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Contact Info
Home Town Augusta
Last Address San Diego, CA
Date of Passing Oct 13, 1982
Location of Interment Not Specified
Wall/Plot Coordinates Not Specified
Military Service Number Not Specified
Official Badges
Unofficial Badges
Additional Information
Last Known Activity His 1st (of 4) Navy Cross Citation reads:
For extraordinary heroism as Commanding Officer of a U.S. Submarine during a war patrol in enemy-controlled waters. Despite extremely strong enemy escorts which included air support, he skillfully penetrated the escort screens, and through his daring and aggressive determination, delivered smashing torpedo attacks against enemy shipping. As a result of these well-planned and brilliantly executed attacks, he successfully sank three enemy ships totaling 20,200 tons, and damaged tow additional enemy ships totaling 15,000 tons. Although severely depth-charged and fired upon by escorts, and bombed by aircraft, his skillful and brilliant evasive tactics enabled him to escape and bring his ship to port. His conduct throughout was an inspiration to his officers and men, and in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.
Other Comments: Not Specified
World War II/Asiatic-Pacific Theater
From Month/Year
December / 1941
To Month/Year
September / 1945
Description The plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest Pacific under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the other in the Central, South, and North Pacific (Pacific Ocean Areas) under Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, were created early in the war. Except in the South and Southwest Pacific, each conducted its own operations with its own ground, air, and naval forces in widely separated areas. These operations required at first only a relatively small number of troops whose efforts often yielded strategic gains which cannot be measured by the size of the forces involved. Indeed, the nature of the objectivesùsmall islands, coral atolls, and jungle-bound harbors and airstrips, made the employment of large ground forces impossible and highlighted the importance of air and naval operations. Thus, until 1945, the war in the Pacific progressed by a double series of amphibious operations each of which fitted into a strategic pattern developed in Washington.
