Criteria The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. ... The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. The performance must merit recognition by individuals in a key position which was performed in a clearly exceptional manner. MoreHide
Criteria The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding ac... The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service not involving aerial flight. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievem... The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement or meritorious service (but not of sufficient nature to warrant a higher decoration). MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Expeditionary Medal is awarded to Navy personnel who have landed on foreign territory and engaged in operations against armed opposition or who have operated under circumstances deemed to mer... The Navy Expeditionary Medal is awarded to Navy personnel who have landed on foreign territory and engaged in operations against armed opposition or who have operated under circumstances deemed to merit special recognition and for which no campaign medal has been awarded. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United... The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United Nations. Service in qualifying organizations had to be certified by the United Nations Commander-in-Chief as having directly supported military operations in Korea. In the case of the United States, such certification was issued in General Orders 31 (June 20, 1955); General Orders 33 (July 11, 1955); and General Orders 36 (July 13, 1955). MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
Criteria The Army Distinguished Service Medal may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the United States Army, performs exceptionally meritorious service in a duty of great responsi... The Army Distinguished Service Medal may be awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the United States Army, performs exceptionally meritorious service in a duty of great responsibility. The individual's performance must merit recognition for services which are clearly exceptional, and the performance of normal duties in an exceptional manner by itself will not justify an award of the Army Distinguished Service Medal MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be m... The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be met: Participation in the initial landing operation of Leyte and adjoining islands from October 7-20, 1944; or, Participation in any engagement against the enemy during the Philippine Liberation Campaign; or, Service in the Philippine Islands or in ships in Philippine wates for not less than 30 days during the period of October 17, 1944 to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Description The plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest PaciThe plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest Pacific under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the other in the Central, South, and North Pacific (Pacific Ocean Areas) under Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, were created early in the war. Except in the South and Southwest Pacific, each conducted its own operations with its own ground, air, and naval forces in widely separated areas. These operations required at first only a relatively small number of troops whose efforts often yielded strategic gains which cannot be measured by the size of the forces involved. Indeed, the nature of the objectivesùsmall islands, coral atolls, and jungle-bound harbors and airstrips, made the employment of large ground forces impossible and highlighted the importance of air and naval operations. Thus, until 1945, the war in the Pacific progressed by a double series of amphibious operations each of which fitted into a strategic pattern developed in Washington.... More
Memories
MIKE SIX was the operation plan for the invasion of Batangas and Tayabas Bays
Description On December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landinOn December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On January 9, 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles (64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on February 3, 1945, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry Regiment (organized as infantry) passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On February 16, paratroopers and amphibious units simultaneously assaulted the islet of Corregidor. It was necessary to take this stronghold because troops there can block the entrance of Manila Bay. The Americans needed to establish a major harbor base at Manila Bay to support the expected invasion of Japan, planned to begin on November 1, 1945. Resistance on Corregidor ended on February 27, and then all resistance by the Japanese Empire ceased on August 15, 1945, obviating the need for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands.
Despite initial optimism, fighting in Manila was harsh. It took until March 3 to clear the city of all Japanese troops, and the Japanese Marines, who fought on stubbornly and refused to either surrender or to evacuate as the Japanese Army had done. Fort Drum, a fortified island in Manila Bay near Corregidor, held out until 13 April, when a team of Army troops went ashore and pumped 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into the fort, then set off incendiary charges. No Japanese soldiers in Fort Drum survived the blast and fire.
In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest American campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.... More
Memories
Participated in landings in Leyte and Luzon
Description On December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landinOn December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On January 9, 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles (64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on February 3, 1945, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry Regiment (organized as infantry) passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On February 16, paratroopers and amphibious units simultaneously assaulted the islet of Corregidor. It was necessary to take this stronghold because troops there can block the entrance of Manila Bay. The Americans needed to establish a major harbor base at Manila Bay to support the expected invasion of Japan, planned to begin on November 1, 1945. Resistance on Corregidor ended on February 27, and then all resistance by the Japanese Empire ceased on August 15, 1945, obviating the need for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands.
Despite initial optimism, fighting in Manila was harsh. It took until March 3 to clear the city of all Japanese troops, and the Japanese Marines, who fought on stubbornly and refused to either surrender or to evacuate as the Japanese Army had done. Fort Drum, a fortified island in Manila Bay near Corregidor, held out until 13 April, when a team of Army troops went ashore and pumped 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into the fort, then set off incendiary charges. No Japanese soldiers in Fort Drum survived the blast and fire.
