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Reid, Beverly William, ENS.
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Casualty Info
Home Town New Orleans, LA
Last Address 2819Laurel Ave New Orleans, LA
Casualty Date Aug 24, 1942
Cause KIA-Body Not Recovered
Reason Air Loss, Crash - Sea
Location Pacific Ocean
Conflict World War II
Location of Interment Manila American Cemetery and Memorial - Manila, Philippines
Wall/Plot Coordinates (cenotaph)
Official Badges
Unofficial Badges
Additional Information
Last Known Activity:
ENS Reid was assigned to VF-6 aboard the USS Enterprise (CV-6). He took off from the ship on August 24, 1942. He flew one of the 27 VF-6 planes scrambled for the CAP over TF 17, and, as one of two pilots listed as missing, was probably shot down by a Zero in the ensuing action. ENS Reid was presumed missing in action. His remains were unrecoverable. On August 25, 1943 he was presumed killed in action.
Comments/Citation:
Service numbers: Enlisted - 2742159 Officer - 137130
Navy Cross
Awarded for Action During World War II
Service: Navy
Battalion: Fighting Squadron 6 (VF-6)
Division: U.S.S. Enterprise (CV-6)
General Orders: Bureau of Naval Personnel Information Bulletin No. 310 (January 1943)
Citation: The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Ensign [then Machinist] Beverly W. Reid (NSN: 0-137130), United States Navy, for extraordinary heroism in operations against the enemy while serving as Pilot of a carrier-based Navy Fighter Plane in Fighting Squadron SIX (VF-6), attached to the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV-6), during the "Air Battle of Midway," against enemy Japanese forces on 4 - 6 June 1942. As a member of a combat patrol on 4 June, Machinist Reid sighted two enemy torpedo planes approaching the U.S.S. YORKTOWN. With bold aggressiveness and extreme disregard for his own personal safety, he intercepted and shot down the first craft, then pressed home his attack against the second until his persistent fire had rendered sufficient damage to cause the plane to burst into flames. Again, on 6 June, as a member of an attack group, he defied a tremendous barrage of concentrated anti-aircraft fire to strafe an enemy destroyer at close range and inflict considerable damage upon that vessel. His superb initiative and expert airmanship contributed materially to the success of our forces and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
Central Pacific Campaign (1941-43)/Marcus Island Raid
From Month/Year
February / 1942
To Month/Year
February / 1942
Description On February 25, 1942, the Commander of Task Force HOW was informed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, that, fuel and other considerations permitting, a raid against Marcus Island would contribute to the further effect desired. Marcus is situated at latitude 24°18' N., longitude 153°58' E., or about 600 miles northwest of Wake on a line leading directly to southern Japan. It is triangular in shape, about 5 miles in circumference, and has been claimed for many years by the Japanese, who call it Minami Tori Shima. At the time of the attack order it was believed that the island was being used as an administrative center by the enemy, and that it contained radio and weather reporting installations. Landplanes had been sighted near it, indicating an air field.
Three days later Admiral Halsey directed the carrier, Enterprise, and Cruiser Division FIVE (the Northampton and Salt Lake City) to proceed to a point 175 miles northeast of Marcus, to launch an air attack about 1730 March 3d (Greenwich civil time), and to retire at high speed.
The attack was arranged to take place before sunrise on March 4 (zone minus 11 time) in the expectation that the full moon would provide sufficient light for the launching of planes and for rendezvous. Early in the morning of March 4 the Enterprise, in company with the Northampton and Salt Lake City, speed 24 knots, was nearing Marcus on course 235°. Because it was desired to include fighters in the attack, launching of planes was delayed until the ships were about 125 miles from the island. At 0438 the Enterprise changed her course into the wind and a few minutes later the first plane was launched.
