Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
Comments BADGER, CHARLES J.
Citation:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Distinguished Service Medal to Charles J. Badger, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired), for exceptional... BADGER, CHARLES J.
Citation:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Distinguished Service Medal to Charles J. Badger, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired), for exceptionally meritorious service in a duty of great responsibility as a member of the General Board in advising the department upon many matters of great importance relating to the conduct of the war.
Authority: Navy Book of Distinguished Service (Stringer)
Criteria The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American... The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in European Russia between November 12, 1918, and August 5, 1919; or for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia between November 23, 1918, and April 1, 1920. MoreHide
Description The United States of America declared war on the German Empire on April 6, 1917. The U.S. was an independent power and did not officially join the Allies. It closely cooperated with them militarily buThe United States of America declared war on the German Empire on April 6, 1917. The U.S. was an independent power and did not officially join the Allies. It closely cooperated with them militarily but acted alone in diplomacy. The U.S. made its major contributions in terms of supplies, raw material and money, starting in 1917. American soldiers under General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), arrived in large numbers on the Western Front in the summer of 1918. They played a major role until victory was achieved on November 11, 1918. Before entering the war, the U.S had remained neutral, though it had been an important supplier to Great Britain and the other Allied powers. During the war, the U.S mobilized over 4 million military personnel and suffered 110,000 deaths, including 43,000 due to the influenza pandemic. The war saw a dramatic expansion of the United States government in an effort to harness the war effort and a significant increase in the size of the U.S. military. After a slow start in mobilising the economy and labour force, by spring 1918 the nation was poised to play a role in the conflict. Under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson, the war represented the climax of the Progressive Era as it sought to bring reform and democracy to the world, although there was substantial public opposition to United States entry into the war.
Although the United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, it did not initially declare war on the other Central Powers, a state of affairs that Woodrow Wilson described as an "embarrassing obstacle" in his State of the Union speech. Congress declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire on December 17, 1917, but never made declarations of war against the other Central Powers, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire or the various Co-belligerents allied with the central powers, thus the United States remained uninvolved in the military campaigns in central, eastern and southern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific.
The United States as late as 1917 maintained only a small army, smaller than thirteen of the nations and empires already active in the war. After the passage of the Selective Service Act in 1917, it drafted 2.8 million men into military service. By the summer of 1918 about a million U.S. soldiers had arrived in France, about half of whom eventually saw front-line service; by the Armistice of November 11 approximately 10,000 fresh soldiers were arriving in France daily. In 1917 Congress gave U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans when they were drafted to participate in World War I, as part of the Jones Act. In the end Germany miscalculated the United States' influence on the outcome of the conflict, believing it would be many more months before U.S. troops would arrive and overestimating the effectiveness of U-boats in slowing the American buildup.
The United States Navy sent a battleship group to Scapa Flow to join with the British Grand Fleet, destroyers to Queenstown, Ireland and submarines to help guard convoys. Several regiments of Marines were also dispatched to France. The British and French wanted U.S. units used to reinforce their troops already on the battle lines and not to waste scarce shipping on bringing over supplies. The U.S. rejected the first proposition and accepted the second. General John J. Pershing, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) commander, refused to break up U.S. units to serve as mere reinforcements for British Empire and French units. As an exception, he did allow African-American combat regiments to fight in French divisions. The Harlem Hellfighters fought as part of the French 16th Division, earning a unit Croix de Guerre for their actions at Château-Thierry, Belleau Wood, and Séchault.
