Criteria Occupation duty in the European-African-Middle Eastern area may be credited to organizations for duty performed on and subsequent to May 8, 1945. Terminal dates for eligibility periods and occupation ... Occupation duty in the European-African-Middle Eastern area may be credited to organizations for duty performed on and subsequent to May 8, 1945. Terminal dates for eligibility periods and occupation territories in this area are as follows: Italy: November 8, 1945 to December 15, 1947, Trieste: May 9, 1945 to October 25, 1954, Germany (exclusive of Berlin): May 9, 1945 to May 5, 1955, Berlin: May 9, 1945 to October 2, 1990, Austria: May 9, 1945 to October 25, 1955, Asiatic-Pacific Area: September 2, 1945 to April 27, 1952. Units performing service in the Korean area during the period of June 27, 1950 to April 27, 1952, inclusive, and which are eligible for the Korean Service Medal, will not be credited with eligibility for the Navy Occupation Service Medal for the same period. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria
The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation is a military unit award issued by the government of South Korea to both South Korean and foreign military units.
Criteria The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United... The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United Nations. Service in qualifying organizations had to be certified by the United Nations Commander-in-Chief as having directly supported military operations in Korea. In the case of the United States, such certification was issued in General Orders 31 (June 20, 1955); General Orders 33 (July 11, 1955); and General Orders 36 (July 13, 1955). MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
Criteria The Army Distinguished Service Medal may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the United States Army, performs exceptionally meritorious service in a duty of great responsi... The Army Distinguished Service Medal may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the United States Army, performs exceptionally meritorious service in a duty of great responsibility. The individual's performance must merit recognition for services which are clearly exceptional, and the performance of normal duties in an exceptional manner by itself will not justify an award of the Army Distinguished Service Medal MoreHide
Description USS Pueblo (AGER-2) is a Banner-class environmental research ship, attached to Navy intelligence as a spy ship, which was attacked and captured by North Korean forces on 23 January 1968, in what is knUSS Pueblo (AGER-2) is a Banner-class environmental research ship, attached to Navy intelligence as a spy ship, which was attacked and captured by North Korean forces on 23 January 1968, in what is known today as the "Pueblo incident" or alternatively, as the "Pueblo crisis".
The seizure of the U.S. Navy ship and its 83 crew members, one of whom was killed in the attack, came less than a week after President Lyndon B. Johnson's "State of the Union" address to the United States Congress, just a week before the start of the "Tet Offensive" in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and only three days after 31 men of North Korea's "KPA Unit 12" had crossed the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and killed 26 South Koreans in an attempt to attack the South Korean "Blue House" (executive mansion) in the capital Seoul. The taking of Pueblo and the abuse and torture of its crew during the subsequent 11-month prisoner drama became a major Cold War incident, raising tensions between the western democracies and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and People's Republic of China.
North Korea stated that Pueblo deliberately entered their territorial waters 7.6 miles away from Ryo Island, and that the logbook shows that they intruded several times. However, the United States maintains that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident and that any purported evidence supplied by North Korea to support its statements was fabricated.
Pueblo, still held by North Korea today, officially remains a commissioned vessel of the United States Navy. Since early 2013, the ship has been moored along the Botong River in Pyongyang, and used there as a museum ship at the Pyongyang Victorious War Museum. Pueblo is the only ship of the U.S. Navy still on the commissioned roster currently being held captive.... More
Description
On July 31, 1964 USS Maddox (DD-731) began a reconnaissance mission in the Gulf of Tonkin and was attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol boats in international waters on August 2, 1964.
Memories Actions in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 1964 Amid steadily rising tensions over North Vietnam's activitActions in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 1964 Amid steadily rising tensions over North Vietnam's activities in Laos and South Vietnam, at the end of July 1964 USS Maddox entered the Gulf of Tonkin for a cruise along the North Vietnamese coast. As part of a general U.S. effort to collect intelligence in potential Far Eastern hot spots, this "Desoto Patrol" was particularly focused on obtaining information that would support South Vietnamese coastal raids against North Vietnam. One of these had just taken place as Maddox began her mission.
On the afternoon of 2 August 1964, while steaming well offshore in international waters, Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats. The destroyer maneuvered to avoid torpedoes and used her guns against her fast-moving opponents, hitting them all. In turn, she was struck in the after gun director by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. Maddox called for air support from the carrier Ticonderoga, whose planes strafed the three boats, leaving one dead in the water and burning. Both sides then separated.
Maddox was soon ordered to resume her patrol, this time accompanied by the larger and newer destroyer Turner Joy. On 3 August, the South Vietnamese conducted another coastal raid. Intelligence indicated that the North Vietnamese were planning to again attack the U.S. ships operating off their shores, although this intrepretation was incorrect. During the night of 4 August, while they were underway in the middle of the Tonkin Gulf, Maddox and Turner Joy detected speedy craft closing in. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of torpedoes.
Though information obtained well after the fact indicates that there was actually no North Vietnamese attack that night, U.S. authorities were convinced at the time that one had taken place, and reacted by sending planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilites. A few days later, the U.S. Congess passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave the Government authorization for what eventually became a full-scale war in Southeast Asia.
CINCPACFLT message regarding "Proof of attack, 071101Z":
NAVAL MESSAGE NAVAL DEPARTMENT PRECEDENCE (ACTION): FLASH
(INFO): FLASH
Z071101Z FM CINCPACFLT
TO RUHL HQ/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKDA/JCS RUECW/CNO
PROOF OF ATTACK (U) A. JCS 7770 DTG 061642Z NOTAL B. CINCPAC 061840Z NOTAL 1. IAW REF B, FOLLOWING INFO IS SUBMITTED FOR RESPONSE TO REF A: A. USS MADDOX (DD 731), WHILE ON PATROL IN THE GULF OF TONKIN, WAS ATTACKED AT 1508 GULF ON 2 AUGUST BY THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS. MADDOX WAS, AT THE TIME OF ATTACK, APPROXIMATELY 30 MILES FROM THE NEAREST LAND. DURING THIS UNPROVOKED ATTACK, THREE TORPEDOES WERE FIRED AT MADDOX. ALTHOUGH NO TORPEDOES HIT MADDOX, ONE MACHINE GUN BULLET WAS OBSERVED HITTING THE SHIP. THIS BULLET WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED FROM THE AMMUNITION MAGAZINE IN WHICH IT HAD LODGED AND WILL BE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES AS EVIDENCE. MADDOX FIRED HER GUNS IN SELF DEFENSE AND WAS ABLE TO REPULSE THE ATTACKERS. MADDOX PROBABLY SANK ONE PT IN THIS ENGAGEMENT. THIS ATTACK HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. B. AFTER THIS ATTACK, MADDOX REFUELED AND RETURNED TO THE PATROL IN THE GULF OF TONKIN IN COMPANY WITH USS TURNER JOY (DD 951). AT ABOUT 2108 GOLF ON 4 AUGUST, THEN MADDOX AND TURNER JOY WERE ON A SOUTHEASTERLY COURSE APPROXIMATELY 60 MILES FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COAST, THREE HIGH SPEED RADAR CONTACTS WERE DETECTED ABOUT 14 MILES TO THE EASTWARD OF THE TWO SHIPS. AT 2119 GOLF THE CONTACTS, WHICH WERE DISPLAYED ON THE RADAR SCREENS OF BOTH SHIPS, INDICATED PROBABLE HOSTILE INTENT BY CHANGING COURSE AND SPEED TO CLOSE THE RANGE AND TAKE COURSE WHICH WOULD PERMIT LAUNCHING TORPEDOES. MADDOX AND TURNER JOY OPENED FIRE WHEN IT WAS EVIDENT FROM THE MANEUVERS OF THE APPROACHING CONTACTS THAT THEY WERE PRESSING IN FOR TORPEDO LAUNCHING POSITION. ABOUT ONE MINUTE LATER MADDOX, HAVING HEARD A TORPEDO RUNNING ON HER SONAR (HEARD BY CAPTAIN HERRICK, US NAVY, COMDESDIV 192, AND OTHERS IN THE CIC), INFORMED TURNER JOY THAT A TORPEDO HAD BEEN LAUNCHED AND WAS HEADED IN THE DIRECTION OF TURNER JOY. LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE JOHN JEROME