Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Okinawa, codenamed Operation Iceberg. was fought on the Ryukyu Islands of Okinawa and was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific War of World War II. The 82-day-long battle lastedThe Battle of Okinawa, codenamed Operation Iceberg. was fought on the Ryukyu Islands of Okinawa and was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific War of World War II. The 82-day-long battle lasted from early April until mid-June 1945. After a long campaign of island hopping, the Allies were approaching Japan, and planned to use Okinawa, a large island only 340 mi (550 km) away from mainland Japan, as a base for air operations on the planned invasion of Japanese mainland (coded Operation Downfall). Four divisions of the U.S. 10th Army (the 7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th) and two Marine Divisions (the 1st and 6th) fought on the island. Their invasion was supported by naval, amphibious, and tactical air forces.
The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" in English, and tetsu no ame ("rain of steel") or ("violent wind of steel") in Japanese. The nicknames refer to the ferocity of the fighting, the intensity of kamikaze attacks from the Japanese defenders, and to the sheer numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island. The battle resulted in the highest number of casualties in the Pacific Theater during World War II. Based on Okinawan government sources, mainland Japan lost 77,166 soldiers, who were either killed or committed suicide, and the Allies suffered 14,009 deaths (with an estimated total of more than 65,000 casualties of all kinds). Simultaneously, 42,000–150,000 local civilians were killed or committed suicide, a significant proportion of the local population. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki together with the Soviet invasion of Manchuria caused Japan to surrender less than two months after the end of the fighting on Okinawa.... More
Description The American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe aThe American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe and Asia. Thus, any threat by the Axis Powers to invade the mainland United States or other areas was considered negligible, allowing for American resources to be deployed in overseas theaters.
This article includes attacks on continental territory, extending 200 miles (320 km) into the ocean, which is today under the sovereignty of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and several other smaller states, but excludes military action involving the Danish territory of Greenland, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Aleutian Islands. The most well known battles in North America during World War II were the Attack on Pearl Harbor (the first attack on US soil since the Battle of Ambos Nogales), the Aleutian Islands Campaign, the Battle of the St. Lawrence, and the attacks on Newfoundland.... More
Description The plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest PaciThe plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest Pacific under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the other in the Central, South, and North Pacific (Pacific Ocean Areas) under Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, were created early in the war. Except in the South and Southwest Pacific, each conducted its own operations with its own ground, air, and naval forces in widely separated areas. These operations required at first only a relatively small number of troops whose efforts often yielded strategic gains which cannot be measured by the size of the forces involved. Indeed, the nature of the objectivesùsmall islands, coral atolls, and jungle-bound harbors and airstrips, made the employment of large ground forces impossible and highlighted the importance of air and naval operations. Thus, until 1945, the war in the Pacific progressed by a double series of amphibious operations each of which fitted into a strategic pattern developed in Washington.... More
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be m... The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be met: Participation in the initial landing operation of Leyte and adjoining islands from October 7-20, 1944; or, Participation in any engagement against the enemy during the Philippine Liberation Campaign; or, Service in the Philippine Islands or in ships in Philippine wates for not less than 30 days during the period of October 17, 1944 to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Description In July 1943, following his decision not to attempt to take Rabaul, MacArthur was encouraged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had discussed the strategy at the Quebec conference, to take the AdmiraltIn July 1943, following his decision not to attempt to take Rabaul, MacArthur was encouraged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had discussed the strategy at the Quebec conference, to take the Admiralty Islands instead. The group was strategically located, had a superb protected anchorage at Seeadler Harbor, and had ample flat ground for airfields on Los Negros, east of the harbor. Furthermore, by seizing the Admiralties, MacArthur would bypass the large Japanese force at Hansa Bay on the north New Guinea coast. A target date of 1 January 1944 was set, but this was pushed back to 1 April due to the Cape Gloucester landings and a dispute over the appropriate command arrangements: Halsey controlled the Seabee units needed to build up the naval base. The decision to make Halsey responsible for developing the base was not made until 28 February 1944.
