Criteria The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. ... The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. The performance must merit recognition by individuals in a key position which was performed in a clearly exceptional manner. MoreHide
Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. MoreHide
Criteria The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American... The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in European Russia between November 12, 1918, and August 5, 1919; or for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia between November 23, 1918, and April 1, 1920. MoreHide
Criteria The China Service Medal was awarded to Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel who: Served ashore in China or who were attached to any of the vessels that operated in support of the operations in... The China Service Medal was awarded to Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel who: Served ashore in China or who were attached to any of the vessels that operated in support of the operations in China between July 7, 1937, and September 7, 1939; or who Served ashore in China or were attached to any of the vessels that operated in support of operations in China between September 2, 1945 and April 1, 1957. Military services performed in the Asiatic-Pacific area between September 2, 1945 and March 2, 1946 could be credited for eligibility for the China Service Medal unless the individual was eligible for the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal based on service performed prior to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria Occupation duty in the European-African-Middle Eastern area may be credited to organizations for duty performed on and subsequent to May 8, 1945. Terminal dates for eligibility periods and occupation ... Occupation duty in the European-African-Middle Eastern area may be credited to organizations for duty performed on and subsequent to May 8, 1945. Terminal dates for eligibility periods and occupation territories in this area are as follows: Italy: November 8, 1945 to December 15, 1947, Trieste: May 9, 1945 to October 25, 1954, Germany (exclusive of Berlin): May 9, 1945 to May 5, 1955, Berlin: May 9, 1945 to October 2, 1990, Austria: May 9, 1945 to October 25, 1955, Asiatic-Pacific Area: September 2, 1945 to April 27, 1952. Units performing service in the Korean area during the period of June 27, 1950 to April 27, 1952, inclusive, and which are eligible for the Korean Service Medal, will not be credited with eligibility for the Navy Occupation Service Medal for the same period. MoreHide
Criteria The medal is awarded to all officers accredited to the Inter-American Defense Board, at the end of their service with the institution. It is also awarded to specialized or subordinate military personn... The medal is awarded to all officers accredited to the Inter-American Defense Board, at the end of their service with the institution. It is also awarded to specialized or subordinate military personnel from the Armed Forces of the member countries who serve in the Inter-American Defense Board Chairman's Office, on its Staff, with the Inter-American Defense College, or at its Secretariat, upon completion of their service. MoreHide
Criteria The medal is awarded to all officers accredited to the Inter-American Defense Board, at the end of their service with the institution. It is also awarded to specialized or subordinate military personn... The medal is awarded to all officers accredited to the Inter-American Defense Board, at the end of their service with the institution. It is also awarded to specialized or subordinate military personnel from the Armed Forces of the member countries who serve in the Inter-American Defense Board Chairman's Office, on its Staff, with the Inter-American Defense College, or at its Secretariat, upon completion of their service. MoreHide
Criteria The medal is awarded to all officers accredited to the Inter-American Defense Board, at the end of their service with the institution. It is also awarded to specialized or subordinate military personn... The medal is awarded to all officers accredited to the Inter-American Defense Board, at the end of their service with the institution. It is also awarded to specialized or subordinate military personnel from the Armed Forces of the member countries who serve in the Inter-American Defense Board Chairman's Office, on its Staff, with the Inter-American Defense College, or at its Secretariat, upon completion of their service. MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Description For consistently outstanding performance and distinguished achievement during repeated action against enemy Japanese forces in the Pacific war area, December 7, 1941, to November 15, 1942. Participati... For consistently outstanding performance and distinguished achievement during repeated action against enemy Japanese forces in the Pacific war area, December 7, 1941, to November 15, 1942. Participating in nearly every major carrier engagement in the first year of the war, the Enterprise and her air group, exclusive of far-flung destruction of hostile shore installations throughout the battle area, did sink or damage on her own a total of 35 Japanese vessels and shoot down a total of 185 Japanese aircraft. Her aggressive spirit and superb combat efficiency are fitting tribute to the officers and men who so gallantly established her as an ahead bulwark in the defense of the American nation.
Description The Battle of Rennell Island took place on 29-30 January 1943. It was the last major naval engagement between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Guadalcanal campaign of WThe Battle of Rennell Island took place on 29-30 January 1943. It was the last major naval engagement between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Guadalcanal campaign of World War II. It occurred in the South Pacific between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal in the southern Solomon Islands.
In the battle, Japanese naval land-based torpedo bombers, seeking to provide protection for the impending evacuation of Japanese forces from Guadalcanal, made several attacks over two days on US warships operating as a task force south of this island. In addition to approaching Guadalcanal with the objective of engaging any Japanese ships that might come into range, the U.S. task force was protecting an Allied transport ship convoy carrying replacement troops there.
As a result of the Japanese air attacks on the task force, one U.S. heavy cruiser was sunk, a destroyer was heavily damaged, and the rest of the U.S. task force was forced to retreat from the southern Solomons area. Partly because they turned back the U.S. task force in this battle, the Japanese successfully evacuated their remaining troops from Guadalcanal by 7 February 1943, leaving it in the hands of the Allies and ending the battle for the island.... More
Memories U.S.S. ENTERPRISE CV6/A16-3/11-KzS E C R E T 6-FEB 1943
From: The Commanding Officer. To: The CommanU.S.S. ENTERPRISE CV6/A16-3/11-KzS E C R E T 6-FEB 1943
From: The Commanding Officer. To: The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Via: (1) Commander Task Force SIXTEEN.(2) Commander South Pacific Force. Subject: Action against Japanese Air Forces Attacking Task Force Eighteen off Rennel Island. Reference: (a) Articles 712 and 874, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.(b) Pac.Flt. Conf. ltr. 24CL-42. Enclosures: (A) Executive Officer's Report.(B) Track Chart.(C) War Diary.(D) Commander Air Group Ten Report of Action 1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), a report of the action which took place on January 30, 1943, east of Rennel Island is submitted herewith. A. PRELIMINARY 1. On January 28, 1943, the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE got underway from Segond Channel, Espiritu Santo and proceeded to sea in company with Task Force 16, Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, U.S. Navy, Commander of the Task Force. Task Force 16 consisted of the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, SAN DIEGO, MORRIS, ELLET, MUSTIN, HUGHES, and RUSSEL, and was ordered to destroy any Japanese forces advancing on the Southern Solomon Islands. After clearing the channel, Air Group Ten, composed of 35 fighters, 14 scouts, 12 bombers and 13 torpedo planes, flew out from Espiritu Santo and landed on board. 2. In accordance with ComSoPac despatch 271145 Task Force 16 proceeded through Bougainville Strait north of Malekula Island and headed for Point Easy, latitude 15° 30' S., longitude 161° E. On the evening of January 29, 1943 Task Force 16 was directed to proceed to Point Able, latitude 16° 30' S., longitude 157° E., and there to rendezvous with Task Force 11, U.S.S. SARATOGA, Flagship, at 2100 January 29, 1943, for the purpose of conducting combined exercises. 3. At 1300- January 29, 1943, the following despatch (in plain language) was received from Commander Task Force 16: "INFORMATION X TF 18 ATTACKED BY ENEMY BOMBERS AND TORPEDO PLANES SOUTH OF GUADALCANAL DURING NIGHT 29-30 JAN X CHICAGO DAMAGED AND UNDER TOW OF LOUISVILLE IN POSITION LAT 10-33 LONG 160-07 AT 2115 LOVE 29TH COURSE 150 X THIS FORCE WILL SEARCH FOR AND PROVIDE AIR COVERAGE AT DAYLIGHT FOR TASK FORCE 18 X ENTERPRISE ASSIGN 18 VF TASK AIR COVERAGE FOR TASK FORCE 18 X MAINTAIN 6 VF OVER TF 18 DURING DAYLIGHT X LAUNCH 4 SEARCH PLANES AND FIRST SECTION OF VF AT EARLIEST DAWN X MAINTAIN INNER AND INTERMEDIATE PATROLS OVER TF 16 AND COMBAT PATROL IN READINESS ON DECK X OPERATION ORDER 2-43XX" Task Force 16 closed Task Force 18 and commencing at daylight, the ENTERPRISE provided air coverage as directed by the above despatch. 4. Weather on January 29-30, 1943, was as follows: A tropical front was situated a short distance north of the ship the entire day. Partly cloudy from 1230-1830 - with broken alto-cumulus and alto-stratus clouds about 15,000 feet. Scattered to broken cumulus and strato-cumulus at 1000-1500 feet the entire day. After 1830 upper clouds slowly increased becoming overcast with few breaks by 2230. This condition continued until 0830, after which the clouds rapidly decreased to scattered. Light showers between 2022 and 2116; light continuous rain between 0020-0210; moderate showers between 0843-1022. Ceiling mostly unlimited, but lowering to less than 1000 feet in showers. Visibility good, but lowering less than 1 mile in moderate showers. Surface wind 1230-1130, mostly ENE, velocity varying from calm to 14 knots at times; 1130-0030, gentle SSE 5-10 knots; 0030-0430, gentle ESE 4-7 knots; 0430-1230, gentle SE to ESE 6-10 knots. Sea mostly smooth with only slight long low swell. Flying conditions average. B. THE ACTION 1. At 2100 January 29, 1943, the Combat Patrol sighted a Zero fighter, landplane type, approximately 20 miles west of Task Force 16. The patrol gave chase but the enemy plane climbed into the sun and pulled rapidly away. This plane probably was a photographic-reconnaissance type fighter. 