arrangements were in accordance with existing instructions, including this dispatch. Prudent security arrangements and readiness to commence offensive action on very short notice were considered to be in effect.
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77. Q. Do you recollect whether the defense forces of the outlying islands were further augmented at the time of the receipt of this dispatch?
A. Whether from this dispatch or from those that had shortly preceded it, additional aircraft were sent to Midway and Wake, arriving at those places in early December.
78. Q. Do you recollect any additional security measures prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief at that time?
A. Except for further warnings, I believe that no additional measures were taken, other than to direct depth bombing submarine contacts suspected of being hostile and to repel hostile planes that might be encountered. As I now recall, the directive with regard to attacking planes was given to both Admiral Newton and Admiral Halsey, who were in command of the forces carrying reenforcement planes to Midway and Wake. I do not recall whether those instructions were written or by dispatch or verbal.
79. Q. Do you recollect any discussion of this dispatch with the Army command on Oahu?
A. No, and I'm under the impression that no discussion occurred, because it was felt that about all had been done that could be done or should be done. Although a general discussion with General Short, Admiral Bloch, and others on defensive matters did occur about this time in connection with a Departmental proposal relative to forces on Wake and Midway.
80. Q. Were you familiar with the condition as to alertness of the Army in the week preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. No. If I was at the time, I'm not now.
81. Q. Admiral, do you recall receipt of any instructions about this time, that is 27 November, with respect to the relieving of the Marine at Wake and Midway and perhaps other outlying islands?
A. I recall that, at some time, not a great while before the commencement of war, there was a suggestion that it might be advisable to relieve the Marines at those places, and being present at a discussion that included, among others, Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and Admiral Bloch. It was the unanimous opinion that it would be highly inadvisable to do so, particularly at the critical time that the proposal was made, and they were not relieved. There was, at that time particularly, a discussion as to the advisability of using some of the fighter aircraft (I believe it was only fighter aircraft, as I recall now) from Army forces on Hawaii. After considerable discussion as to the methods of getting them there, the difficulties of their upkeep, the virtual impossibility of withdrawing them, etc., they were not sent. I believe
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that some tests were made in having some of them fly off carriers because it was believed they could be delivered in that fashion. It was suggested, during the discussion, that the most effective fighters should be sent to that area because there was far greater likelihood of their being usefully employed than there would be from Oahu. I mention this last fact merely as indicative of the fact that the senior officers, Army and Navy, afloat and ashore, gave no indication at that time of anticipating an air attack on Oahu. Incidentally, the War and Navy Departments were proposing considerable reduction in defenses of Oahu in order to strengthen Midway and Wake. At that time, only six Army B-17's on Oahu were operable.
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82. Q. However, did it occur to you that in view of that tenseness of situation, that the proposal as received from Washington was badly timed?
A. Yes, sir, that was why we felt it was highly inadvisable to make any change in the arrangements there whatever merits the proposal might have had otherwise. Nonetheless, it was agreed, between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, that the former would organize several defense battalions for use on outlying islands and would hold several pursuit squadrons in readiness for such employment.
83. Q. Do you recall if the proposal, which, incidentally, bears the same date as this dispatch concerning which you are testifying, if any way vitiated the effect of the statement that the dispatch was a war warning?
A. No, sir, I did not feel that that vitiated the other dispatch. I rather felt that it had in mind making available to the Commander-in-Chief Marine defense battalions for utilization in captured positions in the Marshalls that might be badly needed and might not otherwise be available.
84. Q. Admiral, would you say that there was a doubt in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief and the members of his Staff as to what the Navy Department intended by its directive of 27 November to execute defensive deployments, etc.?
A. I believe that the conclusion reached here was that primarily the Department wished to appraise use of their belief that the war was imminent, that we should continue to maintain our security arrangements, but was cautioning us not to take any disposition that might be regarded as an overt act, such as exposing forces as far as the Gilberts or the close approaches to the Marshalls. It seemed to us that they might have thought that in our enthusiasm to strike as promptly as possible we might advance forces to a position that would be regarded as threatening and thus destroy any remote chance of retaining peace. We were not so uncertain as to ask the Department for a clarification.
85. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, which is Exhibit 9. Do you recall having seen that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief?
A. Yes, I remember seeing this dispatch.
86. Q. Did the directions contained therein, with reference to being prepared to carry out certain tasks, appear to you to be inconsistent with your view as to the previous dispatch of November 27?
A. No.
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87. Q. Was this dispatch, Exhibit 9, the basis for any change in the existing plans at the time of its receipt?
A. No, I think not.
88. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch of December 3, 1941, Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you see that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Yes, I remember this.
89. Q. Will you please state what significance you attached to this dispatch at the time?
A. I felt that it was the best indication which had come to our attention that we would be involved in the war with Japan, from the very beginning.
90. Q. Can you state any significance attached to this dispatch by Admiral Kimmel?
A. No, I don't recall any specific expression of opinion from him with regard to this dispatch.
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91. Q. Admiral, I'll ask you a somewhat hypothetical question. Had you foreseen the full power of that Japanese carrier raid, which was made on 7 December, what measures, other than those taken, were open, insofar as the distribution of the battleships was concerned?
A. We would certainly not have had them in port. Had intelligence, chance contact, or search have located the enemy forces, it seems highly probable that we would have concentrated our battleships at sea and had them with attendant light forces disposed to the westward with the expectation of using them against any enemy forces that could be reached. As a security measure, they certainly would not have been in port.
92. Q. The battleships appear to have constituted the primary target for the Japanese. Actually, what would have been the most probable target in and around Pearl Harbor for the Japanese to have attacked?
A. The oil tanks. The Japanese apparently, from the nature of their attacks, determined, from the very beginning, to at least temporarily immobilize our Fleet. Everything would have been completely immobilized if they had destroyed the oil in Pearl Harbor and would have remained immobilized for a long period of time. If in addition to that, they had destroyed the shops and the dry docks, our capabilities of waging war in the Central and Western Pacific would have been nullified for a very long period of time.
93. Q. Did you, at any time during your incumbency as War Plans Officer to Admiral Kimmel, question, in your own mind, the advisability of continually basing the Pacific Fleet on Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, sir, I frequently did but always came back to the conclusion that if, in the existing international situation, the responsibility were my own, that I would have based them here. There is a considerable divergence of opinion in that regard and it may be idle to go into the pros and cons of it. I express only my own conclusions.
94. Q. However, will you, briefly, express those pros and cons?
A. Among other things, Pearl Harbor has but one entrance. If a considerable portion of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor and that entrance should be blocked, it would have taken a very long time to clear it. Whatever units were in here would have been immobile and there
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would have been no other suitable base in the Central Pacific in which to base our Fleet. Operating for a considerable period here, habitually, would make it certain that the Japanese could concentrate considerable number of submarines in one relatively small area. If they were boldly and skillfully used, they would have found numerous opportunities to inflict serious damage. Those are the two major objections to basing the Fleet here. Such matters as deterioration and morale, strain on logistics, and matters of that nature could be overcome. The advantages of basing it here were that it would be a week's steaming nearer the area of operation. The development of schemes for ingress and egress, and for berthing and servicing and the repairing of the Fleet, would be developed to a degree that would never be accomplished unless large numbers of ships were based here for prolonged period. In other times, temporary expedients had been arranged for temporarily berthing the Fleet and for giving limited services; but this area, until the Fleet was actually maintained out here, had never been developed as a real Fleet base.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
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The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 5:35 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.
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