This Military Service Page was created/owned by
Robert Cox, YNCS
to remember
Ofstie, Ralph, VADM USN(Ret).
If you knew or served with this Sailor and have additional information or photos to support this Page, please leave a message for the Page Administrator(s) HERE.
Contact Info
Last Address Everett, Washington
Date of Passing Nov 19, 1956
Official Badges
Unofficial Badges
Additional Information
Last Known Activity:
I created this profile of Admiral Ofstie as part of my research of the Battle Off Samar. Ofstie was the Commander of Carrier Division 26 assigned to Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy III). The little escort carriers (CVEs) he commanded were an intergal part of winning the war in the Pacific.
Please add ADM Ofstie to your list of shipmates and visit often.
This profile is about 70% complete.
Please visit my Battle Off Samar famous Naval officer profiles:
Ralph Andrew Ofstie was born in Eau Claire, Wisconsin on November 16, 1897. His hometown was Everett, Washington.
He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in June 1918.
During World War 1 he served on the USS WHIPPLE (DD-15) and USS CHATTANOOGA (CL-18) where he saw duty in the Eastern Atlantic and in European Waters. He was promoted to Lieutenant (junior grade) in August 1918. After the war he was transferred to USS O'BANNON (DD-177).
In 1920 Ofstie reported to Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida for Navy Pre-Flight School. Upon completion he attended Naval Flight Training school which he completed in 1921. His first air squadron was Fighter Squadron VF-1 "Wolfpack" where he served from 1922 to 1924. With other Navy pilots in the 1920s Ofstie participated in annual flight competitions with Army pilots in the Curtiss Marine aircraft.
In 1924-1925 he was assigned as Commanding Officer of Scouting Squadron VS-6. From 1927 to 1929 he served as Aviation Officer of USS DETROIT (CL-8).
From 1929 to 1933 Ofstie served in the Flight Test Division at Naval Air Station Anacostia.
Returning to sea aboard the carrier USS SARATOGA (CV-3) in 1933 Ofstie took command of Fighter Squadron VF-6 for the next two years.
Promoted to Lieutenant Commander he was assigned as Assistant naval attaché in Tokyo, Japan and upon completion of that duty he returned to sea as Navigator on the carrier USS ENTERPRISE (CV-6). As an interim assignment he served on staff duty aboard the carrier USS SARATOGA (CV-3) in 1939 before returning to the carrier ENTERPRISE.
Before the United States entered World War 2 Ofstie served on staff duty on the carrier USS YORKTOWN (CV-5) in 1940. With the war in Europe already underway, he next served as Assistant Naval Attache in London, England.
Ofstie's first war-time assignment in the United States was as a Commander on the staff of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander United States Pacific Fleet, at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Promoted to Captain, from November 6, 1943 to August 7, 1944 he commanded the large carrier ESSEX (CV-9). During his tenure on ESSEX Ofstie saw plenty of combat. ESSEX took part in her first amphibious assault, the landing on Tarawa. Her second amphibious assault delivered in company with TG 58.2 was against the Marshalls in January–February 1944. As part Task Group 68.2 she participated in the attack against Truk in February 1944. ESSEX struck Marcus and Wake Islands in May 1944, and finally deployed with Task Force 58 to support the occupation of the Marianas in June 1944.
In August 1944 Ofstie was promoted to Rear Admiral and was assigned as Commander Task Group 32.7/Carrier Division 26 with his flag in USS KITKUN BAY (CVE-71) for the invasion of Palau in September 1944.
Keeping his flag in KITKUN BAY, Carrier Division 26 moved to the Philippines to support the invasion of Leyte Gulf. Ofstie was assigned to Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 code name "Taffy III" where his unit was heavily involved in the Battle Off Samar. During the battle Ofstie's COMCARDIV 26 escort carrier USS GAMBIER BAY (CVE-73) was sunk by Japanese Naval gunfire. For this service at Samar Ofstie was awarded the Navy Cross.
Rear Admiral Ofstie's last sea command in World War 2 was as COMCARDIV 26 at the invasion of Lingayen, Philippines in January 1945. He was next assigned to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of Japan where he interviewed many of the surviving Japanese officials. In 1946 he detached and was reassigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Group and served at the Bikini Nuclear tests.
On October 11, 1949 Rear Admiral Ofstie testified before a committee stated, "strategic air warfare, as practiced in the past and as proposed for the future, is militarily unsound and of limited effect, is morally wrong, and is decidedly harmful to the stability of a post-war world." This discussion was related to Admiral Arthur Radford's infamous "Revolt of the Admirals".
During the Korean War from 1950 to 1951 Ofstie was Commander of Task Force 77. After the Korean War he served as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air).