2. At 0035 January 30, 1943, search radar picked up a bogey bearing 230°, distance 40 miles. Fighters were vectored out but in a forty mile chase to the NE, the bogey opened out on the VF. Estimated speed of bogey 200-220 knots. This bogey circled Task Force 18 and was tracked until 0200 when it faded from the screen. 3. At 0304 the following dispatch was received from Radio Guadalcanal: "Eleven unidentified twin-engine aircraft bearing two six eight Tare dis one three zero course one five zero 1145L." 4. At 0440 four fighters on Combat Patrol over Task Force 18 sighted one Type 1, Mitsubishi twin-engine bomber plane on a SE course. This plane which was apparently on advance reconnaissance was shot down after a 40 miles chase to the SW. 5. At 0454 the CXAM search radar reported a group of bogies, bearing 300°, distance 67 miles. The ship went to General Quarters and prepared to repel air attack. Ten additional fighters were launched to augment the combat patrol of 4 VF over Task Force 16 and 6 VF over Task Force 18. 6. At 0459 the 6 VF over Task Force 18 were vectored on course 190°, distance 20 miles. They intercepted a group of 12 twin-engine, Type 1, Mitsubishi planes, which were headed for the ENTERPRISE. At this time the enemy planes were within 17 miles of the ENTERPRISE, having been tracked in on a direct line, bearing 330°. Upon being intercepted by Lt. Kilpatrick's group they turned left and headed for the CHICAGO. The ENTERPRISE was in sight of Lt. Kilpatrick's section at the interception. This turn enabled the combat patrol to close, attack, and shoot down three planes. Nine enemy planes reached the screen of 4 DD and 1 Corvette protecting the CHICAGO. At this time the 4-plane Combat Air Patrol over Task Force 16 sighted the enemy aircraft and joined in the attack and four more enemy planes were shot down during the approach. Our fighters pursued the enemy through AA fire, and after passing over the CHICAGO,three more enemy planes were shot down and one damaged. A detailed report of the action is contained in the report of Commander Fighting Squadron Ten (Enclosure (A) of Enclosure (D)). 7. At 0553 radar screen clear. 8. For the remainder of the day routine Combat Patrols were maintained over Task Force 16 and 18 and Inner and Intermediate Patrols over Task Force 16. At sunset, Task Force 16 retired towards the south. C. PERSONNEL 1. The performance of the pilots of Fighting Squadron Ten in destroying eleven out of thirteen enemy planes was highly commendable. The courage and determination displayed by our pilots in following the attacking enemy planes through our own anti-aircraft fire is in accordance with the highest traditions of our service. The conduct of the ship's company, when air attack was believed imminent, was excellent. 2. Recommendations for awards will be made by separate letter. 3. There were no personnel casualties. D. MATERIAL 1. In general the performance of the aircraft, aircraft armament, and the arresting gear of the carrier was excellent. 2. The experience of VF-10 with attempts to drop wing tanks in battle has been very discouraging if the plane is making appreciable speed and particularly so if there is fuel in the tank. During this battle only one pilot could release the wing tank. The remainder were forced to join combat with the wing tanks in place. Under such circumstances the wing tank is a serious fire hazard, reduces the speed of the aircraft, and at very high speed effects the pilots gunnery. 3. Eleven thousand (11,000) rounds of .50 caliber ammunition were expended. E. COMMUNICATIONS 1. Although communications were not entirely satisfactory during the period of this action, they were much improved over former actions and sufficiently satisfactory to enable interception of the enemy by our Combat Patrol with the resultant destruction of enemy planes. Fighter direction was very good. It should be noted that YE equipment is not designed for communication purposes, but for homing only. The attempts to communicate on YE channel are experimental in nature, using stop-gap equipment and make-shift procedure, with the object of vectoring fighters to investigate bogies without breaking radio silence. Regarding communication on assigned fighter radio frequency the unsatisfactory results on this occasion were, as usual, largely due to the inadequate communication equipment installed in fighters. This has been the basis of too much correspondence in the past to warrant further comment here, especially in view of the current efforts of the Bureau of Aeronautics to rectify deficiencies at an early date. In this connection it may be noted that VF were operated beyond the recommended reliable range of VF radio equipment. F. OWN AND ENEMY LOSSES 1. Our Aircraft Losses - none. Two planes received superficial damage from enemy fire. 2. Enemy Aircraft Losses - 11 Type 1 - Mitsubishi Twin-engine torpedo bombers destroyed and one damaged. G. CONCLUSIONS 1. Japanese forces are capable of launching a torpedo-bomber attack at a distance of at least 275 miles, the distance from Munda to position of CHICAGO. 2. The Japanese may now be using a single engine high performance type of reconnaissance plane, probably a Zero type fighter designed for photographic-reconnaissance work. 3. The difficulty of providing effective air coverage from carriers for crippled vessels is considerable. If the carrier remains with the crippled escort she can furnish fighter direction but she is extremely vulnerable to both enemy aircraft and submarine attack. Probably the best distance is from 50-75 miles dependent upon visibility. At this distance, though fighter direction cannot be furnished, the maintenance of the patrol is simplified and the risk of discovery is much reduced. At further distances an undue amount of time and fuel is consumed in flights to and from station. 4. Japanese torpedo-bomber pilots once committed to an attack are most determined and will press it home. 5. Japanese torpedo-bombers make very accurate drops at speeds on the order of 250 knots. 6. The Japanese will send out a strike of torpedo-bombers without fighter coverage in face of strong enemy opposition. 7. Japanese torpedo-bombers depend upon high speed rather than armament for defense. 8. An estimated group speed of 160 knots of the Japanese planes from the time sighted by our forces at Guadalcanal to arrival at the point of contact was approximately accurate. 9. Fighter planes fired on all planes shot down. However, in an engagement such as this and, where fighters follow the torpedo planes on into the screen, undoubtedly the AA fire contributed to the destruction of some of the hostile planes. 10. Protection of large convoys and crippled vessels can well be accomplished by a fighter equipped ACV. This offers a most useful field for that type carrier. H. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. All external fuel tanks must be designed for dropping at high speed. 2. New type faster fighters should be supplied to our first line carriers at the earliest possible date as it is becoming increasingly more difficult for the F4F-4, even with altitude advantage, to intercept the fast enemy aircraft in sufficient time to break up and defeat an attack on surface vessels. (Signed) O. B. HARDISON. Distribution:· CinCPac - Original & 2 · ComSoPac - 1 (2 direct) · ComAirSoPac - 1 · CTF-16 - 3 · ComAirPac - 1 ... More
Criteria The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.... The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor. MoreHide
Comments HARDISON, OSBORNE BENNETT
Synopsis:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Osborne Bennett Hardison, Captain, U.S. Navy, for extraordinary heroism and distingu... HARDISON, OSBORNE BENNETT
Synopsis:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Osborne Bennett Hardison, Captain, U.S. Navy, for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service in the line of this profession as Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Carrier U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV-6), during the engagement with enemy Japanese forces north of the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October 1942. His conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Navy of the United States.
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Description The Guadalcanal Campaign, also known as the Battle of Guadalcanal and codenamed Operation Watchtower by Allied forces, was a military campaign fought between 7 August 1942 and 9 February 1943 on and aThe Guadalcanal Campaign, also known as the Battle of Guadalcanal and codenamed Operation Watchtower by Allied forces, was a military campaign fought between 7 August 1942 and 9 February 1943 on and around the island of Guadalcanal in the Pacific theatre of World War II. It was the first major offensive by Allied forces against the Empire of Japan.
On 7 August 1942, Allied forces, predominantly American, landed on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida in the southern Solomon Islands with the objective of denying their use by the Japanese to threaten the supply and communication routes between the US, Australia, and New Zealand. The Allies also intended to use Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases to support a campaign to eventually capture or neutralize the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain. The Allies overwhelmed the outnumbered Japanese defenders, who had occupied the islands since May 1942, and captured Tulagi and Florida, as well as an airfield (later named Henderson Field) that was under construction on Guadalcanal. Powerful US naval forces supported the landings.
Surprised by the Allied offensive, the Japanese made several attempts between August and November 1942 to retake Henderson Field. Three major land battles, seven large naval battles (five nighttime surface actions and two carrier battles), and continual, almost daily aerial battles culminated in the decisive Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in early November 1942, in which the last Japanese attempt to bombard Henderson Field from the sea and land with enough troops to retake it was defeated. In December 1942, the Japanese abandoned further efforts to retake Guadalcanal and evacuated their remaining forces by 7 February 1943 in the face of an offensive by the US Army's XIV Corps, conceding the island to the Allies.
The Guadalcanal campaign was a significant strategic combined arms victory by Allied forces over the Japanese in the Pacific theatre. The Japanese had reached the high-water mark of their conquests in the Pacific, and Guadalcanal marked the transition by the Allies from defensive operations to the strategic offensive in that theatre and the beginning of offensive operations, including the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, and Central Pacific campaigns, that resulted in Japan's eventual surrender and the end of World War II.... More
Memories U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) CV6/A16-3/10-voSerial 0019 November 19, 1942.
From: The Commanding Officer. U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) CV6/A16-3/10-voSerial 0019 November 19, 1942.