Responsibility for the Admiralties assault was assigned to Walter Krueger, who was allocated 1 Cavalry Division (13,600 men under Innis Swift), 592 Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, and 1 Marine Amphibian Tractor Battalion (25.974 men); 73 Wing (RAAF; 2488 men); and 9545 Navy and 7103 Army service troops to build up the base. 1 Cavalry Division had no previous combat experience but was nevertheless considered an elite formation, with a large number of regular officers and men, a proud tradition, and the only square division organization remaining in the U.S. Army. 5 Air Force (Kenney) carried out a bombing campaign in January and early February against both the Admiralties and any nearby airfields that might provide air support for the Japanese on the islands, succeeding in destroying an estimated 80 Japanese aircraft on the ground in the Admiralties in one strike in early February.
On 22 February 1944, a flight of B-25s found no evidence of Japanese forces at Los Negros and Lorengau. The air strip was overgrown and no troops or vehicles were visible. Encouraged by Kenney, who was convinced the Japanese had pulled out of Los Negros ("ripe for the picking"), MacArthur chose to disregard radio intelligence indicating a garrison of four to five thousand troops were still present. He authorized a reconnaissance-in-force, with the intention of converting this into a full-scale assault if resistance proved light: "... a gamble in which I have everything to win, little to lose. I bet ten to win a million, if I hit the jackpot" (quoted in Taaffe 1998). The order went out on 1500 on 25 February 1944 with the target date set at 29 February. Kinkaid had to order the shore patrol to quickly round up the crew of light cruiser Phoenix so that she could sail in time to support the landings, and MacArthur could no longer expect carrier support from Nimitz, who was not expecting the assault on the Admiralties for another month.
Krueger had serious doubts about the assault, as did Swift, who thought at least 2200 men were needed. Krueger increased the landing force from MacArthur's recommendation of 800 men to over 1000 men, the most that could be landed with the available shipping. Krueger also ensured that there would be shipping for a large followup force, which was the key to the operation if the reconnaissance-in-force became a serious invasion attempt. Barbey pulled together a force of destroyers and destroyer transports for the reconnaissance force, assigning his slower LCIs and LSTs to bring in the followup force.
On 27 February 1944 a reconnaissance patrol of six Alamo Scouts was brought in by Catalina and went ashore by rubber raft. At 0645 the lieutenant in charge radioed that he "Could not get to river. Lousy with Japs." He and his men were extracted the next day. However, Kenney doubted the reports from the Scouts, and MacArthur felt it was too late to cancel the operation.
Initial Reconnaissance. Two days later, 2 Squadron, 5 Cavalry Regiment and supporting elements under William C. Chase were landed on Los Negros. The landing beach selected was at Hyane Harbor. It was very narrow and most of the shore was mangrove swamp, but there was a landing leading directly to Momote Airfield. Colonel Ezaki Yoshio, commanding the Japanese garrison, was expecting the attack. Japanese signals intelligence had intercepted U.S. submarine transmissions from south of the Admiralties, and his troops had spotted the Alamo Scouts coming ashore to reconnoiter. However, Ezaki expected the landings to be at Seeadler or southeast Los Negros and his troops were poorly deployed to meet the landings at Hyane Harbor. Although the the American landing craft encountered heavy fire, particularly in the fourth wave, the troopers encountered little resistance once ashore. Air support and naval gunnery in support of the landings were effective and Momote Airfield was seized by 0950. The landings took over four hours to complete, mostly because there was reluctance to hazard the twelve LCPRs available, which would be needed if there was to be an evacuation.
MacArthur, who had accompanied the invasion force aboard Phoenix, went ashore at 1600, awarded a few decorations, and made the decision to convert the reconnaissance-in-force into a full-scale invasion. However, captured documents had indicated that the radio intelligence estimate of the size of the garrison, not the much smaller aerial reconnaissance estimate, was closer to the truth. Chase wisely abandoned the southern half the airstrip in order to tighten his perimeter. A few outposts were set up outside the perimeter while all available 0.50 Browning antiaircraft machine guns were deployed to the perimeter to beef up its firepower. Barbey likewise left two of his destroyers (Bush and Stockton) offshore to provide call fire.
Ezaki had positioned 1/229 Regiment in the area around Hyane Harbor and Momote Airstrip, while 2/1 Independent Mixed Regiment was deployed at Salami Plantation (147.408E 2.017S) northwest of Hyane Harbor and a third battalion was at Lorengau. Ezaki was ordered by Imamura to throw his entire force against the invaders; however, rather than take the time to marshal his full strength, Ezaki ordered 1/229 Regiment to counterattack at once and "annihilate the enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case capture is imminent" (quoted by Miller 1959). Ezaki apparently grossly underestimated the size of the landing force, thinking only about 200 Americans had come ashore. The Japanese attack began at dusk on 29 February and fell mostly on the southern part of the American perimeter. Although two Japanese infantrymen penetrated to Chase's command post before being cut down, the attack was badly coordinated and was turned back. Some 66 Japanese corpses were later counted within the perimeter, while American casualties were seven killed and fifteen wounded.
The next day, the Americans received additional supplies by air drop, and Chase sent out patrols that used information from captured documents to pinpoint Japanese strong points. These were bombarded by the American artillery, offshore destroyers, and aircraft from 5 Air Force. That afternoon, a patrol of 17 Japanese led by the battalion commander of 1/229 Regiment, who had infiltrated the American perimeter the previous night, got to within 35 yards (32m) of Chase's command post. The Japanese were driven back with heavy casualties, whereupon the survivors committed suicide.
Additional Landings on Los Negros. On 2 March the second echelon arrived to find the beachhead under heavy fire. An attempt to force the passage to Seeadler Bay northwest of Los Negros was driven back by heavy fire from Japanese coastal guns. The LSTs unloaded at Hyane Harbor as their gunners opened fire with 3" guns and 0.50 machine guns, and B-25s and P-40s from 5 Air Force strafed Japanese positions. Seven hours later the ships finished unloading and pulled out. The newly landed Seabees went immediately to work clearing the taxiway between the beach and the runway and the runway itself. Debris scraped from the runway provided convenient cover for the troopers digging in on the west edge of the runway. "One 53-year-old operator drove his grader the full length of the strip three or four times, drawing sniper fire from the coconut grove. When he came in he said, 'I'm sure glad Mother let me come this time; you know, she wouldn't let me go to the other war!'" (Morison 1950)
That afternoon, the Americans went over to the offensive, seizing the revetments west of the airfield. There was little opposition, and the Americans used their engineering equipment to clear fields of fire in front of the new perimeter. Ezaki had ordered a second counterattack on the night of 2/3 March, but his troops were slow to concentrate, and the attack was postponed to the night of 3/4 March. The attack began at 1900 with 2/1 Independent Regiment moving over a causeway passing from the northern part of Los Negros to the Momote area. Heavy gunfire support from offshore destroyers and minesweepers broke up the this column, and attacks by two smaller Japanese columns were poorly coordinated and were broken up by rifle and machine gun fire as the Japanese infantry tried to make their way through mines and trip wires. The survivors pressed on in an unimaginative frontal assault, making no attempts at stealth and, allegedly, singing and shouting misleading orders in English. Although some of the American positions were overrun, the Japanese were forced to pull back by dawn on 4 March. They had suffered hundreds of casualties, while the Americans lost 61 killed and 244 wounded. Of the American casualties, nine of the dead and 38 of the wounded were Seabees. The Japanese garrison no longer had the strength to mount any further serious counterattacks.