In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest American campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.... More
Description On December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landinOn December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On January 9, 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles (64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on February 3, 1945, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry Regiment (organized as infantry) passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On February 16, paratroopers and amphibious units simultaneously assaulted the islet of Corregidor. It was necessary to take this stronghold because troops there can block the entrance of Manila Bay. The Americans needed to establish a major harbor base at Manila Bay to support the expected invasion of Japan, planned to begin on November 1, 1945. Resistance on Corregidor ended on February 27, and then all resistance by the Japanese Empire ceased on August 15, 1945, obviating the need for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands.
Despite initial optimism, fighting in Manila was harsh. It took until March 3 to clear the city of all Japanese troops, and the Japanese Marines, who fought on stubbornly and refused to either surrender or to evacuate as the Japanese Army had done. Fort Drum, a fortified island in Manila Bay near Corregidor, held out until 13 April, when a team of Army troops went ashore and pumped 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into the fort, then set off incendiary charges. No Japanese soldiers in Fort Drum survived the blast and fire.
In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest American campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.... More
Memories embarking Admiral Fechteler as senior officer present afloat. She came under enemy air attack on sevembarking Admiral Fechteler as senior officer present afloat. She came under enemy air attack on several occasions, and on 24 October, during the decisive Battle for Leyte Gulf, a small caliber shell which exploded on her bridge injured seven men. Returning to Hollandia 22 November, Fremont embarked men and equipment for rehearsal landings in preparation for the assault on Luzon. During these exercises, Fremont aided in splashing a lone attacking aircraft.... More
Description The American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe aThe American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe and Asia. Thus, any threat by the Axis Powers to invade the mainland United States or other areas was considered negligible, allowing for American resources to be deployed in overseas theaters.
This article includes attacks on continental territory, extending 200 miles (320 km) into the ocean, which is today under the sovereignty of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and several other smaller states, but excludes military action involving the Danish territory of Greenland, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Aleutian Islands. The most well known battles in North America during World War II were the Attack on Pearl Harbor (the first attack on US soil since the Battle of Ambos Nogales), the Aleutian Islands Campaign, the Battle of the St. Lawrence, and the attacks on Newfoundland.... More
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be m... The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be met: Participation in the initial landing operation of Leyte and adjoining islands from October 7-20, 1944; or, Participation in any engagement against the enemy during the Philippine Liberation Campaign; or, Service in the Philippine Islands or in ships in Philippine wates for not less than 30 days during the period of October 17, 1944 to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be m... The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be met: Participation in the initial landing operation of Leyte and adjoining islands from October 7-20, 1944; or, Participation in any engagement against the enemy during the Philippine Liberation Campaign; or, Service in the Philippine Islands or in ships in Philippine wates for not less than 30 days during the period of October 17, 1944 to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Description The plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest PaciThe plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest Pacific under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the other in the Central, South, and North Pacific (Pacific Ocean Areas) under Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, were created early in the war. Except in the South and Southwest Pacific, each conducted its own operations with its own ground, air, and naval forces in widely separated areas. These operations required at first only a relatively small number of troops whose efforts often yielded strategic gains which cannot be measured by the size of the forces involved. Indeed, the nature of the objectivesùsmall islands, coral atolls, and jungle-bound harbors and airstrips, made the employment of large ground forces impossible and highlighted the importance of air and naval operations. Thus, until 1945, the war in the Pacific progressed by a double series of amphibious operations each of which fitted into a strategic pattern developed in Washington.... More
People You Remember 1 February 1944 Steaming as before in Task Group 58.1, Southeast of Kwajalein Island, on base course1 February 1944 Steaming as before in Task Group 58.1, Southeast of Kwajalein Island, on base course 090°, Fleet axis 060°, Cruising disposition SR, speed 09 knots, conducting fueling operations, WASHINGTON had been designated as guide, destroyer COGSWELL was along side.
The Task Group was engaged in Flintlock operations and operating in accordance with Commander Central Pacific Op Plan Cen 1-44, Task force 58 Op Plan 1-44, and Commander Task Group 58,1 Op Plan 1-44. Having completed our bombardment of Kwajalein, we were now engaged in providing support for the Southern Attack force.
