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Description This campaign was from 25 December 1965 to 30 June 1966. As the war continued, the Navy continued to patrol the coasts and rivers in brown water operations. Minesweeping craft begin patrolling the Long Tau River leading to Saigon to keep that vital waterway open to merging traffic.
Navy patrol craft worked to keep Vietnamese's harbors open and safe in operation stable door. Navy helicopters called Seawolves began supporting the newly arrived Navy PBR in Game Warden missions.
On 1 January 1966, the Sea Force was renamed the Fleet Command and reorganized along functional lines. Flotilla I, comprised the submarine chasers (PC) and escorts in Squadron 11, the motor gunboats in Squadron 13, and the large support landing ships (LSSL) in Squadron 15. The minesweepers in Squadron 17 were responsible for sea patrol, inshore patrol, river patrol, and minesweeping duties, respectively. Flotilla II controlled Squadrons 22 and 24, which consisted of the Vietnamese Navy's landing ships and craft, coastal oilers, and other vessels providing logistic support.
Throughout this period, the Vietnamese Navy continued to suffer from serious deficiencies. Perhaps the greatest was the careerism and interservice political activity of many naval officers, which hamstrung coordination and cooperation in operations and lowered the morale and motivation of naval personnel. The emphasis on politics disrupted the training of sailors, many already educationally unprepared in the technical skills essential for the operation of complex vessels, weapons, and equipment.
Aside from the political factor, training in gunnery, seamanship, and communications skills was hurt by the Vietnamese stress on instruction at shore-based schools, rather than on board ships. Unfortunately, few Vietnamese sailors were released from operational duty to receive training ashore.
At the same time, the Recruit Training Center at Cam Ranh Bay, the Advanced Training Center in Saigon, and the Naval Training Center at Nha Trang, which included the Naval Academy, were hard-pressed to handle the great number of men entering the service during this period. Some relief was afforded by the training of Vietnamese officers and men on board U.S. naval vessels and in the United States. The quality of training improved somewhat as a result of these measures and the hard work of many Vietnamese sailors and American advisors.
The material condition of the navy raised even more serious concerns. Officers and men in the operational units often showed little regard for the maintenance of their ships and craft. Compounding the problem was the inability of the ship and boat repair facilities to cope with the growing backlog of work orders generated by the increased tempo of the war and the doubling in size of the navy.
The lack of skilled workmen severely hampered operations at the Eastern Repair Facility at Cuu Long near Saigon and the Western Repair Facility at Can Tho, which handled River Force and Coastal Force work. The same condition existed at the smaller establishments at Danang, Cat Lo, Qui Nhon, An Thoi, and Rach Gia, which supported the Coastal Force exclusively. A number of these repair operations barely functioned.