On 4 March 1944, the beachhead was reinforced by 7 Cavalry Regiment. The next day, Swift came ashore and took command of the American invasion force. That afternoon, as the Americans were preparing to attack towards Salami Plantation, the Japanese launched a spoiling attack which was easily beaten off but delayed the start of the American attack until 1630. The attacking squadron, 2/7 Cavalry Regiment, found their advance impeded more by Japanese mines than Japanese troops. On 6 March, 12 Cavalry Regimental Combat Team came ashore to reinforce the drive on Salami Plantation, which was finally seized after an hour-long firefight. On 7 March 2/5 Cavalry Regiment took Papitalai (147.408E 2.053S) in a shore-to-shore movement and 2/12 Cavalry Regiment likewise seized Papitalai Mission (147.397E 2.045S) after a sharp firefight. The next day, 2/7 Cavalry Regiment seized Lombrum Plantation (147.374E 2.041S). All these shore to shore movements were supported by the LVTs of 592 Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.
By 9 March, the Allies controlled about half of Los Negros and had silenced the Japanese gun positions on the islets north of Seeadler Bay, clearing the way for 2 Cavalry Brigade (Mudge) to come ashore at Salami Plantation. The Americans had suffered casualties of 116 dead and 434 wounded while killing 1288 Japanese. A group of 68 Sikhs from the Indian Army who had surrendered at Singapore and been impressed as labor troops were also discovered and released by the Americans.
The remaining organized Japanese resistance on Los Negros was centered around Hill 260 (147.385E 2.059S). An attack on 11 March was thrown back when the mortars and flamethrowers of 5 Cavalry Regiment lagged behind the assaulting troops. Reinforcements from 12 Cavalry Regiment joined a second assault on 14 March which, with heavy support from artillery and aircraft, took the hill with only light casualties.
Landings on Manus. Responsibility for the assault on Manus was now assigned to 2 Cavalry Brigade. Reconnaissance elements landed on Manus on 11 March 1944 and found the Lorengau area strongly defended. However, there were suitable beaches for landings west of Lugos Mission (147.242E 2.014S) that were almost undefended. Mudge decided to make his main assault here, supported by artillery on the islets of Seeadler Harbor.
The islets were probed on 11 March 1944 by elements of 302 Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. The Butjo Luo group (147.312E 2.027N) was unoccupied, had suitable sites for artillery, and was well positioned to fire across the front of the advancing American troops. However, Hauei (147.286E 1.962S) was found to be heavily defended, and the reconnaissance patrol withdrew in confusion after taking heavy casualties. The PT boat commander bringing in half of the patrol bugged out after being shot through the ankle, but the LCVP commander bringing in the other half of the patrol was made of sterner stuff. He evacuated the survivors, only to have his boat sunk from under him. The remaining survivors of the patrol and LCVP were spotted in their life jackets by aircraft and rescued a few hours later.
On 12 March, 2/7 Cavalry Regiment returned to Hauei with heavy artillery, naval, and air support, and secured the island the next morning after taking casualties of eight killed and 46 wounded. At least 43 Japanese sailors were killed.
With its supporting artillery sited, 2 Cavalry Brigade was now ready to make its assault. On 15 March the brigade went ashore at Lugos Mission following a heavy bombardment. Japanese roadblocks and a strong Japanese position on a ridge west of Lorengau were reduced with the help of the artillery, and Lorengau airfield was captured on on 17 March. Organized resistance on Manus ended on the 25th. It took until 23 March to reduce the last pocket of Japanese resistance on western Los Negros. The final Japanese strong point, on Pityilu Island (147.225E 1.963S), was heavily bombarded by destroyers and assaulted on 30 March. Although a few hundred Japanese escaped into the interior of Manus, the campaign was effectively over by 3 April 1944, and Krueger declared the campaign officially concluded on 18 May.
Total Allied casualties were 330 killed or missing and 2200 wounded, included 10 Seabees killed and 59 wounded. Japanese casualties were estimated at 4380 killed and 75 taken prisoner. The wild interior of Manus became known as "the Reservation", since inexperienced infantrymen were sent there to hunt Japanese survivors in order to give them some combat experience before deploying further forward.
