Steele, James Mortimer, CAPT

Deceased
 
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Last Rank
Captain
Last Primary NEC
112X-Unrestricted Line Officer - Submarine Warfare
Last Rating/NEC Group
Line Officer
Primary Unit
1944-1946, 112X, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC/USPACOM)
Service Years
1916 - 1946
Captain Captain

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Home State
Colorado
Colorado
Year of Birth
1894
 
This Military Service Page was created/owned by Kent Weekly (SS/DSV) (DBF), EMCS to remember Steele, James Mortimer, CAPT USN(Ret).

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Contact Info
Last Address
Denver, CO
Date of Passing
May 24, 1977
 

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Last Known Activity:


Was forced ashore for final years of service due to collision with USS Washington (BB-56) while he was CO of USS Indiana.

   
Other Comments:


Was the commanding officer of USS Utah during attack on Pearl Harbor.

   


World War II/Asiatic-Pacific Theater/Attack on Pearl Harbor
From Month/Year
December / 1941
To Month/Year
December / 1941

Description
The attack on Pearl Harbor, also known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor, the Hawaii Operation or Operation AI by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters,  and Operation Z during planning, was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory, on the morning of December 7, 1941. The attack led to the United States' entry into World War II.

Japan intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with military actions the Empire of Japan planned in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the next seven hours there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines, Guam and Wake Island and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

The attack commenced at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time. The base was attacked by 353 Imperial Japanese fighter planes, bombers, and torpedo planes in two waves, launched from six aircraft carriers. All eight U.S. Navy battleships were damaged, with four sunk. All but Arizona were later raised, and six were returned to service and went on to fight in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship, and one minelayer. 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed; 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were wounded. Important base installations such as the power station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) were not attacked. Japanese losses were light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 64 servicemen killed. One Japanese sailor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured.

The attack came as a profound shock to the American people and led directly to the American entry into World War II in both the Pacific and European theaters. The following day, December 8, the United States declared war on Japan. Domestic support for non-interventionism, which had been fading since the Fall of France in 1940,[19] disappeared. Clandestine support of the United Kingdom (e.g., the Neutrality Patrol) was replaced by active alliance. Subsequent operations by the U.S. prompted Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to declare war on the U.S. on December 11, which was reciprocated by the U.S. the same day.

From the 1950s, several writers alleged that parties high in the U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may have let it happen (or even encouraged it) with the aim of bringing the U.S. into war. However, this advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is rejected by mainstream historians.

There were numerous historical precedents for unannounced military action by Japan. However, the lack of any formal warning, particularly while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to proclaim December 7, 1941, "a date which will live in infamy". Because the attack happened without a declaration of war and without explicit warning, the attack on Pearl Harbor was judged by the Tokyo Trials to be a war crime.
   
My Participation in This Battle or Operation
From Month/Year
December / 1941
To Month/Year
December / 1941
 
Last Updated:
Mar 16, 2020
   
Personal Memories

People You Remember
Was the commanding officer of USS Utah during attack on Pearl Harbor


Memories
On Thursday, 5 December 1941, in the evening, UTAH returned to Pearl Harbor (allegedly following a submarine scare that led to cancellation of Wendsdays' practice), after completing nine weeks of practice bombings with carrier and USMC and Army Air Corps planes. Significantly, a Japanese spy reported not only her arrival, but also that UTAH had departed again that evening. This was not the case, and supports an interesting story: According to Lee Soucy, the UTAH did not tie up at F-11, but was scheduled to enter No.1 drydock to offload her timber. However, fleet flagship PENNSYLVANIA had damaged a screw and naturally taken precedence. Forced to wait, the UTAH in fact stayed in midstream some distance to the side of Battleship Row that night. Then, in the morning, she moved around to the north side of Ford Island.) Friday morning UTAH waited while USS LEXINGTON backed out at 0828 from F-9, and then UTAH tied up with her starboard side against the quays of berth Fox-11, bow facing roughly northeast.(6) Astern of her, the seaplane tender USS TANGIER (AV-8) had been moored at Fox 10 since 3 November, and was facing the opposite direction, on a 230 True bearing. (7) Ahead, were moored the light cruisers USS RALEIGH and USS DETROIT. The UTAH's stay would be short. She was scheduled to move to the shipyward on Monday morning, have the wood removed, and depart for the West Coast. The crew spent all day Friday and most of Saturday morning lifting and stacking the protective timbers to facilitate a fast offload on Monday morning. Consequently soon much of the timbers were now piled in stacks eight feet high topside in preparation to be taken off the ship.