WARRY III, FILE NUMBER 664848, US NAVY, ATTACHED TO TURNER JOY AND SERVING AS THE FORWARD GUN DIRECTOR OFFICER, SIGHTED A TORPEDO COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE RADAR CONTACTS WHICH HAD AMBUSHED THE U.S. SHIPS. TURNER JOY TURNED TO AVOID THE TORPEDO AND, LARRY O'LITTON, 5976601, SEAMAN, US NAVY, WHO WAS WITH LTJG WARRY IN THE GUN DIRECTOR, AND EDWIN R SENTETL, 3440026, SEAMAN APPRENTICE, US NAVY, WHO WAS SHIP'S LOOKOUT FOR THE PORT SIDE, SIGHTED THE TORPEDO PASSING PARALLEL TO TURNER JOY AT DISTANCE OF 300 FEET. THE TORPEDO PASSED ALONG TURNER JOY FROM AFT TO FORWARD ON THE BEARING FROM WHICH MADDOX HAD REPORTED THE TORPEDO WAS APPROACHING. DURING THE ATTACK A SEARCHLIGHT WAS OBSERVED BY ALL SIGNAL BRIDGE AND MANEUVERING BRIDGE PERSONNEL INCLUDING THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF TURNER JOY. THE BEAM OF THE SEARCHLIGHT DID NOT TOUCH THE SHIP, BUT WAS SEEN TO SWING IN AN ARC TOWARD TURNER JOY AND WAS IMMEDIATELY EXTINGUISHED WHEN AIRCRAFT FROM THE COMBAT AIR PATROL ORBITING ABOVE THE SHIPS APPROACHED. TURNER JOY PERSONNEL MAKING STATEMENTS REGARDING THE SEARCHLIGHT SIGHTING KARE RECHARD M. BACION, 5178897, SIGNALMAN SECOND CLASS, US NAVY; GARY D. CARROL, 5881266, SIGNALMAN THIRD CLASS, US NAVY. THE ATTACKING TORPEDO BOATS WERE ACTUALLY SEEN AND DESCRIBED BY THE FOLLOWING TURNER JOY PERSONNEL: DONALD V. SHARKEY, 5184893, BOATSWAINS MATE THIRD CLASS, US NAVY; KENNETH E. GARRISON, 6874988, SEAMAN, US NAVY; DELNER JONES, 5499624, SEAMAN APPRENTICE, US NAVY; AND ARTHUR B. ANDERSON, 6931937, FIRECONTROLMAN SEAMAN APPRENTICE, US NAVY. THESE PERSONNEL SIGHTED THE TORPEDO BOATS WHEN THE COMBAT AIR CONTROL AIRCRAFT OVERHEAD DROPPED FLARES. NONE OF THESE PERSONNEL HAD SEEN A MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT BEFORE (TURNER JOY NOT HAVING BEEN IN THE 2 AUGUST ACTION), BUT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR OBSERVATIONS EACH ON INDEPENDENTLY DREW AN ACCURATE SKETCH OF A MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SIMILAR TO THOSE KNOWN TO BE OPERATIONAL IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVY. MOREOVER, THE SKETCHES WERE SIMILAR TO THE TORPEDO BOATS WHICH HAD ATTACKED THE MADDOX IN DAYLIGHT ON 2 AUGUST. COMMANDER G. H. EDMONDSON, US NAVY, COMMANDING OFFICER OF ATTACK SQUADRON 52, AND HIS WINGMAN WERE FLYING COMBAT AIR PATROL IN THE VICINITY OF THE MADDOX AND TURNER JOY AT THE TIME OF THE TORPEDO ATTACK. BOTH OFFICERS WERE FLYING AT ALTITUDES RANGING BETWEEN 700 AND 1500 FEET WHEN THEY SIGHTED GUN FLASHES ON THE SURFACE OF THE WATER AS WELL AS LIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT BURSTS AT THEIR APPROXIMATE ALTITUDE. ON ONE PASS OVER THE US DESTROYERS, BOTH PILOTS POSITIVELY SIGHTED A "SNAKEY" WAKE ONE AND ONE-HALF MILES AHEAD OF THE LEAD DESTROYER, USS MADDOX. THE WEATHER WAS OVERCAST WITH LIMITED VISIBILITY; HOWEVER, SURFACE VISIBILITY WAS SUFFICIENT FOR SERGEANT MATTHEW B. ALLASNE, 1605290, USMC, AND LANCE CORPORAL DAVID A. PROUTY, 19990505, USMC, WHO WERE MANNING MACHINE GUNS ON MADDOX, TO SIGHT LIGHTS PASS UP THE PORT SIDE OF THE SHIP, GO OUT AHEAD, AND THEN PASS DOWN THE STARBOARD SIDE. BOTH BELIEVED THE LIGHTS TO BE FROM ONE OR MORE SMALL BOATS GOING AT HIGH SPEED.
2. FOREGOING NARRATIVE DERIVED FROM OPERATIONAL SUMMARIES AND A SERIES OF STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO CINCPACFLT BY MESSAGE AND ARE BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO CINCPAC AND JCS. POINTS INCLUDED IN THIS NARRATIVE ARE SUBSTANTIATED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THESE STATEMENTS.
3. APART FROM THE ONE INSTANCE OF MACHINE GUN BULLET STRIKING THE USS MADDOX DURING THE ACTION ON 2 AUGUST, THERE WAS NO DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ANY U.S. UNIT DURING EITHER ACTION.
4. PHOTOGRAPHY OBTAINED FROM ON BOARD USS MADDOX DURING THE 2 AUGUST ACTION WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS. SO FAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED, THERE WAS NO PHOTOGRAPHY OBTAINED DURING THE NIGHT ACTION ON 4 AUGUST.
GP-4
CONTROL NO. 195 14/FS/RT/3 CIRCUIT NO. N800 TIME OF RECEIPT 1304Z 7 AUG 64 DATE TIME GROUP 071101Z AUG 64
Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
Description The blockade began October 21 and, the next day, Kennedy delivered a public address alerting Americans to the situation. In his speech, he warned a frightened American public that the missiles on CubaThe blockade began October 21 and, the next day, Kennedy delivered a public address alerting Americans to the situation. In his speech, he warned a frightened American public that the missiles on Cuba were capable of hitting Washington, D.C. or anywhere in the southeastern portion of the country, the Panama Canal, Mexico City or “as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru.” A military confrontation appeared imminent when Kennedy told his audience that he ordered the evacuation of the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and put military units on standby. Boldly, he stated, “one path we shall never choose is the path of surrender or submission.”
Khrushchev responded by sending additional ships—possibly carrying military cargo—toward Cuba and by allowing construction at the missile sites to continue. Over the following six days, the Cuban Missile Crisis, as it is now known, brought the world to the brink of global nuclear war while the two leaders engaged in tense negotiations via telegram and letter.
Fortunately by October 28, Kennedy and Khrushchev had reached a settlement and people on both sides of the conflict breathed a collective but wary sigh of relief. The Cuban missile sites were dismantled and, in return, Kennedy agreed to close U.S. missile sites in Turkey.... More
Memories As political negotiations began in the UN and bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, theAs political negotiations began in the UN and bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the naval quarantine entered a new phase. On the 30th, the President agreed to suspend aerial surveillance and active quarantine operations pending the outcome of UN attempts to secure inspection guarantees and a show of Soviet good faith. The next several days, Cuban actions involved primarily only surveillance activity.
Wednesday, 31 October
Soviet merchantmen approaching the quarantine zone continued to heave to upon reaching the 500-mile line. By 31 October, Kladna and Karl Marx had joined Belovodsk and Groznyy in lying dead in the water.
Other significant developments on this first day of the new phase of operations centered around reappraisal of submarine surveillance successes and committal of Latin American assistance to the U.S. military action.
An unprecedented number of eleven submarines had been identified outside of Soviet home waters. At least four Russian "F" class submarines were operating in the area east of the Bahamas. All of these had been sighted on the surface at least once. In one case, one of these remained on the surface for 45 hours, under escort of two U.S. destroyers.
Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the U.S. Commander South Atlantic at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers and one submarine had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by 2 November. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the quarantine. The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation.
That evening there was an analysis of information and press reports concerning The UN Secretary General's conferences with Cuban Premier Castro and Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Havana. About 1900R, CNO telephoned CINCLANT and later sent a confirming dispatch that the quarantine would be resumed at daybreak in the morning, but that ships should only be visually challenged and were not to be boarded without authority of the JCS. At 1930Q, Secretary McNamara called the duty admiral (RADM Gentner) reconfirming the quarantine order. He also advised that 14 low-level reconnaissance flights were to be ordered for the next day.
Diplomatic developments prompted CNO to advise his Fleet Commanders further on his thinking in regard to the possible outcome of the Cuban negotiations. U Thant had returned to New York the night before without securing inspection rights but with "assurances" that the missiles would be removed in a matter of days. Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan was en route to Cuba and Khrushchev's moderate First Deputy Premier Vasily Kuznetzov had been sent as a special envoy to the UN to negotiate on Cuban matters.
CNO's reflections were:
"Observers eventually will get into Cuba. The missiles will actually be seen being shipped out and so reported by numbers and types to the UN. The sites may even be inspected, but the entire country will not be opened or some rules will preclude inspection of the entire island. Obviously, some missiles and equipment will still remain. Khrushchev as a figure of 'peace-loving emissary' who withdrew his missiles from Cuba, will hammer for U. S. withdrawal of warmongering U. S. missiles in Turkey as show of peaceful intentions and reciprocation.
