Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria Occupation duty in the European-African-Middle Eastern area may be credited to organizations for duty performed on and subsequent to May 8, 1945. Terminal dates for eligibility periods and occupation ... Occupation duty in the European-African-Middle Eastern area may be credited to organizations for duty performed on and subsequent to May 8, 1945. Terminal dates for eligibility periods and occupation territories in this area are as follows: Italy: November 8, 1945 to December 15, 1947, Trieste: May 9, 1945 to October 25, 1954, Germany (exclusive of Berlin): May 9, 1945 to May 5, 1955, Berlin: May 9, 1945 to October 2, 1990, Austria: May 9, 1945 to October 25, 1955, Asiatic-Pacific Area: September 2, 1945 to April 27, 1952. Units performing service in the Korean area during the period of June 27, 1950 to April 27, 1952, inclusive, and which are eligible for the Korean Service Medal, will not be credited with eligibility for the Navy Occupation Service Medal for the same period. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Okinawa, codenamed Operation Iceberg. was fought on the Ryukyu Islands of Okinawa and was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific War of World War II. The 82-day-long battle lastedThe Battle of Okinawa, codenamed Operation Iceberg. was fought on the Ryukyu Islands of Okinawa and was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific War of World War II. The 82-day-long battle lasted from early April until mid-June 1945. After a long campaign of island hopping, the Allies were approaching Japan, and planned to use Okinawa, a large island only 340 mi (550 km) away from mainland Japan, as a base for air operations on the planned invasion of Japanese mainland (coded Operation Downfall). Four divisions of the U.S. 10th Army (the 7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th) and two Marine Divisions (the 1st and 6th) fought on the island. Their invasion was supported by naval, amphibious, and tactical air forces.
The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" in English, and tetsu no ame ("rain of steel") or ("violent wind of steel") in Japanese. The nicknames refer to the ferocity of the fighting, the intensity of kamikaze attacks from the Japanese defenders, and to the sheer numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island. The battle resulted in the highest number of casualties in the Pacific Theater during World War II. Based on Okinawan government sources, mainland Japan lost 77,166 soldiers, who were either killed or committed suicide, and the Allies suffered 14,009 deaths (with an estimated total of more than 65,000 casualties of all kinds). Simultaneously, 42,000–150,000 local civilians were killed or committed suicide, a significant proportion of the local population. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki together with the Soviet invasion of Manchuria caused Japan to surrender less than two months after the end of the fighting on Okinawa.... More
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Kwajalein was fought as part of the Pacific campaign of World War II. It took place from 31 January-3 February 1944, on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Employing the hard-learneThe Battle of Kwajalein was fought as part of the Pacific campaign of World War II. It took place from 31 January-3 February 1944, on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Employing the hard-learned lessons of the battle of Tarawa, the United States launched a successful twin assault on the main islands of Kwajalein in the south and Roi-Namur in the north. The Japanese defenders put up stiff resistance, although outnumbered and under-prepared. The determined defense of Roi-Namur left only 51 survivors of an original garrison of 3,500.
For the US, the battle represented both the next step in its island-hopping march to Japan and a significant moral victory because it was the first time the Americans had penetrated the "outer ring" of the Japanese Pacific sphere. For the Japanese, the battle represented the failure of the beach-line defense. Japanese defenses became prepared in depth, and the battles of Peleliu, Guam, and the Marianas proved far more costly to the US. ... More
Description Japan took over in 1914 and colonised the Marshalls extensively, developing and fortifying large bases on many of the islands. Roi-Namur was the target of the U.S. 4th Marine Division in the Battle ofJapan took over in 1914 and colonised the Marshalls extensively, developing and fortifying large bases on many of the islands. Roi-Namur was the target of the U.S. 4th Marine Division in the Battle of Kwajalein, in February 1944. During the Japanese occupation, the two islands were connected by a narrow neck of land and causeway. After the American occupation, US Navy SeaBees filled the area between the islands by December 1944; the two islands are now joined are presently called Roi-Namur with a total area of about one square mile. ... More
Description The Battle of Peleliu, codenamed Operation Stalemate II, was fought between the United States and the Empire of Japan in the Pacific Theater of World War II, from September–November 1944 on the islandThe Battle of Peleliu, codenamed Operation Stalemate II, was fought between the United States and the Empire of Japan in the Pacific Theater of World War II, from September–November 1944 on the island of Peleliu, present-day Palau. U.S. Marines of the First Marine Division and later soldiers of the U.S. Army's 81st Infantry Division, fought to capture an airstrip on the small coral island. This battle was part of a larger offensive campaign known as Operation Forager which ran from June–November 1944 in the Pacific Theater of Operations.