Task Organization was as follows: Carrier Task Group One (TG 58.1) - Rear Admiral J.W. Reeves, Jr Carrier Unit C-TU-58.1.5) Rear Admiral J.W. Reeves, Jr. ENTERPRISE (CV-06) (F) YORKTOWN (CV-10) (FF) BELLEAU WOOD (CVL-24)
Support Unit (TU-58.1.3)-Rear Admiral W.A. Lee, Jr. WASHINGTON (BB-56) (F) INDIANA (BB-58) MASSACHUSETTS (BB-59)
The COGSWELL completed fueling at 0055 and cast off, by 0220 night fueling had been completed and the destroyers resumed their station in the screen. The ENTERPRISE assumed guide and increased speed to 19 knots. At 0415 the Group course was changed to 340°, axis was still 060'. At 0420, in accordance with previous orders, INDIANA commenced maneuvering independently to leave the formation for the purpose of refueling destroyers. While coming right and when on approximately 150°, sighted WASHINGTON about 25° on our starboard bow, target angle about 350°, distant approximately 1500 yards. INDIANA maneuvered to avoid her, but collided with her at 0428 +/-. Material condition ZEBRA was set immediately, and all engines were stopped; six minutes later all engines were ordered ahead at 5 knots. Went to collision quarters at 0440 during which time, a sight muster of all hands was held. Injury report of personal as a result of the collision was:
2 Dead 1 Missing 6 Injured The destroyers COTTEN, GATLING, CAPERTON, and HEALY were ordered to remain with the WASHINGTON and INDIANA At 0612 went to General Quarters. (morning alert). INDIANA took station 2000 yards ahead of WASHINGTON, unit speed 6.5 knots, course 180°. Burial services for the two dead men were held this afternoon. The WASHINGTON refueled three destroyers during the afternoon (CAPERTON, COTTEN AND HEALY) operation completed by 1700. Various speeds were used throughout the afternoon and evening, but at 2249 speed was increased to 12 knots and the INDIANA took station 10° on the starboard quarter of the WASHINGTON, distance 1500 yards, steering course 080°.
02 February 1944 Steaming as before, en route for Majuro, Marshall Islands. 0600 went to General Quarters for morning alert. Majuro Atoll was sighted at 1516 and preparations for entering port were made at 2045. INDIANA anchored in Majuro Atoll berth C-2. As a result of injuries received in the collision on February 01 1944, one of the injured died at 1700 to-day (See additional sheet for injured, dead, and missing) Held funeral services for the marine that died last night. Buried him ashore. ... More
Memories Do not forget that this collision between these two 35,000 ton battleships in the darkness of 01 FebDo not forget that this collision between these two 35,000 ton battleships in the darkness of 01 February 1944 deprived the navy of two capital ships for over 90 days. Few realized at the time how close the Indiana was in danger of sinking, With thanks to the damage control party that shored up the third deck bulkhead #128 1/2 that held, the Indiana remained afloat. The damage sustained by the Indiana occurred at the most vulnerable location within the armored citadel length. Indeed, a detailed vulnerability study conducted early in 1945 concluded that, if the unprotected stern were riddled, flooding the third deck area between bulkheads 113 and 128 ½ would probably result in a South Dakota-class battleship sinking by the stern. This is precisely the area were the Indiana was hit by the Washington. In this instance the Indiana's holding bulkhead remained intact and the ship's longitudinal stability was not jeopardized, However, it appears that a very similar collision, involving damage to the stern as well as this critical compartment, possibly would have been sufficient to cause the ship to sink..
1 February 1944
From: The Commanding Officer. To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Via: (1) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. (2) Commander Battleship, U.S. Pacific Fleet, (3) Commander Battleship Division Eight. Subject: Collision with U.S.S. WASHINGTON (BB-56), Report of Reference: (A) Article 840, U.S. Navy Regulation, 1920. Enclosure: (A) Formation at 0420 (local) (B) Estimated tracks, (C) Casualties, (D) Damage sustained.
1. At about 0429 (all times herein Zone Plus 12) 01 February 1944 this vessel was in collision with the U.S.S. WASHINGTON at latitude 07-50.2 North, longitude 167-28.5 East.