"Since observers will have seen missiles leaving Cuba, Khrushchev will say there is no need for reconnaissance flights. The flights will continue and no doubt Cubans will attempt to shoot them down Any photographs produced subsequent to the report of the missiles leaving Cuba would be branded as 'pre-missile-departure' photos, falsely introduced and, therefore, proof of further missile site construction would be a tough problem and create much wrangling.
"In the meantime, the Soviets will continue construction of sites, this time careful to camouflage as they progress, and strengthen their political hold on the island for spreading Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Just what lessons Khrushchev will have learned and what influence this present incident will have on his future actions is a matter to which we will give much attention in order to hopefully head him off -- or belatedly counter him."
Thursday, 1 November
Reconnaissance flights over Cuba were resumed. Six sorties were launched and all six returned safely. Their photographs revealed that all known MRBM sites in Cuba were either being or had been dismantled. The launch pads were destroyed, apparently by bulldozing. Missiles and launch equipment had been removed, but their location was unknown.
Construction activity at the IRBM sites had stopped and the installations were partially destroyed. However, IL-28 bomber aircraft still were being assembled. One appeared to be completed, and two more were finished except for engine cowlings. Three others lacked only engines, while 21 remained in their crates.
Based on a review of all information available, the CNO Submarine Contact Evaluation Board estimated that at least four and possibly seven Soviet submarines were operating in the Southwestern Atlantic.
Photography was available of five Soviet "F" class submarines. The Board considered that two of these were the same submarine; however, should this not be the case, an additional positive submarine existed.
One contact located south of Jamaica was evaluated as a tentative positive submarine based on standard evaluation criteria. However, analysis of additional contact information was required before accepting this as a positive Soviet submarine.
The Board believed that the four "F" class submarines deployed from Northern Fleet waters during the period September 26 - October 1 based on a 7 knot speed of advance to the area of initial contact. The contact south of Jamaica would have had to maintain a significantly higher speed of advance than the others, or would have had to depart home waters about a week earlier.
It was believed that these submarines were en route to Cuban waters to commence operations from a Cuban port as a part of the offensive build-up. Their movements subsequent to the declaration of the quarantine indicated Moscow indecision on a new course of action.
The Cecil forced a Soviet "F" class submarine to the surface after 35 hours of continuous contact. When the SS surfaced, it was on course 090 as prescribed by our instructions to Moscow of 2 October. CINCLANTFLT sent the following congratulatory message to Cecil:
"Your persistent and expert holding of contact until exhaustion with Soviet 'F' class 011 has been followed with pride and admiration. Well done."
At 2235, Groznyy, one of four Soviet ships which had been lying dead in the water east of the quarantine line) began to move towards Cuba. Shortly after, the other three, Belovodsk, Mir, and Karl Marx, got underway on a southwestward course. Other ships west of latitude 50W and heading for Cuban ports were Birgit and Sottern (Swedish); Camaguey (Cuban); Eref (Turkish); Kladna (Czech); Aspromonte (Italian); Theo Korner (East German), and Sierra Maestra (Cuban). CINCLANT's instructions were not to stop or board any of these ships unless authorized to do so by higher authority and to permit them to pass after identification-
Friday, 2 November through Wednesday, 7 November
For the next five days, the naval quarantine was characterized by continued surveillance of merchant ships entering and leaving Cuban ports and aerial reconnaissance of the dismantling of missile sites. Reconnaissance photographs showed the IRBM and MRBM sites were being disassembled and destroyed. Throughout this period, there also were repeated submarine contacts and surfacings.
Meanwhile the President appointed a special negotiating committee headed by Mr. John J. McCloy to deal with a Soviet delegation headed by First Deputy Premier Kuznetzov at the United Nations in New York. This group was to work out the details for removal of the offensive weapons in Cuba and arrange for a system of inspection.
Admiral Anderson was concerned by the fact that submarines had not been specifically included on the list of "offensive" weapons which were to be removed from Cuba. On November 3, CNO supplied the U.S. negotiators with an appraisal of the strategic implications of Soviet submarines operating from or being supported from a Cuban base. His views on this matter were:
"Soviet submarines already can refuel, reprovision and effect minor repairs in existing Cuban ports. Additional support capabilities can be introduced clandestinely in the absence of adequate inspection. The publicly announced 'fishing fleet' base is probably a cover for a submarine base, and the Soviets will continue covert attempts to improve this base capability. They ostensibly could turn over to Cuba submarines for 'defense' purposes.
"A submarine base in Cuba would enable the Soviets to place offensive weapon systems in the Western Hemisphere. The base could be used by surface-launching ballistic missile submarines as well as attack submarines. The SLBM's would be within range of American targets while in port or at sea. The U.S. ASW defensive perimeter, so important to the ASW and continental defense system, would be penetrated and the southern flank of the United States would be ex posed to short range ballistic missile attack.
"With the Gulf of Mexico a Soviet operating area, nuclear capabilities against the U.S. targets would be increased many fold. Caribbean and South American trade routes would be exposed to easy attack by Soviet submarines in early stages of a limited war at sea.
"The United States could no longer rely on intelligence information indicating a movement of large numbers of submarines toward the East Coast as a strategic warning. The Soviets could establish a pattern of operations near Cuba which would defeat or vitiate this indication. A Soviet-Cuban 'fishing fleet' could be used to support submarines, and consumable supplies, fuel and personnel could be transferred at sea to submarines operating in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.
"The United States cannot permit the USSR to establish either a Soviet or a Cuban submarine base in Cuba or allow Cuban facilities to be used for direct support of submarine operations, any more than we can permit the establishment of nuclear-capable missile and air bases. The U. S. should formally announce that submarines are included in the list of offensive weapons systems in Cuba and that necessary measures will be taken to ensure submarines do not operate from or receive support from Cuban bases. Daily aerial surveillance of Cuba should include Cuban ports in which submarines would receive support. The 'fishing fleet' should be kept under routine surveillance, and surface patrols should be maintained off Cuban ports. in addition, South American ASW capabilities should be increased so that this operation can properly become an 'all-American' undertaking."
On 4 November, the Soviet merchant ship Emilian Pugachew was inspected at Balboa, C.Z. at 0830R. Cargo consisted of canned fish, fish oil, and lumber and no prohibited items. No further intercept was made on this ship.
COMSOLANT issued OpOrder 9-62 which promulgated the quarantine instructions for the southern approaches to the Caribbean. Stations were established covering all passages through the Lesser Antilles.
All of the ships of special interest approaching or loading in Cuban waters were under surveillance or being trailed by surface quarantine forces. The relaxation of activity had permitted an opportunity to relieve and replace force units.
At 1258R on 5 November a report was received that two of the BLUE MOON low-level reconnaissance flights were being pursued by two MIG 21's. Flight 16 reported that it was jumped eight miles west of Santa Clara. The tailman saw the two Soviet fighters closing and the BLUE MOON F8U's turned and rolled into the MIG's for a head-on approach. Then, the Navy planes hit their afterburners and exited six miles east of their point of entry. The two MIG's stayed with them for about five minutes. The high combat air patrol observed the action, but could not take action until after the incident was closed.
COMSECONDFLT in Newport News relieved COMCRUDESFLOT Six in Canberra as CTF 136 and Canberra proceeded to Norfolk, Va. Other routine reliefs of quarantine units continued.
CINCLANT assigned the Dominican Republic frigates Gregori (F-103) and Luferon (F-104) to operational control of CTF 137 (COMSOLANT). They were stationed in Mona Passage, one at a time on individual eight-day patrols.
The next day, 6 November, at 1008R, a U-2 high-level reconnaissance flight was terminated because the pilot detected surface-to-air radar guidance activity. Because of the danger of possible missile attacks on the high-level reconnaissance flights, heavier reliance was placed on the low-level sorties which could operate at altitudes low enough to render SAM defenses ineffective.
Admiral Anderson submitted an analysis of the establishment of a secret naval base in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense. The President had requested the information the day before in a memorandum to SECDEF, which read:
"We must operate on the presumption that the Russians may try again. This time they may prepare themselves for action on the sea in the Cuban area. Does Admiral Anderson think they could build up a secret naval base which will put them on a near parity with us if we should once again blockade? If he thinks there is substantial danger of this, what suggestions would he now make?"
CNO reported to SECDEF that there were several ways in which the Soviets could base naval forces in Cuba; however, he pointed out that by using means for internal intelligence, aerial and other surveillance, a warning would be supplied for all but the most austere naval support build-up. He reemphasized that his recommendation that submarines operated or supported from Cuban bases should be declared offensive weapons and placed on the list of prohibited materials. He detailed these views in the memorandum.
Meanwhile, the disassembling of the missile sites continued at a rapid pace. CINCLANT reported that the movement of Soviet personnel and equipment towards ports was proceeding hurriedly.