From: The Commanding Officer. To: The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Via: (1) Commander Task Force SIXTEEN.(2) Commander South Pacific Forces. Subject: Action against Japanese Forces Attempting the Recapture of Guadalcanal, November 13 - 14, 1942 - Report of. Reference: (a) Art. 712 and 874, Navy Regulations, 1920.(b) PacFlt. Conf. Ltr. 24CL-42. Enclosures: A. Track Chart. B. Executive Officer's Report. C. War Diary. D. Detailed Summary of Air Operations. E. Comdr. Air Group TEN's Report of Action. 1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), a report of the action which took place November 13 - 14, 1942, in the Southern Solomons is submitted herewith. A. PRELIMINARY 1. On November 11, 1942, the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE got underway from NOUMEA, NEW CALEDONIA, and proceeded to sea in company with Task Force 16, Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy. After clearing the channel, Air Group TEN, composed of 38 fighters, 16 scouts, 25 bombers, and 9 torpedo planes, flew out from TONTOUTA Field and landed aboard. 2. The ENTERPRISE had suffered considerable bomb damage from the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 26, 1942. The forward elevator was not in commission and considerable underwater damage had not been repaired. The bomb hit which exploded in the officers' country had seriously affected watertight integrity in the area between frames 35 and 54, in addition to destroying living accommodations for approximately 70 officers. The ship's repair force and 59 officers and men on temporary duty from U.S.S. VESTAL and a construction battalion worked continuously night and day, watch and watch, repairing the structural damage and preparing the ship for battle. 3. Task Force 16 proceeded on a northwesterly course west of NEW CALEDONIA. At 1925, November 12, 1942, a report was received from Radio GUADALCANAL of two enemy CV and two DD at 1450 (Love) on course 135°, speed 15, bearing 265°, distant 150 miles, from LUNGA POINT, or approximately 575 miles to the northwest of Task Force 16. B. THE ACTION 1. Task Force 16 closed the contact at high speed, and in Latitude 14°-44'S, Longitude 161°-28'E, at dawn on November 13, 1942, a 10-plane search by single planes was launched, sector bearings 270° to 030° (T), distance 200 miles. No contacts resulted. However, in view of the fact that No. 1 elevator of the ENTERPRISE was still out of commission, it was deemed wise to send the torpedo planes with a fighter escort in on an offensive sweep with orders to attack any targets found and then to land at CACTUS and report to the Commanding General for temporary duty. This plane would increase the effectiveness of flight operations should an action occur, as well as reinforce HENDERSON Field. Accordingly, at 0810, when the search planes had reached the end of their search and no contacts had been made, 9 torpedo planes (8 armed with torpedoes and 1 with 500-lb bombs) and 6 fighters were launched for GUADALCANAL with instructions to search and to strike any suitable targets they might encounter. This flight also provided a search to considerable depth for muchly needed information. Subsequent information received on the activities of this group indicates that it struck the enemy many hard and timely blows. Enroute to CACTUS, this flight sighted a BB of the KONGO class with CA and DD escort 10 miles north of SAVO ISLAND steaming into position for bombardment of the air field. The TBF's attacked, scored 3 torpedo hits on the BB, landed at CACTUS for rearming, made a second attack three hours later scoring 3 more torpedo hits, and the left the BB practically dead in the water and listing heavily. These attacks probably prevented destructive bombardment of our only air base in the SOLOMONS and probably prevented the sinking of the PORTLAND then dead in the water 2 miles north of LUNGA POINT. Running shuttle trips from CACTUS during the next two days (14-15 November), this squadron made six additional attacks on Japanese vessels, expending a total of 26 torpedoes, 13 500-lb bombs, and 29 incendiary bombs. 2. During the remainder of the 13th, both Combat and Inner Air Patrols were maintained over the Task Force. The only action occurred at approximately 1200 when a section of fighters led by Lieutenant S. W. Vejtasa, USN, was vectored to and shot down a 4-engine Kawanishi flying boat which had been shadowing 50 miles northwest of our force. Information received later indicated the position of our force had been reported to the enemy. 3. During the night of November 13-14, a northwesterly course and high speed were maintained, placing this force at dawn on the 14th approximately 200 miles south-southwest of CACTUS. The situation at dawn on the 14th was obscure. No further contact reports on enemy carriers had been received, the presence or absence of other enemy forces within striking distance was not known, and no information as to the situation at GUADALCANAL or the availability of the field was at hand. It was decided to send out a search of the minimum number of planes capable of giving satisfactory coverage in order to maintain as large an attack group as possible, ready to strike any targets which were developed. Because of heavy rain squalls, the dawn launching was delayed until 0708 when 2 VSB were launched for single plane search of sectors bearing 285° - 315° (T) to a distance of 200 miles and 4 groups of 2 planes each to search sectors bearing 315°--015° (T) to a distance of 250 miles. At the same time a 3 plane Inner Air Patrol and an 8 plane Combat Air Patrol were also established. All search planes were armed with 500-lb. bombs and were ordered to transmit contact reports carefully and then attack. 4. At 0808 Lieutenant W.I. Martin, one of the search pilots, reported that 10 unidentified planes were about 140 miles to the north, heading in the direction of our task force. On receipt of this message 12 VF were launched to augment our Combat Air Patrol. In addition, it was decided to send off the Attack Group, consisting of 17 VSB with 1000-lb, bombs and 10 VF, in order to clear the flight deck in case the ship should be subjected to attack and in order to strike early targets which, it was believed, certainly would be found in the GUADALCANAL area. Because of the absence of recent contact reports, this attack group was sent on a northerly course and instructed to listen for contact reports and to attack the best targets within range. The flight of unidentified planes was not picked up by the radar and no attack on us developed. 5. The first contact report of enemy ships from our search planes was received from Lieut(jg) R.D. Gibson, of VB-10, at 0915. He reported a force of 9 enemy ships including one "possible XCV". At 0921 he reported the weather good and conditions favorable for dive bombing. He then (0935) amplified his report to include "2 BB, 2 CA, 1 possible XCV, 4 DD, position 08°-45'S, 157°-10'E, course 290°" (south of NEW GEORGIA). 6. At 0925 ENTERPRISE broke radio silence to direct fighters. Lieut. M. Kilpatrick and Lieut(jg) W.K. Blair shot down a 4-engine patrol plane which was shadowing about 30 miles northeast of this Task Force. 7. At 0944 Lt-Comdr. J.R. Lee, leader of the VSB group, was asked if he had received LT(jg) Gibson's contact report. He answered that he had missed the position. This information was given, and at 0945 Lt-Comdr. Lee's group was ordered to proceed to and attack this enemy force, then 270 miles from ENTERPRISE, and land at GUADALCANAL. These messages to the attack group were acknowledged. 8. Lieut(jg) M.D. Carmody, at 0949, reported a second enemy force in position 08°-00'S, 158°-00'E (North of NEW GEORGIA), course 130°, speed 14 knots. A few minutes later, he amplified this report to read "many enemy transports, 2 CA, 3 CL, 6 DD", and confirmed position, course, and speed. 9. Lieut(jg) Carmody then dove on one transport, and his wing man, Lieut(jg) W.E. Johnson, dove on another. Lieut(jg) Carmody's bomb hit just off the transport's stern. Lieut(jg) Johnson was seen being chased by Zeros and, up to the present, no further report of him has been received. Lieut(jg) Carmody landed back aboard at 1233 with 5 gallons of gasoline remaining after having been in the air for 5 hours and 21 minutes, and having performed his duties in an excellent manner. 10. At 1044 Lieut(jg) R.D. Gibson reported that he and his wing man, Ensign R.M. Buchanan, had made direct hits on a NACHI class cruiser and left it burning badly. He reported being low on gasoline and that he was proceeding to CACTUS. 11. The only other report from the search planes was from Ensign R.A. Hoogerwerf whose bomb fell only a few feet astern of a heavy cruiser. His wing man, Ensign P.M. Halloran, made a direct hit on another light cruiser which burst into flames and burned fiercely. Ensign Hoogerwerf reported on his return that the cruiser hit by Lieut(jg) Gibson, when last seen, was sinking and being circled by 3 DD's. 12. At 1133, Lieut. W.I. Martin having completed a thorough search of the GUADALCANAL, FLORIDA, RUSSELL IS. and southeast tip of SANTA ISABEL reported "no enemy surface vessels in the vicinity of GUADALCANAL, FLORIDA, RUSSELL, SANTA ISABEL." 13. A summary of the damage inflicted by the search planes: 2 hits on a CA (probably sunk), 1 hit on a CL, and near misses on an AP and a CA. 14. The first attack group changed heading at 0940 to intercept the BB-CA force reported by Lt(jg) Gibson in the vicinity of RENDOVA I. One CA was sighted about 15 miles southwest of RENDOVA I., burning and apparently being abandoned. The group continued on a northwest track, sighted and attacked a force composed of CA's, CL's, and DD's, 30 miles west of RENDOVA I. Two direct hits were observed on one CL and several near misses on CA's and CL's. The VSB proceeded to CACTUS on completion of the attack. Eight VF returned to the ENTERPRISE and two proceeded to CACTUS after strafing a cruiser. Some half hour before reaching the target, the VSB changed course to the left while separated from the VF escort by a cloud. Due to scattered clouds in the area and inability of the VF to transmit on the search and attack frequency, contact was not regained. The 8 VF searched to the north and west, then due to fuel considerations, returned and landed on the ENTERPRISE. These VF were reserviced and relaunched with the second attack group. 15. At 1405, a second attack group composed of the remaining 8 VSB with a 12 VF escort were launched to attack the transport force east of NEW GEORGIA, then proceed to CACTUS. The VSB were armed with one 1000-lb, 1/100 sec. fuze, bomb. At about 1620 this group attacked the transports with methodical and devastating effect, having been instructed to hit undamaged ships with only one bomb. One 1000-lb hit was made on each of five of the undamaged AP-AK's. The VF made two separate strafing attacks on the two remaining undamaged AP-AK's. The group landed at CACTUS. 16. After launching the second attack group, the ENTERPRISE retired to the southward with only 18 VF. 17. At 1500, the Combat Air Patrol was landed and the Task Force entered a weather front about 300 miles south of CACTUS. 18. During daylight November 15, VF maintained Inner and Intermediate Air Patrols covering the Task Force retirement toward NOUMEA. C. PERSONNEL. 1. Although the ship itself was not attacked, the two days of continuous General Quarters and operations in vicinity of enemy forces imposed unusual demands upon all hands. All departments operated smoothly and effectively. 2. The excellent training which the Air Group has received, and the courage and determination with which it is inspired, were reflected in its magnificent performance. For this a large share of credit belongs to the Air Department, and on this account the performance of that Department is considered to have been outstanding. 3. The report of the Executive Officer concerning conduct of personnel is fully concurred in. The recommendation for commendation of Commander Crommelin is being forwarded to the President Board of Awards, South Pacific Area, and further recommendations for awards to personnel of the Air Group are being prepared and will be forwarded to that Board. 4. As a result of air actions, the following personnel are wounded or missing: § VF-10 - Wounded. § Lt.(jg) Henry A. Carey, A-V(N), USNR - Superficial wound left thigh. § Lt.(jg) Roy Marlin Voris, A-V(N), USNR - Painful but not serious gunshot wound in right thigh. § VT-10 - No casualties. § VS-10 - Missing in action on November 14, 1942: § Lt.(jg) W.E. Johnson, A-V(N), USNR., and Hughes, Hugh P., Jr. ARM3c, USNR - When last seen their plane was being heavily attacked by Jap Zeros. The section leader believes it was shot down. § VB-10 - Missing in action on November 14, 1942: § Ensign P.M. Halloran, A-V(N), USNR. § Lieut. V.W. Welch, USN. § Lt.(jg) J.D. Wakeham, A-V(N), USNR. § Ensign J.H. Carroum, A-V(N), USNR. § Gallagher, E., ARM3c, USN. § Ansley, H.C., ARM1c, USN. § Stanley, F.G., ARM1c, USN. § Hyson, R.C., ARM3c, USN. § Total Missing: 5 officers; 5 enlisted men. § Total Wounded: 2 officers. D. MATERIAL. Own Material. 1. The ship's launching and arresting gear, with the exception of that damaged by enemy action on October 26, 1942, functioned normally. 2. There was no action other than air. 3. All aircraft on board were flown on combat missions, and there were no forced landings of planes launched from this ship. 4. The ship and aircraft radio communications functioned satisfactorily. No fighter direction other than that incident to shooting down two "snoopers" was involved. 5. The ship's radar functioned satisfactorily. 6. All ordnance equipment on aircraft launched from ENTERPRISE functioned normally with the exception of two 1000-lb. bombs on scouts which failed to release for reasons so far undetermined. While operating from CACTUS, and probably due to servicing difficulties and lack of personnel, there were several instances of failure of flexible machine guns in SBD's to fire and bombs in TBF's and SBD's to release. Our Aircraft Losses. Five SBD's (B6, B12, B13, B14, B15) lost in action.
Enemy Aircraft Losses. Type Certain Probably Kawanishi 97 VPB 2 0 Nagoya Zero VF 15 7
Damage to ENTERPRISE. None.
Damage to Enemy: Summary of Hits. Type Hit by Hits Results 1 BB VT-10 6 torpedoes plus 2 duds Probably sunk 1 CA VT-10 3 torpedoes Probably sunk 1 AP VT-10 2 torpedoes Probably sunk 1 AP VT-10 1 torpedoes Damaged 3 AP VT-10 1 500-lb bomb each Damaged 1 CL VS-10 2 1000-lb bombs Probably sunk 3 AP VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb each Badly damaged 1 AP VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb Badly damaged 1 AP VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb Badly damaged 4 AP-AK VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb each Badly damaged 1 AP VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb Badly damaged 1 AP VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb Badly damaged 1 AP(beached) VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb Badly damaged 1 AP(beached) VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb Badly damaged 2 AP-AK(beached) VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb each Badly damaged 1 CA(NACHI) VB-10 2 500-lb bombs Sunk 1 CL VB-10 1 500-lb bomb Badly damaged 1 AP VB-10 1 1000-lb bomb Badly damaged 1 AP VS-10 2 1000-lb bombs Sunk 2 AP VB-10 1 1000-lb bomb each Badly damaged 1 AP VB-10 2 1000-lb bombs Badly damaged 2 AP(beached) VB-10 1 1000-lb bomb each Badly damaged 1 CL VF-10 Strafed Slightly damaged 2 AP VF-10 Strafed Slightly damaged 1 DD VF-10 Strafed Slightly damaged Stores dump VS-10 1 1000-lb bomb Destroyed Ammunition dump VB-10 1 1000-lb bomb Destroyed
7. No accurate estimates of the total number of ships sunk and damaged can be arrived at. It is known that each of several ships was attacked and damaged at different times by different pilots. No near misses are included. Some of these vessels were also attacked by Army bombers and strafers and by Marine Corps dive bombers, torpedo planes and strafers. 8. Ammunition Expended by ENTERPRISE. 1. Ammunition supplied by the ship was as follows: § 12 - 500-lb bombs § 25 - 1000-lb bombs § 7 - Mark 13-1 torpedoes § 1 - Mark 13-2 torpedo § 49,000 rounds - .50 cal. § 72,000 rounds - .30 cal. E. CONCLUSIONS, COMMENTS, and RECOMMENDATIONS. 1. Nothing in the operations herein discussed altered materially previously held views as to methods of operations of Carrier Task Forces. However, a number of points did arise which are worthy of mention. 2. As in nearly all previous actions, the need for more complete information was keenly felt. Reports as to enemy targets in the GUADALCANAL area were in several cases incomplete and confusing. What now appears to have been erroneous reports of enemy carrier contacts might, under different circumstances, have had a decidedly adverse effect upon decisions as to the operations of this Task Force. The almost total absence of reports from GUADALCANAL as to the status of the landing field introduced an unnecessary element of uncertainty. 3. The air operations of the ENTERPRISE, other than routine searches and patrols, consisted of the launching of attack groups, which were sent in to attack such targets as offered themselves in the vicinity of GUADALCANAL. Even the search on the morning of the 14th had orders to attack objectives found, and if necessary to proceed to GUADALCANAL for reservicing, and thereafter to operate from GUADALCANAL or return to the ship as conditions warranted or as directed. Under these circumstances it was permissible to launch the groups at distances from objectives varying from 230 miles up to as far as 290 miles. This is too far if recovery of planes by the carrier prior to their refueling is contemplated. Where such recovery is planned with present carrier aircraft, launchings at distances from objectives above 200 miles, are rather awkward. The reasons for this lie in the small fuel margin which is left for developing contacts; for combat at the objective (as was required here); and for finding the carrier under conditions of low visibility, or when due to imperfect plane navigation, or to unexpected and unannounced movements of the carrier, difficulty is experienced in locating her. It follows therefore that unless the carrier plans to stand on in and close the range, attacks should if possible be launched from positions no more than 200 miles from the objective, and preferably closer. To extend this distance by relatively small increments makes little difference to attacking enemy planes, whereas it may make a great difference when it comes to recovering one's own group. 4. Availability of a landing field ashore altered the situation in this particular operation. However, everything observed here supported the generally accepted view, that a carrier should go in, hit, get clear, and not remain in the danger zone longer than absolutely necessary. Two "snoopers" which were shot down on successive days, together with other information received, indicates that the position of this force was known within rather narrow limits by the enemy during the time the force was operating in advance areas. Under such conditions the period of exposure must be kept to a minimum. 5. Again it seems wise to point out the fact that there is a constant tendency to overestimate the travel of Point Option when this travel is in a down wind direction. Such overestimation is usually occasioned by the desire to advance in that direction. However, it in no way facilitates such advance and usually results only in a wide separation of the ship from Point Option with consequent embarrassment to returning planes. When patrols, searches, forced landings and unplanned launchings and recoveries are taken into account, it is literally astonishing how difficult it is to advance Point Option down wind. Therefore operating personnel must take into account very carefully items such as force and direction of the wind, numbers of scheduled launchings, and probable direction of movement of the carrier due to submarine reports and other emergencies such as threatened actual air attacks. It is easy to move Point Option in up wind directions, but difficult to move it down wind. 6. The forward elevator was out of commission throughout all operations due to damage received on 26 October. A repair party was on board working on it throughout, and it was ready for starting tests after the 13th. However, due to fear of its sticking in a down position, and this blocking operations which were progressing satisfactorily, the tests were not made. In spite of this the ENTERPRISE operated 32 VF and 31 SBD with no difficulty whatsoever. Nine TBF and six VF were sent ashore in order to attack objectives at GUADALCANAL (which they did nobly) and to reduce plane congestion on the ship. Had it been necessary to land all of the 63 remaining planes at one time, some delay would have been encountered due to necessity of using number two elevator to clear the flight deck. Fortunately such necessity did not arise. 7. The lack of sustained enemy air attack on CACTUS during this operation indicates an appreciable depletion of his air forces. 8. The employment of the ENTERPRISE Air Group first from the ship and subsequently from the field at CACTUS was an effective use of the Group and resulted in maximum damage to the enemy. 9. The conditions under which the torpedo planes were used with such destructive results in this operation were within the limitations governing the use of torpedo planes as advocated in previous reports. 10. The successful landing of a large sea borne force in the face of strong aircraft opposition is extremely difficult. 11. Our Mk. 13-1 torpedoes do not contain enough explosive; their speed is too slow, and range excessive. 12. Enemy antiaircraft fire was relatively ineffective. 13. The phenomenally high percentage of bomb and torpedo hits was due to careful training in basic fundamentals, excellent leadership in the air, the employment of small highly flexible units, and efficient fighter protection on our part, and lack of effective AA and fighter opposition by the enemy. 14. The high percentage of malfunctioning torpedoes among those loaded at CACTUS indicates the necessity of improvement in the protection, maintenance, adjustment, and loading of torpedoes at the landing field of an advanced base. The necessity of protecting the firing mechanism from the elements and from dust should be impressed upon all personnel concerned. 15. The potentialities for effective use of landing fields by carrier air groups should be given careful consideration in the planning of carrier task force operations. 16. It is recommended that .08 second delay fuzes be made available for use with the demolition bombs now in the carriers. (Signed) O. B. HARDISON Distribution:· Cincpac (original & 2) · Comsopac (2) · Comairpac (1) · Comtaskforc 16 (3) ... More
Description The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, 26 October 1942, sometimes referred to as the Battle of Santa Cruz or in Japanese sources as the Battle of the South Pacific, was the fourth carrier battle of theThe Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, 26 October 1942, sometimes referred to as the Battle of Santa Cruz or in Japanese sources as the Battle of the South Pacific, was the fourth carrier battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II and the fourth major naval engagement fought between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the lengthy and strategically important Guadalcanal campaign. In similar fashion to the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomons, the ships of the two adversaries were rarely in direct visual range of each other. Instead, almost all attacks by both sides were mounted by carrier or land-based aircraft.
