King, Ernest Joseph, FADM

Ernest Joseph King was Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) during World War II. As COMINCH-CNO, he directed the United States Navy's operations, planning, and administration and was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was the United States Navy's second most senior officer in World War II after Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, who served as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief.

Born in Lorain, Ohio, King served in the Spanish–American War while still attending the United States Naval Academy. He received his first command in 1914, leading the destroyer USS Terry in the occupation of Veracruz. During World War I, he served on the staff of Vice Admiral Henry T. Mayo, the commander of the United States Atlantic Fleet. After the war, King served as head of the Naval Postgraduate School, commanded a submarine squadron, and served as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. After a period on the Navy's General Board, King became commander of the Atlantic Fleet in February 1941.

Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II, King was appointed as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet. In March 1942, King succeeded Harold Stark as Chief of Naval Operations. In December 1944, King became the second admiral to be promoted to fleet admiral.

USS King (DL-10/DLG-10/DDG-41) was a Farragut-class guided missile destroyer in the United States Navy named for Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King.

King was intelligent and extremely capable, but controversial. Some consider him to have been one of the greatest admirals of the 20th century; others, however, point out that he never commanded ships or fleets at sea in war time, and that his anglophobia led him to make decisions which cost many Allied lives.

He was considered rude and abrasive; as a result, King was loathed by many officers with whom he served. He was... perhaps the most disliked Allied leader of World War II.
Only British Field Marshal Montgomery may have had more enemies...

King also loved parties and often drank to excess. Apparently, he reserved his charm for the wives of fellow naval officers. On the job, he "seemed always to be angry or annoyed." (John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan). There was a tongue-in-cheek remark carried about by Naval personnel at the time that "Admiral King was the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy: He was angry 100% of the time!"

Roosevelt once described King as "... a man who shaves with a blow torch". Someone once asked Admiral King if it was he who said, "When they get in trouble they send for the sons of bitches." He replied that he was not -- but that he would have said it if he had thought of it.

King has the reputation of having been an anglophobe. This outlook and his strong preference that the Pacific war should take first priority coloured his decisions at various times. He was the greatest critic of the Allies' "Europe first" strategy and he constantly argued that resources should be diverted to the Pacific War.

At the start of US involvement in World War II, King decided not to request blackouts on the U.S. eastern seaboard and not to convoy ships. Many attribute these decisions to King's anglophobia, as the convoys and seaboard blackouts were British proposals, and he was loath to have his much-beloved U.S Navy adopt any ideas from the Royal Navy. He also refused the loan of British convoy escorts when the USN had only a handful of suitable vessels.

Instead of convoys, King had the U.S Navy and Coast Guard perform regular anti-submarine patrols, but these patrols followed a regular schedule. U-boat commanders learned the schedule, and coordinated their attacks to those schedules. Leaving the lights on in coastal towns illuminated merchant ships to the U-Boats. As a result, there were disastrous shipping losses - two million tons lost in a few months in early 1942.

When convoys were introduced in May 1942, the U-boats' "second happy time" ended, with the loss of seven U-boats and a dramatic reduction in shipping losses. The same effect occurred when convoys were extended to the Caribbean: this proved that King's initial decision in this matter had been flawed.

Other questionable decisions were the refusal to allow long-range Liberators to be allocated to Atlantic patrols (thus allowing the U-boats a safe area in the middle of the Atlantic - the "Atlantic Gap"), the denial of adequate numbers of landing craft to the Allied invasion of Europe and the reluctance to permit the Royal Navy's Pacific Fleet any role in the Pacific. In all of these instances, circumstances forced a re-think or he was over-ruled.

Following Japan's defeat at the Battle of Midway, while the other Joint Chiefs urged that the Allies should fight a holding action to concentrate resources against Germany, King advocated the invasion of Guadalcanal. He won the argument, and the invasion went ahead. It was ultimately successful, and was the first time the Japanese lost ground during the War.

For his attention to the Pacific Theatre, he is highly regarded by some Australian war historians. General Hastings Ismay, chief of staff to Winston Churchill, described King as: "tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. He was blunt and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. At the start, he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the Royal Navy; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the American Army.
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War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy the Japanese. He mistrusted Churchill's powers of advocacy, and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific."