Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe aThe American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe and Asia. Thus, any threat by the Axis Powers to invade the mainland United States or other areas was considered negligible, allowing for American resources to be deployed in overseas theaters.
This article includes attacks on continental territory, extending 200 miles (320 km) into the ocean, which is today under the sovereignty of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and several other smaller states, but excludes military action involving the Danish territory of Greenland, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Aleutian Islands. The most well known battles in North America during World War II were the Attack on Pearl Harbor (the first attack on US soil since the Battle of Ambos Nogales), the Aleutian Islands Campaign, the Battle of the St. Lawrence, and the attacks on Newfoundland.... More
Other Memories
USS PC-815 was a PC-461-class submarine chaser built for the United States Navy during World War II. PC-815 is notable for being the ship commanded by L. Ron Hubbard, who later became the founder of Scientology. However, PC-815's short career has led to the vessel being dubbed the "jinxed sub-chaser".
PC-815 was laid down on October 10, 1942 at the Albina Engine and Machinery Works in Portland, Oregon. She was fitted out commencing December 5 and was commissioned on April 20, 1943, with Lieutenant (j.g.) L. Ron Hubbard in command.[3]. A few weeks later she sailed down the Columbia River to Astoria, Oregon, where she arrived on May 17 to take on supplies. On May 18, the PC-815 left Astoria for Bremerton, Washington, where she was to have radar and depth charge launchers fitted. Her journey was interrupted by an air-sea rescue operation, then was resumed with a new destination - San Diego.[3]
[edit] The "jinxed sub-chaser" [edit] Claims of submarine contact off Cape Lookout In the early hours of May 19, the crew of PC-815 detected what Hubbard thought was first one then later two Imperial Japanese Navy submarines approximately 10 nautical miles (19 km) off the shore of Cape Lookout. Both the SONAR operator and Lt. Hubbard himself thought that the echo of an active sonar ping, combined with apparent engine noises heard through the ship's hydrophone indicated contact with a submarine.[4]
Over the next 68 hours, the ship expended 37 depth charges in a "battle" that also involved the US Navy blimps K-39 and K-33, the US Coast Guard patrol boats Bonham and 78302, and the subchasers USS SC-536 and USS SC-537, all summoned to act as reinforcements. PC-815 was finally ordered back to base on May 21.[5]
In his eighteen page after-action report, Hubbard claimed to have "definitely sunk, beyond doubt" one submarine and critically damaged another. However, the subsequent investigation by the Commander NW Sea Frontier, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, cast a skeptical light on Hubbard's claims. His summary memorandum to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, stated:
It is noted that the report of PC 815 is not in accordance with "Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Ship" (ASW-1) which should be submitted to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.[6] An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was no submarine in the area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was unable to obtain any evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is unexplained except by turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The Commanding Officers of all ships except the PC-815 state they had no evidence of a submarine and do not think a submarine was in the area.[7] Fletcher added that "there is a known magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were dropped", absolving the responding blimps from any fault as their method of detecting submarines relies on a Magnetic Anomaly Detector. This also implied that Lt. Hubbard and his crew were operating the ship's SONAR equipment incorrectly.[8] After the war, British and American analyses of captured Japanese Navy records confirmed that no Japanese submarines had been lost off the Oregon coast.[9] Hubbard, however, never accepted that he had been mistaken about the "battle." Both he and Tom Moulton, one of his officers, claimed that the official denials of any Japanese submarine presence off the Pacific coast had been motivated by a desire to avoid panic among the U.S. population.[10] Years later, Hubbard told Scientologists:
I dropped the I-76 or the Imperial Japanese Navy Trans-Pacific Submarine down into the mouth of the Columbia River, dead duck. And it went down with a resounding furor. And that was that. I never thought about it again particularly except to get mad at all the admirals I had to make reports to because of this thing, see? This was one out of seventy-nine separate actions that I had to do with. And it had no significance, see? But the other day I was kind of tired, and my dad suddenly sprung on me the fact that my submarine had been causing a tremendous amount of difficulty in the mouth of the Columbia River. Hadn't thought about this thing for years. Of course, it's all shot to ribbons, this thing. It's got jagged steel sticking out at all ends and angles, and it's a big submarine! It's a -- I don't know, about the size of the first Narwhal that we built. And the fishermen coming in there and fishing are dragging their nets around in that area, and it's just tearing their nets to ribbons -- they've even hired a civilian contractor to try to blow the thing up and get it the devil out of there -- and has evidently been raising bob with postwar fishing here for more years than I'd care to count.[11] It should be noted, however, that the mouth of the Columbia River is some 75 miles north of Cape Lookout, the area in which Hubbard's naval reports claimed his anti-submarine action took place.