The Situation: 2. The situation prior to the collision was;
(A) This vessel was operating with carrier Task Group One (TG 58.1) in support unit (TU 58.1.3) in accordance with Carrier Task Group One operation order No. 1-44 dated 13 January 1944 (Flintlock) and other pertinent directives included below,
(B) During the night of the collision, Task Group 58.1 was in cruising disposition 5R with major units assigned the following stations: (circle spacing 1000 yards). U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (GUIDE) 0000 U.S.S. INDIANA 3300 U.S.S. WASHINGTON 3060 U.S.S. MASSACHUSETTS 3180 U.S.S. YORKTOWN 2240 U.S.S. BELLEAU WOOD 2120 U.S.S. OAKLAND 6000 Nine destroyers were equally spaced on circle six. (C) The task group axis was 060° (D) The damage control readiness was Yoke and the engineering readiness was 33 (E) All boilers were cut in on the main steam line, (F) The radars were operating: 3. At 0400 the weather was as indicated below, and no significant change was noted up to the time of collision. Wind direction 062°, force 16 knots, low cumulus clouds about seven tenths, visibility 1500 to 6000 yards depending on direction, slight from 045°. 4. The following messages were received bearing or prospective moves of this vessel. (A) Commander Task Unit 58.1.3. "When directed about twenty one hundred to night one destroyer will fuel from each battleship in present disposition X if weather permits second destroyer may be ordered along side each battleship for simultaneous fueling X about daylight and rejoin in the afternoon. (B) Commander Task Group 58.1 010650 to Commander Task Group 58.1,3 and retransmitted to INDIANA " If circumstances permit desire to fuel five DD's tonight X remaining four and INDIANA will be detached at about 0400 in latitude 7-41 N, longitude 166-35 E, X two DD's screen while others fuel beginning about 0630 in latitude 7-55 North, longitude 166-56 East while ASP will join groups estimated position at 1200, latitude 8-33 N longitude 161-19 East." (C) Commander Task Group 58.1 by TBS at 0045, "third team proceeded with mission without further orders at 'XFD' in accordance with previous instructions ," 5 At 0221 the Task Group speed was set at 19 knots and was not changed by the Task Group prior to the collision. At 0232 the Task Group base was set. At 0307 commenced ZIG-ZAG in accordance with plan six. 6 The Commanding Officer was in the Chart House from about 0348 until 0355 when he went to the Bridge. 7 At 0355 "emergency turn NINE" was received from Commander Task Group 58.1 was executed immediately by this vessel , steady on 042° 8 About 0410 the Commanding Officer directed that signal "My course 280°, speed 15" be transmitted by TBS at 0420 to U.S.S. HEALY, U.S.S. CAPERTON and U.S.S. COTTEN who had been designated to accompany the U.S.S. INDIANA. The 0630 fueling rendezvous for this vessel was then about 30 miles distant bearing 208°. 9 At 0415 "340° turn" was executed by Task Group Commander, this vessel complying. 10 From 0420 to 0430 the time of events were not recorded with sufficient accuracy to permit precise record of all events. The pit log was not recorded during this period. Thus, reconstruction of the ships track during this period is in approximation, All orders to the engines and helm during this time are, therefore, set forth in detail below. 11 At 0420, just prior to bring the ship to the easterly course, the Commanding Officer ordered a change of course to 280° and speed reduced to 15 knots within a few seconds the helm was ordered shifted from left to right. At about 0423 (local) this vessel was steady on course 340° and at about 0420 (local) the CIC reported this vessel "in position." However, the net result was some reduction in ships speed through the water, and probably a small change in bearing of the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE. 12 At 0420 the U.S.S. YORKTOWN, U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, AND U.S.S. BELLEAU WOOD were already visible to port, and were seen by the Commanding Officer and Commander F.W. Brumby, Jr. U.S. Navy (Senior duty Officer on the Bridge). 13 At about 0420 the Officer of the deck was ordered by the Commanding Officer to change to course to the right to 180°, followed by orders from the Commanding Officer to steady up on 090°, 14 By about 0426, the ship steadied on 090°, 15 Shortly after steading on 090*, The Commanding Officer ordered "come to 180°" and as the ship started to swing the Commanding Officer ordered "steady on 150" at this instant and about 0427, The U.S.S. WASHINGTON was sighted on the starboard bow, distance estimated at 150 yards, The rudder was immediately ordered "HARD LEFT" with orders to come to 090° also at about this time the CIC, reported the U.S.S. WASHINGTON bearing 348° distance 1700 yards. 16 Collision seemed inevitably by about this 0428 when the rudder was hard left and emergency full speed was ordered. One engine room bell sheet indicates that increase of speed was ordered at 0427. It was noted that the U.S.S. WASHINGTON was swinging hard left. 17 At the moment of collision this vessel was on 100°. The estimated course of the U.S.S. WASHINGTON on impact was 325", 18 The blow was a glancing one. The U.S.S. WASHINGTON swinging left very rapidly, and U.S.S. INDIANA either steady or swinging slowly right.