In an attempt to drive Allied forces from Guadalcanal and nearby islands and end the stalemate that had existed since September 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army planned a major ground offensive on Guadalcanal for 20–25 October 1942. In support of this offensive, and with the hope of engaging Allied naval forces, Japanese carriers and other large warships moved into a position near the southern Solomon Islands. From this location, the Japanese naval forces hoped to engage and decisively defeat any Allied (primarily U.S.) naval forces, especially carrier forces, that responded to the ground offensive. Allied naval forces also hoped to meet the Japanese naval forces in battle, with the same objectives of breaking the stalemate and decisively defeating their adversary.
The Japanese ground offensive on Guadalcanal was under way in the Battle for Henderson Field while the naval warships and aircraft from the two adversaries confronted each other on the morning of 26 October 1942, just north of the Santa Cruz Islands. After an exchange of carrier air attacks, Allied surface ships were forced to retreat from the battle area with one carrier sunk and another heavily damaged. The participating Japanese carrier forces, however, also retired because of high aircraft and aircrew losses plus significant damage to two carriers. Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk and damaged, the loss of many irreplaceable, veteran aircrews would prove to be a long term strategic advantage for the Allies, whose aircrew losses in the battle were relatively low and could be quickly replaced. The high cost of the battle for the Japanese prevented their carrier forces from further significant involvement in the Guadalcanal campaign.... More
Memories U.S.S. ENTERPRISE CV6/A16-3/(10-My)Serial 0015 November 10, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer. To: Comm U.S.S. ENTERPRISE CV6/A16-3/(10-My)Serial 0015 November 10, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer. To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Via: Commander Task Force Sixteen. Subject: The Battle of Santa Cruz, October 26, 1942 - Report of. Reference: (a) Arts. 712 and 874, Navy Regs, 1920.(b) PacFlt. Conf. ltr. 24CL-42. Enclosures: A. Track Chart. B. Executive Officer's Report, and CO ENTERPRISE 1stEnd. C. War Damage Report; Copy of (less photographs). D. War Diary for October 26, 1942, copy of. E. Medical Officer's Report. F. CEAG Report with CO ENTERPRISE 1st end. G. Set of photographs. H. Notes on Carrier Maneuvers while Undergoing Air Attack. 1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), a report of the action which took place October 26, 1942, north of the Santa Cruz Islands, is submitted herewith. A. PRELIMINARY 1. U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, flagship of Commander Task Force Sixteen, Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy, in company with Task Force Sixteen comprising ENTERPRISE, SOUTH DAKOTA, PORTER, PRESTON, CUSHING, LAMSON, SMITH, MAHAN, SHAW, MAURY, CONYNGHAM, departed Pearl Harbor at 0820 (Zone plus 9 1/2), October 16, 1942, enroute to the southwest Pacific. Air Group Ten was taken aboard south of Oahu. Each day thereafter patrols and searches were launched as practicable. Gunnery exercises for both Air Group and ship's batteries were carried out to the fullest extent permitted by the relatively high speed of advance (18.8 knots). Time and circumstances, however, did not permit the desired and necessary amount of this accelerated and valuable training. 2. On October 19 the accompanying destroyers were refueled, two at a time from the SOUTH DAKOTA, the ENTERPRISE maintaining air coverage and fueling three destroyers between flight operations. LAMSON and MAHAN were refueled and dispatched on special duty in connection with the attack on Japanese patrol craft stationed between the Gilberts and Ellice Islands. 3. On October 21, 1942 (Zone plus 10 1/2) Captain Osborne B. Hardison, U.S. Navy, relieved Captain Arthur C. Davis, U.S. Navy, in command of this vessel. 4. At daylight October 23, 1942 (Zone minus 12) rendezvous was effected with SABINE and STACK in latitude 12°-30' S., longitude 175°-00' E., and all vessels of the task force were refueled to capacity. PORTLAND and SAN JUAN joined and were fueled. LAMSON and MAHAN rejoined and were refueled. Task Force Seventeen (HORNET, NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, JUNEAU and DD's) joined with Task Force Sixteen. The combined forces became Task Force Sixty-One under the command of Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy, in ENTERPRISE. Upon completion of fueling, SABINE and STACK departed for Espiritu Santo. At 1500 Task Force 61 proceeded to the north-westward to round the Santa Cruz Islands prior to a southwesterly passage east of San Cristobal (Solomons) in support of our forces in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area against a threatened attack by large Japanese naval forces known to be to the northeastward of the Solomons. 5. At 1250 October 25, 1942 (Zone minus 12) a despatch was received from CURTISS reporting 2 enemy CV's in latitude 08°-51'S., longitude 164°-30' E., course 145° T., speed 25. Our position was latitude 10°-04' S., longitude 170°-18' E., source 295° T., speed 22. A distance of 360 miles separated our force from the enemy CV's. Task Force Sixty-One continued course and speed, and at 1430 launched 12 VSB for a 200 mile search in sector 280° T to 010° T, and at 1520 launched 11 VF, 12 VSB, and 6 VTB with the Group Commander as an attack group to follow up the search. This group did not make contact. It was late returning to the carrier and experienced difficulty in landing aboard after dark. One VF pilot crashed about 40 miles from the ship on the return trip, cause unknown. Six additional planes were lost as a result of water landings around the ship due to fuel exhaustion or in crashes incident to landing on board. With the exception of the VF pilot first mentioned, no lives were lost. B. THE ACTION 1. The following day, the weather was mostly fair with broken to scattered cumulus and strato-cumulus clouds at 2000 feet. There were 5/10 to 7/10 clouds from 1100 to 1345, decreasing to 1/10 after 1400; scattered light showers; ceiling 2000 feet to unlimited; visibility 15 miles plus; surface winds SE 6-10 knots; sea smooth with slight swell. 2. At 0111 October 26, 1942 (Zone minus 12) a contact report by tender-based planes was received "Enemy position 07°-14' S., longitude 164°-15' E." Our position was latitude 09°-46' S., longitude 168°-40 E.; separation 300 miles. The ship went to General Quarters at 0550 and set Material Condition Afirm. At 0600 ENTERPRISE launched a 16 plane search group carrying 500-lb bombs, an inner air patrol of 6 VSB for the combined task force, and a combat air patrol of 8 VF. Planes of this search made contact with two enemy forces; one comprising 2 BB, 1 CA, 7 DD at 170 miles on bearing 275° T; the other, 2 CV at 200 miles on bearing 300° T. The contact reports were in proper order giving latitude, longitude, composition, course, and speed. The BB contact report was received at 0730 and the CV contact report at 0750. 3. Of this search group of 16 planes, 8 made contact, 4 attacked and 2 500-lb bomb hits were made on a CV of the SHOKAKU class. 4. At 0847 ENTERPRISE attack group of 8 VF, 8 VTB (armed with torpedoes), 3 VSB (armed with 1000-lb bombs) and 1 VTB (the Group Commander) were launched. HORNET launched her attack group in two waves, the first of which started taking off at approximately 0832. 5. At about 0930, while proceeding on its mission, our attack group was surprised by enemy VF approximately sixty miles from our forces. Three of our VTB, 2 VF were shot down, and 2 VF and 1 VTB were damaged so badly that they were forced to return to ENTERPRISE. It appears that these enemy VF were escorts for the Japanese air group which shortly thereafter attacked the HORNET. 6. Our attack group continued on and at 1030 sighted the enemy BB force interposed between our forces and the enemy CV which were not sighted as they were 60 to 80 miles beyond the enemy BB. Our planes searched beyond this force but did not sight the CV, and as considerable fuel had been consumed in the combat on the approach they returned and attacked this group. The VF strafed in order to assist; the VSB attacked a BB and made two 1000-lb bomb hits on a BB of the KONGO class; the VTB attacked a cruiser, no hits were observed. 7. At 0940 HORNET aircraft reported 24 enemy dive bombers approaching from 280° T. This ship launched all remaining planes and prepared to repel air attack. The attack was made on HORNET at 1011. At 1026 ENTERPRISE turned into the wind (110° T) to land returning aircraft low on gas, and immediate reservicing and rearming were commenced to send these planes out to attack. Enemy air attacks interfered with servicing and prevented launching. 8. From the time of the first radar report of enemy planes at 0957 (when they were coming in, distance 45 miles) until 1100, there were almost continuous reports of bogies coming in and going out. At 1100 radar reported large groups of enemy planes coming in distance 23 miles, but our fire control radars did not pick them up. 9. At 1115 the first dive bombing attack on ENTERPRISE commenced. The attacking planes were not seen until well in their dives when they were quickly opposed by dense AA fire, and the ship maneuvered radically in evasion. Of an estimated 24 attacking planes, 7 were observed to be shot down and crashed in the sea, and others were harassed into making wild releases. The attack lasted about 4 minutes and was pressed home with determination. One bomb hit and pierced the flight deck 20 feet from the forward end. One of the aircraft spotted forward caught on fire and was pushed over the side. Another was blown overboard by the blast. The bomb passed through the forecastle deck and the skin of the ship, exploding just outside off the extreme bow. Bomb fragments pierced the hull in 160 places between the waterline and the forecastle deck level. A second bomb hit the flight deck almost on the centerline ten feet abaft the forward elevator. It is possible that it divided into two parts after passing through the flight deck, as there were two separate holes in the hangar deck. On the other hand, it is possible that the second hole in the hangar deck was caused by one of several of our own bombs, which were being loaded on planes forward on the hangar deck, being exploded by the bomb hit. In any event, there was one explosion at the hangar deck level, causing blast and fragment damage and casualties on the hangar deck, and making a shambles of the officers' country on the second deck between frames 38 and 54, causing a number of casualties, and starting fired that were quickly under control. There was a second explosion on the third deck at frame 39 in Repair Two, causing numerous fatalities, many injuries and heavy general damage between frames 38 and 64. It is the opinion of the Bomb Disposal Officer that the two explosions were caused by a single bomb which broke in two. His detailed analysis in support of this theory is appended to the War Damage Report, enclosure (C). A third bomb detonated close aboard near frame 129 starboard, cracking the after bearing pedestal of No. 2 H.P. turbine, opening a seam in the side plating to a maximum of three inches extending from frame 123 to frame 135, flooding two empty fuel tanks, and opening a third tank which was full. The ship shook violently as a result of this explosion. Planes parked in Fly I were bounced clear of the deck and the farthest one forward on the starboard side fell over the side. One plane in Fly III was bounced into the starboard 20mm battery. 