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Home Town Baltimore
Last Address US Naval Academy Cemetery Riley, Herbert Douglas Vice Admiral, U.S.N. Dec. 24, 1904 to Jan. 17, 1973 Section 7, Lot No.: 1631 Ninth generation Marylander.
Riley, Herbert D. (1904-1973)
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley was at The Battle of Guadacanal WWII, Okinawa. He commanded the USS Coral Sea from 1952-1953
Other Comments:
Once he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1927, Riley served in the battleship New Mexico (BB-40) and had to be persistent to get into flight training. Aviation assignments in the 1930s included service in Scouting Squadron Six (VS-6) with the cruiser Cincinnati (CL-6), Scouting Squadron Five (VS-5) with the cruiser Richmond (CL-9), Patrol Squadron One, Patrol Squadron Ten, Fighting Squadron Three (VF-3) in the Ranger (CV-4), the aviation unit of the heavy cruiser Portland (CA-33), and Anacostia Naval Air Station. In the billet at Anacostia he was a pilot for VIPs and married the daughter of Rear Admiral John Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In 1940-41 Riley served on the staff of Commander Carrier Division One and on the staff of Commander Patrol Wings. He had temporary duty in 1942 on Guadalcanal and in 1943-44 served in the Bureau of Aeronautics. In 1944-45 he commanded the escort carrier Makassar Strait (CVE-91) and at war’s end in 1945 was operations officer on the staff of the prospective Commander First Carrier Task Force, Vice Admiral Frederick Sherman. In 1946 Riley was on the staff of Joint Task Force One, during Operation Crossroads. Shore duty in the late 1940s included service in the Strategic Plans Section of OpNav, as an assistant to two Secretaries of Defense, James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, and as a student at the National War College. In the early 1950s he was assistant chief of staff for plans on the staff of CinCLant-CinCLantFlt-SACLant, commanded the aircraft carrier Coral Sea (CVA-43), and was chief of staff to Commander Carrier Division Two, Rear Admiral Hugh H. Goodwin. After duty in the International Affairs Division of OpNav, Riley served as Commander Carrier Division One and from February 1958 to May 1961 was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Command serving Admiral Felix B. Stump and Admiral Harry D. Felt. Riley’s service in the early 1960s was as Deputy CNO (Operations and Readiness), OP-03, and as Director of the Joint Staff.
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*** PROFILE UNDER CONSTRUCTION ***
Vietnam War/Advisory Campaign (62-65)
From Month/Year
March / 1962
To Month/Year
March / 1965
Description This campaign period was from 15 March 1962 to 7 March 1965. In the early days of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Sailors worked with the developing Vietnamese Navy as advisors, helping them with such things as logistical support, vessel construction techniques, and so forth. As the Communist insurgency increased, the Americans became more and more involved in combat operations.
The average American naval advisor was dedicated to preparing the Vietnamese Navy to some day stand alone against the Communist foe. Often assigned to vessels or bases lacking even basic amenities, the advisor also shared the risks of combat with his hosts. His task was a heavy one. Not empowered to give orders, he could only hope to persuade his Vietnamese counterpart that a particular course of action was warranted. That advice often was ignored. Aside from the natural difficulty of getting others to accept counsel, the naval advisor was often hampered by the language barrier and differences in cultures, educational levels, and personalities that separated him from his counterpart. Furthermore, the one-year tour completed by most advisors did not allow them enough time to learn the job and bring about meaningful change. Despite all this, the Naval Advisory Group helped improve the Vietnamese naval service in important respects.
During this phase, The first significant U.S. naval engagement of the war was the famous Tonkin Gulf incident of 1964. On the afternoon of 2 August, three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats attacked the destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin with gunfire and torpedoes. On the night of 4 August, Maddox and another destroyer, Turner Joy, reported fighting a running battle with hostile patrol craft in the middle of the gulf. Communications intercepts and other relevant information convinced Washington that an attack had taken place. At President Lyndon B. Johnson's direction, on 5 August navy carrier forces bombed North Vietnam. Two days later, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Johnson thereafter used to wage war in Vietnam. A sustained bombing campaign of the North (dubbed "Rolling Thunder") began on 2 March 1965.
My Participation in This Battle or Operation
From Month/Year
March / 1962
To Month/Year
March / 1965
Last Updated: Oct 15, 2020
Personal Memories
Memories Vice Admiral Riley was part of team involved at the highest level with the leaders in Laos (1960).
At a meeting on October 11 1960 with a visiting United States delegation made up of Parsons, Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II, and Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, chief of staff to the Commander in Chief Pacific, Souvanna Phouma gave an indictment of the provocative errors committed by his successors after formation of the first coalition. He warned that the only course for Laos was to implement the 1957 agreements before the Pathet Lao--with whom he was in touch and intended to resume negotiations- -presented even more far-reaching demands. The first Soviet ambassador to Laos, Aleksandr N. Abramov, arrived as Parsons was leaving.
After conferring with the king, the Parsons-Irwin-Riley team proceeded to Bangkok. On October 17, Irwin and Riley met with Phoumi in Ubol. Although the Department of State at that point was under the impression that United States policy required that Phoumi dissolve the Revolutionary Committee, both as a gesture of good faith toward Souvanna Phouma in preserving the unity of anticommunist forces in Laos and, more practically, in order to avoid the growing impression abroad that the United States was illegally aiding a rebel movement, no mention of this point was made either in Parsons' instructions to his two colleagues or at the October 17 meeting.
Following the formal conversation, Riley took Phoumi aside and told him that the United States had completely lost confidence in Souvanna Phouma and was backing Phoumi to go back and clean up the situation. Irwin similarly told Phoumi that the United States was only supporting him in building up his defenses for the moment; in the long run, the United States was supporting him all the way. The message was not lost on Phoumi. The effect of these unauthorized remarks was to undercut both Souvanna Phouma's efforts to negotiate a compromise solution with Phoumi and Brown's bona fides with Souvanna Phouma, already strained by the continuing United States aid flowing into Savannakh't in the absence of any matching military action against the Pathet Lao. Phoumi's intransigence in turn led the Department of State to make ever-increasing demands on Souvanna Phouma in the interest of "compromise," beginning with the charge that the prime minister was not exercising sufficient control over Kong Le, the demand that he take appropriate precautions to prevent Kong Le from launching an attack on Savannakh't, and so forth.