A Colorado native, before graduation from Westminster High School in 1966 I enlisted in the Naval Reserve on what was called a minority enlistment (I was only 17). My basic training at RTC San Diego began in August 1966. Following basic training, I was first assigned to USS Greenlet (ASR 10) home ported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. During my time on the USS Greenlet I made numerous WESTPAC cruises with a port visits in Japan, Hong Kong, Philippines and assignments in Vietnam. Following my promotion to Signalman Third Class I was assigned to the USS Dale (DLG 19) -- home ported in San Diego, CA. Another WESTPAC cruise was made in 1969 with notable port visits in Japan, Gulf of Tonkin with the USS Enterprise, Philippines, operations resulting from the attack by North Korea of an EC-131 aircraft, crossing the Equator and cruising to New Zealand. Upon return to San Diego in September 1969, my enlistment ended and I returned home.
In 1979, I re-affiliated with the Naval Reserve as a Signalman Second Class and joined a Naval Control of Shipping Reserve Unit (NCSO FE 118). My assignments included Merchant Ship Boarding officer and Career Counselor. During this tour with Naval Control of Shipping, I participated in naval control of shipping exercises in the United States and Japan. During my time with the unit, I submitted an application for a direct commission and was selected as a Restricted Line officer with a designator for Intelligence (1635) and commissioned as a new Ensign in 1984. I was assigned to an Intelligence Reserve Unit, Fleet Intelligence Rapid Support Team, Pacific (FIRSTPAC 0571) (JICPAC 0571) with subsequent assignments to NR FIRSTPAC 1371(JICPAC 1371) as a plank owner, and NSIU 0171 (U. S. Space Command) in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In October 1996, I returned to JICPAC 0571 and held assignments as an Intelligence analyst, awards officer for JICPAC 0571 and Reserve Intelligence Area-5, Assistant Officer-in-Charge (AOIC) and Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of JICPAC 0571's Second Drill Weekend including duties as the Production Chief to the Reserve Production Center Denver at Buckley AFB.
In 2002, as a Commander, I was selected as Commanding Officer for NR Office of Naval Intelligence 1071. Upon completion of my command tour, I was assigned as the Deputy OIC for the Navy Reserve Element NR NORTHCOM to the J2 of NORTHERN COMMAND.
In 2006, I was Selected and promoted to Captain. My assignments included staff positions with Reserve Intelligence Area Commander Five and Reserve Intelligence Area Commander Southwest in Denver and San Diego.
In 2007 I retired as a Sergeant with the Denver Police Department after serving as a police officer for 32 years.
In 2008, I submitted my retirement request and officially retired in October 2008.
Among my service awards and military decorations, are the Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy Commendation Medals and Armed Forces Reserve Medal. I reside in Thornton, Colorado with my wife Karen.
Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase II Campaign (66-67)
From Month/Year
July / 1966
To Month/Year
May / 1967
Description This Campaign period was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. The growing Coastal Force devoted most of its attention to amphibious raids, patrols of shallow inlets and river mouths, troop lifts, and blocking support for allied ground sweeps. For instance, during Operation Irving in October 1966, ground forces and junk units in II Coastal Zone killed 681 Viet Cong troops. In addition, the junkmen established a government presence among the fishermen and provided them with medical services and other assistance. Sometimes the Coastal Force sailors convinced Communist soldiers to desert their units.
The enemy, who often attacked the 27 vulnerable Coastal Force bases, overran the triangular-shaped fortifications of Coastal Group 15 at Cua An Hoa in July 1965 and of Coastal Group 16 at Co Luy in August 1967. Other bases, however, withstood repeated assaults. In doing so, these facilities played a part in the allied effort that denied the enemy easy access to the coastal regions.
Viet Cong mines also took their toll of the command's MLMS fleet, which worked to keep open the shipping channel to Saigon. In August 1966 and again in January 1967, enemy mines sank an MLMS in the Rung Sat. The River Force did not fully employ its strength. The political troubles of 1965 and 1966 in the Republic of Vietnam, in which high-ranking River Force officers figured prominently, damaged morale and distracted personnel from their military mission.
The navy and the army rarely launched joint amphibious assaults against the Viet Cong. Operations reflected the River Force's lack of technically skilled crewmen, the poor maintenance and repair of river craft, and the absence of inspired leadership. Usually, only half of the command's units were ready for combat action, and many of these boats were committed by the army to static guard, resupply, troop lift, or other nonoffensive duties.
The reliance on defense over offense reflected the historic Vietnamese strategy of husbanding resources until there was clear advantage over an enemy. The Vietnamese Navy's River Force sailors often fought hard and bravely, killing many of the enemy and suffering heavy losses of their own, but their valor and sacrifice was not rewarded with strategic success.
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