10. At 1135 radar reported possible torpedo planes coming in from astern, and shortly afterward one was seen to burst into flames and crash while still about five miles from the ship. An estimated 14 additional torpedo planes were then seen to divide into two groups which attempted to gain favorable approach positions forward on both sides, outside our screen. Heavy AA was brought to bear from ENTERPRISE as well as from vessels of the screen, but approximately nine torpedoes were launched, five from the starboard side and probably four from the port side. The were dropped from heights of about 75 feet at ranges of 1000 to 2000 yards. Three torpedo tracks close together were observed coming at the ship from 20° forward of the starboard beam. The rudder was immediately put over hard right and the ship passed inside the three tracks by an estimated fifty yards (from the bridge, the tracks were obscured by the flight deck forward as the ship turned). The rudder was reversed to avoid collision with SMITH which was aflame forward. ENTERPRISE was turning left when a plane was observed to drop its torpedo from ahead. The track of this torpedo was not seen until it was less than 800 yards away. It appeared that ENTERPRISE bow would be past the torpedo track, so hard right rudder was put on and the stern swung left. The torpedo passed the ship to starboard almost parallel to it and within 100 feet. The plane that dropped this torpedo was shot down shortly after the drop, and two of its occupants were clinging to its wreckage as the ship passed by close enough to see their faces. Five torpedo planes approached from dead astern and then tried to gain favorable launching position on the port beam. The initial turn to starboard kept the stern pointed toward these planes as they swung out to port, with the result that their approach was prolonged after they had come within effective range of the 20mm batteries. AA fire against them was very heavy and accurate. Three were shot down close aboard, one pulled up, released his torpedo in a climbing turn, then crashed, and the remaining plane made an aimed release from an angle of about 20° on the port quarter, but the torpedo missed to port as the ship paralleled its track. 11. At 1220 radar reported that the screen was clear, but at 1221 enemy planes were observed in their dives, attacking ENTERPRISE. Fire was opened upon them immediately. The shallow angle of dive of planes of this attack (45°) made them particularly vulnerable. The attack was short, of about two minutes' duration. Eight planes were seen to crash. Several were seen to release their bombs after obviously being hit; the bombs fell 500 yards short and the planes spun down in flames. Approximately 20 planes are thought to have made this attack. A bomb was seen to fall very near the ship at frame 30 starboard. It appeared from the bridge that it must certainly have been a hit in the ship's side. Subsequent inspection revealed a mark just below the waterline apparently made by the glancing impact of the bomb. A heavy explosion occurred close to the ship's side about 15 feet below the surface of the water, dishing in the side plating, heavily damaging three voids and opening two voids directly to the sea through small ruptures in the side plating. 12. Five minutes later radar reported a group of planes coming in. Fire control radar failed to get on, but the rangefinder in Sky Forward picked them up at 35,000 yards. They were identified as two groups of dive bombers, nine in one and six in the other, accompanied by nine fighters above them. These enemy planes were tracked in to 22,000 yards and the altitude determined to be 17,000 feet. Before fire could be opened with the 5-inch, the enemy planes disappeared in a rain cloud and were not seen again until about two minutes later when they were in their dives. Ten planes of this attack group are believed to have been shot down. No bomb hits were made. 13. There were no further attacks, and ENTERPRISE resumed landing aircraft, all of which were low on gas. Numerous planes had to land in the water when they ran out of fuel. HORNET and ENTERPRISE planes were landed indiscriminately until the deck would hold no more. Fighters and dive bombers were given preference. Number 1 elevator was damaged and out of commission so none could be struck below until the respot. Thirteen VS were reserviced and sent to Espiritu Santo, and others reserviced and launched as patrols. Landings were then resumed and the remaining planes taken aboard. 14. Retirement to the southeast was resumed. C. DEFENSE BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES 1. Again fire control radar did not pick up any target. At no time since its installation has it been useful. Previously submitted recommendations relative to its modification are again stressed. The precision requirements necessary to put this equipment on an aerial target apparently cannot be met in action. 2. Neither 5-inch director picked up targets, although the rangefinder in Sky Forward was able to do so. 3. Complete power failures occurred on Groups I and II 5-inch. Partial power failure occurred on Group III. There were frequent rammer failures and electrical misfires on all guns. 4. The apparently unwieldy director firing system, augmented by numerous casualties which greatly slow the rate of fire, has made the 5-inch battery the least useful of the AA for all except high altitude horizontal bombing attacks. In local control, difficulty is experienced in getting both trainer and pointer on the same target. A new type of fuze, which it is understood will soon be available, may greatly increase the effectiveness of the 5-inch against dive bombing and torpedo attacks. 5. The performance of the 40mm in their first action was gratifying. Eventually these guns may prove to be our best defense against dive bombers. Several faults now exist, namely: empties jam in the chutes, local control is too sensitive, firing mechanism is not satisfactory, and our splinter shields are too high. Separate reports on these deficiencies will be forwarded. 6. The 20mm, in spite of its short range, was extremely effective and accounted for most of the enemy planes shot down by this ship. It can not always get the dive bombers before they release, but it can keep them high and reap fearful toll of those that press home their attacks. D. DAMAGE SUSTAINED - SHIP 1. There were two direct hits by bombs, two near misses which caused damage, and probably six additional near misses. There were no torpedo hits. Damage sustained by the ship has been described in a general way in the narrative of the action, Section (B) above. A full and detailed report of the damage appears in the War Damage Report, Enclosure (C). E. LOSSES - AIR GROUP 1. Aircraft losses sustained by ENTERPRISE Air Group were as follows: Missing (probably shot down) 2 VF, 2 VTB Water Landings (out of fuel) 9 VF, 5 VTB Damaged in action (beyond repair, expended) 1 VF, 10 VSB 2. The crews of 7 VF and 2 VTB are missing. F. CASUALTIES - SHIP'S PERSONNEL 1. Killed - 3 officers and 40 men. 2. Missing in action and believed dead - 1 man. 3. Wounded - 1 officer and 74 men. G. ENEMY PLANES DESTROYED. 1. ENTERPRISE Air Group destroyed approximately the following enemy aircraft: a. By VF10 - - - - - - - - 21 b. By VB10 - - - - - - - - 0 c. By VS10 - - - - - - - - 9 d. By VT10 - - - - - - - - 3 Total - - - 33 2. It is estimated that the ENTERPRISE AA batteries shot down about 30 enemy planes. Approximate total for ENTERPRISE: 63 planes. 3. A reasonable estimate of the number of enemy aircraft shot down by the combined AA fire of Task Force Sixteen is 40 planes. H. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES. 1. By aircraft: .30 caliber - 15,400 rds (against enemy)33,000 " (lost in planes) Total 48,400 rds
.50 caliber - 52,970 rds (against enemy)33,000 rds (lost in planes or damaged) Total 85,970 rds
500 lb bombs 4 (dropped at enemy targets)10 (lost overboard on planes) Total 14
1000 lb bombs 3 (dropped at enemy targets) 9 (lost overboard on planes) Total 12
Torpedoes 4 (launched at enemy targets) 4 (lost in planes shot down) Total 8 2. By Anti-aircraft batteries: .50 caliber 400 rds 20MM 46,000 rds 1.1 500 rds 40MM 3,200 rds 5"/38 400 rds I. PERSONNEL 1. The coolness, resourcefulness, and effectiveness of the U.S. Man-o'warsman under fire was again demonstrated. Officers and crew of ENTERPRISE have been amply tested and on all occasions have met highest demands in courage and devotion to duty. 2. The Executive Officer's report, enclosure (B), describes special acts of heroism and extraordinary accomplishments by individuals, and contains recommendations for appropriate recognition thereof in which the Commanding Officer fully concurs. Inasmuch as full comment and recommendation are contained in my endorsement on enclosure (B), no further remarks will be made here. J. COMMENT, CONCLUSIONS, and RECOMMENDATIONS. a. Air Department. 1. It is very evident that in this action, as apparently was the case in the action of 24 August, the fighter direction was a disappointment. Some errors in judgement on the part of the Fighter Director Officer were undoubtedly made, the most apparent of which were the stationing of fighters at altitudes generally too low and the frequent use of relative bearings which under the circumstances were meaningless to pilots in the air. However, Fighter Direction having fallen short of expectations in two successive actions, a careful re-examination and analysis of the problem is required. It is not sufficient simply to charge the failure to lack of training, inexperience, or similar causes. It is a fact that when the problem is simple, that is, when one group is to be intercepted, little difficulty is experienced in effecting the interception. This was done repeatedly while enroute to the South Pacific Area in drills wherein our dive bombers or torpedo planes represented the enemy and came in from an unannounced direction and altitude. As soon, however, as the problem becomes complicated, as it did on 26 October, with some 38 of our fighters in the air, and with enemy planes in large numbers coming in from various directions and altitudes, and with friendly planes complicating the situation, then the system breaks down. Two conditions of attack must be considered. In the first condition the attack group is located well out. Here precise interception pursuant to detailed instructions from the fighter director, is practicable and should be effected. In the second condition, the attack group has arrived in the immediate vicinity of our formation and probably has separated into groups at various