[edit] Unauthorized shelling of Coronado Islands and failure to follow orders A month later, the PC-815 traveled to San Diego, which was to become her home port. She arrived there on June 2, and at the end of June was ordered to sea to join an anti-submarine training exercise.[3] The exercise, held on June 28, ended early and Hubbard took the opportunity to order an impromptu gunnery exercise while anchored just off the Mexican territory of South Coronado Island to the south-west of San Diego. The Mexican government sent an official protest to the US Government, as no gunnery operations had been scheduled.
Another view of USS PC-815 on trialsOn June 30 a Board of Investigation was convened concerning PC-815 which concluded that Hubbard had disregarded orders, both by conducting gunnery practice and by anchoring in Mexican territorial waters without proper authority. His orders stated that the PC-815 was supposed to return after completing that day's training. Hubbard argued that his crew was inexperienced, it was foggy, and he was tired so he did not return to port as ordered. A month earlier in his after action report concerning the recent fiasco off Cape Lookout, he had described the same men as "experienced" and "highly skilled". Vice Admiral Fletcher, who both chaired the board and read the prior after action report, rated Hubbard "below average" and noted: "Consider this officer lacking in the essential qualities of judgement, leadership and cooperation. He acts without forethought as to probable results. He is believed to have been sincere in his efforts to make his ship efficient and ready. Not considered qualified for command or promotion at this time. Recommend duty on a large vessel where he can be properly supervised". Hubbard was relieved of command effective July 7, 1943
USS PC-815 was a PC-461-class submarine chaser built for the United States Navy during World War II. PC-815 is notable for being the ship commanded by L. Ron Hubbard, who later became the founder of Scientology. However, PC-815's short career has led to the vessel being dubbed the "jinxed sub-chaser".
PC-815 was laid down on October 10, 1942 at the Albina Engine and Machinery Works in Portland, Oregon. She was fitted out commencing December 5 and was commissioned on April 20, 1943, with Lieutenant (j.g.) L. Ron Hubbard in command.[3]. A few weeks later she sailed down the Columbia River to Astoria, Oregon, where she arrived on May 17 to take on supplies. On May 18, the PC-815 left Astoria for Bremerton, Washington, where she was to have radar and depth charge launchers fitted. Her journey was interrupted by an air-sea rescue operation, then was resumed with a new destination - San Diego.[3]
[edit] The "jinxed sub-chaser"
[edit] Claims of submarine contact off Cape Lookout
In the early hours of May 19, the crew of PC-815 detected what Hubbard thought was first one then later two Imperial Japanese Navy submarines approximately 10 nautical miles (19 km) off the shore of Cape Lookout. Both the SONAR operator and Lt. Hubbard himself thought that the echo of an active sonar ping, combined with apparent engine noises heard through the ship's hydrophone indicated contact with a submarine.[4]
Over the next 68 hours, the ship expended 37 depth charges in a "battle" that also involved the US Navy blimps K-39 and K-33, the US Coast Guard patrol boats Bonham and 78302, and the subchasers USS SC-536 and USS SC-537, all summoned to act as reinforcements. PC-815 was finally ordered back to base on May 21.[5]
In his eighteen page after-action report, Hubbard claimed to have "definitely sunk, beyond doubt" one submarine and critically damaged another. However, the subsequent investigation by the Commander NW Sea Frontier, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, cast a skeptical light on Hubbard's claims. His summary memorandum to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, stated:
It is noted that the report of PC 815 is not in accordance with "Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Ship" (ASW-1) which should be submitted to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.[6]