Impact of US forces on the war
On the battlefields of France in spring 1918, the war-weary Allied armies enthusiastically welcomed the fresh American troops. They arrived at the rate of 10,000 a day, at a time when the Germans were unable to replace their losses. After British Empire, French and Portuguese forces had defeated and turned back the powerful final German offensive (Spring Offensive of March to July, 1918), the Americans played a role in the Allied final offensive (Hundred Days Offensive of August to November). However, many American commanders used the same flawed tactics which the British, French, Germans and others had abandoned early in the war, and so many American offensives were not particularly effective. Pershing continued to commit troops to these full- frontal attacks, resulting in high casualties against experienced veteran German and Austrian-Hungarian units. Nevertheless, the infusion of new and fresh U.S. troops greatly strengthened the Allies' strategic position and boosted morale. The Allies achieved victory over Germany on November 11, 1918 after German morale had collapsed both at home and on the battlefield.... More
Criteria The Mexican Service Medal was awarded for military service in any of the following expeditions or engagements:Vera Cruz Expedition: April 24 to November 26, 1914, Punitive Expedition into Mexico: Marc... The Mexican Service Medal was awarded for military service in any of the following expeditions or engagements:Vera Cruz Expedition: April 24 to November 26, 1914, Punitive Expedition into Mexico: March 14, 1916, to February 7, 1917, Buena Vista, Mexico: December 1, 1917, San Bernardino Canon, Mexico: December 26, 1917, LeGrulla, Texas: January 8-9, 1918, Pilares, Mexico: March 28, 1918, Nogales, Arizona: November 1-5, 1915, or on August 27, 1918, El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Mexico: June 15-16, 1919 or Any action against hostile Mexican forces in which U.S. troops were killed or wounded between April 12, 1911, and February 7, 1917. MoreHide
Other Memories
In 1913 Rear Adm. Charles J. Badger, USN, became Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. The new Chief of Staff was Comdr. Charles F. Hughes, USN. Hughes had been thoroughly briefed at the Navy Department concerning the unsatisfactory radio situation which existed within the fleet and of the necessity for improvement. At his suggestion Badger relieved Hooper of his additional duties as fleet tactical and athletic officer and gave full support of his plans.16 Discipline improved rapidly and a rivalry began between the signalmen and the radiomen with each group determined to obtain the acknowledgements of signals first. This materially improved the efficiency of both methods of signaling and created a healthy communications attitude.17 After observing conditions for a period, Admiral Badger decided that he would exercise the battleship divisions for an entire day by radio signals alone, except that visual signals could be used in an emergency. This was conducted successfully without a single mishap or failure in communications.18 It was fortunate that this exercise was held, for within the week a situation developed which necessitated maneuvering solely by radio signals. Sixteen battleships were about to proceed from Hampton Roads to Annapolis Roads. Just after the signal to get underway had been executed a terrific Chesapeake Bay squall descended accompanied by a howling wind. The visibility was reduced to zero and the situation became critical. Admiral Badger dared not let them anchor again as the current could have swept them into each other. Hesitating only for seconds to ascertain if all ships had their radio manned, he directed his signal transmitted by radio. It was quickly acknowledged by all but the U.S.S. New Jersey. Hooper, quite sure that the New Jersey had suffered a remote transmitter keying line casualty, advised the admiral that he believed she had received the signal, whereupon the latter ordered it executed. The storm continued for half an hour during which time all course and speed changes necessary to lead the fleet through the narrow dredged channel were given and executed by radio with only the New Jersey unable to acknowledge. When the storm passed all the ships were in position astern of the flagship. Badger, relieved of his anxiety, directed that thereafter both radio and visual methods would be used for tactical signaling, and that they would be executed by whichever method was the faster.19 VERACRUZ--PROVING GROUND OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
On April 21, 1914, after a year of strained relations with the revolutionary government of Mexico, President Wilson ordered the Navy to land troops, seize, and occupy the city of Veracruz. This occupation, which continued until November of the same year, was the proving ground of naval communications and pinpointed the deficiencies in our system. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, aided by Hooper, had instituted many reforms within the fleet which tended to enhance the tactical and strategic value of radio. Despite these improvements, the system was far from capable of providing the communication services required by a major war. Radio, Virginia, had been established and equipped with the 100-kw. rotary spark gap and the 35-kw. arc transmitters in the endeavor to provide communication from the seat of government to fleet commanders distant from the U.S. mainland. These both failed to provide continuous direct radio communication between Washington and the ships at Veracruz, nor was such communication possible via Key West, Fla., the closest of the shore stations. Even had this station been successful, shipboard transmitters were of insufficient power to provide two-way communications. This necessitated stationing the U.S.S. Birmingham off Tampico, Mexico, to serve as a relay station between Key West and the U.S.S. Wyoming.23 With the Birmingham at Tampico, satisfactory day and night communications could be maintained provided the men-of-war of other nations, stationed off Veracruz and Tampico for the protection of their nationals, abstained from transmitting when either Key West or the Birmingham was sending. The spark transmitters fitted on the foreign men-of-war created totally disruptive local interferences.24 This situation necessitated the development of a time-sharing plan which was readily approved and adopted by the naval commanders of other nations present. Normally ships of three or four other nations were present