The Admiralties campaign was a remarkable gamble, with a 1-to-4 ratio of attackers to defenders in its early stages. It succeeded only because of massive Allied air and sea superiority, which prevented the Japanese from shifting troops by barge and left them vulnerable to defeat in detail. MacArthur's reasons for taking such a great risk were complex, but Taaffe (1998) has suggested that MacArthur was motivated at least in part by a desire to upstage Nimitz, who had just conducted a successful campaign in the Marshalls. For MacArthur, what was at stake in the battle was his bid for an offensive along the north coast of New Guinea that would return him to the Philippines. ... More
Description The Battle of Sansapor (Operation Globetrotter) was an amphibious landing and subsequent operations around Sansapor, Dutch New Guinea on the Vogelkop Peninsula during World War II.
Admiral William FeThe Battle of Sansapor (Operation Globetrotter) was an amphibious landing and subsequent operations around Sansapor, Dutch New Guinea on the Vogelkop Peninsula during World War II.
Admiral William Fechteler's Attack Force (Task Force 77) was to have a D-Day groupment comprising 11 destroyers, 5 APD's, 16 LCI's, 3 rocket LCI's, 8 LST's, 4 PC's, and 1 ATF. A Covering Force (Task Force 78), consisting of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers,and 9 destroyers under the command of Admiral Russell Berkey, was to be available for support fire if needed.
In preparation for Operation Typhoon (code name for the US Army landings on the Vogelkop Peninsula), on June 17, 1944, S-47, under Lieutenant Lloyd V. Young, sailed from the Admiralty Islands for Waigeo, with the mission to insert elements of the Alamo Scouts, Allied Intelligence Bureau agents, terrain experts of the Fifth Air Force, and hydrographic survey men of the VII Amphibious Force. The reconnaissance force landed near Sausapor-Mar on June 23 where the party spent the week surveying the region. As a result of the both ground and aerial reconnaissance the assault landing was diverted to land 55 miles (89 km) northeast of Sorong.
On June 30, 1944 Operation Typhoon landed at Sansapar (Green Beach), Mar (Red Beach), Middelburg Island and Amsterdam Island. In charge of the Operation Typhoon ground forces was Major General Franklin C. Sibert, commanding general of the 6th Infantry Division. General Sibert was to command an organization designated the TYPHOON Task Force, which comprised the 6th Division (Reinforced), less the 20th Regimental Combat Team. Combat units for the D-Day echelon of the TYPHOON Task Force were the 1st Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry Regiment, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, a company of the 6th Engineers, and four antiaircraft batteries. All of the landings ultimately proved to be unopposed and it was not until August 16th that elements of the Japanese 35th Division were able to reach the area of the landings. By 31 August the 1-63rd Infantry had killed 155 Japanese and taken 42 prisoners. The American regiment lost only 3 men killed and 4 wounded. The 1st Infantry, on the west flank, killed 197 Japanese and captured 154, while losing only 4 men wounded itself. The 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, during its series of far flung patrols, killed 42 Japanese and captured 5 others. Total battle casualties for the TYPHOON Task Force from 30 July through 31 August were 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured. Japanese losses during the same period were estimated to be 385 killed and 215 captured.
Eventually, the runway for fighter aircraft was built on Middleburg Island and for bombers near Mar to the northeast (the landing strip is still visible to this day), although the control of Sausapor was vital for the security of the base to launch the campaign and remained an air warning radar station. Ships patrolled this area of the coastline throughout the month long campaign, keeping the Japanese at bay. Operation Globetrotter ended on August 31 and General MacArthur's last point of landing on the way back to the Philippines was at Sausapor. Cape Opmarai Airfield is now a nearby, disused airfield.
On 31 July, shore-to shore landings from Cape Opmarai were carried out at Sansapor. The Japanese garrison at Manokwari was cut off and attempted to retreat to Sorong.... More
Description The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II and, by some criteria, possibly the largest naval battle in history.