Reconnaissance flights continued and the Cuban air defense system was tracking our high-altitude flights. However, there were no incidents of defensive action or harassment.
One of the immediate tasks of the U. S. negotiators at the UN was to insure that the U. S. position covered all of the facets of the problem and that surveillance continued. Mr. Mc Cloy was pushing for the dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba at the earliest possible date. Concerning on-site inspection of the missile bases, the Soviets had agreed to that only after dismantling and removal. However, the Cubans would not agree to any on-site inspection. Also, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans would agree to the firm U. S. requirement that aerial reconnaissance flights had to continue.
The Soviet negotiators proposed that the Red Cross inspect incoming cargoes, and the U. S. accepted this as "suitable." Four Swedish ships were tentatively suggested to transport the Red Cross inspection teams, but the problem of paying the chartering costs had all but wrecked the proposal.
Kuznetzov suggested that as a compromise on the inspection issue, the Soviets would give the U. S. photographic evidence of the dismantling. He also said that if Cuba would not permit inspection of the missile withdrawal, the Soviet Union would supply a list of the ships which were to transport the missiles and shipping schedules, then allow the U.S. ships to come alongside outbound vessels to see and count the missiles. Kuznetzov stated that the USSR had a total of only 42 offensive missiles in Cuba. However, JCS estimates on October 30 placed the number of MRBM's at 48 and IRBM's at 24 or possibly 32.
The JCS invited Cuban contingency and quarantine commanders to a Washington meeting the next day to discuss the possibility of stand down in readiness posture and SECDEF's belief that CINCLANT Operations Plan 316 might be "too thin." November 15 was suggested as an approximate date for some degree of stand down.
Wednesday, 7 November
The United States accepted the Soviet offer to inspect outbound missile-bearing ships and the Secretary of Defense notified the JCS of the procedures for conducting the at-sea inspection. The directive was sent to the quarantine force commander 1157R for immediate compliance.
The USSR provided the names of the nine vessels which were carrying out the missiles. The agreement was that the alongside inspections would begin at first light on the next day. Appropriate call signs were assigned to quarantine ships which were to affect the intercepts. The master of the Soviet ship and the commanding officer of the intercepting U. S. ship assigned were to work out their own arrangements for rendezvous at a convenient point along the track of the outbound vessel.
Photographic equipment and Russian language interpreters were placed aboard the intercepting ships. The Soviet Union had also agreed that helicopters could be used to photograph deck cargoes if seas and weather prohibited good shipboard photographic results.
Negotiations later brought further Russian agreement that outer covers would be removed partially from missile transporters in order to permit visual and photographic inspection.
Six of the nine ships designated for inspection by the USSR had already departed. They were: Ship Time Location Course/Speed F. Kurchatov 071700 20-05N, 73-20W 070/20 M. Anosov 070841 22-10N, 77W Labinsk 071814 24-00N, 80-24W /16 Polzunov 070816 23-12N, 82-24W 070/12 Bratsk 071015 23-20N, 82-40W Dvinogorsk 071500 23-00N, 70-40W 075/15
Meanwhile, the 5th MEB had completed its transit of the Panama Canal and was departing Colon. All forces involved in the transit had changed operational control to CINCLANT. CINCPACFLT offered his congratulations for the manner in which all officers and men responded to the movement operation.
Thursday, 8 November
During the morning, Mr. Gilpatric ordered that photographic confirmation of missiles and associated equipment being transported from Cuba be obtained in time for a Presidential announcement in the evening. The President wanted to say that the missiles were being removed and, if possible, that they had been counted aboard ships carrying them out. in view of this, all efforts were being directed towards the obtaining of firm fixes on the location of all outgoing ships and the positioning of a surface quarantine vessel with each. Patrol planes were being dispatched from Jacksonville and Guantanamo to locate and help photograph the deck cargoes.
Photographs of the Dvinogorsk, Anosov, and Klirchatov already had been taken while these ships were either underway or loading in port. They showed four missiles on the first ship, eight on the second, and six on the third.
The Soviet ships were not complying with an agreement to sail a single transit route, and there was difficulty in finding all of them. At 1245R CINCLANTFLT reported that the Alapayevsk had been photographed by a VP-2- aircraft, and the pictures would be in Jacksonville by 1500R.
At 1414R, Rear Admiral Hogle at CINCLANTFLT reported that the Volgoles had been sighted by a P2V at - Her deck cargo was covered and the ship would not uncover after being asked by voice and flashing light to do so. Saufley was en route to intercept her, estimating the scene at 1700Q. The P2V was staying on top while the destroyer arrived. The pilot reported the Volgoles deck cargo as six vehicles forward and three aft, and two tube shapes forward and five aft, estimated size 8 x 6 x 55 feet.
Perry made first contact with Volgoles at 1530R and requested that she uncover the missiles, but the ship refused. Communication was made by voice on 500KC, flashing light, loud hailer, and placards.
The message sent was, "Show me your missiles, please. I must see them." The reply was, "I cannot show U.S."
All of the information surrounding the incident was forwarded to Admiral Wellborn at the United Nations, so the U. S. negotiators could protest this lack of cooperation to Kuznetzov at a 1700R meeting.
The decision was made that Perry and Vesole would trail the Volgoles through the night and try again in the morning to get the Russians to uncover the missiles. Admiral Anderson did not recommend forceful action to get the Volgoles or any other ship to uncover under the existing "ground rules."
Mr. Gilpatric directed that in the morning and in all other intercepts the message to intercepted ships would be: "Your government has agreed to uncover missiles. Please do so."
When it became obvious that the Russian ships were not going to follow the guidelines for rendezvousing with our patrol forces, Admiral Anderson passed the order to CINCLANT, "Don't wait -- go find them."
Also during the day, Mr. Gilpatric had initiated action to prepare a plan whereby newsmen could be flown out to photograph the inspection of one or more of the Russian ships during an intercept.
Since Soviet missile ships were making no attempt to pass through the designated geographic check points, CINCLANTFLT directed his forces to intercept, track and photograph all ships.
Alapayevsk, when hailed and photographed, reported no missiles aboard, only personnel and equipment.
Seven of the nine Soviet missile ships were sighted underway and departing Cuban waters. The remaining two (L. Komsomol and Polzunov) were expected to get underway shortly. Six of these ships were photographed during the day.
The following was the status of designated missile ships that were known to have departed Cuba: Ship Time Location Course/Speed Photo F. Kurchatov 081112 20-06N, 67-42W 075/18 Yes M. Anosov 081030 23-55N, 70-03W 085/17 Yes Labinsk 081405 21-30N, 75-42W 080/12 ---- Bratsk 082400 21-30N, 74-40W 060/12 Yes Dvinogorsk 081356 25-11N, 63-15W DIW Yes Volgoles 081255 23-17N, 81-45W 085/12 Yes Alapayevsk 082400 23-20N, 73-40W 070/15 Yes
Friday, 9 November
At about 0700R, Blandy intercepted Dvinogorsk and asked her to roll back the coverings on the missiles. The Soviet vessel complied. Blandy reported that there was a large cylindrical object beneath, encased in a water-tight seal.
Early in the morning, photographs of missile-bearing ships began arriving at the Pentagon via helicopter.
At 0800R Newport News and Leary intercepted the Labinsk. Newport News went alongside and hailed the Soviet vessel on 500KC. "How many missiles on board?" The reply was, "All on deck. See for yourself."
In response to a request to uncover the missiles, the canvas was rolled back on one. The same cylindrical shape was observed as was by Blandy on the Dvinogorsk; Newport News reported this one as being mounted on a wheeled vehicle.
After Vesole hailed Volgoles at first light, the formerly reluctant ship complied with a request to roll back the canvas covering a missile.
Our intercepting ships were wondering what they should do about the inner-seal problem. Mr. Gilpatric said not to request that it be broken.
A plan was finally devised where five newsmen left in each of two P3V's from NAS, Patuxent River. One was to overfly Komsomol and the other one Anosov. However, Admiral Griffin and CINCLANTFLT were more inclined to favor a slower plan whereby an intercept would have been staged on the next day with one of the remaining unchallenged Soviet ships. In either event, time was running out on the possibility of being able to catch a ship before they were all inspected.
During a special 1330R meeting at the UN a protest was received from the Russians that force was used against Dvinogorsk; that Alexandrovsk, which was not a missile-carrying ship, had been stopped; and that Volgoles was stopped twice. A request for confirmation of these alleged incidents was passed to CINCLANT. Mr. McCloy called Mr. Gilpatric on the matter, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense said the incidents would be investigated and we would apologize only if such were warranted. Mr. Gilpatric then directed his naval aide, Captain Houser, to look into the matter and commented, "Let's make sure the Navy doesn't put us in that spot again.'