The attack group consisted of the air group commander with 14 scout bombers (SBD's), 17 bombers (SBD's), and 6 fighters (F4F's). The bomber and scout planes were armed with one 500-pound (instantaneous fuse) and two 100-pound bombs each. Strong southerly winds prevailed, with a 9/10 overcast of heavy cumulus clouds extending from 4,000 to 8,000 feet. The moon was full.
Because of the heavy overcast and the smallness of the objective, accurate navigation by the attack force was essential. Success was achieved largely through the use of a new method. The Enterprise tracked the planes by radar, informing the group commander of any deviations from the course to Marcus and telling him just how far he had proceeded on that course. This assistance was of great value for it enabled the planes to proceed above the overcast and yet be confident that they would know when to descend through it and locate the island.
At 6:30 the island was sighted through a break in the clouds, "nestling in the moonlight," and the order to attack from an altitude of 16,000 feet was given. The surprise was complete. At least four bombs were dropped before any antiaircraft fire was noticed.
The bombing squadron separated into three divisions and began high speed approaches from the south and west. The dives varied in steepness from 045° to 070°, with final dives entered at from 8,000 to 10,000 feet, releases at 3,000 to 2,000 feet in ripple drops, and pull-outs at 1,000 feet with a continued power glide retirement. One plane was detached from the first section just before the attack to reconnoiter the island and broadcast any information available concerning planes on the field or other objectives. Limited strafing was conducted both in the dive and during retirement, the fixed .50-caliber and the flexible .30-caliber machine guns being used.
The scouting squadron followed immediately, some of its planes making a conventional dive bombing attack, approaching from 15,000 feet and entering final dive at about 10,000, while others dived through the clouds and then executed a glide attack.
One plane 6-S-7, pilot Lt. (j.g.) Hart D. Hilton, and gunner J. Leaming, aviation radioman, third class, failed to return from the attack. At 0705 the pilot reported that his plane was on fire and that he was about to land in the water. Lt. Richard H. Best (Bombing Squadron SIX) stated that he saw Hilton's plane land in the sea about 10 miles east of Marcus, and that the pilot and gunner manned their rubber boat, waved and gave a "thumbs up" signal before he departed from the scene. Lt. Wilmer E. Gallaher, commander of Scouting Squadron SIX, states in his report: "It is believed that 6-S-7 would not have been lost had it been equipped with leak-proof tanks.8 Otherwise no deficiencies in our aircraft armament or equipment were noted."
Although no enemy aircraft was encountered in the air or sighted on the ground or water, the antiaircraft fire, coming presumably from 3-inch guns located on each point of the island, was sufficiently heavy to prevent close inspection of the damage done. Our carrier-based planes are now equipped with leak-proof tanks.
ever, witnessed a hit on and subsequent fire in what looked like a fuel storage tank. Several buildings or hangars on both sides of the field were on fire and several explosions at short intervals occurred in one group. Two large fires visible from 20 to 30 miles were still burning fiercely at 0705, as well as numerous smaller fires. Unfortunately, considerably fewer objectives were found than had been anticipated. No photographs could be obtained due to darkness and clouds. By 8 o'clock the planes had returned to the Enterprise, which, with the Northampton and Salt Lake City was already steaming eastward.
CONCLUSION
This action, while relatively simple and completely successful, reemphasized the need for reserve pilots on carriers. After flying for 4 hours or more on an attack mission, it was pointed out, the same pilots immediately had to become available for search and patrol, reserve combat patrol or anti-torpedo plane patrol for the rest of the daylight period, and possibly at night under moonlight conditions when attack by enemy planes was threatened. It was stated that it had been necessary to make demands on pilots which, if continued, would unquestionably become injurious to health. Unless these conditions were ameliorated, it was emphasized, there was real danger of prematurely losing the services of some pilots because of incipient breakdown.
"The raid against Marcus caused some concern as to the defenses of the Japanese homeland", wrote Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, in his report, "but the exact amount of diversion from Japanese effort in the southwest cannot be measured at this time."