It was fought in waters near the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar and Luzon from 23–26 October 1944, between combined US and Australian forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy. On 20 October, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia, and in particular depriving its forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied invasion, but was repulsed by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets. The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never afterwards sailed to battle in comparable force. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of fuel, remained in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four separate engagements between the opposing forces: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
It was the first battle in which Japanese aircraft carried out organized kamikaze attacks. By the time of the battle, Japan had fewer aircraft than the Allied forces had sea vessels, demonstrating the difference in power of the two sides at this point of the war. ... More
Description The Battle of Cape Gloucester was a battle in the Pacific theater of World War II, which took place between late December 1943 and April 1944, on the island of New Britain, part of the Territory of NeThe Battle of Cape Gloucester was a battle in the Pacific theater of World War II, which took place between late December 1943 and April 1944, on the island of New Britain, part of the Territory of New Guinea.
The battle was a major part of Operation Cartwheel, the main Allied strategy in the South West Pacific Area and Pacific Ocean Areas during 1943–44, and it was the second World War II landing of the U.S. 1st Marine Division, after Guadalcanal. ... More
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The Aleutian Islands Campaign was a struggle over the Aleutian Islands, part of the Alaska Territory, in the Pacific campaign of World War II starting on 3 June 1942. A small Japanese force occupied tThe Aleutian Islands Campaign was a struggle over the Aleutian Islands, part of the Alaska Territory, in the Pacific campaign of World War II starting on 3 June 1942. A small Japanese force occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska, but the remoteness of the islands and the difficulties of weather and terrain meant that it took nearly a year for a far larger U.S./Canadian force to eject them. The islands' strategic value was their ability to control Pacific Great Circle routes. This control of the Pacific transportation routes is why U.S. General Billy Mitchell stated to the U.S. Congress in 1935, "I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world." The Japanese reasoned that control of the Aleutians would prevent a possible U.S. attack across the Northern Pacific. Similarly, the U.S. feared that the islands would be used as bases from which to launch aerial assaults against the West Coast.
The battle is known as the "Forgotten Battle", due to being overshadowed by the simultaneous Guadalcanal Campaign. In the past, many western military historians believed it was a diversionary or feint attack during the Battle of Midway meant to draw out the U.S. Pacific Fleet from Midway Atoll, and was in fact launched simultaneously under the same overall commander, Isoroku Yamamoto. However, historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have made an argument against this interpretation, stating that the Japanese invaded the Aleutians to protect the northern flank of their empire and did not intend it as a diversion.
Until the end of the Pacific War no one can make a conclusive statement of the objectives of the Japanese attack on the Aleutian Islands in June 1942. The enemy may have been planning the subsequent conquest of all the islands in order to obtain access to Canada and our northwestern states. He may even have aimed at an immediate invasion of Alaska, only to be deterred by our victory at Midway. It is well known that the Japanese had long coveted Alaska and the Aleutians, and that many of their military leaders considered these poorly defended outposts the logical route for an invasion of North America.
The enemy's intentions may have been less ambitious, however. He may merely have planned to protect his northern flank, to divide our forces, and to complicate our defense of Hawaii and the West Coast after the expected capture of Midway.
Whatever his primary motives, the crushing blow administered by our forces in the mid-Pacific drastically revised the strategic situation. The reasons why Japan clung thereafter to her footholds in the western Aleutians are obscure. But it is probable that Attu and Kiska were either to provide jumping-off places for a future invasion, or to constitute advanced observation posts and defenses for the Empire. Perhaps both ends were envisaged. At all events, it was immediately clear that the occupation provided a continuing threat to our security. Even if this threat did not develop, any plans for seizing the offensive in the Central Pacific would be difficult to execute while the enemy maintained his flanking positions in the north. Furthermore, considering the war as a whole, every day
that hostile troops remained on American soil was as beneficial to Japanese morale as it was deleterious to that of our own people.
The situation was grave. Because of our commitments elsewhere, the means of quickly resolving it were far from adequate. As a result, the Japanese were ejected from the Aleutians only after 15 months of arduous operations which were hampered by shortages afloat, ashore, and in the air, as well as by almost insuperable obstacles of weather and terrain.
