Badger, Charles Johnston, RADM

Other Memories
In 1913 Rear Adm. Charles J. Badger, USN, became Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. The new Chief of Staff was Comdr. Charles F. Hughes, USN. Hughes had been thoroughly briefed at the Navy Department concerning the unsatisfactory radio situation which existed within the fleet and of the necessity for improvement. At his suggestion Badger relieved Hooper of his additional duties as fleet tactical and athletic officer and gave full support of his plans.16
Discipline improved rapidly and a rivalry began between the signalmen and the radiomen with each group determined to obtain the acknowledgements of signals first. This materially improved the efficiency of both methods of signaling and created a healthy communications attitude.17
After observing conditions for a period, Admiral Badger decided that he would exercise the battleship divisions for an entire day by radio signals alone, except that visual signals could be used in an emergency. This was conducted successfully without a single mishap or failure in communications.18
It was fortunate that this exercise was held, for within the week a situation developed which necessitated maneuvering solely by radio signals. Sixteen battleships were about to proceed from Hampton Roads to Annapolis Roads. Just after the signal to get underway had been executed a terrific Chesapeake Bay squall descended accompanied by a howling wind. The visibility was reduced to zero and the situation became critical. Admiral Badger dared not let them anchor again as the current could have swept them into each other. Hesitating only for seconds to ascertain if all ships had their radio manned, he directed his signal transmitted by radio. It was quickly acknowledged by all but the U.S.S. New Jersey. Hooper, quite sure that the New Jersey had suffered a remote transmitter keying line casualty, advised the admiral that he believed she had received the signal, whereupon the latter ordered it executed. The storm continued for half an hour during which time all course and speed changes necessary to lead the fleet through the narrow dredged channel were given and executed by radio with only the New Jersey unable to acknowledge. When the storm passed all the ships were in position astern of the flagship. Badger, relieved of his anxiety, directed that thereafter both radio and visual methods would be used for tactical signaling, and that they would be executed by whichever method was the faster.19
VERACRUZ--PROVING GROUND OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

On April 21, 1914, after a year of strained relations with the revolutionary government of Mexico, President Wilson ordered the Navy to land troops, seize, and occupy the city of Veracruz. This occupation, which continued until November of the same year, was the proving ground of naval communications and pinpointed the deficiencies in our system.
The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, aided by Hooper, had instituted many reforms within the fleet which tended to enhance the tactical and strategic value of radio. Despite these improvements, the system was far from capable of providing the communication services required by a major war.
Radio, Virginia, had been established and equipped with the 100-kw. rotary spark gap and the 35-kw. arc transmitters in the endeavor to provide communication from the seat of government to fleet commanders distant from the U.S. mainland. These both failed to provide continuous direct radio communication between Washington and the ships at Veracruz, nor was such communication possible via Key West, Fla., the closest of the shore stations. Even had this station been successful, shipboard transmitters were of insufficient power to provide two-way communications. This necessitated stationing the U.S.S. Birmingham off Tampico, Mexico, to serve as a relay station between Key West and the U.S.S. Wyoming.23
With the Birmingham at Tampico, satisfactory day and night communications could be maintained provided the men-of-war of other nations, stationed off Veracruz and Tampico for the protection of their nationals, abstained from transmitting when either Key West or the Birmingham was sending. The spark transmitters fitted on the foreign men-of-war created totally disruptive local interferences.24
This situation necessitated the development of a time-sharing plan which was readily approved and adopted by the naval commanders of other nations present. Normally ships of three or four other nations were present and, under this plan, the United States was allotted a 2-hour period and the four other powers present 1 hour each. This resulted in there being periods of 4 or more hours when it was impossible to communicate between the Navy Department and its commander in the field. Although this condition could not be accepted during a major conflict, under the existing conditions a more satisfactory method could not have been devised.25
Mr. Arthur O'Brien, at that time a radioman in the Birmingham, years later related an incident which indicated the excellent state of training and capabilities of the operators on the Wyoming and Birmingham. This proficiency was the result of Hooper's personal supervision and was not generally the condition existing throughout the service. He stated that in one 2-hour schedule, plus an additional minute of encroachment on another country's time, he transmitted 9 messages totalling 3,800 code groups, at a speed better than 31 groups per minute, all of which were correctly received by the operator in the Wycoming without request for repetition. In contrast with this, the English, French, and German operators, transmitted at the rate of 12 code groups per minute, and repeated each group regardless of existing conditions, thus reducing their traffic handling capability to 6 groups per minute. Under the prevailing division of time it would have required 4 days for them to have handled 3,800 code groups.26 This was just 2 months prior to the outbreak of World War I.
The Veracruz occupation was not without its humorous events, one of which occurred on the day the city was occupied. A Mexican gunboat, totally unaware of events, was steaming up the coast with several hundred reinforcements for the garrison at Veracruz. Long before it hove into sight it commenced to call the commercial shore radio station at that port. Because of the interference from the ships in the harbor the shore station was unable to hear the call and at the same time the continuous effort was interfering with the reception of messages by the ships. Finally, the fleet radio officer contacted the vessel and offered to relay the message. This offer was gratefully and courteously accepted. Hooper, on receiving it for relay, expecting it would be military in character, found it to be a message from the captain of the gunboat to his wife stating that he would be home for dinner. One can further imagine his chagrin when, on arriving at Veracruz, his ship was immediately taken into custody.27
Another humorous incident which occurred at the time was occasioned by the press representatives whose only means of forwarding items to their papers was by naval radio. Under the existing condition of time-sharing it was necessary to limit the number of words these representatives could file with the flagship. Additionally, these press items were subjected to delays since they could not take precedence over official messages and at times were several days in reaching their papers. Consequently, a delegation of newsmen prevailed upon the Secretary of the Navy to direct Badger to have the press items transmitted direct to New York without relay. Compliance with this directive was simple enough but it produced no faster press since the radio station at New York was unable to receive the flagship's transmissions. The relay stations, although the press messages were addressed to New York without relay instructions, simply copied the messages and forwarded them on to their destination.28