and, under this plan, the United States was allotted a 2-hour period and the four other powers present 1 hour each. This resulted in there being periods of 4 or more hours when it was impossible to communicate between the Navy Department and its commander in the field. Although this condition could not be accepted during a major conflict, under the existing conditions a more satisfactory method could not have been devised.25 Mr. Arthur O'Brien, at that time a radioman in the Birmingham, years later related an incident which indicated the excellent state of training and capabilities of the operators on the Wyoming and Birmingham. This proficiency was the result of Hooper's personal supervision and was not generally the condition existing throughout the service. He stated that in one 2-hour schedule, plus an additional minute of encroachment on another country's time, he transmitted 9 messages totalling 3,800 code groups, at a speed better than 31 groups per minute, all of which were correctly received by the operator in the Wycoming without request for repetition. In contrast with this, the English, French, and German operators, transmitted at the rate of 12 code groups per minute, and repeated each group regardless of existing conditions, thus reducing their traffic handling capability to 6 groups per minute. Under the prevailing division of time it would have required 4 days for them to have handled 3,800 code groups.26 This was just 2 months prior to the outbreak of World War I. The Veracruz occupation was not without its humorous events, one of which occurred on the day the city was occupied. A Mexican gunboat, totally unaware of events, was steaming up the coast with several hundred reinforcements for the garrison at Veracruz. Long before it hove into sight it commenced to call the commercial shore radio station at that port. Because of the interference from the ships in the harbor the shore station was unable to hear the call and at the same time the continuous effort was interfering with the reception of messages by the ships. Finally, the fleet radio officer contacted the vessel and offered to relay the message. This offer was gratefully and courteously accepted. Hooper, on receiving it for relay, expecting it would be military in character, found it to be a message from the captain of the gunboat to his wife stating that he would be home for dinner. One can further imagine his chagrin when, on arriving at Veracruz, his ship was immediately taken into custody.27 Another humorous incident which occurred at the time was occasioned by the press representatives whose only means of forwarding items to their papers was by naval radio. Under the existing condition of time-sharing it was necessary to limit the number of words these representatives could file with the flagship. Additionally, these press items were subjected to delays since they could not take precedence over official messages and at times were several days in reaching their papers. Consequently, a delegation of newsmen prevailed upon the Secretary of the Navy to direct Badger to have the press items transmitted direct to New York without relay. Compliance with this directive was simple enough but it produced no faster press since the radio station at New York was unable to receive the flagship's transmissions. The relay stations, although the press messages were addressed to New York without relay instructions, simply copied the messages and forwarded them on to their destination.28
Other Memories
12. Commander Charles J. Badger was placed in command of the 6th District at 6:30 p.m. April 22nd in accordance with an order from Rear Admiral C.F. Goodrich, U.S.N., Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron, Flagship CHICAGO, dated San Francisco, Cal., April 22nd, 1906... . 13. The limits of which District, as defined in General Order No. 12, Headquarters Pacific Division, April 22, 1906, included "the wharves between Fort Mason wharf and the Pacific Mail Dock, both inclusive, in charge of the Navy". These limits were modified in General Order No. 13, April 24th, so as to exclude the Fort Mason wharf. The total length of the District was about three and one half miles. 14. On April 23rd Headquarters were established in the office of the Port Warden, in a small building near the Market Street Ferry entrance. 15. The District was divided into sections, each to be guarded and patrolled by men from a designated ship and as soon as the vessels were fast to the wharves the patrol was taken up and continued until the withdrawal of the Command from the District.
Criteria The Sampson Medal was first authorized by a Joint resolution of the United States Congress on March 3, 1901. The resolution authorized the Secretary of the Navy to have produced bronze medals to comme... The Sampson Medal was first authorized by a Joint resolution of the United States Congress on March 3, 1901. The resolution authorized the Secretary of the Navy to have produced bronze medals to commemorate naval engagements in the West Indies and on the shores of Cuba during the Spanish-American War. The medal was to be presented to the officers and men of the United States Navy and Marine Corps who participated in engagements and battles that were deemed to be of sufficient importance to merit their commemoration. MoreHide
Criteria The Spanish Campaign Medal was awarded for military service in, or on the high seas en route to, any of the following countries during the dates indicated: Cuba (May 11 to July 17, 1898), Puerto Rico ... The Spanish Campaign Medal was awarded for military service in, or on the high seas en route to, any of the following countries during the dates indicated: Cuba (May 11 to July 17, 1898), Puerto Rico (July 24 to August 13, 1898) or Philippine Islands (June 30 to 16 August 16, 1898). MoreHide
Description The Spanish–American War (Spanish: Guerra hispano-estadounidense or Guerra hispano-americana; Filipino: Digmaang Espanyol-Amerikano) was a conflict fought between Spain and the United States in 1898. The Spanish–American War (Spanish: Guerra hispano-estadounidense or Guerra hispano-americana; Filipino: Digmaang Espanyol-Amerikano) was a conflict fought between Spain and the United States in 1898. Hostilities began in the aftermath of the internal explosion of the USS Maine in Havana harbor in Cuba leading to United States intervention in the Cuban War of Independence. American acquisition of Spain's Pacific possessions led to its involvement in the Philippine Revolution and ultimately in the Philippine–American War.