Ofstie’s last tour of duty was as Commander, Sixth Fleet in European waters from 1955 to 1956. After only a year, however, Ofstie fell ill and returned to Bethesda Naval Hospital where he died on November 19, 1956.
Vice Admiral Ralph Andrew Ofstie and his wife, Captain Joy Bright Little Hancock Ofstie, are buried together in Section 30, Grave 2138, at Arlington National Cemetery.
Leyte Campaign (1944)/Battle of Samar
From Month/Year
October / 1944
To Month/Year
October / 1944
Description The Battle of Samar (25 October 1944) was the nearest the Japanese came to success during the battle of Leyte Gulf and saw a powerful Japanese battleship force come close to destroying a force of American escort carriers.
The Japanese realised that an American invasion of the Philippines or of Formosa would cut their Empire in half and prevent vital supplies reaching the Home Islands from the south part of the empire. They decided to try and fight the 'decisive battle' of the war wherever the Americans attacked next. If the Americans attacked the Philippines then the Japanese hoped to use the scattered elements of their fleet in a coordinated attack that might allow them to get at the vulnerable invasion fleet. In the final version of the plan Admiral Ozawa's carriers, coming from Japan, were to drag the US 3rd Fleet away from the invasion beaches in Leyte Gulf, allowing three other Japanese fleets to advance through the central Philippines to attack the invasion fleets.
The most important of these three fleets was Admiral Kurita's I Striking Force. Admiral Kurita began the battle of Leyte Gulf with a powerful fleet, containing five battleships, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Amongst the battleships were the Musashi and the Yamato, the biggest and most powerful battleships in the world. He also had the older battleships Kongo, Haruna and Nagato, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. This force suffered grievous losses before reaching Samar. In the two day battle of the Sibuyan Sea (23-24 October 1944) the Musashi was sunk by American aircraft, two cruisers were sunk by two American subs and a third crippled. Kurita started the battle of Samar with four battleships, six cruisers and ten destroyers.
On the American side the bulk of the battle was fought by Admiral Sprague's Taffy Three, with six escort carriers, three destroyers and four destroyer escorts. The escort carriers carried modern aircraft, but these were armed for ground attack and so didn't have many of the armour piercing bombs needed against battleships. Twelve more escort carriers in two groups were in the area, but the 7th Fleet's six old battleships were away to the south defending the Surigao Strait. The powerful modern carriers and fast battleships of the 3rd Fleet had been lured away to the north to try and intercept Ozawa's carriers (Battle of Cape Engano). Admiral Kinkaid, commander of the 7th Fleet, believed that Halsey had left a powerful task force (Task Force 34, Admiral Lee) to watch Kurita, but in fact this force had accompanied the 3rd Fleet north.
On the night of 24-25 October Kurita passed through the San Bernardino Straits, turned south and headed for Leyte Gulf. Soon after this, at about 5.30, he learnt that Admiral Nishimura's force had been destroyed and Admiral Shima was retreating (battle of the Surigao Strait). He probably never received the messages Ozawa sent out announcing that the 3rd Fleet was chasing him. Kurita could justifiably believe that the main parts of both the US 3rd and 7th Fleets were somewhere in or close to Leyte Gulf.
At about dawn (6.30) Kurita found Admiral Sprague's Taffy 3, a task force made up of six escort carriers and seven escorts. Kurita believed that he had found a 'gigantic enemy task force' containing large carriers, cruisers, destroyers and possibly battleships. He decided to abandon the charge into Leyte Gulf and turned to attack Sprague's force. At 6.58 the Yamato's main guns opened fire on a surface target for the first time.
Sprague realised that he was in trouble. At 7.01 he issued a call for help in the clear, ordered his aircraft into the air and headed for a nearby rain squall. Under cover of the rain he decided to try and reach the support of Taffy 2, thirty miles to the south. His destroyers were ordered to attack the Japanese fleet while the carriers made their best speed south.
Sprague's aircraft had a limited potential to do serious damage to the Japanese battleships. The escort carriers didn't have enough storage space to carry both fragmentation bombs for ground support and a significant number of armour piercing bombs. The Japanese had no way to know that, and the American aircraft were able to force the Japanese heavy ships into frantic manoeuvres, slowing their pursuit of the carriers. The torpedo firing destroyers were equally effective.