On Sunday morning 7 December 1941, both her skipper, Commander James Mortimer Steele, and XO, Commander W. F. Warris, were ashore on leave. Acting C.O. was thus Engineering Officer LtCdr. Solomon S. Isquith. Though sources disagree slightly, at the time of the attack, the UTAH appears to have had actually mounted four 5/38s and four 5/25s, with two 1.1 quad mounts and fifteen .50 caliber machine-guns. This differed from the assigned secondary armament of four 3in/50, one quad 40mm and one twin 40 mm, two quad 1.1s, four 20mm and eight .50 caliber machine-guns. As it happened, whatever the true battery, it proved completely irrelevant that day. The reason was that heavy "dog house" steel sheds were secured in place over all the weapons except the single 50-calibre mounts. Even the machine guns were dismantled and stored below decks. In short, though No.2 boiler was lit and hot to provide steam while in port, UTAH was almost totally defenceless when the attack eventuated.

0757 to 0801: UTAH is Torpedoed
When the attack began, UTAH was about to activate cranes at 0800 to begin shifting the lumber to prepare it for offloading at the Navy Yard. The first attack planes began sweeping in at less than ten minutes before 0800, and the ships in harbor were preparing for morning colors. As on most of the other ships, on UTAH the bugler and bo'sun were on the fantail for the raising of the colors. In a matter of seconds the bugler began to blow "General Quarters" instead. UTAH's alarm was a big gong with a single stroke, and it now sounded a few times before abruptly silenced. At 0759 a group of planes were seen coming in low over Pearl City. (These were sixteen torpedo planes from the carriers SORYU and HIRYU, and were two-plane groups). The crew was gathering aft for the raising of the flag at 0800 and could hear dull booms from Battleship Row. The flag was just being hoisted and still at the `prep' position at half-mast, when a column of water shot up alongside the RALEIGH just ahead. A torpedo was then sighted heading for the UTAH herself, and the crew immediately broke for their stations. No one ever finished raising her colors.

In the attack that followed, UTAH was struck by two, perhaps even three (see below) torpedoes, blowing massive holes through the fuel tanks, sending seawater and fuel cascading into her compartments, and bursting her old seams. Though UTAH's acting commanding officer would later estimate 0801 as the time the first torpedo struck, a number of details as well as photographs operate to rule this out. Instead, almost certainly, the first hit on UTAH came about 0756/57, almost the exact same moment the RALEIGH is torpedoed. In fact, it is quite likely UTAH was the first ship to be struck that morning. A photograph showing Battleship Row receiving hits at about 0800 clearly shows both the RALEIGH and UTAH hit and smoking. UTAH in fact is already notably listing to port. Further, several survivors accounts agree that UTAH was hit just before she raised morning colors, and indeed, the photographs show the flag only half-raised in the `prep' position of 0755. Finally, one of the group of planes that attacked the north side of Ford Island held its torpedo, skimmed across, and torpedoed the HELENA and OGLALA at 1010 dock, an event which took place at 0758. All of these factors and more point to being hit prior to 0800.(9)

Or is this mistaken? After all, caution must exercised here. There has always been a bit of dispute when the photos of Battleship Row were taken, and USS TANGIER's report is explicit that she opened fire on planes at 0800. She says it is at 0803 that three torpedo planes struck at UTAH. In fact, her report states "Observers aft differ as to whether all three torpedoes hit UTAH or whether two torpedoes hit UTAH and one slid between UTAH's stern and this ship's stern." The possible veracity of this report can be judged by its remarkable consistency with other events: At 0804 the RALEIGH was seen to take a bomb, and settle aft. "At 0805 - USS Arizona, West Virginia, and Oklahoma hit by torpedoes or bombs or both....At 0806 - Arizona exploded internally, foremast capsized, forward part of ship on fire. At 0811 UTAH sunk bottom up." It's worth noting that a clock was stopped burned and blasted on USS Arizona at 0805 by a bomb that exploded in the wardroom, and all agree the main explosion came with moments of the first hit. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence points strongly to UTAH being the first or second ship torpedoed, and within only a minute or two of the first bomb hit on Ford Island's #6 hangar, generally accepted as at 0755.