Revolts had been occurring for some years in Cuba against Spanish rule. The U.S. later backed these revolts upon entering the Spanish–American War. There had been war scares before, as in the Virginius Affair in 1873. In the late 1890s, US public opinion was agitated by anti-Spanish propaganda led by newspaper publishers such as Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst which used yellow journalism to call for war. The business community across the United States had just recovered from a deep depression, and feared that a war would reverse the gains. They lobbied vigorously against going to war.
The US Navy battleship Maine was mysteriously sunk in Havana harbor; political pressures from the Democratic Party pushed the administration of Republican President William McKinley into a war that he had wished to avoid.[9] Spain promised time and time again that it would reform, but never delivered. The United States sent an ultimatum to Spain demanding that it surrender control of Cuba. First Madrid declared war, and Washington then followed suit.
The main issue was Cuban independence; the ten-week war was fought in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. US naval power proved decisive, allowing expeditionary forces to disembark in Cuba against a Spanish garrison already facing nationwide Cuban insurgent attacks and further wasted by yellow fever. Numerically superior Cuban, Philippine, and US forces obtained the surrender of Santiago de Cuba and Manila despite the good performance of some Spanish infantry units and fierce fighting for positions such as San Juan Hill. Madrid sued for peace with two obsolete Spanish squadrons sunk in Santiago de Cuba and Manila Bay and a third, more modern fleet recalled home to protect the Spanish coasts.
The result was the 1898 Treaty of Paris, negotiated on terms favorable to the US which allowed it temporary control of Cuba and ceded ownership of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine islands. The cession of the Philippines involved payment of $20 million ($575,760,000 today) to Spain by the US to cover infrastructure owned by Spain.
The defeat and collapse of the Spanish Empire was a profound shock to Spain's national psyche, and provoked a thorough philosophical and artistic revaluation of Spanish society known as the Generation of '98.[ The United States gained several island possessions spanning the globe and a rancorous new debate over the wisdom of expansionism. It was one of only five US wars (against a total of eleven sovereign states) to have been formally declared by Congress.... More
In 1913 Rear Adm. Charles J. Badger, USN, became Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. The new Chief of Staff was Comdr. Charles F. Hughes, USN. Hughes had been thoroughly briefed at the Navy Department concerning the unsatisfactory radio situation which existed within the fleet and of the necessity for improvement. At his suggestion Badger relieved Hooper of his additional duties as fleet tactical and athletic officer and gave full support of his plans.16
Discipline improved rapidly and a rivalry began between the signalmen and the radiomen with each group determined to obtain the acknowledgements of signals first. This materially improved the efficiency of both methods of signaling and created a healthy communications attitude.17
After observing conditions for a period, Admiral Badger decided that he would exercise the battleship divisions for an entire day by radio signals alone, except that visual signals could be used in an emergency. This was conducted successfully without a single mishap or failure in communications.18
It was fortunate that this exercise was held, for within the week a situation developed which necessitated maneuvering solely by radio signals. Sixteen battleships were about to proceed from Hampton Roads to Annapolis Roads. Just after the signal to get underway had been executed a terrific Chesapeake Bay squall descended accompanied by a howling wind. The visibility was reduced to zero and the situation became critical. Admiral Badger dared not let them anchor again as the current could have swept them into each other. Hesitating only for seconds to ascertain if all ships had their radio manned, he directed his signal transmitted by radio. It was quickly acknowledged by all but the U.S.S. New Jersey. Hooper, quite sure that the New Jersey had suffered a remote transmitter keying line casualty, advised the admiral that he believed she had received the signal, whereupon the latter ordered it executed. The storm continued for half an hour during which time all course and speed changes necessary to lead the fleet through the narrow dredged channel were given and executed by radio with only the New Jersey unable to acknowledge. When the storm passed all the ships were in position astern of the flagship. Badger, relieved of his anxiety, directed that thereafter both radio and visual methods would be used for tactical signaling, and that they would be executed by whichever method was the faster.19
VERACRUZ--PROVING GROUND OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
On April 21, 1914, after a year of strained relations with the revolutionary government of Mexico, President Wilson ordered the Navy to land troops, seize, and occupy the city of Veracruz. This occupation, which continued until November of the same year, was the proving ground of naval communications and pinpointed the deficiencies in our system.