Comments of the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Indiana
19 As it may serve to throw further light on the collision, the intention of the Commanding officer, U.S.S. INDIANA are included. He intended to make a very slow turn to the right, eventually ending up on course 280° and thereby gaining enough ground to the Eastward to clear the heavy ships, then gradually coming around to the South, avoiding the screen by keeping inside of circle six, and after passing clear of the U.S.S. WASHINGTON , to come to course 280° or the appropriate relative course in case zig-zag was resumed before clearing the screen, There was sufficient visibility to make this rather radial maneuver rather than an initial change to say, right to 040° and maneuvering by radar alone. 20 The Commanding Officer regrets the necessity of reporting casualties. 21 Immediately after the collision, the vessel took a list of 4° to the starboard, which was corrected promptly by counter flooding, 22 Except for the loss of automatic weapons the starboard quarter of the main deck and damage to turret three rangefinder, the fire power of this vessel was not affected. There was no damage to the main engines or boilers. 23 During the emergency all officers and men conducted themselves in accordance with the best traditions of the Naval service. No confusion or excessive noise was noted, and all hands acted promptly and intelligently to localize the damage and to effect repairs within the capacity of the ships force.
signed by Captain J.G. Steele The Following List of Casualties
DEAD Mc Clanahan, Paul Robert Coxswain, 342-10-50 USN Gerou, John Francis Seaman Second Class, 238-84-61 USN
MISSING Neville, Lawrence Hilton Seaman Second Class, V-6, 867-46-51 USNR
INJURED Kelly, William Martin Fireman First Class, V-6, 710-21-13 USNR Pattenaude, Milton Lee Seaman Second Class, V-6, 862-01-34 USNR Stafford, Morris LaVaughn Fireman Second Class, V-6, 645-92-53 USNR Thompson, Dan Victor Private First Class, 818-999 USMC Eucke, Robert Frank Seaman First Class, 300-79-77 USN Trouiller, John Alvin Seaman Second Class, V-6, 846-63-77 USNR ... More
Description The Battle of Biak was part of the New Guinea campaign of World War II, fought between the United States Army and the Japanese Army from 27 May to 17 August 1944. It was part of General Douglas MacArtThe Battle of Biak was part of the New Guinea campaign of World War II, fought between the United States Army and the Japanese Army from 27 May to 17 August 1944. It was part of General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific command's offensive drive to clear New Guinea in preparation for an invasion of the Philippines. It was the first major effort by the Japanese to allow uncontested landings for the purpose of creating a kill zone inland. ... More
Memories On 27 May 1944, the United States begins "Operation Horlicks" to retake Biak, Indonesia.
27 May 1944:On 27 May 1944, the United States begins "Operation Horlicks" to retake Biak, Indonesia.
27 May 1944: American Operation "Horlicks" - The Invasion of Biak: Rear Admiral (later Admiral/CNO) William M. Fechteler's (former CO of INDIANA, BB-58) Task Force 77 lands Maj Gen Horace H. Fuller's 41st Division on Biak off New Guinea... More
Description The Battle of Sansapor (Operation Globetrotter) was an amphibious landing and subsequent operations around Sansapor, Dutch New Guinea on the Vogelkop Peninsula during World War II.
Admiral William FeThe Battle of Sansapor (Operation Globetrotter) was an amphibious landing and subsequent operations around Sansapor, Dutch New Guinea on the Vogelkop Peninsula during World War II.
Admiral William Fechteler's Attack Force (Task Force 77) was to have a D-Day groupment comprising 11 destroyers, 5 APD's, 16 LCI's, 3 rocket LCI's, 8 LST's, 4 PC's, and 1 ATF. A Covering Force (Task Force 78), consisting of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers,and 9 destroyers under the command of Admiral Russell Berkey, was to be available for support fire if needed.