As it happens, details of the attack on UTAH are somewhat scanty, but this is partly compensated for by photographic documentation. This data, when collated with survivor/eyewitness and salvage reports, allows some reconstruction of the events. As will become clear, it is significant that most witnesses say three Japanese planes, not two, made runs on UTAH. For example, Seaman 2nd Class Truett L. Davis had seen planes coming in, but descended the ladder from the forecastle to the Junior Officer's quarters to swab them, when "the UTAH shook and shuddered with a loud explosion, quickly followed by at least two more." In addition, most accounts that comment on this point agree that the first torpedo to hit the UTAH struck amidships. UTAH's acting skipper, LtCdr. Isquith's report later estimated that the first torpedo hit was at 0801 about frame 84. Though the time estimate was about four minutes too late, the location estimate was nearly exactly correct. This would make it almost dead-on frame 80, since a torpedo hole extending from frames 77 to 82 was found by divers. Just forward of the mainmast, this opened the former No.3 shell room and the port engine room to the sea. Contrary to the impression given in some accounts, it seems the second torpedo hit did not come immediately, though within only a minute or two.

Overhead, this first hit was observed with not elation, but rather disgust by Lt. Matsumura Heita of the HIRYU. After all, before take-off, he had expressly directed that drops not be made on the UTAH. The eight planes of HIRYU's group had bypassed the ships north of Ford Island, but several of the SORYU group had made drops. As if that was not bad enough, seeing the first hit on UTAH, a pilot from the SORYU - Lt. Nakajima Tamotsu - dipped down and proceeded to do the same thing. (Dec 7th says his name is Nakajima Akitsu, int'vd 1/28/51). (10) Perhaps his torpedo was the second hit. Contrary to popular and persistent misconception, the UTAH was not mistaken for an aircraft carrier. In no regard did she resemble one, and it is far more likely that if she was mis-identified at all, it was as a heavy cruiser or battleship. It is worth noting that USS PENNSYLVANIA was in Drydock No.1 and initially overlooked. UTAH may have been taken for the expected eighth battleship, but certainly not for either USS LEXINGTON or USS ENTERPRISE.

This second torpedo struck in the vicinity of frame 57, for a torpedo hole covering frames 55 to 61 was found by the divers. This is a location approximately beneath the stack, just at the break of the aircastle and after deck. Since frames on U.S. warships then were four feet apart, this means the impacts were about sixty-five feet apart. That is, roughly under between the mainmast and foremast respectively. (A recent article by David Aiken - "Torpedoeing Pearl Harbor"in December 2001affirms that the second torpedo struck UTAH forward. This is in accordance with the evidence (11). Curiously enough, it is quite possible a third torpedo struck UTAH between these hits, but failed to detonate, for a puzzling twelve-foot hole at frames 69 to 72 (under the forward part of No.3 turret) was found by the salvage teams. It has been assumed it was simply a structural failure from shock damage, and this may well be the case. (12) There is however, another possibility, for just such `dud torpedo' strikes were reported by an eyewitness, Mess Attendant Clark B. Simmons. In a recent interview with National Geographic (2001), he says:

"I looked out...on the port side toward Pearl City...and as I looked out the port, I saw a plane making a run on the UTAH. And as she dropped her, the torpedo, the wing dipped and then straightened up, and the torpedo headed for the UTAH. And another one right behind it did the same thing. And as it hit the ship we felt the jar but the torpedoes did not explode. They went right into the hull of the ship and let water in. And at that time the bugler sound - man your battle stations, which our battle station was below deck. [We] went down [below], and there was water coming through the ship. It was knee deep."

Taken at face value this extraordinary claim would imply that the torpedoes that hit UTAH did not detonate! This has not been reported before, but given the singular neglect of the UTAH in books, this itself is not decisive. Still, though it is true UTAH's side plating was thin, the damage and flooding suffered seems inconsistent with duds. Twenty to twenty-five foot long holes appear consistent with torpedo detonations. However, given Mr. Simmons' perspective, there is another possibility to consider: Namely, that he did witness at least one dud torpedo hit as described. This could very well be the twelve-foot hole found at frames 69 to 72. A more likely other possibility is a near-miss bomb explosion. At this juncture, it is impossible to know. In any case, whatever their nature, the three holes blown through the hull proved lethal.


   
My Photos From This Battle or Operation
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USS UTAH (BB-31) starting to capsize
USS UTAH (BB-31) prior to Pearl Harbor
USS UTAH (BB-31) as Bomb Test Ship
  USS UTAH (BB-31) after attack on Pearl Harbor

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