Memories Vogelkop Operation 30 July-31 August 1944 At the Sansapor-Mar area, an air base and minor naval facilities were to be established to support subsequent operations northwest toward the Philippines. The air construction task called for the development of fields upon which two fighter groups, five squadrons of medium bombers, and a half squadron of night-fighters could be based. To seize and protect the air-base area, the 6th Infantry Division, less one regimental combat team but reinforced with service and antiaircraft units, was considered sufficient force. General Krueger was made responsible for the direction of the operation and for co-ordination of air, naval, and ground planning.
Plans and Planning Mar lies in flat, swampy ground at the mouth of the Wewe River, which flows into the Pacific about 18 miles west-southwest of the Kaap de Goede Hoop, northernmost point on the Vogelkop. About 7 miles northeast of Mar is Cape Opmarai, and 7 miles to the southwest is Cape Sansapor, situated 2 miles northeast of Sansapor Plantation and the native hamlet of the same name. At many points along the 25 miles of coast line between Kaap de Goede Hoop and Cape Sansapor, spurs of the Tamrau Mountains, which dominate most of the Vogelkop, descend to the shore. Densely forested coastal flats are to be found near Mar and along the shore line northeast of Cape Sansapor. Off Mar lie the Mios Soe Islands, Amsterdam and Middleburg, respectively 5 and 3 miles from the coast.23
Little detailed information concerning the target area was available to ALAMO Force other than that brought back by the 23-30 June reconnaissance party. Japanese activity appeared to center at Sansapor Plantation, where the Japanese were known to maintain a staging base for barges moving along the coast from Sorong to Manokwari. The ALAMO G-2 Section estimated that unless a clearing noted near the mouth of the Wewe proved to be airdrome construction, few more than 100 Japanese would be found at Sansapor-Mar. If the clearing was in preparation for an airfield, then a Japanese airdrome construction unit of perhaps 700 men might be stationed at the objective. The terrain reconnaissance and photographs indicated that good landing beaches existed near Mar and above Cape Sansapor. Potential airdrome sites had been reported at both places and, in addition, it was believed possible that a fighter strip might be constructed on tiny Middleburg Island, the flat surface of which was given over to a neglected coconut tree plantation.
When on 8 July principal air, ground, and naval commanders gathered at General Krueger's command post to discuss plans for the new operation, it immediately became apparent that more intelligence and terrain information would be needed before detailed landing, supply, and engineer plans could be evolved. As a result, only general discussions were held and the conferees reached only tentative conclusions, which they realized might be changed after further reconnaissance at the objective area.
The first question taken up at the 8 July conference was that of setting H Hour, the target date of 30 July being agreeable to all concerned. To assure tactical surprise, General Krueger wanted the landing made at first light, even though Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, now in command of the Fifth Air Force, could not promise air cover until forty-five minutes later. Admiral Fechteler, in charge of the amphibious phase of the operation, was willing to forego air cover since no enemy opposition was expected, but he would approve the early landing hour only if an advance party could be put ashore to guide LST's to the proper beaches. The conferees concluded that putting an advance party ashore might destroy chances for tactical surprise and bring Japanese aircraft over the area. Therefore, H Hour was tentatively set for 0700, about fifteen minutes before sunrise at Mar.
Preliminary naval bombardment was considered unnecessary in the light of expected Japanese dispositions. Without naval bombardment, chances for tactical surprise seemed good. The nearest enemy garrison was at Sansapor, only twelve miles from the proposed landing points near Mar, and the nearest Japanese radio facilities were also thought to be located at Sansapor. If no bombardments were delivered and if the naval forces maintained radio silence until some Japanese opposition was encountered, there would be a good chance to land the entire D Day force before the Japanese realized a landing was under way. Thus, the possibility of harassing attacks by Japanese troops from Sansapor would be reduced, as would the probability of air attacks from Japanese bases within range of Mar.