Search by two DD's and aircraft was continuing for Kurchatov. Anosov and Polzunov were being trailed by DD's with air and surface inspection scheduled for first light 10 November.
Individual details on missile-carrying ships during the day were (times Romeo): Labinsk 090300 Leary and Newport News assigned to intercept. 090615 Intercept made. 090730 Outer covers on missiles removed. 090748 Request to remove inner cover ignored. 090854 Deck cargo reported by Newport News as 2 missiles without nose cones. Outer cover removed for 1/3 of length from after end. 091100 090836 posit 22-55N, 72-31W reported by CTG 136.2 Photos obtained 091113 Leary trailing. 091134 Leary discontinued trail. Labinsk proceeding. 091155 Posit at 090818 22-18N, 71-57N on course 095, speed 15.
Bratsk 090300 R. A. Owens assigned to intercept. 090700 Expect intercept at 090730. 090735 Owens intercepted. 090736 Wasp helo overhead posit 22-55N, 72-31W. Deck cargo 2 mobile cranes, 2 canvas covered trucks, 2 vans, and 2 missile shaped objects. Outer covers on missile shapes removed. 091113 Basilone trailing. Owens relieved by Basilone at 1130. 092212 Basilone ordered to discontinue trail.
Komsomol 90735 Komsomol departed Casilda. Norfolk closing to photo. 91022 Norfolk reports Master initially cooperative but will only uncover nose and tail of one out of 8 missiles. 091034 Instructed Komsomol to proceed CHECK POINT south of GTMO. 091052 Posit 21-24N, 78-48W, course 153, speed 18. 091140 Photography completed. 091215 Dahlgren joining .Norfolk. 091245 P2V overhead. 091320 Master informed Norfolk he was requesting further instructions from his Government before removal of covers; complying with request to proceed to CHECK POINT. 091350 Deck cargo includes 8 missiles less nose cones and 7 trucks. 091505 Master continues to report no authority to uncover missiles. Posit 20-31N, 78-50W. 091623 Covers now being removed from missiles, closed to 400 yards for photos. 091652 Canvas covers removed from missiles but weather seals left in place. Photo coverage obtained. --Norfolk returned to trailing station, posit 20-15N, 78-27W, course 128, speed 18.
Kurchatov 082100 Best posit 21-15N, 64-30W, course 075, speed 18. 090300 Biddle assigned to intercept. 090700 Biddle in tail chase. 090950 PATRON 44 to launch one P3V to locate and photo. 091040 Best posit 23-30N, 60-30W, estimated course 071, speed 20. Blandy directed to search for Kurchatov. 091059 P2V assisting in search. 091113 Biddle continues search. 092400 Biddle, Blandy and air search continues for Kurchatov
Anosov 090855 Barry reports intercept time of about 091700. 091011 CTG 81.5 reported sighting of 090919 at 25-30N, 60-13W, course 090, speed 15. 091059 P2V assisting in search. 091210 Best posit 25-30N, 63-13W. 091420 Sighted by aircraft at 25-44N, 61-51W. Estimate Barry will arrive 30 minutes before dusk. Also 2 P2V with newsmen aboard at arrive at about the same time. 091530 Communications established between Anosov and Barry. 091920 Barry intercepted at 091800 posit 25-45N, 61-05W. Intends to trail all night close first light for photos. P3V will be on scene first light for photos.
Dvinogrosk 082030 Posit 25-00N, 63-15W, dead in the water. 090300 TG 83.3 assigned to intercept. 090656 COMDESRON 24 in Blandy reported cover removed from first missile, however inner cover not removed. Probably 4 missiles. Posit 25-29.5N, 60-11.1W, course 075, speed 15. 090718 Outer covers removed from other missiles. 090752 COMDESRON 24 reports missiles resemble modified T11. 090855 COMDESRON 24 reports intercept, photography, and visual observations completed. 091040 Blandy discontinued trailing.
Volgoles 082100 Vesole directed to reattempt to have covers removed from missiles during early day light 9 November. 090630 Asked that covers be removed from missiles. 090724 Outer cover removed from one missile. 090822 Removing outer covers from missiles, 3 missiles viewed with outer covers removed. 090924 COMDESRON 6 in Vesole reports 7 missile shapes sighted. Thanked Master for his cooperation. Continuing trail. 091055 VESOLE directed by CINCLANT to continue trail. 091146 Vesole discontinues trail. Volgoles proceeding.
Polzunov 090300 Steinaker assigned to intercept. 090700 Intercept expected about 091859. 091059 P2V assisting in search. 091113 Steinaker proceeding to intercept. 091316 Steinaker directed to commence calling Polzunov on radio. 092400 CINCLANTFLT reports Polzunov underway. Rhodes trailing. Vesole expected to join about 0400, with interpreter on board. Aircraft scheduled overhead at first light. ---- Karl Marx appears to be in company with Polzunov.
Alapayesk 081420 Posit 22-20N, 71-55W, photos obtained. 180-200 men on deck, no missile shapes sighted. Master stated to Holder, "Have rocket technician in accordance with agreement between Governments of USSR and USA." 081545 Helo flight from Wasp with Chief of Staff, COMCARDIV 14 aboard. Exchanged tie clasp and bottle of vodka. Three of five cargo hatches open. Cots, blankets and about 50 boxes under open hatches sighted. Four fuel trucks, five stake trucks, one dump truck, two earth movers sighted on deck. 091113 Holder continues trail. 092212 Holder ordered to discontinue trail.
Saturday, 10 November
Vice Admiral Beakley's personally drafted message replying to the Soviet protest of the preceding afternoon was approved by Mr. Gilpatric and forwarded to Mr. McCloy at the UN. The reply stated that the quarantine forces were not ordered to carry out the actions against the Dvinogorsk and Alexandrovsk and that these incidents could not be confirmed. As far as the Volgoles was concerned, Vice Admiral Beakley pointed out that the second intercept was effected because on the first the ship had refused to remove covers from the missile transporters.
There was a great deal of pressure from the White House to complete the missile count so that the President could make an announcement that the operation had been completed. However, one ship -- the Kurchatov -- eluded surveillance.
In order that the UN negotiators might be informed on happenings involving the ship intercepts and inspections, all communications were ordered relayed immediately from the CNO Communications Center to Admiral Wellborn through the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier communications stations.
Details on the sightings and inspection of ships of interest during the day were:
Karl Marx (Not on UN Inspection List) 100104 Karl Marx underway with Polzunov 5 miles astern. Rhodes is in between. Vesole should join about 0400. 100728 Close observation previously directed held in abeyance to permit coordination with news media. 101050 Rhodes directed to close and photograph, aerial photography as directed by CTG 81.6. When completed cease trailing.
Bratsk 101700 Posit 27-08N, 64-27W, course 060, speed 15. CTG 83.3 directed to search for, locate and shadow Bratsk, closing Essex to within helo range. MK3 neutron detector being flown direct Bermuda then COD to Essex. On receipt Essex to conduct helo flights on Bratsk and to report results soonest.
L. Komsomol 100400 Posit: 37-05N, 75-01W, course 072. 101326 CINCLANT directed cease trailing. 101928 CTF 136 directed to reintercept and inspect with MK3 neutron detector. CTF 81 directed to search and locate once in AM and once in PM until CTF 136 task completed.
Kurchatov 101324 Aircraft report sighting at 101050 at posit 26-25N, 53-37W, course 060, speed 15. Blandy directed to close, photo, and conduct visual inspection. 101726 Blandy posit 27-17N, 51-48W, course 078, speed 22. Still does not hold.
Anosov 100430 Posit 26-50N, 55-51W. 100627 One aircraft overhead, second aircraft expected in 5 minutes. 100642 Barry alongside to starboard. Observed two long shapes and one long curved shape. Requested covers be removed, complied, approximately 200 personnel, including women, on deck. 100755 Missiles not completely uncovered, Barry reports 8 missiles sighted. 100811 Aircraft departed. 100844 Refused to change course to reduce effect of seas. 100941 Barry directed rejoin COMCARDIV 18 (Essex Group) when completed. 101053 Barry completed. Departed. Posit 26-52N, 55-39W, course 325, speed 17.
Polzunov 100104 Polzunov underway 5 miles astern of Karl Marx with Rhodes in between. Vesole to join about 0400. 100142 Posit 23-28N, 81-17W, course 080, speed 12. 100728 Close observation delayed to permit coordination with news media. 101232 Posit: 22-58N, 79-01W, course 115, speed 15, Vesole in company. Aerial photography conducted. 101352 Vesole makes approach in coordination with aircraft. 101400 Removing covers as requested. 101404 Vesole alongside. 101414 Vesole completes inspection, five missiles sighted. 101424 Vesole directed to discontinue trail. 101518 News media in participating aircraft express satisfaction with coverage. 101928 CINCLANT directs CTF 136 to intercept and inspect with MK3 neutron detector. CTF 81 to search and locate once in AM and once in PM until CTE 136 task completed.
