This Military Service Page was created/owned by
Kent Weekly (SS/DSV) (DBF), EMCS
to remember
Aurand, Evan Peter (Pete), VADM USN(Ret).
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Contact Info
Home Town New York, NY
Last Address Honolulu, HI
Date of Passing Jun 07, 1989
Location of Interment Buried at Sea, Pacific Ocean
Official Badges
Unofficial Badges
Additional Information
Last Known Activity:
After his Navy service, Evan Aurand was a safety inspector for Boeing Aircraft Company as wellas serving as a consultant for the Navy.
He was very active in his community. He was a lobbyist before the Hawaii State Legislature, the City Council, and other organizations. He was one of the founders of the Hawaii Leaseholders (HALE) Equity Coalition.he served as president of both the Maunaiua Triangle-Koko Kai Community Association and the Rotary Club of Hawaii Kai. Other board memberships included the Hawaii Kai Neighborhood Board and the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce.
Other Comments:
Navy Cross
Awarded for Actions During World War II
Service: Navy
Battalion: Scouting Squadron 2 (VS-2)
Division: U.S.S. Lexington (CV-2)
Citation: The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Lieutenant Evan Peter Aurand (NSN: 0-81177), United States Navy, for extraordinary heroism in operations against the enemy while serving as Pilot of a carrier-based Navy Scouting Plane in Scouting Squadron TWO (VS-2), attached to the U.S.S. LEXINGTON (CV-2), in action against enemy Japanese forces over enemy-controlled waters near Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea, on 10 March 1942. Lieutenant Aurand pressed home, in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire, a vigorous and determined dive bombing attack on enemy ships, sinking one of them. His outstanding courage, daring airmanship and determined skill were at all times inspiring and in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
World War II/Asiatic-Pacific Theater/Bismarck Archipelago Operation
From Month/Year
June / 1943
To Month/Year
May / 1944
Description Rabaul was the strategic key to the Bismarcks. The Japanese recognized the value of the port, and seized it with forces staged from Truk early in the Pacific War. Air attacks began on 4 January 1942 and elements of the South Seas Detachment began their landings on 23 January, rapidly driving back the 1390 men of the defending Australian 22 Battalion ("Lark Force") and taking the town and airfields. With Rabaul secured, the Japanese occupied the remainder of the Bismarcks more or less at their leisure. Kavieng was taken the same day as Rabaul, Bougainville was occuped on 30-31 March, and the Admiralties were occupied on 8 April 1942.
Allied strategy in the Southwest Pacific was initially focused on recapturing Rabaul. MacArthur envisioned a two-pronged counteroffensive (CARTWHEEL) with one prong coming up the Solomons and the other across the Dampier and Vitiaz Straits from New Guinea to New Britain. These operations began with the operations to secure Guadalcanal in the Solomons (7 August 1942) and to clear the northeast coast of New Guinea around Buna (19 November 1942.) Both tasks proved far more difficult than anticipated, becoming battles of attrition that lasted for months. The Buna area was not secured until 22 January 1943 and Guadalcanal was not secured until 9 February 1943.
At at the Pacific Military Conference of March 1943 in Washington, D.C., MacArthur's representative, Richard Sutherland, presented a revised plan for taking Rabaul (ELKTON III). This envisioned the capture of the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea and Munda on New Georgia, followed by the seizure of points in western New Britain and Bougainville. The Allies could then take Kavieng, if necessary, before the final assault on Rabaul. Japanese forces in the area were estimated at around 85,000 men and 383 aircraft, with another 11,000 men, 250 aircraft, and the main strength of Combined Fleet available for immediate reinforcement. In the longer term, the Japanese could dispatch another 615 aircraft and 10 to 15 divisions to the area if shipping could be found. (Japanese records show that this estimate was quite good, and that shipping available was about 300,000 tons to which perhaps another 100,000 tons could be added.) MacArthur demanded another five divisions and a tripling of the air strength in the theater in order to carry out his plan.
The Washington planners rejected any reinforcements beyond two or three divisions and a small number of aircraft, and the plan was scaled back accordingly. The final directive, issued 28 March 1943, called for Allied forces to advance as far as the Huon peninsula, western New Britain, and Bougainville by the end of 1943. Overall command would be given to MacArthur, with whom Halsey in the South Pacific would be expected to cooperate. Fortunately, there was enough mutual respect between the two men to make the plan work.
