This Military Service Page was created/owned by
Daniel L Arnes, CMDCM
to remember
Porch, Stephen Letson, LCDR.
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Contact Info
Home Town Portland, ME
Last Address Sedgewood Commons Nursing Home, Assisted Living, Short Term Care 22 Northbrook Dr Falmouth, ME 04105
Date of Passing Jan 06, 2013
Official Badges
Unofficial Badges
Additional Information
Last Known Activity:
Steve was cremated, location of ashes unknown.
Other Comments:
http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/k4/kitty_hawk-ii.html 22–23 May 1967: Big Mother 69, an SH-3A, LT(JG) Stephen L. Porch and his crew, HS-2, attempted a nighttime CSAR over North Vietnam for Twerps 2, a USAF F-4C, 1st LT David L. Baldwin, downed by “enemy action” after encountering “an intense wall of flak.” Receiving North Vietnamese small arms, automatic weapons and 75 mm fire, Porch and his crew located the pilot and tried to retrieve him, only disengaging when a crewman was wounded and the crewman’s radar altimeter was knocked out. Porch and his co-pilot, LT(JG) Stuart B. Williams, were each awarded the Silver Star.
http://www.hc7seadevils.org/CACArticle.pdf AX-2 Paul DeGennaro, Coronado, CA served in Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron (HS-2) from June1966 to Sept 1967. Paul was aircrewman in the SH-3A helicopter armed with M-60 machine guns and Thompson sub-machine guns while conducting Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations. He shares this most memorable mission; Attempted Night Rescue by Paul DeGennaro.
On the evening of May 22, 1967 aboard the USS Kittyhawk (CVA-63) the men of HS-2 SAR DET 1 were at a relaxed state. This was the final day of the SAR DET 1 tour because air operations were secured and the USS Hornet (CVS-12) and the main body of HS-2 would be arriving on station the next morning. Then the 1MC blared “Big Mother standby crew, man your aircraft “ The crew consisted of aircraft commander Lt. (JG) Stephen L Porch, Co pilot Lt (JG) Stuart B. Williams, First crewman AX2 (AC) Paul DeGennaro, Second crewman AX2 Duane A. Shaffer. We launched about 2100 and flew up to North SAR Station. We orbited for a number of hours while they tried to get a fix on downed Air Force pilot, Lt. David L. Baldwin, who punched out in the mountains north of Haiphong. At this point it was about midnight and it was decided that we would in-flight refuel from a DE. This was tricky because our rescue hoist had an intermittent electrical problem and I didn’t want the problem to get worse. We had the DE crew throw us a line and we pulled up the fuel hose with rope. We successfully refueled this way. The downed pilot was located and the OK was given for us to make the rescue. We had two A1 Spads escorting us. We flew at 6000 ft and flew over numerous coastal islands before hitting the mainland. We drew heavy Anti-aircraft fire from the islands. There were shells exploding above us and below us the whole time we were over the island airspace. After flying about 45 minutes we got to the rescue area which was covered with tall trees and at about 5000 ft in altitude. We were communicating with the downed pilot and the A1’s guided us in. We were hovering over tall trees and could not see through them. I clipped a light I took off a Mae West onto the Jungle Penetrator and lowered the penetrator through trees and we waited. At this point we were drawing heavy small arms fire and lost communication with the downed pilot. The aircraft was taking numerous hits. I was knocked over by one bullet going through my shirt and the other crewman took one through the leg. We could not regain communication with the downed pilot and the aircraft started spinning because the rudder controls were damaged by enemy gunfire. Reluctantly we left the area and headed back to the ship. We drew sporadic gunfire until we got to the islands. Our friends on the islands were waiting for us to return and threw every thing they had at us. It was like the 4th July. We landed on the USS Long Beach (CGN 9). A few minutes after landing the self sealing tanks gave out and all the fuel we had left dumped out on the deck of the Long Beach. At first light the next morning another HS-2 DET 1 helicopter commanded by Lt Richard T Daniels went in and successfully made the rescue. With daylight they could see the enemy positions and F4’s were called in to deal with them. It’s amazing what a few well placed cluster bombs can do.
Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase II Campaign (66-67)
From Month/Year
July / 1966
To Month/Year
May / 1967
Description This Campaign period was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. The growing Coastal Force devoted most of its attention to amphibious raids, patrols of shallow inlets and river mouths, troop lifts, and blocking support for allied ground sweeps. For instance, during Operation Irving in October 1966, ground forces and junk units in II Coastal Zone killed 681 Viet Cong troops. In addition, the junkmen established a government presence among the fishermen and provided them with medical services and other assistance. Sometimes the Coastal Force sailors convinced Communist soldiers to desert their units.
The enemy, who often attacked the 27 vulnerable Coastal Force bases, overran the triangular-shaped fortifications of Coastal Group 15 at Cua An Hoa in July 1965 and of Coastal Group 16 at Co Luy in August 1967. Other bases, however, withstood repeated assaults. In doing so, these facilities played a part in the allied effort that denied the enemy easy access to the coastal regions.
Viet Cong mines also took their toll of the command's MLMS fleet, which worked to keep open the shipping channel to Saigon. In August 1966 and again in January 1967, enemy mines sank an MLMS in the Rung Sat. The River Force did not fully employ its strength. The political troubles of 1965 and 1966 in the Republic of Vietnam, in which high-ranking River Force officers figured prominently, damaged morale and distracted personnel from their military mission.
The navy and the army rarely launched joint amphibious assaults against the Viet Cong. Operations reflected the River Force's lack of technically skilled crewmen, the poor maintenance and repair of river craft, and the absence of inspired leadership. Usually, only half of the command's units were ready for combat action, and many of these boats were committed by the army to static guard, resupply, troop lift, or other nonoffensive duties.
The reliance on defense over offense reflected the historic Vietnamese strategy of husbanding resources until there was clear advantage over an enemy. The Vietnamese Navy's River Force sailors often fought hard and bravely, killing many of the enemy and suffering heavy losses of their own, but their valor and sacrifice was not rewarded with strategic success.