In preparation for Operation Typhoon (code name for the US Army landings on the Vogelkop Peninsula), on June 17, 1944, S-47, under Lieutenant Lloyd V. Young, sailed from the Admiralty Islands for Waigeo, with the mission to insert elements of the Alamo Scouts, Allied Intelligence Bureau agents, terrain experts of the Fifth Air Force, and hydrographic survey men of the VII Amphibious Force. The reconnaissance force landed near Sausapor-Mar on June 23 where the party spent the week surveying the region. As a result of the both ground and aerial reconnaissance the assault landing was diverted to land 55 miles (89 km) northeast of Sorong.
On June 30, 1944 Operation Typhoon landed at Sansapar (Green Beach), Mar (Red Beach), Middelburg Island and Amsterdam Island. In charge of the Operation Typhoon ground forces was Major General Franklin C. Sibert, commanding general of the 6th Infantry Division. General Sibert was to command an organization designated the TYPHOON Task Force, which comprised the 6th Division (Reinforced), less the 20th Regimental Combat Team. Combat units for the D-Day echelon of the TYPHOON Task Force were the 1st Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry Regiment, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, a company of the 6th Engineers, and four antiaircraft batteries. All of the landings ultimately proved to be unopposed and it was not until August 16th that elements of the Japanese 35th Division were able to reach the area of the landings. By 31 August the 1-63rd Infantry had killed 155 Japanese and taken 42 prisoners. The American regiment lost only 3 men killed and 4 wounded. The 1st Infantry, on the west flank, killed 197 Japanese and captured 154, while losing only 4 men wounded itself. The 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, during its series of far flung patrols, killed 42 Japanese and captured 5 others. Total battle casualties for the TYPHOON Task Force from 30 July through 31 August were 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured. Japanese losses during the same period were estimated to be 385 killed and 215 captured.
Eventually, the runway for fighter aircraft was built on Middleburg Island and for bombers near Mar to the northeast (the landing strip is still visible to this day), although the control of Sausapor was vital for the security of the base to launch the campaign and remained an air warning radar station. Ships patrolled this area of the coastline throughout the month long campaign, keeping the Japanese at bay. Operation Globetrotter ended on August 31 and General MacArthur's last point of landing on the way back to the Philippines was at Sausapor. Cape Opmarai Airfield is now a nearby, disused airfield.
On 31 July, shore-to shore landings from Cape Opmarai were carried out at Sansapor. The Japanese garrison at Manokwari was cut off and attempted to retreat to Sorong.... More
Memories Vogelkop Operation 30 July-31 August 1944 At the Sansapor-Mar area, an air base and minor naval faciVogelkop Operation 30 July-31 August 1944 At the Sansapor-Mar area, an air base and minor naval facilities were to be established to support subsequent operations northwest toward the Philippines. The air construction task called for the development of fields upon which two fighter groups, five squadrons of medium bombers, and a half squadron of night-fighters could be based. To seize and protect the air-base area, the 6th Infantry Division, less one regimental combat team but reinforced with service and antiaircraft units, was considered sufficient force. General Krueger was made responsible for the direction of the operation and for co-ordination of air, naval, and ground planning.
Plans and Planning Mar lies in flat, swampy ground at the mouth of the Wewe River, which flows into the Pacific about 18 miles west-southwest of the Kaap de Goede Hoop, northernmost point on the Vogelkop. About 7 miles northeast of Mar is Cape Opmarai, and 7 miles to the southwest is Cape Sansapor, situated 2 miles northeast of Sansapor Plantation and the native hamlet of the same name. At many points along the 25 miles of coast line between Kaap de Goede Hoop and Cape Sansapor, spurs of the Tamrau Mountains, which dominate most of the Vogelkop, descend to the shore. Densely forested coastal flats are to be found near Mar and along the shore line northeast of Cape Sansapor. Off Mar lie the Mios Soe Islands, Amsterdam and Middleburg, respectively 5 and 3 miles from the coast.23
Little detailed information concerning the target area was available to ALAMO Force other than that brought back by the 23-30 June reconnaissance party. Japanese activity appeared to center at Sansapor Plantation, where the Japanese were known to maintain a staging base for barges moving along the coast from Sorong to Manokwari. The ALAMO G-2 Section estimated that unless a clearing noted near the mouth of the Wewe proved to be airdrome construction, few more than 100 Japanese would be found at Sansapor-Mar. If the clearing was in preparation for an airfield, then a Japanese airdrome construction unit of perhaps 700 men might be stationed at the objective. The terrain reconnaissance and photographs indicated that good landing beaches existed near Mar and above Cape Sansapor. Potential airdrome sites had been reported at both places and, in addition, it was believed possible that a fighter strip might be constructed on tiny Middleburg Island, the flat surface of which was given over to a neglected coconut tree plantation.