The Geographical Factor
One cannot form an accurate picture of the Aleutians Campaign without a thorough understanding of the geographical and meteorological peculiarities of the area. Practically every offensive or defensive move by either side was conditioned as much by terrain and weather as by the efforts of the enemy.
Approximately 120 islands comprise the Aleutian chain, which stretches from the tip of the Alaskan peninsula to within 90 miles of Kamchatka. The easternmost island, Unimak, is also the largest, measuring 65 by 22 miles. To the southwest is Unalaska, on the north coast of which Dutch Harbor is located. Unalaska is about 2,000 miles from both San Francisco and Honolulu. Westward, in order, lie Umnak, Atka, and Adak. Kiska is 610 miles west of Dutch Harbor, while Attu, the westernmost American island, is nearly 1,000 miles from the Alaskan mainland and 750 miles northeast of the northernmost of the Japanese Kurile Islands. Attu is about 20 by 35 miles in size.
Terrain
All the Aleutians are volcanic in origin. They are uniformly rocky and barren, with precipitous mountains and scant vegetation. The mountains are conical in shape and covered with volcanic ash and resembling cinders. There are no trees on the islands, except a few stunted spruces at Dutch Harbor, and no brush, which complicates the building and heating problems. The lowlands are blanketed with tundra or muskeg as much as three feet thick. This growth forms a spongy carpet which makes walking most difficult. Below the tundra is volcanic ash which has been finely ground and watersoaked until it has the consistency of slime. In many places water is trapped in ponds under the tundra. Frequently men have fallen into these bogs and been lost.
Throughout the Aleutians, jagged shorelines and submerged rock formations
render navigation hazardous. Conditions are least unfavorable in the eastern islands. Unalaska has two comparatively good anchorages, Dutch Harbor and Captain's Bay, while Umnak has three, of which Nikolski Bay on the west coast is the most important. Farther west, protected anchorages are scarce. Atka has two fair harbors. Adak has three small bays on the west coast. Amchitka offers one small bay on the east coast. Neither Kiska nor Attu possesses a harbor which is entirely suitable for larger vessels. Kiska is the better endowed, having a broad, moderately deep indentation on the eastern shore which is protected by Little Kiska Island, lying across its mouth. Attu has four less adequately guarded bays - Holtz, Chichagof, and Sarana on the northeast side, and Massacre Bay on the southeast.1 Of these Chichagof is the best.
Weather
Meteorological conditions become progressively worse as the western end of the island chain is approached. On Attu five or six days a week are likely to be rainy, and there are hardly more than eight or ten clear days a year. The rest of the time, even if rain is not falling, fog of varying density is the rule rather than the exception. Weather is highly localized, however, and areas of high visibility will often be found within 20 miles of fog concentration.
Throughout the islands annual rainfall averages 40 to 50 inches, spread over most of the year. Precipitation is rarely heavy, but reaches a peak in fall and early winter.
A special hazard to sea and air navigation is provided by sudden squalls known as "williwaws," which sweep down from the mountainous area with great force, sometimes reaching gale proportions within half an hour. The mountains are concentrated on the north sides of the islands, and the williwaws cause strong off-shore winds which make it difficult to find a lee along the north coasts. The columns of spray and mist resulting from the williwaws frequently resemble huge waterfalls.
Winds generally are gusty because of the deflection of air currents by the steep mountain slopes. The greatest velocities occur in March. In the Aleutians, curiously enough, winds and fogs may persist together many days at a time. Humidity is always high. Temperatures are moderate and not subject to much variation. In this connection it should be remembered.... More
Description Because of poor weather, limited photo intel, initial planning estimated 27,000 Japanese garrison troops based on vessel movements. Intel provided just prior to D-day drasticly reduced those estimatesBecause of poor weather, limited photo intel, initial planning estimated 27,000 Japanese garrison troops based on vessel movements. Intel provided just prior to D-day drasticly reduced those estimates to less than 1,600.... More
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
S2c - 12 Mar 1943 (Commissioning)
S1c - 1 Aug 1943
BKR3c - 1 Nov 1943
BKR2c - 1 Jul 1944