positions and altitudes. In the second case the multiplicity of planes, the amount of radio traffic which has to go through the air, and the numerous radar reports received (reports on friendly planes complicated the picture) present such a complicated picture, that it may be the problem is not solvable if we attempt to give detailed instructions to all fighters. Possible in the latter case a plan whereby the combat patrol is stationed in definite localities and at select altitudes, and wherein the fighter director gives out general information, and undertakes detailed interception only in case of large groups or in special cases is the answer. Certainly the positioning of fighters both as to location and altitudes must receive the most careful thought. It is imperative that operating carriers continue to exert every effort to improve their fighter direction and to reach a satisfactory solution of the problem. Permanency of personnel is important and in the past has been lacking. This can be corrected. Further, there is good reason to believe that the material condition of the radar on ENTERPRISE has been improved. However, what is urgently needed is a sound doctrine. This can only be arrived at by extensive trials and experiments. Therefore it is a problem the solution of which may well be undertaken concurrently by the Carrier Replacement Groups both as training for themselves and the fighter director officers, and in order to formulate doctrine. These trials even though they start on a modest scale, must work up to full scale exercises wherein a very large number of fighters is employed, and wherein a number of attack planes on the order of two or more carrier groups are brought in from various directions, at various altitudes, and in several groups. The duration of the attacks should be varied. Thus there will be simulated a condition such as may be expected to be encountered in a large scale engagement such as that of the Santa Cruz Islands. 2. Comment is made in the report of Commander VF-10 included in the Group Commander's report, enclosure (F), concerning the sending out of the attack group 25 October. It is believed this comment was based on incomplete information. The O.T.C. did have information of enemy carriers in a position which, at course and speed given, made contact practicable. In the same report comment was made on the size of the ENTERPRISE attack group launched on the 26th. This group comprised all flyable planes on board and consisted of 20 planes, 8 of which were fighters and one the CEAG. Obviously it was far from an ideal attack group; however, the need for getting them off promptly in order to prevent their being caught on deck by an imminent air attack, and also to get them out to the attack before the enemy carriers opened out too far, were undoubtedly factors in the O.T.C.'s decision. Further, it was to be expected that, having been launched at approximately the same time as the HORNET's first wave, they would arrive at the targets nearly simultaneously. As a matter of fact two ENTERPRISE scouts alone and unassisted did actually come some 30 miles from their scouting sector and put two 500-lb bombs in one of the enemy carriers on this same morning. The surprise attack on the attack group serves to emphasize again the necessity for eternal vigilance. 3. The remarks of the Commanding Officer VF10 concerning the deficiencies of the electric propellers and the auxiliary wing tanks are strongly concurred in. In view of the fact that almost all fighter missions require the auxiliary tank, it is rather discouraging to have tanks which can be used only once, as apparently the specifications for this particular tank contemplate. Under such circumstances it is almost impossible for the ship to be sure of having enough. 4. The ENTERPRISE Air Group went into action some ten days after departure from Pearl Harbor. It had never before been embarked as a group in a carrier and its carrier experience as a group consisted only of the qualification and refresher exercises conducted over a period of some five days immediately prior to departure. The fast passage to this area did not permit as much training as was desirable. Considering the inexperience of many of the group, their performance was in general very good and in some cases excellent. In courage, zeal, and determination they were outstanding. However, it is very evident we must never let up in the training of our groups, especially replacement groups. They must be expert in communications and gunnery (including bombing). Navigation must be stressed continuously, both for homing (radio silence and breakdown of ZB equipment must be considered) and, more important still, because it is only by good navigation that accurate contact reports can be made, and attack groups lead to their objectives. Groups should be thoroughly indoctrinated in night landing procedure. If possible the pilots should be qualified on board, and in any event they should be carefully checked out ashore in night carrier landings by a qualified carrier signal officer. This checking out should include the full procedure required when a group returns to a carrier after nightfall. When night landings became necessary on the evening of 25 October, results were disappointing, especially during the short period between dusk and moonrise. As soon as the moon rose sufficiently to clear some low clouds on the horizon, landings improved materially. However, had it not been for landing crashes which tied up the deck for considerable periods, there is no doubt that several planes which landed in the water due to fuel exhaustion, would have gotten on board. Further, such night training should include, in addition to landings and take-offs, thorough exercise with the weapons of the various carrier-based squadrons. While night dive bombing may not be generally feasible at the present time, surely night operations for fighting and torpedo planes, employing radar planes for locating the enemy, would be most useful. A fighter strafing attack on plane laden carrier at night would probably cripple the air group and resulting fires could easily put the carrier out of action. 5. The limitations in the use of torpedo planes, which have repeatedly been set forth in reports of previous actions, were again amply demonstrated. Although the attack of the enemy torpedo squadron (probably 18 planes) against the ENTERPRISE was executed with obvious skill and great determination, only about nine planes reached a proper release point, and no hits were made. The harassing effect on the Japanese pilots of the extremely heavy and accurate fire of the combined task force and the maneuvers of the ship in combing the wakes of the torpedoes launched were the prime factors in nullifying the attack. The results of the attacks of our own torpedo planes, while not nil, were disappointing. It has been proven time and again that the probability of success of a torpedo plane attack in good visibility against a formation properly defended by fighters and anti-aircraft fire is small and out of all proportion to the losses in planes and men. The conclusion is obvious - that in the present state of the art, torpedo plane operations should if practicable be limited to attacks delivered under conditions of low visibility or in mopping up operations after the defensive power of the enemy formation has been reduced. Thus limited, the torpedo plane is not as valuable, plane for plane, in day operations as is the dive bomber. Accordingly, it is recommended that for the present, the air groups of our large carriers include not more than twelve torpedo planes. Only when torpedo squadron personnel are fully trained and planes are equipped for all aspects of night operations will torpedo planes reach their full effectiveness. We should not abandon them for carrier use; after all, they were the decisive factor in the HORNET attack. 6. After almost one year of war, it is believed that we have enough pilots available who have had previous successful experience in combat with the enemy to fill all Air Group Commander and Squadron Commander billets. It is strongly recommended that only such officers be assigned to those billets. 7. Once again the enemy has shown himself superior in locating our forces and in keeping himself informed of our movements. He does this, apparently, without daily carrier plane searches as we know them. Perhaps we over-emphasize our carrier plane searches. On occasions in the past, even though we have had contact reports from shore and tender-based aircraft followed by substantiating reports from the same sources, we have considered it necessary to send out a large carrier-based search. At such crucial times, we sacrifice much of the power of an attack group for these searches and for inner air and intermediate air patrols. When under the umbrella of our own shore-based scouts, it might pay greater dividends if we were to send out a powerful attack group immediately behind a search covering only a 20-30° sector whose median passes through a position of the enemy based on reports by shore-based scouts or trackers. It is not intended to imply that our search is useless and should be done away with. It is suggested that, when enemy carriers are reliably reported where we can hit them, we deliver a full strength attack upon them rather than reducing our striking force to search for possible additional carriers or other forces which if found could not be attacked. Greater tenacity on the part of our tracking planes must be developed. The procurement of B-17 type aircraft by the Navy for long range scouting and extended tracking is urgently recommended. 8. In the torpedo attack by four planes of Torpedo Squadron Ten, there were two failures of torpedoes to release on the first attempt. Such casualties are costly beyond measure. Errors of personnel, either operational or in maintenance, are indicated, and steps for correction will be taken. There are also indications that torpedoes were released too far out. 9. Many of our fighters expended their ammunition long before the attacks by enemy planes were over, and were forced to remain helplessly looking on while the carriers were being attacked. The F4F-4 ammunition supply of 240 rounds per gun is wholly inadequate. As seen from the Fighting Squadron Ten report, the preference of VF pilots for a four gun installation with at least 400 rounds per gun is practically unanimous and strong. It is recommended that action be taken at the earliest possible date to introduce the four gun installation into new F4F-4 production. 