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Stuvengen, Charles (Stu), BMC USN(Ret).
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Contact Info
Last Address ORFORDVILLE, WI
Date of Passing Nov 30, 2011
Location of Interment Orfordville Lutheran Cemetery - Orfordville, Wisconsin
Charles Gilmour "Chuck" Stuvengen, died on November 30, 2011 at Sun Valley East, Beloit, a victim of Alzheimer's Disease and its side effects. He was born in Janesville on November 16, 1926, the son of Charles Levi and Kirsten Gertrude (Schneeberger) Stuvengen, Orfordville. As a young child, he moved with his family to Galveston, TX, to follow his father's profession as first baseman with the New York Yankees organization, as backup to Lou Gehrig. While a student at Ball High School in 1944, he dropped out to join the Navy, obtaining his GED while in service. One of his proudest moments came on Veterans Day 2001, when he was presented his real diploma from Ball High and a citation from the Governor of Texas. When he returned from World War II, his family had moved to San Francisco, California, and after a short term at City College of S.F., he entered the electrician apprenticeship program at Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard. Chuck and the former Barbara "Bobbe" Poole Lundgren were married at the Lutheran Church of the Good Shepherd, Las Vegas, Nevada 54 years ago on July 5, 1957. They lived in San Francisco until 1965, when they moved back to Orfordville, and he became a Maintenance Electrician at General Motors and member of Local 95, UAW, retiring from there in 1989. Chuck's Navy career lasted nearly 44 years. He served on active duty in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam War. He retired from the Navy Reserve as a Chief Boatswain's Mate in 1986. He was a member of Kenneth S. Wells American Legion Post 209 (Past Commander), SAL Squadron 209, Kienow-Hilt VFW Post 1621, Fleet Reserve Association Branch 376 (Past President), U. S. Naval Institute, Navy Enlisted Reserve Association, and Destroyer-Escort Sailors Association. He served on the Governor's Commission on the USS WISCONSIN, several State and National committees of The American Legion and life member of ANAVICUS (Army, Navy and Air Force Veterans in Canada/US). Until he retired and became more active himself, he was often known throughout the Legion as "Bobbe's Husband". He was a member of Bass Creek Golf Club, a former member and Past President of Decatur Lake Country Club, and longtime secretary of the Orfordville-Footville Golf Association. He was a member of Orfordville Lutheran Church, serving on the Church Council for over 20 years and several years as representative to Lutherdale Bible Camp. Burial in Orfordville Lutheran Cemetery.
Cold War Event - Standoff at Checkpoint Charlie
From Month/Year
October / 1961
To Month/Year
October / 1961
Description The four powers governing Berlin (Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, and France) had agreed at the 1945 Potsdam Conference that Allied personnel could move freely in any sector of Berlin. But on 22 October 1961, just two months after the construction of the Wall, the US Chief of Mission in West Berlin, E. Allan Lightner, was stopped in his car (which had occupation forces license plates) while crossing at Checkpoint Charlie to go to a theatre in East Berlin. The former Army General Lucius D. Clay, US President John F. Kennedy's Special Advisor in West Berlin, decided to demonstrate American resolve.
Clay sent an American diplomat, Albert Hemsing, to probe the border. While probing in a vehicle clearly identified as belonging to a member of the US Mission in Berlin, Hemsing was stopped by East German police asking to see his passport. Once his identity became clear, US Military Police were rushed in. The Military Police escorted the diplomatic car as it drove into East Berlin and the shocked GDR police got out of the way. The car continued and the soldiers returned to West Berlin. A British diplomat — British cars were not immediately recognisable as belonging to the staff in Berlin — was stopped the next day and showed his identity card identifying him as a member of the British Military Government in Berlin, infuriating Clay.