Major General William Rupertus, USMC—commander of 1st Marine Division—predicted the island would be secured within four days. However, due to Japan's well-crafted fortifications and stiff resistance, the battle lasted over two months. In the United States, it was a controversial battle because of the island's questionable strategic value and the high casualty rate, which exceeded all other amphibious operations during the Pacific War. The National Museum of the Marine Corps called it "the bitterest battle of the war for the Marines".... More
Description The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II and, by some criteria, possibly the largest naval battle in history.
It was fought in waters near the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar and Luzon from 23–26 October 1944, between combined US and Australian forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy. On 20 October, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia, and in particular depriving its forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied invasion, but was repulsed by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets. The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never afterwards sailed to battle in comparable force. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of fuel, remained in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four separate engagements between the opposing forces: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
It was the first battle in which Japanese aircraft carried out organized kamikaze attacks. By the time of the battle, Japan had fewer aircraft than the Allied forces had sea vessels, demonstrating the difference in power of the two sides at this point of the war. ... More
Description Around 08:00 on 24 October, the Center Force was spotted entering the Sibuyan Sea and attacked by VF-20 squadron F6F-5 Hellcat fighters, VB-20 SB2C-3 Helldiver dive bombers, and VT-20 Avenger torpedo Around 08:00 on 24 October, the Center Force was spotted entering the Sibuyan Sea and attacked by VF-20 squadron F6F-5 Hellcat fighters, VB-20 SB2C-3 Helldiver dive bombers, and VT-20 Avenger torpedo bombers from USS Enterprise of Halsey's 3rd Fleet. Despite its great strength, 3rd Fleet was not well-placed to deal with the threat. On 22 October, Halsey had detached two of his carrier groups to the fleet base at Ulithi to provision and rearm. When Darter 's contact report came in, Halsey recalled Davison's group, but allowed Vice Admiral John S. McCain, with the strongest of TF 38's carrier groups, to continue towards Ulithi. Halsey finally recalled McCain on 24 October—but the delay meant the most powerful American carrier group played little part in the coming battle, and the 3rd Fleet was therefore effectively deprived of nearly 40% of its air strength for most of the engagement. On the morning of 24 October, only three groups were available to strike Kurita's force, and the one best positioned to do so—Gerald F. Bogan's Task Group 38.2 (TG 38.2)—was by mischance the weakest of the groups, containing only one large carrier—USS Intrepid—and two light carriers (the failure to promptly recall McCain on 23 October had also effectively deprived 3rd Fleet, throughout the battle, of four of its six heavy cruisers).... More
Description he battle of Cape Engano (25 October 1944) was a one-sided American victory that saw Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet sink four Japanese aircraft carriers, but at the same time exposing the invasion shippinhe battle of Cape Engano (25 October 1944) was a one-sided American victory that saw Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet sink four Japanese aircraft carriers, but at the same time exposing the invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf to a possible Japanese attack.
The Japanese had long realised that an American conquest of the Philippines would cut their empire in half, isolating their main sources of fuel in the south. Accordingly they decided to fight the 'decisive battle' of the war in the Philippines, using just about every available naval unit. Admiral Ozawa's Main Force was to sail from Japan, where new naval aviators had been training, and approach the American fleet from the north. In the final version of the plan his role was to draw the powerful American 3rd Fleet away from the invasion fleet, leaving them vulnerable to an attack by other Japanese forces approaching from the west.