The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, aided by Hooper, had instituted many reforms within the fleet which tended to enhance the tactical and strategic value of radio. Despite these improvements, the system was far from capable of providing the communication services required by a major war.
Radio, Virginia, had been established and equipped with the 100-kw. rotary spark gap and the 35-kw. arc transmitters in the endeavor to provide communication from the seat of government to fleet commanders distant from the U.S. mainland. These both failed to provide continuous direct radio communication between Washington and the ships at Veracruz, nor was such communication possible via Key West, Fla., the closest of the shore stations. Even had this station been successful, shipboard transmitters were of insufficient power to provide two-way communications. This necessitated stationing the U.S.S. Birmingham off Tampico, Mexico, to serve as a relay station between Key West and the U.S.S. Wyoming.23
With the Birmingham at Tampico, satisfactory day and night communications could be maintained provided the men-of-war of other nations, stationed off Veracruz and Tampico for the protection of their nationals, abstained from transmitting when either Key West or the Birmingham was sending. The spark transmitters fitted on the foreign men-of-war created totally disruptive local interferences.24
This situation necessitated the development of a time-sharing plan which was readily approved and adopted by the naval commanders of other nations present. Normally ships of three or four other nations were present and, under this plan, the United States was allotted a 2-hour period and the four other powers present 1 hour each. This resulted in there being periods of 4 or more hours when it was impossible to communicate between the Navy Department and its commander in the field. Although this condition could not be accepted during a major conflict, under the existing conditions a more satisfactory method could not have been devised.25
Mr. Arthur O'Brien, at that time a radioman in the Birmingham, years later related an incident which indicated the excellent state of training and capabilities of the operators on the Wyoming and Birmingham. This proficiency was the result of Hooper's personal supervision and was not generally the condition existing throughout the service. He stated that in one 2-hour schedule, plus an additional minute of encroachment on another country's time, he transmitted 9 messages totalling 3,800 code groups, at a speed better than 31 groups per minute, all of which were correctly received by the operator in the Wycoming without request for repetition. In contrast with this, the English, French, and German operators, transmitted at the rate of 12 code groups per minute, and repeated each group regardless of existing conditions, thus reducing their traffic handling capability to 6 groups per minute. Under the prevailing division of time it would have required 4 days for them to have handled 3,800 code groups.26 This was just 2 months prior to the outbreak of World War I.
The Veracruz occupation was not without its humorous events, one of which occurred on the day the city was occupied. A Mexican gunboat, totally unaware of events, was steaming up the coast with several hundred reinforcements for the garrison at Veracruz. Long before it hove into sight it commenced to call the commercial shore radio station at that port. Because of the interference from the ships in the harbor the shore station was unable to hear the call and at the same time the continuous effort was interfering with the reception of messages by the ships. Finally, the fleet radio officer contacted the vessel and offered to relay the message. This offer was gratefully and courteously accepted. Hooper, on receiving it for relay, expecting it would be military in character, found it to be a message from the captain of the gunboat to his wife stating that he would be home for dinner. One can further imagine his chagrin when, on arriving at Veracruz, his ship was immediately taken into custody.27
Another humorous incident which occurred at the time was occasioned by the press representatives whose only means of forwarding items to their papers was by naval radio. Under the existing condition of time-sharing it was necessary to limit the number of words these representatives could file with the flagship. Additionally, these press items were subjected to delays since they could not take precedence over official messages and at times were several days in reaching their papers. Consequently, a delegation of newsmen prevailed upon the Secretary of the Navy to direct Badger to have the press items transmitted direct to New York without relay. Compliance with this directive was simple enough but it produced no faster press since the radio station at New York was unable to receive the flagship's transmissions. The relay stations, although the press messages were addressed to New York without relay instructions, simply copied the messages and forwarded them on to their destination.28