Just after 7.20am the cruiser Kumano was hit by a torpedo from the US destroyer Johnston DD-557. Her speed was reduced, and at 9.45 she was detached from the main fleet and ordered back through the San Bernardino Strait. This brought her into range of aircraft from the US 3rd Fleet and at around 9.45 she was attacked by SB2C dive-bombers and TBM torpedo bombers from TF 38. They only managed to score one near miss. A second attack early on 26 October managed three bomb hits, but the cruiser could still make 10kts. The Kumano managed to reach safety at Manila where she underwent repairs before leaving for Japan on 5 November. Her luck now turned - her convoy was attacked by four American submarines and the cruiser was hit twice. She remained afloat and reached Dasol Bay on the Luzon coast, but on 25 November she was sunk by American aircraft.
This first destroyer attack cost the Americans dearly. The Johnston was hit by three 14in and three 6in shells and the Hoel by shells that disabled her main engine. The Hoel remained in the fight until she was unable to move and at about 8.30 her crew abandoned ship.
A little further south the escort carriers came under fire from the Japanese battleships. Kalinin Bay and Gambier Bay were both hit but managed to main their position until the Gambier Bay was hit in the forward engine room. The destroyer Johnston attempted to distract attention from the stricken carrier but without success and the Gambier Bay sank at around 8.45am. The Johnston then managed to break up a light cruiser attack on the carriers, but in the process she became their main target and was sunk. Only 141 of her 327 crewmen survived.
The cruiser Chikuma was hit by a torpedo at around 8.54. It was a sign that Sprague's men were getting closer to help that this torpedo was probably launched by an aircraft from Admiral Felix B. Stump's Task Group 77.4.2. The engine rooms flooded, and the ship came to a halt. She was unable to respond when Kurita decided to withdraw from battle, and was left alone. She sank during the day with the loss of most of her crew. Another 100 were rescued by the destroyer Nowaki, but that ship was lost on the night of 25-26 October with the loss of all hands.
The cruiser Chokai was hit by 500lb bombs at around 9.05am. The bombs caused heavy fires and damaged the forward engine room. The cruiser came to a halt, and couldn't be rescued. At around 10.30 the crippled cruiser was sunk by a spread of torpedoes from the destroyer Fujinami.
By this time Kurita was rather losing his grip on the battle. The Yamato was some way behind his cruisers and visibility was poor. He wasn't aware of the damage to three of his cruisers, and had lost sight of the carriers. At 9.11, believing that he had won a major victory over a squadron of fleet carriers, Kurita ordered his surviving ships to withdraw from the battle.
At about 10.50 the cruiser Suzuya suffered a near miss that detonated the torpedoes in the starboard forward torpedo tubes. This set off a fire made worse when more of her torpedoes exploded at around 11.00. Damage control measures failed and at about 12 noon a series of ammunition explosions began. The ship was abandoned at 1pm and sank twenty minutes later.
Taffy 3's ordeal wasn't yet over. At 10.50, just as the Suzuya was being attacked, nine kamikaze aircraft attacked the task group, in one of the first organised suicide attacks of the war. Most were destroyed or missed, but one hit the escort carrier St Lô, triggering explosions that sank her. A second kamikaze attack twenty minutes later did more damage but failed to sink anything.
It took Kurita about two hours to regroup. He then turned south with his remaining fifteen ships in an attempt to reach Leyte Gulf, the original target of his operation. At 11.40 one of his lookouts reported sighting a battleship and destroyers. The fleet turned aside to chase this phantom before turning south again. At around 12.30, when only forty five miles from Leyte Gulf, Kurita decided that it wasn't worth risking the destruction of his fleet just to sink empty transport ships. He had also received reports that an American carrier task force had been sighted 113 miles north of the gulf, and he now decided to turn north to deal with this
In fact Halsey's carriers were still far to the north. All morning he had been receiving urgent calls for help, but had refused to turn back. In the resulting battle of Cape Engano Halsey sank all four of Ozawa's carriers. At around 11 he ordered one of his carrier groups to turn south, and his fourth carrier group, which was some way to the east, was also directed towards Kurita. This fourth task group was first to come into range and during the afternoon it launched two attacks on Kurita's fleet. After spending all afternoon looking for the American carriers Kurita retired to the eastern end of the San Bernardino Strait at 6pm. He was under orders to wait for dark and try and fight a night battle, but at 9.25, with fuel short, he decided to retreat west through the straits. He would suffer further air attack on 26 October, but the main fighting in Leyte Gulf was over.
Kurita has since been blamed for his decisions to withdraw from combat at 9.11 and to turn back from Leyte Gulf at 12.30. Both can be defended using the information available to Kurita at the time, but he later believed the second decision to have been a mistake. If Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf then his fleet would almost certainly have been destroyed - if not by Kinkaid's escort carriers and old battleships then by the 3rd Fleet. All he could have achieved was the destruction of empty transport ships, and perhaps a damaging bombardment of the US troops on Leyte, but neither would have altered the eventual course of the fighting in the Philippines.
Personal Details