When on 8 July principal air, ground, and naval commanders gathered at General Krueger's command post to discuss plans for the new operation, it immediately became apparent that more intelligence and terrain information would be needed before detailed landing, supply, and engineer plans could be evolved. As a result, only general discussions were held and the conferees reached only tentative conclusions, which they realized might be changed after further reconnaissance at the objective area.
The first question taken up at the 8 July conference was that of setting H Hour, the target date of 30 July being agreeable to all concerned. To assure tactical surprise, General Krueger wanted the landing made at first light, even though Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, now in command of the Fifth Air Force, could not promise air cover until forty-five minutes later. Admiral Fechteler, in charge of the amphibious phase of the operation, was willing to forego air cover since no enemy opposition was expected, but he would approve the early landing hour only if an advance party could be put ashore to guide LST's to the proper beaches. The conferees concluded that putting an advance party ashore might destroy chances for tactical surprise and bring Japanese aircraft over the area. Therefore, H Hour was tentatively set for 0700, about fifteen minutes before sunrise at Mar.
Preliminary naval bombardment was considered unnecessary in the light of expected Japanese dispositions. Without naval bombardment, chances for tactical surprise seemed good. The nearest enemy garrison was at Sansapor, only twelve miles from the proposed landing points near Mar, and the nearest Japanese radio facilities were also thought to be located at Sansapor. If no bombardments were delivered and if the naval forces maintained radio silence until some Japanese opposition was encountered, there would be a good chance to land the entire D Day force before the Japanese realized a landing was under way. Thus, the possibility of harassing attacks by Japanese troops from Sansapor would be reduced, as would the probability of air attacks from Japanese bases within range of Mar.
Much time at the conference was devoted to discussing airdrome construction. The ALAMO Force engineer officer thought Middleburg Island offered the best site for quick construction of an airfield from which local fighter cover could be provided. The Mar area, according to available information, did not appear well suited to airdrome development, although a landing at Mar seemed best from the naval point of view since that area provided favorable beaches for LST's. The conferees therefore thought that the main landing would have to take place near Mar. A shore-to-shore operation to seize the Cape Sansapor area, apparently better suited for airfields, would follow, as might another minor landing to secure the Mios Soe Islands.25
Since lack of detailed terrain information made further planning almost impossible, another reconnaissance party was slipped ashore near Cape Opmarai during the night of 14-15 July. This group, which went forward by PT boat from Noemfoor, encountered no Japanese in the area and found the natives friendly. After spending three days in the Sansapor-Mar area, the group brought out a terrain report which considerably changed tentative plans. First, the reconnaissance disclosed that there was no Japanese airdrome construction in the area and that the previously located cleared strips were actually overgrown native gardens. The best airdrome site was found near two small, reef-bound capes about one and three-fourths miles northeast of Mar. The beaches near and between the two capes were found to be excellent for landing although not too satisfactory for heavy truck traffic. The rain forest in the region was noted to be less dense than anticipated. Finally, the party's airdrome engineers estimated that a 6,000-foot runway could be constructed near the capes within twenty-five days after the landing, providing heavy rains did not impede the work.26
With the new information at hand, final plans were rapidly drawn up by all units concerned. The landing was to be made at 0700 on D Day, 30 July, between the two small capes northeast of Mar. The first airstrip would be constructed in a partially cleared area immediately inland from the westernmost promontory. The Cape Sansapor area, now deemed unsuitable for an airstrip, was selected by naval planners as a PT base site, and plans were made to secure that area by a shore-to-shore operation on D plus 1. Middleburg Island would be seized at H plus 35 minutes on D Day so as to assure another airfield site. Final determination of airfield locations was left to Brig. Gen. Earl W. Barnes, who was to accompany the assault echelon to Mar as the commander of the XIII Air Task Force. This organization was, in effect, an advance echelon of the Thirteenth Air Force, from which was to be drawn the air garrison for the Sansapor-Mar area. General Barnes built his headquarters around men selected from his previous staff, that of the XIII Fighter Command.27
In charge of the ground forces was Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, commanding general of the 6th Infantry Division and previously of the TORNADO Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi. For the Sansapor-Mar operation General Sibert was to command an organization designated the TYPHOON Task Force, which comprised the 6th Division, reinforced, less the 20th Regimental Combat Team. The latter unit was to remain at Wakde-Sarmi as ALAMO Force Reserve for the new operation. Combat units for the D Day echelon of the TYPHOON Task Force were the 1st Infantry, the 1st Battalion of the 63d Infantry, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, a company of the 6th Engineers, and four antiaircraft batteries. There was to be a high percentage of service troops, especially engineers, among the approximately 7,300 men who were to land on 30 July.