US Commandant General Watson was outraged by the East Berlin police's attempt to control the passage of American military forces. He communicated to the Department of State on 25 October 1961 that Soviet Commandant Colonel Solovyev and his men were not doing their part to avoid disturbing actions during a time of peace negotiations, and demanded that the Soviet authorities take immediate steps to remedy the situation. Solovyev replied by describing American attempts to send armed soldiers across the checkpoint and keeping American tanks at sector boundary as an "open provocation" and a direct violation of GDR regulations. He insisted that properly identified American military could cross the sector border without impediments, and were only stopped when their nationality was not immediately clear to guards. Solovyev contended that requesting identifying paperwork from those crossing the border was not unreasonable control; Watson disagreed. In regards to the American military presence on the border, Solovyev warned:
I am authorized to state that it is necessary to avoid actions of this kind. Such actions can provoke corresponding actions from our side. We have tanks too. We hate the idea of carrying out such actions, and are sure that you will re-examine your course.[16]
Perhaps this contributed to Hemsing's decision to make the attempt again: on 27 October 1961, Mr. Hemsing again approached the zonal boundary in a diplomatic vehicle. But Clay did not know how the Soviets would respond, so just in case, he had sent tanks with an infantry battalion to the nearby Tempelhof airfield. To everyone's relief the same routine was played out as before. The US Military Police and Jeeps went back to West Berlin, and the tanks waiting behind also went home.
Immediately afterwards, 33 Soviet tanks drove to the Brandenburg Gate. Curiously, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev claimed in his memoirs that as he understood it, the American tanks had seen the Soviet tanks coming and retreated. Col. Jim Atwood, then Commander of the US Military Mission in West Berlin, disagreed in later statements. As one of the first to spot the tanks when they arrived, Lieutenant Vern Pike was ordered to verify whether they were indeed Soviet tanks. He and tank driver Sam McCart drove over to East Berlin, where Pike took advantage of a temporary absence of any soldiers near the tanks to climb into one of them. He came out with definitive evidence that the tanks were Soviet, including a Red Army newspaper.
Ten of these tanks continued to Friedrichstraße, and stopped just 50 to 100 metres from the checkpoint on the Soviet side of the sector boundary. The US tanks turned back towards the checkpoint, stopping an equal distance from it on the American side of the boundary. From 27 October 1961 at 17:00 until 28 October 1961 at about 11:00, the respective troops faced each other. As per standing orders, both groups of tanks were loaded with live munitions. The alert levels of the US Garrison in West Berlin, then NATO, and finally the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) were raised. Both groups of tanks had orders to fire if fired upon.
It was at this point that US Secretary of State Dean Rusk conveyed to General Lucius Clay, the US commanding officer in Berlin, that "We had long since decided that Berlin is not a vital interest which would warrant determined recourse to force to protect and sustain." Clay was convinced that having US tanks use bulldozer mounts to knock down parts of the Wall would have ended the Crisis to the greater advantage of the US and its allies without eliciting a Soviet military response. His views, and corresponding evidence that the Soviets may have backed down following this action, support a more critical assessment of Kennedy's decisions during the crisis and his willingness to accept the Wall as the best solution.
With KGB spy Georgi Bolshakov serving as the primary channel of communication, Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to reduce tensions by withdrawing the tanks. The Soviet checkpoint had direct communications to General Anatoly Gribkov at the Soviet Army High Command, who in turn was on the phone to Khrushchev. The US checkpoint contained a Military Police officer on the telephone to the HQ of the US Military Mission in Berlin, which in turn was in communication with the White House. Kennedy offered to go easy over Berlin in the future in return for the Soviets removing their tanks first. The Soviets agreed. Kennedy stated concerning the Wall: "It's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war."
A Soviet tank moved about 5 metres backwards first; then an American tank followed suit. One by one the tanks withdrew. But General Bruce C. Clarke, then the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of US Army Europe (USAREUR), was said to have been concerned about Clay's conduct[citation needed] and Clay returned to the United States in May 1962. Gen. Clarke's assessment may have been incomplete, however: Clay's firmness had a great effect on the German population, led by West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.