Much time at the conference was devoted to discussing airdrome construction. The ALAMO Force engineer officer thought Middleburg Island offered the best site for quick construction of an airfield from which local fighter cover could be provided. The Mar area, according to available information, did not appear well suited to airdrome development, although a landing at Mar seemed best from the naval point of view since that area provided favorable beaches for LST's. The conferees therefore thought that the main landing would have to take place near Mar. A shore-to-shore operation to seize the Cape Sansapor area, apparently better suited for airfields, would follow, as might another minor landing to secure the Mios Soe Islands.25
Since lack of detailed terrain information made further planning almost impossible, another reconnaissance party was slipped ashore near Cape Opmarai during the night of 14-15 July. This group, which went forward by PT boat from Noemfoor, encountered no Japanese in the area and found the natives friendly. After spending three days in the Sansapor-Mar area, the group brought out a terrain report which considerably changed tentative plans. First, the reconnaissance disclosed that there was no Japanese airdrome construction in the area and that the previously located cleared strips were actually overgrown native gardens. The best airdrome site was found near two small, reef-bound capes about one and three-fourths miles northeast of Mar. The beaches near and between the two capes were found to be excellent for landing although not too satisfactory for heavy truck traffic. The rain forest in the region was noted to be less dense than anticipated. Finally, the party's airdrome engineers estimated that a 6,000-foot runway could be constructed near the capes within twenty-five days after the landing, providing heavy rains did not impede the work.26
With the new information at hand, final plans were rapidly drawn up by all units concerned. The landing was to be made at 0700 on D Day, 30 July, between the two small capes northeast of Mar. The first airstrip would be constructed in a partially cleared area immediately inland from the westernmost promontory. The Cape Sansapor area, now deemed unsuitable for an airstrip, was selected by naval planners as a PT base site, and plans were made to secure that area by a shore-to-shore operation on D plus 1. Middleburg Island would be seized at H plus 35 minutes on D Day so as to assure another airfield site. Final determination of airfield locations was left to Brig. Gen. Earl W. Barnes, who was to accompany the assault echelon to Mar as the commander of the XIII Air Task Force. This organization was, in effect, an advance echelon of the Thirteenth Air Force, from which was to be drawn the air garrison for the Sansapor-Mar area. General Barnes built his headquarters around men selected from his previous staff, that of the XIII Fighter Command.27
In charge of the ground forces was Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, commanding general of the 6th Infantry Division and previously of the TORNADO Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi. For the Sansapor-Mar operation General Sibert was to command an organization designated the TYPHOON Task Force, which comprised the 6th Division, reinforced, less the 20th Regimental Combat Team. The latter unit was to remain at Wakde-Sarmi as ALAMO Force Reserve for the new operation. Combat units for the D Day echelon of the TYPHOON Task Force were the 1st Infantry, the 1st Battalion of the 63d Infantry, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, a company of the 6th Engineers, and four antiaircraft batteries. There was to be a high percentage of service troops, especially engineers, among the approximately 7,300 men who were to land on 30 July.
The assault on RED Beach, as the landing point was named, was to be undertaken by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Infantry, going ashore in LCVP's from the APD's taking them forward from Wakde-Sarmi. The 3d Battalion was designated TYPHOON Task Force Reserve for the landing, and, if necessary, it would aid the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop to secure Middleburg Island. The reconnaissance unit was to move ashore in LVT's and LVT(A)'s launched from LST's. The 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry, was initially to operate as part of the Shore Party with the Shore Battalion of the 543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 3d Engineer Special Brigade, and was then to revert to a reserve role.
Admiral Fechteler's Attack Force (Task Force 77) was to have a D Day groupment comprising 11 destroyers, 5 APD's, 16 LCI's, 3 rocket LCI's, 8 LST's, 4 PC's, and 1 ATF. A Covering Force (Task Force 78), consisting of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers under the command of Admiral Berkey, was to be available for support fire if needed. In addition to covering the main landing, the naval elements would support the operations against the Mios Soe group on D Day, and on D plus 1 provide LCI and destroyer support fire to cover theshore-to-shore operation against Cape Sansapor. The Allied Naval Forces was responsible for the movement of all troops and supplies from rear bases to Sansapor until relieved by the Services of Supply on 1 September.
Units of the TYPHOON Task Force reaching the objective area on D Day, D plus 2, and D plus 4 were to take with them a ten-day supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment, fuels, and lubricants, and two units of fire for all weapons. After D plus 4, amphibious craft were to bring forward with each unit aboard a ten-day supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment, petroleum products, medical supplies, engineer construction equipment, and motor maintenance supplies. Large cargo ships to arrive after D plus 4 were to carry thirty days' supply of these items, and both types of shipping were to bring forward three units of fire for all weapons of the organizations aboard
|