This Military Service Page was created/owned by
Kent Weekly (SS/DSV) (DBF), EMCS
to remember
Sharp, Ulysses S Grant, Jr., ADM USN(Ret).
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Contact Info
Home Town Chinook, MT
Last Address San Diego, CA
Date of Passing Dec 12, 2001
Location of Interment Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery (VA) - San Diego, California
Our air power did not fail us; it was the decision makers. And if I am unsurprisingly critical of those decision makers, I offer no apology. My conscience and professional record both stand clear.
–Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp
After his retirement in 1968, Admiral Sharp lectured widely. His chief message reflected his continuing frustration over Vietnam.
''That lesson is that we should never commit the armed forces of the United States to combat unless we have decided at the same time to use the nonnuclear power we have available to win in the shortest possible time,''
Other Comments:
Admiral Sharp was CINCPACFLT during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Admiral Sharp was CINCPAC during the Pueblo Incident
FOREIGN AWARDS:
Taiwan - Order of Cloud and Banner with Grand Cordan
Description The Battle of Hollandia (code-named Operation Reckless) was an engagement between American and Japanese forces during World war II. It took place in spring of 1944 and was part of the New Guinea campaign. The landings were undertaken simultaneously with the amphibious landings at Aitape ("Operation Persecution") to the east. The battle was an unqualified success for the US forces, resulting in a withdrawal by the Japanese to a new strategic defence line in the west of New Guinea and the abandonment of all positions in the east of the island.
Initial operations commenced in the second week of March 1944 with air raids by the Fast Carrier Force on Palau and islands in the Carolines, while aircraft of the US 5th Air Force and the RAAF attacked Japanese airfields along the New Guinea coast from Wewak to the Vogelkop and on Biak Island.
On 30 March and continuing to 3 April these air forces attacked Hollandia itself and the airfields on the Sentani plain. Achieving complete surprise they were able to destroy nearly 100 aircraft on the ground, leaving 6 Air Div unable to resist the planned invasion.
On 16 to 18 April the amphibious forces sailed from their bases at Finschafen and Goodenough Island, taking evasive routes to confuse their intentions until they arrived off Hollandia during the night of 21/22 April. The landings took place at dawn on 22 April after a supporting naval bombardment at each site.
At Tanahmera Bay the two RCT’s from 24 Div. were able to land without opposition, but found the beach to be highly unsuitable. Backed by a swamp just 30 yards from the shoreline, and with just one exit trail unsuitable for vehicles, Tanahmera Bay was quickly written off as a landing site; while the infantry already ashore pressed on to the Sentani plain the remainder of 24 Div was diverted to Humboldt Bay, which had by this time been secured. After four days under these conditions the two units had reached the western airfield and on 26 April it was secured.
Meanwhile at Humboldt Bay 41 Div. also achieved complete surprise, and though the beaches were defended after the naval bombardment the Japanese troops there uncharacteristically abandoned their positions and fled inland. There was some opposition as they pressed forward, but by 24 April they had reached the lake and by 26 April secured the two eastern airfields. The two forces linked up the same day.
The collapse of Japanese resistance has been attributed to lack of preparedness, due to changes in the command structure and to a lack of combat troops; many of the 11,000 men based there were administrative and support units. None of the senior officers present had been in post more than a few weeks and the senior air officer had been relieved following the destruction of his air forces at the beginning of April. Neither Kitazono nor Endo had been able to prepare a comprehensive defence plan, and in any event had neither the men nor the resources to carry it out. On the other hand the Allied operation had been over-insured; concerns over the strength of the Japanese garrison had left the Allies with a four to one advantage in the event.