10. When preparing for an attack mission against enemy carriers, it has been the practice to use .01 second delay fuzes in the noses and tails of 1000-lb and 500-lb demolition bombs. The striking velocity of a heavy bomb released in a dive-bombing attack can be expected to be on the order of 600 feet per second. With the .01 second fuze delay, the explosion takes place about six feet below the point of initial impact. The normal expectancy is that a bomb so fuzed striking the flight deck of a Japanese carrier will detonate about six feet below the hangar overhead, an area which is particularly well vented. A fairly large hole in the flight deck will probably result, but this can be readily bridged. A close miss of a bomb so fuzed will detonate about five feet below the surface of the water, deep enough to smother the fragments but not deep enough for a good mining effect. Thus, with our present policy of fuzing bombs, there is little likelihood of one of our bombs reaching a really vital area in an enemy carrier such as the fire rooms, engine rooms, magazines, or gasoline stowages. Our bombs will be temporarily crippling and may start fires which may get out of control, but there is not the proper expectancy that a small number of bomb hits will put down or stop an enemy carrier. Considerable thought has been given to this subject and it is recommended that the bombs of approximately the leading 20 to 30% of the attacking dive bombers be equipped with instantaneous fuzes for maximum effect against AA guns' crews and planes on deck, and that the bombs of the remaining planes be equipped with fuzes having a delay of .08 or .10 seconds in order to reach the vital areas of the ship in case of a direct hit or to obtain better mining effect in the case of a close miss. b. Gunnery. 0. The information obtained from the search radars was not sufficient to coach the FD radar on. It is strongly recommended that at every opportunity a group be tracked in without IFF and with fighter interception, in other words as realistically as possible, for training of FD radar operators. The FD radar is almost useless for search and cannot pick up the target unless coached on by accurate and prompt information from the search radar. The FD radar cannot pick up the present IFF and that adds greatly to the problem. With friendly VF and enemy attackers at the same ranges, the FD radar cannot distinguish between the two. It is believed that with proper coordination between the search radars and the FD, and with practice, the 5-inch guns can open fire on planes before they can be seen and long before they reach their dive points or bomb release points. 1. It is believed that the 5-inch guns of screening vessels might best be employed in shooting at enemy planes that have not yet pushed over into their dives. Their problem in this respect is identical to our own. The fire of 5-inch at diving planes other than a barrage fired by the ship being attacked is ineffective, but it should be possible to hit them before they start their dives. All supporting ships should direct their 5-inch fire accordingly. 2. The 5-inch guns should be equipped with a single man control, either a Mark 51 director or a joy stick similar to that of the 40mm for use against dive bombers. The 5-inch gun can hit, but it is most difficult to get the pointer and the trainer on the same plane. This is important and must be done if we are to stop dive bombers before they release their bombs. 3. Each 5-inch gun group should be equipped with its own auxiliary power supply if only sufficient to provide rammer power. It is understood that small diesel driven generators, which would be suitable, are available. In every action we have lost power on some of the 5-inch guns. The loss of power on the rammer slows the rate of fire to about half and will make the gun useless against horizontal bombers as the "dead time" becomes unpredictable. The gun cannot be rammed by hand at high elevation and must be depressed for each shot. This takes time and requires cutting out the firing circuit between shots, making the director almost useless. 4. The 40mm shields must be cut down and the firing cams remade so that the guns can be depressed to fire horizontally during a turn. This job cannot wait and will be started by the ship's force. 5. In addition to being too high, it is believed that the shields are too large. They should be brought in until the gun barrel protrudes over the shield. If the shield is cut down the top row of ammunition will be only a few inches below the muzzle blast. There is ample room around the mount at present and it is believed that decreasing the diameter of the shield will not interfere with the service of the guns, and it would save considerable weight. 6. A thorough investigation should be made of the ejection troughs. The shooting of our 40mm guns was interrupted several times at critical moments because of empties jammed in the tube. We are experimenting to find a remedy, but the work that can be done by the ship's force in this respect is limited. 7. The "joy stick" control of the 40mm mount is too sensitive. A leverage system on the present stick should be designed. At present, every time the pointer shifts his weight a little or the ship heels over, the guns swing violently in some unwanted direction. 8. The mechanical firing system on the 40mm is not satisfactory because it is too complicated to maintain and cut-outs cannot be accurately set. It is considered that this can be greatly simplified and improved. 9. The Mark 51 director and Mark 14 sights are excellent but the mounting must be as rigid as possible and the location as clear of smoke as possible for maximum effectiveness. 10. The initial velocity of the 20mm gun should be increased and the weight and shape of the projectile should be changed to give it better ballistic qualities. An increase in the effective range of 1000 yards is essential, and it is going to be even more essential when the enemy realize that they can probably survive by pulling out at three or four thousand feet whereas at present it is almost suicide to come down to 1500 feet. 11. Increased depression of 20mm guns is urgently required in order that guns on the high side when the ship is heeled over in an evasive action turn can fire horizontally at attacking torpedo planes. 12. It is considered that the installation of additional 20mm guns would be highly desirable. However, the weight and stability situation in this ship appears to have reached the point at which no further topside weights should be added without adequate compensation by the removal of corresponding weights. The removal of the armor belts is again recommended for consideration in this connection. It is strongly felt that additional automatic AA guns would be of more value to the ship than the present armor belts. The removal of the upper portion of the conning tower down to the level of the main deck and the substitution of a small lightly armored electrical conduit trunk is also recommended for consideration as a weight removal item. c. Medical. Once again the Medical Department of this ship functioned with outstanding efficiency in caring for a large number of wounded. Through the skillful and untiring efforts of the Medical Officers and their assistants, no further fatalities occurred beyond those which occurred during or immediately following the action. d. General. 0. The advantages of operating two carriers in close proximity, if the operations are in areas where air attack is to be expected, are numerous. One carrier alone under such conditions, forced to conduct morning and evening searches, combat patrols, inner and possible intermediate air patrols, has nothing much left with which to strike, and if long continued is likely to suffer considerable weakening of its air strength due to exhaustion of personnel and deterioration of material. If, of course, an "air umbrella" is furnished from other sources, and if it is reliable, then the picture changes. However, at present it is doubtful if such an umbrella exists in this area and certainly a Task Force Commander will be under considerable apprehension as to its reliability. Other advantages include availability of an additional carrier deck to receive planes from a damaged carrier; retention of one carrier's planes as a striking force ready for immediate launching; the institution of a "duty" system whereby in normal cruising each carrier has days for upkeep and training of its group and other essential work. These and others have been discussed before and it is not necessary to go into detail here. 1. When two carriers are operating together, each should have its own screen and supporting vessels, and should be organized as an independent task force or group (this applies to large carriers). The separation used in the operations now being discussed, about five miles, appeared very satisfactory. The distance permitted each group to maneuver independently while at the same time maintaining good visual contact for signaling, and facilitated patrols. The precise separation when air attack is imminent is a question. The problem is how much separation will prevent sighting of both carriers if one is picked up. In the areas where we are now operating five miles will not do it, neither will ten. It must be a really wide separation on the order of some thirty to fifty miles, and even this will not guarantee it. Therefore unless conditions permit a separation in advance whereby the above can be achieved, it cannot be effected on short notice when attack is imminent. We must make our choice based on conditions present and likely to be encountered, weighing the advantages of close operation, such as ease of control, and of communications, economy of effort in air patrols and surface protection including that against submarines, against the insurance against discovery resulting from relatively wide separation. Again the air coverage of the area to be expected from sources other than the carriers is a large factor. 2. Point Option, as a result of YE - ZB equipment, has lost something of its importance. However, this equipment has failed at critical moments. Therefore, it is desirable to keep near Point Option if circumstances permit. Probably the chief reason for wide separation is the effort to maintain a relatively fast moving Point Option in a down wind direction. With light winds, and frequent launchings and recoveries incident to patrols and searches, this is almost impossible. Therefore, estimates as to its travel under such conditions should be conservative. 3. We know that PBY's have been captured by the Japanese. On more than one occasion, the actions of PBY's sighted in the vicinity of our formations, and subsequent events which have occurred, have given rise to the possibility that the Japs are using a few PBY's as shadowing planes. It is recommended that a doctrine be adopted wherein fighters approaching for identification friendly types in visual contact with our formations be required to insure complete identification by flying close alongside and identifying the flight crews as Americans by visual inspection of their faces. The cooperation of our own shore-based planes would be necessary. 4. Following the action, and because of the size and duration of the air attack, it was felt that a description of the maneuvers and methods used in the endeavor to avoid being hit, might be of value. Enclosure (H) represents an effort to describe these maneuvers, and to enumerate some conclusions reached. (Signed) O. B. HARDISON Distribution:· Cincpac (Orig. & 2) · ComSoPac (2) · ComAirPac (1) · ComTaskFor 16 (3) ... More
Description
Organized in September 1939 as a response to the war in Europe, was ordered to track and report the movements of any warlike operations of belligerents in the waters of the Western Hemisphere