A Newport News helicopter using a MK3 neutron detector over the Bratsk reported that the instrument showed active reactions but that the results were not conclusive. Therefore, the WaspGroup was directed to conduct a second flight using the detector over the Bratsk and obtain more conclusive data. Similar operations were directed by CTF 136 for Polzunov and L. Komsomol.
A summary of inspection results at the end of the day indicated the following:
The search for Kurchatov was being continued by Blandy and aircraft.
Sunday, 11 November
With the interception of Kurchatov by Blandy, all ships reported by the Soviets as having missiles aboard had been inspected. A total of 42 missiles were visually sighted and photographed.
A re-Inspection of Bratsk and Polzunov with the Naval Research Laboratory neutron sensing device produced negative results, and the remaining re-inspection schedule was canceled.
The BLUE MOON low-level Cuba reconnaissance flights for the day returned without incident. On previous and succeeding days, these flights were alternately flown by Navy and Air Force aircraft. In addition, high-altitude BRASS KNOB U-2 photographic missions also were made. Although these reconnaissance flights were scheduled for each day, the missions were frequently canceled or their sorties reduced.
Monday, 12 November
At a special Executive Committee meeting in the morning, which was attended by the UN Cuban negotiating team, there was a lengthy discussion concerning the removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers. On the previous Saturday, Deputy Secretary of State Ball had recommended a strong stand on the issue; concurred in by Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze.
Mr. McCloy was optimistic in that he believed the Russians could regain ownership of the aircraft, even though they legally belonged to the Cubans. He also said the Soviet negotiators were pushing hard for a lifting of the quarantine and a formal pledge that the U.S. would not invade Cuba.
Before the meeting adjourned, the Executive Committee adopted Secretary of State Rusk's position that when the IL-28's were on the way out of Cuba the negotiators would discuss the possibility of lifting the quarantine, and, when an acceptable arrangement was reached for inspecting ships carrying materials to Cuba, the U. S. would consider a guarantee against invasion.
As far as operational matters during the day were concerned, submarine activity in the quarantine area was continuing at a reduced rate. Only one positive contact was being prosecuted; all others had remained "cold" for more than 72 hours.
Three new ships were designated for intercept and trail -- the East German freighter Theodor Korner and the Russian freighters Atkarsk and Okhotsk.
During the day, the Argentia submarine/air antisubmarine barrier was disestablished.
At 1525R, CINCLANT reported that the master of [deleted] freighter [deleted] requested that the destroyer Perry send an intelligence officer to his ship. The commanding officer of Perry replied that he could not comply unless he received a request for a boarding party. The freighter's master then officially requested the boarding party, which was dispatched and headed by the Perry's commanding officer.
After departing the freighter, the commanding officer was flown to Key West for a debriefing. He said the [deleted] master had offered his services [deleted] collecting any information which the U.S. might want.
While Perry was in the vicinity of Trajan, two MIG's buzzed the ships at an altitude of about 300 feet and then headed for Cuba.
CINCLANT informed the duty CNO (VADM Sharp) of his instructions as to hailing and intercepting ships, namely, that he was designating ships for intercept which, according to information available to him, had suspicious cargoes. A quarantine force ship then was named to close the suspicious ship and hail her, requesting the port of departure, destination, and type of cargo. He pointed out that all ships of the force were exchanging calls with any other vessel they encountered, but were not going out of their way to intercept a ship unless directed to do so by CINCLANT.
Admiral Dennison also told Vice Admiral Sharp that he was sending out a message to CTF 136 notifying him that there was great interest in Washington on the details of contacts with ships inbound for and outbound from Cuba. He had instructed CTF 136 to insure that incident reports included the methods of communicating and the exact text of the exchanges.
Tuesday, 13 November
The quarantine line was still intact, but only trailing actions were being pursued. CTF 137 had five ships on the southern line, and all forces remained alert for any eventuality.
Admiral Anderson told his Fleet Commanders that they could look with pride on the outstanding manner in which the Navy and Marine Corps forces reacted to carry out the actions necessary to implement quarantine directives and the thoroughly professional performances of our units in preparing for other contingencies.
"I am certain that we have benefitted from the actions of the past several weeks. Our forces were exercised, our control systems were checked, our command arrangements were tested and the decision-making process back here was given a rigorous work out and proved itself throughout the operation."
In view of the fact that negotiations were reaching a stage where the policy makers would have to consider lifting the blockade, Admiral Anderson communicated his philosophy on the matter to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.
His summary and views were that the quarantine was imposed to stop the importation of offensive weapons into Cuba and this quarantine had not subsequently been lifted. However, ships on station had been directed to hail ships bound for Cuba, but not to board them. Because of this declaration, 16 Bloc ships had reversed course and returned to the Soviet Union and no ships with suspicious cargoes had attempted to pass the quarantine line.
There were one East German and sixteen Soviet cargo ships en route to Cuba, which could be carrying suspicious cargo below decks. Two of the Soviet ships, the Okhotsk and the Orenburg, had 72-foot hatches, capable of carrying missiles.
If the quarantine was to remain effective with the object of insuring that offensive weapons were not imported into Cuba, the admiral recommended the visit and search of Bloc and Free World ships which could be carrying offensive weapons. This particularly applied to the Soviet ships with large hatches.
In view of the lapse of time since a Bloc had transited the quarantine line, CNO felt it should be made known that the U.S. still intended to enforce The quarantine by search when necessary.
The admiral recommended that quarantine forces then board a Free World non-Bloc-chartered ship en route to Cuba, if time permitted, followed by the interdiction and search of a Bloc ship.
The next step should be to visit and search each of the Soviet cargo ships as they arrived at the quarantine line.
The decision was reached to lift the quarantine and terminate the October 23 proclamation if the USSR agreed to remove the IL-28's. However, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was to continue, and the U.S. was to withhold a declaration of assurances against an invasion of Cuba until agreement was reached for suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of offensive weapons.
If the Soviets refused to remove the bombers, the United States was to continue the limited quarantine by intercepting and boarding all ships en route to Cuba according to CNO's plan. The interdiction would be carried out in an escalating manner. The first ships to be stopped would be ones of a Free World, non-Bloc nation under charter, next a Bloc ship, and, finally, a Soviet ship. At 0858R, CINCLANT was advised of the possibility that the quarantine might be re-instituted and was told to provide the names and times of the first intercepts in each category.
The President and Secretary of Defense were concerned about the ability of surface patrol units to use force without sinking a ship or inflicting casualties. This concern was a great deterrent to granting permission to forcibly stop a ship and one cause for the Executive Committee's decision throughout the quarantine to avoid direct confrontation with a Soviet vessel. Admiral Anderson informed SECDEF of the procedures which would be followed should it be necessary to use force.
The action would be carried out at short range using 3- or 5-inch guns. Nonexplosive shells would be used for destruction of the rudder and propeller. The following sequence of events would be followed if the ship failed to stop after hailing: First, a powder charge would be fired with no projectile in the breach; next, a shot would be sent across the bow of the reluctant ship, and finally, the ship's stern would be fired on.
The admiral noted that it would be highly unlikely that any captain of a merchant ship would attempt to proceed after having received a shot across his bow and a deliberate near miss in the vicinity of his propeller.... More
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Description Third Korean Winter, 1 December 1952 - 30 April 1953. Meanwhile the armistice talks had stalled. Discord over several issues, but principally the exchange of prisoners of war, had prevented any agreemThird Korean Winter, 1 December 1952 - 30 April 1953. Meanwhile the armistice talks had stalled. Discord over several issues, but principally the exchange of prisoners of war, had prevented any agreement in the latter part of 1951. This disagreement was heightened in January 1952. The U.N. delegates proposed to give captives a choice of repatriation, so that those who did not wish to return to Communist control could be repatriated elsewhere. The enemy delegates protested vigorously, insisting that all captives held by the Eighth Army be returned to their side. When the enemy failed to respond to U.N. efforts to settle the question, the U.N. delegation on 7 October called an indefinite recess in the armistice negotiations. Both military operations and armistice talks remained stalemated and, as the year 1952 ended, peace prospects seemed as remote as at its beginning.... More
Criteria The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding ac... The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service not involving aerial flight. MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Description (September 15–26, 1950) in the Korean War, an amphibious landing by U.S. and South Korean forces at the port of Inchon, near the South Korean capital, Seoul. A daring operation planned and executed un(September 15–26, 1950) in the Korean War, an amphibious landing by U.S. and South Korean forces at the port of Inchon, near the South Korean capital, Seoul. A daring operation planned and executed under extremely difficult conditions by U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the landing suddenly reversed the tide of the war, forcing the invading North Korean army to retreat in disorder up the Korean peninsula. ... More
Criteria The Silver Star may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States, is cited for gallantry in action, against an enemy of the United States whil... The Silver Star may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States, is cited for gallantry in action, against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force or, while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.The required gallantry, while of a lesser degree than that required for the award of a Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction. MoreHide
Criteria The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding ac... The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service not involving aerial flight. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievem... The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement or meritorious service (but not of sufficient nature to warrant a higher decoration). MoreHide
Criteria The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievem... The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement or meritorious service (but not of sufficient nature to warrant a higher decoration). MoreHide
Best Moment
USS BOYD was commissioned May 8, 1943 at the Bethlehem Steel Company Yard, Terminal Island, Clifornia, by Captain S. F. Heim, USN, Commandant Naval Operating Base, Terminal Island, Cammanding Officer was U. S. G. Sharp, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, USN.