Admiral Ozawa started the battle with four carriers, two battleships that had been converted to carry some aircraft, three cruisers and eight destroyers. The four carriers were something of a mixed bag. The best of them was the Zuikaku, a veteran of the attack on Pearl Harbor and one of the best Japanese carriers of the war. The other three were less impressive. Zuiho was a light carrier produced during 1940 by converting a submarine support ship. Chitose and Chiyoda were sister ships produced by modifying seaplane carriers. Work on the conversions began in the aftermath of the battle of Midway and they arrived in service in late 1943-early 1944.
The two battleships were the Ise and Hyuga, both of First World War vintage. After Midway their rear turrets had been removed and a short flight deck installed. Neither ship was carrying any aircraft at Leyte Gulf.
Halsey's 3rd Fleet contained fifteen fleet carriers, seven modern fast battleships, twenty one cruisers and fifty eight destroyers. His orders were to protect the landing fleets at Leyte Gulf but also to seek out a chance to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.
On 24 October the Americans detected all of the incoming Japanese fleets (although Ozawa's carriers weren’t found until quite late in the day). Halsey launched a series of air strikes on the most powerful of the surface fleets, Admiral Kurita's I Striking Force. This contained the Musashi and Yamato, the two most powerful battleships in the world, but during the day the Musashi was sunk by repeated air attacks. Kurita briefly turned back to avoid further attacks while passing through the narrow San Bernardino Straits. This, combined with a belief that Kurita had suffered more damage than he had, convinced Halsey that the Japanese battleships no longer represented a serious threat and could be dealt with by the old battleships and escort carriers of Admiral Kinkaid's 7th Fleet. In contrast four Japanese aircraft carriers posed a potentially very serious threat to the invasion fleet, and so at 20.00 Halsey ordered his entire fleet to move north.
At this point the American command structure broke down. Halsey created a new Task Force 34, under Admiral Lee. This force, of four battleships and a large number of cruisers, might be used to engage Kurita if he passed through the San Bernardino Strait. As Halsey didn't expect this to happen Lee's ships were taken north with him. Unfortunately Kinkaid heard this message and assumed that Task Force 34 was being left behind to watch Kurita. Kinkaid thus felt free to move his six old battleships south to deal with Nishimura's fleet heading for the Surigao Strait. Kinkaid was not the only person to make this assumption - Admiral Nimitz back on Hawaii also believed that Task Force 34 was watching the San Bernardino Strait.
At 2.2am Admiral Mitscher's scout plans find the Japanese carriers. The first of a series of air strikes went in at about 8am. The few Japanese aircraft left were quickly destroyed and in this first attack the light carrier Chitose was sunk and the fleet carrier Zuikaku hit by a torpedo. The second attack was unopposed and the Chiyoda was badly damaged. At about the same time Halsey received the first in a series of messages from Kinkaid requesting urgent help. Kurita's powerful battleships had indeed emerged from the San Bernardino Strait and turned south to head for Leyte Gulk. Instead they ran into six of Kinkaid's escort carriers and a desperate running battle began (Battle of Samar). Over the next two hours Kinkaid sent two more increasingly urgent requests for help, but Halsey refused to be budged. He was dealing with the most dangerous Japanese fleet and Kinkaid would have to cope by himself (to be fair to Halsey by the time the second and third messages arrived Kurita had withdrawn from combat with the escort carriers, but it was still at large).
At around 10am Halsey received a message from Nimitz, 'Where is repeat where is Task Force thirty-four'. Unfortunately some padding added to increase security was erroneously left in the final message, so Halsey read ' Where is repeat where is Task Force thirty-four rr The World Wonders'. Halsey was furious, but he did finally send one of his three carrier task groups south to try and help Kinkaid.
The remaining carriers launched a third strike on the Japanese carriers at 1.10pm. This time Zuikaku and Zuiho were both set on fire. Zuiho managed to keep going, but Zuikaku was doomed and at 2.07 she sank. The fourth and final American strike finished off the Zuiho. The last Japanese carrier, Chiyoda, was already dead in the water and sank later. The two converted battleships managed to escape, but the Japanese carrier force had been eliminated. Further south Kinkaid's carriers had escaped total destruction through their own efforts, and Kurita had retreated back through the San Bernardino Strait.
Halsey's conduct of the battle has remained controversial. Afterwards he wrote 'At that moment Ozawa was exactly 42 miles from the muzzles of my 16in guns. … I turned my back on the opportunity I had dreamed of since my days as a cadet', a revealing statement that suggests that Halsey was so focused on the chance of engaging in a major gun battle that he ignored the danger to his south.
Description The Battle of Samar (25 October 1944) was the nearest the Japanese came to success during the battle of Leyte Gulf and saw a powerful Japanese battleship force come close to destroying a force of AmerThe Battle of Samar (25 October 1944) was the nearest the Japanese came to success during the battle of Leyte Gulf and saw a powerful Japanese battleship force come close to destroying a force of American escort carriers.
The Japanese realised that an American invasion of the Philippines or of Formosa would cut their Empire in half and prevent vital supplies reaching the Home Islands from the south part of the empire. They decided to try and fight the 'decisive battle' of the war wherever the Americans attacked next. If the Americans attacked the Philippines then the Japanese hoped to use the scattered elements of their fleet in a coordinated attack that might allow them to get at the vulnerable invasion fleet. In the final version of the plan Admiral Ozawa's carriers, coming from Japan, were to drag the US 3rd Fleet away from the invasion beaches in Leyte Gulf, allowing three other Japanese fleets to advance through the central Philippines to attack the invasion fleets.
The most important of these three fleets was Admiral Kurita's I Striking Force. Admiral Kurita began the battle of Leyte Gulf with a powerful fleet, containing five battleships, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Amongst the battleships were the Musashi and the Yamato, the biggest and most powerful battleships in the world. He also had the older battleships Kongo, Haruna and Nagato, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. This force suffered grievous losses before reaching Samar. In the two day battle of the Sibuyan Sea (23-24 October 1944) the Musashi was sunk by American aircraft, two cruisers were sunk by two American subs and a third crippled. Kurita started the battle of Samar with four battleships, six cruisers and ten destroyers.
On the American side the bulk of the battle was fought by Admiral Sprague's Taffy Three, with six escort carriers, three destroyers and four destroyer escorts. The escort carriers carried modern aircraft, but these were armed for ground attack and so didn't have many of the armour piercing bombs needed against battleships. Twelve more escort carriers in two groups were in the area, but the 7th Fleet's six old battleships were away to the south defending the Surigao Strait. The powerful modern carriers and fast battleships of the 3rd Fleet had been lured away to the north to try and intercept Ozawa's carriers (Battle of Cape Engano). Admiral Kinkaid, commander of the 7th Fleet, believed that Halsey had left a powerful task force (Task Force 34, Admiral Lee) to watch Kurita, but in fact this force had accompanied the 3rd Fleet north.
On the night of 24-25 October Kurita passed through the San Bernardino Straits, turned south and headed for Leyte Gulf. Soon after this, at about 5.30, he learnt that Admiral Nishimura's force had been destroyed and Admiral Shima was retreating (battle of the Surigao Strait). He probably never received the messages Ozawa sent out announcing that the 3rd Fleet was chasing him. Kurita could justifiably believe that the main parts of both the US 3rd and 7th Fleets were somewhere in or close to Leyte Gulf.
At about dawn (6.30) Kurita found Admiral Sprague's Taffy 3, a task force made up of six escort carriers and seven escorts. Kurita believed that he had found a 'gigantic enemy task force' containing large carriers, cruisers, destroyers and possibly battleships. He decided to abandon the charge into Leyte Gulf and turned to attack Sprague's force. At 6.58 the Yamato's main guns opened fire on a surface target for the first time.
Sprague realised that he was in trouble. At 7.01 he issued a call for help in the clear, ordered his aircraft into the air and headed for a nearby rain squall. Under cover of the rain he decided to try and reach the support of Taffy 2, thirty miles to the south. His destroyers were ordered to attack the Japanese fleet while the carriers made their best speed south.
Sprague's aircraft had a limited potential to do serious damage to the Japanese battleships. The escort carriers didn't have enough storage space to carry both fragmentation bombs for ground support and a significant number of armour piercing bombs. The Japanese had no way to know that, and the American aircraft were able to force the Japanese heavy ships into frantic manoeuvres, slowing their pursuit of the carriers. The torpedo firing destroyers were equally effective.
Just after 7.20am the cruiser Kumano was hit by a torpedo from the US destroyer Johnston DD-557. Her speed was reduced, and at 9.45 she was detached from the main fleet and ordered back through the San Bernardino Strait. This brought her into range of aircraft from the US 3rd Fleet and at around 9.45 she was attacked by SB2C dive-bombers and TBM torpedo bombers from TF 38. They only managed to score one near miss. A second attack early on 26 October managed three bomb hits, but the cruiser could still make 10kts. The Kumano managed to reach safety at Manila where she underwent repairs before leaving for Japan on 5 November. Her luck now turned - her convoy was attacked by four American submarines and the cruiser was hit twice. She remained afloat and reached Dasol Bay on the Luzon coast, but on 25 November she was sunk by American aircraft.
This first destroyer attack cost the Americans dearly. The Johnston was hit by three 14in and three 6in shells and the Hoel by shells that disabled her main engine. The Hoel remained in the fight until she was unable to move and at about 8.30 her crew abandoned ship.
A little further south the escort carriers came under fire from the Japanese battleships. Kalinin Bay and Gambier Bay were both hit but managed to main their position until the Gambier Bay was hit in the forward engine room. The destroyer Johnston attempted to distract attention from the stricken carrier but without success and the Gambier Bay sank at around 8.45am. The Johnston then managed to break up a light cruiser attack on the carriers, but in the process she became their main target and was sunk. Only 141 of her 327 crewmen survived.
The cruiser Chikuma was hit by a torpedo at around 8.54. It was a sign that Sprague's men were getting closer to help that this torpedo was probably launched by an aircraft from Admiral Felix B. Stump's Task Group 77.4.2. The engine rooms flooded, and the ship came to a halt. She was unable to respond when Kurita decided to withdraw from battle, and was left alone. She sank during the day with the loss of most of her crew. Another 100 were rescued by the destroyer Nowaki, but that ship was lost on the night of 25-26 October with the loss of all hands.
The cruiser Chokai was hit by 500lb bombs at around 9.05am. The bombs caused heavy fires and damaged the forward engine room. The cruiser came to a halt, and couldn't be rescued. At around 10.30 the crippled cruiser was sunk by a spread of torpedoes from the destroyer Fujinami.
By this time Kurita was rather losing his grip on the battle. The Yamato was some way behind his cruisers and visibility was poor. He wasn't aware of the damage to three of his cruisers, and had lost sight of the carriers. At 9.11, believing that he had won a major victory over a squadron of fleet carriers, Kurita ordered his surviving ships to withdraw from the battle.
At about 10.50 the cruiser Suzuya suffered a near miss that detonated the torpedoes in the starboard forward torpedo tubes. This set off a fire made worse when more of her torpedoes exploded at around 11.00. Damage control measures failed and at about 12 noon a series of ammunition explosions began. The ship was abandoned at 1pm and sank twenty minutes later.
Taffy 3's ordeal wasn't yet over. At 10.50, just as the Suzuya was being attacked, nine kamikaze aircraft attacked the task group, in one of the first organised suicide attacks of the war. Most were destroyed or missed, but one hit the escort carrier St Lô, triggering explosions that sank her. A second kamikaze attack twenty minutes later did more damage but failed to sink anything.
It took Kurita about two hours to regroup. He then turned south with his remaining fifteen ships in an attempt to reach Leyte Gulf, the original target of his operation. At 11.40 one of his lookouts reported sighting a battleship and destroyers. The fleet turned aside to chase this phantom before turning south again. At around 12.30, when only forty five miles from Leyte Gulf, Kurita decided that it wasn't worth risking the destruction of his fleet just to sink empty transport ships. He had also received reports that an American carrier task force had been sighted 113 miles north of the gulf, and he now decided to turn north to deal with this
In fact Halsey's carriers were still far to the north. All morning he had been receiving urgent calls for help, but had refused to turn back. In the resulting battle of Cape Engano Halsey sank all four of Ozawa's carriers. At around 11 he ordered one of his carrier groups to turn south, and his fourth carrier group, which was some way to the east, was also directed towards Kurita. This fourth task group was first to come into range and during the afternoon it launched two attacks on Kurita's fleet. After spending all afternoon looking for the American carriers Kurita retired to the eastern end of the San Bernardino Strait at 6pm. He was under orders to wait for dark and try and fight a night battle, but at 9.25, with fuel short, he decided to retreat west through the straits. He would suffer further air attack on 26 October, but the main fighting in Leyte Gulf was over.
Kurita has since been blamed for his decisions to withdraw from combat at 9.11 and to turn back from Leyte Gulf at 12.30. Both can be defended using the information available to Kurita at the time, but he later believed the second decision to have been a mistake. If Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf then his fleet would almost certainly have been destroyed - if not by Kinkaid's escort carriers and old battleships then by the 3rd Fleet. All he could have achieved was the destruction of empty transport ships, and perhaps a damaging bombardment of the US troops on Leyte, but neither would have altered the eventual course of the fighting in the Philippines.
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_samar.html... More
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description In the Pacific Theater of World War II, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign, from November 1943 through February 1944, were key strategic operations of the United States Pacific Fleet and MarineIn the Pacific Theater of World War II, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign, from November 1943 through February 1944, were key strategic operations of the United States Pacific Fleet and Marine Corps in the Central Pacific. The purpose was to establish airfields that would allow land based air support for the upcoming operations across the Central Pacific. The campaign began with a costly three-day battle for the island of Betio at the Tarawa atoll. The campaign was preceded a year earlier by a diversionary raid on Makin Island by U.S. Marines in August, 1942.
About 4,000 kilometers southwest of the Hawaii Islands, the Marshall Islands represented part of the perimeter of the Japanese Pacific empire. The former German colony was given to Japan after the closure of WW1, and had since been an important part of both offensive and defensive plans of the Japanese Navy. By the end of 1943, Admiral Mineichi Koga of the Japanese Combined Fleet knew the Americans were eyeing the islands, but he could not figure out where they would strike. His difficulties were further complicated by the lack of carrier aircraft, as they were taken away from him in an attempt to reinforce land-based squadrons. With his hands tied, all Koga could do was to send his submarines out as forward observers and order the regional commander in Truk Admiral Masashi Kobayashi to reinforce the island garrisons that were most exposed to American attacks. Kobayashi shifted men to the outer islands of Jaluit, Mili, Wotje, and Maloelap. In total, Kobayashi had 28,000 troops available to him in the Marshall Islands. For a garrison that size ground fortifications were sub-par, but that was rather by design at this stage of the war, for that Tokyo had since decided that the Marshall Islands were to serve only as a part of a delay action campaign. The new defensive perimeter was to be established much closer to the home islands.
American intelligence decoded Japanese messages and detected movements for the outer islands, and decided to change the invasion plans. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the Americans were now bypassing the reinforced outer islands; they were now directly attacking Kwajalein and Eniwetok.... More