An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was no submarine in the area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was unable to obtain any evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is unexplained except by turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The Commanding Officers of all ships except the PC-815 state they had no evidence of a submarine and do not think a submarine was in the area.[7]
Fletcher added that "there is a known magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were dropped", absolving the responding blimps from any fault as their method of detecting submarines relies on a Magnetic Anomaly Detector. This also implied that Lt. Hubbard and his crew were operating the ship's SONAR equipment incorrectly.[8] After the war, British and American analyses of captured Japanese Navy records confirmed that no Japanese submarines had been lost off the Oregon coast.[9] Hubbard, however, never accepted that he had been mistaken about the "battle." Both he and Tom Moulton, one of his officers, claimed that the official denials of any Japanese submarine presence off the Pacific coast had been motivated by a desire to avoid panic among the U.S. population.[10] Years later, Hubbard told Scientologists:
I dropped the I-76 or the Imperial Japanese Navy Trans-Pacific Submarine down into the mouth of the Columbia River, dead duck. And it went down with a resounding furor. And that was that. I never thought about it again particularly except to get mad at all the admirals I had to make reports to because of this thing, see? This was one out of seventy-nine separate actions that I had to do with. And it had no significance, see?
But the other day I was kind of tired, and my dad suddenly sprung on me the fact that my submarine had been causing a tremendous amount of difficulty in the mouth of the Columbia River. Hadn't thought about this thing for years. Of course, it's all shot to ribbons, this thing. It's got jagged steel sticking out at all ends and angles, and it's a big submarine! It's a -- I don't know, about the size of the first Narwhal that we built. And the fishermen coming in there and fishing are dragging their nets around in that area, and it's just tearing their nets to ribbons -- they've even hired a civilian contractor to try to blow the thing up and get it the devil out of there -- and has evidently been raising bob with postwar fishing here for more years than I'd care to count.[11]
It should be noted, however, that the mouth of the Columbia River is some 75 miles north of Cape Lookout, the area in which Hubbard's naval reports claimed his anti-submarine action took place.
[edit] Unauthorized shelling of Coronado Islands and failure to follow orders
A month later, the PC-815 traveled to San Diego, which was to become her home port. She arrived there on June 2, and at the end of June was ordered to sea to join an anti-submarine training exercise.[3] The exercise, held on June 28, ended early and Hubbard took the opportunity to order an impromptu gunnery exercise while anchored just off the Mexican territory of South Coronado Island to the south-west of San Diego. The Mexican government sent an official protest to the US Government, as no gunnery operations had been scheduled.
Another view of USS PC-815 on trialsOn June 30 a Board of Investigation was convened concerning PC-815 which concluded that Hubbard had disregarded orders, both by conducting gunnery practice and by anchoring in Mexican territorial waters without proper authority. His orders stated that the PC-815 was supposed to return after completing that day's training. Hubbard argued that his crew was inexperienced, it was foggy, and he was tired so he did not return to port as ordered. A month earlier in his after action report concerning the recent fiasco off Cape Lookout, he had described the same men as "experienced" and "highly skilled". Vice Admiral Fletcher, who both chaired the board and read the prior after action report, rated Hubbard "below average" and noted: "Consider this officer lacking in the essential qualities of judgement, leadership and cooperation. He acts without forethought as to probable results. He is believed to have been sincere in his efforts to make his ship efficient and ready. Not considered qualified for command or promotion at this time. Recommend duty on a large vessel where he can be properly supervised". Hubbard was relieved of command effective July 7, 1943