Criteria The Silver Star may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States, is cited for gallantry in action, against an enemy of the United States whil... The Silver Star may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States, is cited for gallantry in action, against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force or, while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.The required gallantry, while of a lesser degree than that required for the award of a Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be m... The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be met: Participation in the initial landing operation of Leyte and adjoining islands from October 7-20, 1944; or, Participation in any engagement against the enemy during the Philippine Liberation Campaign; or, Service in the Philippine Islands or in ships in Philippine wates for not less than 30 days during the period of October 17, 1944 to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be m... The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be met: Participation in the initial landing operation of Leyte and adjoining islands from October 7-20, 1944; or, Participation in any engagement against the enemy during the Philippine Liberation Campaign; or, Service in the Philippine Islands or in ships in Philippine wates for not less than 30 days during the period of October 17, 1944 to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Hollandia (code-named Operation Reckless) was an engagement between American and Japanese forces during World war II. It took place in spring of 1944 and was part of the New Guinea campaThe Battle of Hollandia (code-named Operation Reckless) was an engagement between American and Japanese forces during World war II. It took place in spring of 1944 and was part of the New Guinea campaign. The landings were undertaken simultaneously with the amphibious landings at Aitape ("Operation Persecution") to the east. The battle was an unqualified success for the US forces, resulting in a withdrawal by the Japanese to a new strategic defence line in the west of New Guinea and the abandonment of all positions in the east of the island.
Initial operations commenced in the second week of March 1944 with air raids by the Fast Carrier Force on Palau and islands in the Carolines, while aircraft of the US 5th Air Force and the RAAF attacked Japanese airfields along the New Guinea coast from Wewak to the Vogelkop and on Biak Island.
On 30 March and continuing to 3 April these air forces attacked Hollandia itself and the airfields on the Sentani plain. Achieving complete surprise they were able to destroy nearly 100 aircraft on the ground, leaving 6 Air Div unable to resist the planned invasion.
On 16 to 18 April the amphibious forces sailed from their bases at Finschafen and Goodenough Island, taking evasive routes to confuse their intentions until they arrived off Hollandia during the night of 21/22 April. The landings took place at dawn on 22 April after a supporting naval bombardment at each site.
At Tanahmera Bay the two RCT’s from 24 Div. were able to land without opposition, but found the beach to be highly unsuitable. Backed by a swamp just 30 yards from the shoreline, and with just one exit trail unsuitable for vehicles, Tanahmera Bay was quickly written off as a landing site; while the infantry already ashore pressed on to the Sentani plain the remainder of 24 Div was diverted to Humboldt Bay, which had by this time been secured. After four days under these conditions the two units had reached the western airfield and on 26 April it was secured.
Meanwhile at Humboldt Bay 41 Div. also achieved complete surprise, and though the beaches were defended after the naval bombardment the Japanese troops there uncharacteristically abandoned their positions and fled inland. There was some opposition as they pressed forward, but by 24 April they had reached the lake and by 26 April secured the two eastern airfields. The two forces linked up the same day.
The collapse of Japanese resistance has been attributed to lack of preparedness, due to changes in the command structure and to a lack of combat troops; many of the 11,000 men based there were administrative and support units. None of the senior officers present had been in post more than a few weeks and the senior air officer had been relieved following the destruction of his air forces at the beginning of April. Neither Kitazono nor Endo had been able to prepare a comprehensive defence plan, and in any event had neither the men nor the resources to carry it out. On the other hand the Allied operation had been over-insured; concerns over the strength of the Japanese garrison had left the Allies with a four to one advantage in the event.... More
Description The Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–20, 1944) was a major naval battle of World War II that eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy's ability to conduct large-scale carrier actions. It took place The Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–20, 1944) was a major naval battle of World War II that eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy's ability to conduct large-scale carrier actions. It took place during the United States' amphibious invasion of the Mariana Islands during the Pacific War. The battle was the last of five major "carrier-versus-carrier" engagements between American and Japanese naval forces, and pitted elements of the United States Navy's Fifth Fleet against ships and aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Mobile Fleet and nearby island garrisons.
The aerial part of the battle was nicknamed the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot by American aviators for the severely disproportional loss ratio inflicted upon Japanese aircraft by American pilots and anti-aircraft gunners. During a debriefing after the first two air battles a pilot from USS Lexington remarked "Why, hell, it was just like an old-time turkey shoot down home!" The outcome is generally attributed to American improvements in pilot and crew training and tactics, technology (including the top-secret anti-aircraft proximity fuze), and ship and aircraft design. Although at the time the battle appeared to be a missed opportunity to destroy the Japanese fleet, the Imperial Japanese Navy had lost the bulk of its carrier air strength and would never recover. During the course of the battle, American submarines torpedoed and sank two of the largest Japanese fleet carriers taking part in the battle.
This was the largest carrier-to-carrier battle in history.... More
Description The Battle of Saipan was a battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II, fought on the island of Saipan in the Mariana Islands from 15 June–9 July 1944. The Allied invasion fleet embarking the expedThe Battle of Saipan was a battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II, fought on the island of Saipan in the Mariana Islands from 15 June–9 July 1944. The Allied invasion fleet embarking the expeditionary forces left Pearl Harbor on 5 June 1944, the day before Operation Overlord in Europe was launched. The U.S. 2nd Marine Division, 4th Marine Division, and 27th Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Holland Smith, defeated the 43rd Division of the Imperial Japanese Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saito.
Bombardment of Saipan began on 13 June 1944. Fifteen battleships were involved, and 165,000 shells were fired. Seven modern fast battleships delivered twenty-four hundred 16 in (410 mm) shells, but to avoid potential minefields, fire was from a distance of 10,000 yd (9,100 m) or more, and crews were inexperienced in shore bombardment. The following day the eight older battleships and 11 cruisers under Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf replaced the fast battleships but were lacking in time and ammunition.
The landings[4] began at 07:00 on 15 June 1944. More than 300 LVTs landed 8,000 Marines on the west coast of Saipan by about 09:00. Eleven fire support ships covered the Marine landings. The naval force consisted of the battleships Tennessee and California. The cruisers were Birmingham and Indianapolis. The destroyers were Norman Scott, Monssen, Colahan, Halsey Powell, Bailey, Robinson and Albert W. Grant. Careful Japanese artillery preparation — placing flags in the lagoon to indicate the range — allowed them to destroy about 20 amphibious tanks, and the Japanese strategically placed barbed wire, artillery, machine gun emplacements, and trenches to maximize the American casualties. However, by nightfall the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions had a beachhead about 6 mi (10 km) wide and 0.5 mi (1 km) deep. The Japanese counter-attacked at night but were repulsed with heavy losses. On 16 June, units of the U.S. Army's 27th Infantry Division landed and advanced on the airfield at Ås Lito (which is now the location of Saipan International Airport). Again the Japanese counter-attacked at night. On 18 June, Saito abandoned the airfield.
The invasion surprised the Japanese high command, which had been expecting an attack further south. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Navy, saw an opportunity to use the A-Go force to attack the U.S. Navy forces around Saipan. On 15 June, he gave the order to attack. But the resulting battle of the Philippine Sea was a disaster for the Imperial Japanese Navy, which lost three aircraft carriers and hundreds of planes. The garrisons of the Marianas would have no hope of resupply or reinforcement.
Without resupply, the battle on Saipan was hopeless for the defenders, but the Japanese were determined to fight to the last man. Saito organized his troops into a line anchored on Mount Tapotchau in the defensible mountainous terrain of central Saipan. The nicknames given by the Americans to the features of the battle — "Hell's Pocket", "Purple Heart Ridge" and "Death Valley" — indicate the severity of the fighting. The Japanese used the many caves in the volcanic landscape to delay the attackers, by hiding during the day and making sorties at night. The Americans gradually developed tactics for clearing the caves by using flamethrower teams supported by artillery and machine guns.
The operation was marred by inter-service controversy when Marine General Holland Smith, unsatisfied with the performance of the 27th Division, relieved its commander, Army Major General Ralph C. Smith. However, General Holland Smith had not inspected the terrain over which the 27th was to advance. Essentially, it was a valley surrounded by hills and cliffs under Japanese control. The 27th took heavy casualties and eventually, under a plan developed by General Ralph Smith and implemented after his relief, had one battalion hold the area while two other battalions successfully flanked the Japanese.
By 7 July, the Japanese had nowhere to retreat. Saito made plans for a final suicidal banzai charge. On the fate of the remaining civilians on the island, Saito said, "There is no longer any distinction between civilians and troops. It would be better for them to join in the attack with bamboo spears than be captured." At dawn, with a group of 12 men carrying a great red flag in the lead, the remaining able-bodied troops — about 3,000 men — charged forward in the final attack. Amazingly, behind them came the wounded, with bandaged heads, crutches, and barely armed. The Japanese surged over the American front lines, engaging both army and Marine units. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 105th Infantry Regiment were almost destroyed, losing 650 killed and wounded. However, the fierce resistance of these two battalions, as well as that of Headquarters Company, 105th Infantry, and supply elements of 3rd Battalion, 10th Marine Artillery Regiment resulted in over 4,300 Japanese killed. For their actions during the 15-hour Japanese attack, three men of the 105th Infantry were awarded the Medal of Honor — all posthumously. Numerous others fought the Japanese until they were overwhelmed by the largest Japanese Banzai attack in the Pacific War.
By 16:15 on 9 July, Admiral Turner announced that Saipan was officially secured. Saito — along with commanders Hirakushi and Igeta — committed suicide in a cave. Also committing suicide at the end of the battle was Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo — the naval commander who led the Japanese carriers at Pearl Harbor and Midway — who had been assigned to Saipan to direct the Japanese naval air forces based there.
In the end, almost the entire garrison of troops on the island — at least 30,000 — died. For the Americans, the victory was the most costly to date in the Pacific War. 2,949 Americans were killed and 10,464 wounded, out of 71,000 who landed. Hollywood actor Lee Marvin was among the many American wounded. He was serving with "I" Company, 24th Marine Regiment, when he was shot in the buttocks by Japanese machine gun fire during the assault on Mount Tapochau. He was awarded the Purple Heart and was given a medical discharge with the rank of Private First Class in 1945.... More
Description Guam, ringed by reefs, cliffs, and heavy surf, presents a formidable challenge for an attacker. But despite the obstacles, on 21 July, the Americans landed on both sides of the Orote peninsula on the Guam, ringed by reefs, cliffs, and heavy surf, presents a formidable challenge for an attacker. But despite the obstacles, on 21 July, the Americans landed on both sides of the Orote peninsula on the western side of Guam, planning to cut off the airfield. The 3rd Marine Division landed near Agana to the north of Orote at 08:28, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed near Agat to the south. Japanese artillery sank 20 LVTs, and inflicted heavy casualties on the Americans, especially on the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, but by 09:00 men and tanks were ashore at both beaches. The 77th Infantry Division had a more difficult landing. Lacking amphibious vehicles, they had to wade ashore from the edge of the reef where they were dropped by their landing craft. The men stationed in the two beachheads were pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, making initial progress inland quite slow.
US Marines move inland.
By nightfall, the Americans had established beachheads about 6,600 feet (2,000 m) deep. Japanese counterattacks were made throughout the first few days of the battle, mostly at night, using infiltration tactics. Several times, they penetrated the American defenses and were driven back with heavy loss of men and equipment. Lieutenant General Takeshi Takashina was killed on 28 July, and Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata took over the command of the defenders.
Supply was very difficult for the Americans in the first days of the battle. Landing ships could not come closer than the reef, several hundred yards from the beach, and amphibious vehicles were scarce. However, the two beachheads were joined up on 25 July, and the Orote airfield and Apra harbor were captured by 30 July.
The counterattacks against the American beachheads, as well as the fierce fighting, had exhausted the Japanese. At the start of August, they were running out of food and ammunition and had only a handful of tanks left. Obata withdrew his troops from the south of Guam, planning to make a stand in the mountainous central and northern part of the island. But with resupply and reinforcement impossible because of American control of the sea and air around Guam, he could hope to do no more than delay the inevitable defeat for a few days.
Rain and thick jungle made conditions difficult for the Americans, but after an engagement at Mount Barrigada from 2-4 August, the Japanese line collapsed; the rest of the battle was a pursuit to the north. As in other battles of the Pacific War, the Japanese refused to surrender, and almost all were killed. On 10 August, after three weeks of combat, organized Japanese resistance ended, and Guam was declared secure. The next day, Obata committed ritual suicide. ... More
Description The Battle of Peleliu, codenamed Operation Stalemate II, was fought between the United States and the Empire of Japan in the Pacific Theater of World War II, from September–November 1944 on the islandThe Battle of Peleliu, codenamed Operation Stalemate II, was fought between the United States and the Empire of Japan in the Pacific Theater of World War II, from September–November 1944 on the island of Peleliu, present-day Palau. U.S. Marines of the First Marine Division and later soldiers of the U.S. Army's 81st Infantry Division, fought to capture an airstrip on the small coral island. This battle was part of a larger offensive campaign known as Operation Forager which ran from June–November 1944 in the Pacific Theater of Operations.
Major General William Rupertus, USMC—commander of 1st Marine Division—predicted the island would be secured within four days. However, due to Japan's well-crafted fortifications and stiff resistance, the battle lasted over two months. In the United States, it was a controversial battle because of the island's questionable strategic value and the high casualty rate, which exceeded all other amphibious operations during the Pacific War. The National Museum of the Marine Corps called it "the bitterest battle of the war for the Marines".... More
Description The Battle of Morotai, part of the Pacific War, began on 15 September 1944, and continued until the end of the war in August 1945. The fighting started when United States and Australian forces landed The Battle of Morotai, part of the Pacific War, began on 15 September 1944, and continued until the end of the war in August 1945. The fighting started when United States and Australian forces landed on the southwest corner of Morotai, a small island in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), which the Allies needed as a base to support the liberation of the Philippines later that year. The invading forces greatly outnumbered the island's Japanese defenders and secured their objectives in two weeks. Japanese reinforcements landed on the island between September and November, but lacked the supplies needed to effectively attack the Allied defensive perimeter. Intermittent fighting continued until the end of the war, with the Japanese troops suffering heavy loss of life from disease and starvation.
Morotai's development into an Allied base began shortly after the landing, and two major airfields were ready for use in October. These and other base facilities played an important role in the liberation of the Philippines during 1944 and 1945. Torpedo boats and aircraft based at Morotai also harassed Japanese positions in the NEI. The island's base facilities were further expanded in 1945 to support the Australian-led Borneo Campaign, and Morotai remained an important logistical hub and command center until the Dutch reestablished their colonial rule in the NEI. ... More
Description The Formosa Air Battle took place between October 10 and 20, 1944, off the eastern coasts of the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, and Luzon. It was fought by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and the appThe Formosa Air Battle took place between October 10 and 20, 1944, off the eastern coasts of the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, and Luzon. It was fought by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and the approaching Task Force 38 of the United States Third Fleet and was one of a series of air raids on Japan during the Pacific War. The attacks served to prevent Japanese aircraft from participating in the Battle of Leyte Gulf later that month.
The battle was one-sided, as the U.S. practically dominated the air war due to the superior training and weaponry that it possessed at that point. Japanese air power in the region was battle exhausted, giving the Americans air superiority and weakening Japan's ability to defend the Okinawa Islands in the upcoming Okinawa Campaign. However, in an effort to boost morale and to cover up th... More
Description The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II and, by some criteria, possibly the largest naval battle in history.
It was fought in waters near the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar and Luzon from 23–26 October 1944, between combined US and Australian forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy. On 20 October, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia, and in particular depriving its forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied invasion, but was repulsed by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets. The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never afterwards sailed to battle in comparable force. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of fuel, remained in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four separate engagements between the opposing forces: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
It was the first battle in which Japanese aircraft carried out organized kamikaze attacks. By the time of the battle, Japan had fewer aircraft than the Allied forces had sea vessels, demonstrating the difference in power of the two sides at this point of the war. ... More
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description In the Pacific Theater of World War II, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign, from November 1943 through February 1944, were key strategic operations of the United States Pacific Fleet and MarineIn the Pacific Theater of World War II, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign, from November 1943 through February 1944, were key strategic operations of the United States Pacific Fleet and Marine Corps in the Central Pacific. The purpose was to establish airfields that would allow land based air support for the upcoming operations across the Central Pacific. The campaign began with a costly three-day battle for the island of Betio at the Tarawa atoll. The campaign was preceded a year earlier by a diversionary raid on Makin Island by U.S. Marines.... More
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, ... The European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty status for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, ... The European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty status for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
USS BOYD was commissioned May 8, 1943 at the Bethlehem Steel Company Yard, Terminal Island, Clifornia, by Captain S. F. Heim, USN, Commandant Naval Operating Base, Terminal Island, Cammanding Officer was U. S. G. Sharp, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, USN.