The assault on RED Beach, as the landing point was named, was to be undertaken by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Infantry, going ashore in LCVP's from the APD's taking them forward from Wakde-Sarmi. The 3d Battalion was designated TYPHOON Task Force Reserve for the landing, and, if necessary, it would aid the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop to secure Middleburg Island. The reconnaissance unit was to move ashore in LVT's and LVT(A)'s launched from LST's. The 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry, was initially to operate as part of the Shore Party with the Shore Battalion of the 543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 3d Engineer Special Brigade, and was then to revert to a reserve role.
Admiral Fechteler's Attack Force (Task Force 77) was to have a D Day groupment comprising 11 destroyers, 5 APD's, 16 LCI's, 3 rocket LCI's, 8 LST's, 4 PC's, and 1 ATF. A Covering Force (Task Force 78), consisting of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers under the command of Admiral Berkey, was to be available for support fire if needed. In addition to covering the main landing, the naval elements would support the operations against the Mios Soe group on D Day, and on D plus 1 provide LCI and destroyer support fire to cover theshore-to-shore operation against Cape Sansapor. The Allied Naval Forces was responsible for the movement of all troops and supplies from rear bases to Sansapor until relieved by the Services of Supply on 1 September.
Units of the TYPHOON Task Force reaching the objective area on D Day, D plus 2, and D plus 4 were to take with them a ten-day supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment, fuels, and lubricants, and two units of fire for all weapons. After D plus 4, amphibious craft were to bring forward with each unit aboard a ten-day supply of rations, clothing, unit equipment, petroleum products, medical supplies, engineer construction equipment, and motor maintenance supplies. Large cargo ships to arrive after D plus 4 were to carry thirty days' supply of these items, and both types of shipping were to bring forward three units of fire for all weapons of the organizations aboard ... More
Description The Battle of Noemfoor was a battle of World War II that took place on the island of Noemfoor, in Dutch New Guinea, between 2 July and 31 August 1944. United States and Australian forces attacked to cThe Battle of Noemfoor was a battle of World War II that took place on the island of Noemfoor, in Dutch New Guinea, between 2 July and 31 August 1944. United States and Australian forces attacked to capture Japanese bases on the island. ... More
Memories The amphibious phase of the Noemfoor operation was to be directed by Rear Adm. William M. Fechteler The amphibious phase of the Noemfoor operation was to be directed by Rear Adm. William M. Fechteler as the Commander, Naval Attack Force.14 Admiral Fechteler divided his Attack Force into three groups. The Covering Force, under the command of Rear Adm. Russell S. Berkey (USN), contained 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 10 destroyers. Admiral Fechteler retained command over the Main Body, consisting of 15 destroyers, 8 LST's, 8 LCT's, 4 patrol craft (PC's), 1 tug, and 14 LCI's (including 3 rocket-equipped LCI's and 2 LCI's transporting demolition experts and their equipment for blasting approaches for landing craft through the reefs). An LCT-LCM Unit, commanded by Lt. Comdr. James S. Munroe (USNR), contained 3 PC's, 5 LCT's, and 40 LCM's, the latter manned by Company A, 543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. A Beach Party and two Reinforcement Groups (the latter arriving after D Day) completed the naval organization.
The bulk of the air missions in support of the landing were to be flown by the U.S. Fifth Air Force, now under Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. The newly arrived Thirteenth Air Force, under Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, was to have a share in the support, as were Australian and Dutch planes. Also available was Task Force 73, the Seventh Fleet's land-based aircraft, which flew under the operational control of the Allied Air Forces.
Initially, ALAMO Force Reserve for the Noemfoor operation was the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. This unit, stationed at Hollandia, was to be prepared for airborne movement to Noemfoor on C-47's of the 54th Troop Carrier Wing, Fifth Air Force. Since there were not enough C-47's available to move the entire regiment at one time, provision was made to fly it forward in battalion groups.17 Late during the planning for Noemfoor, General Krueger, concerned lest the ground situation on Noemfoor on D Day require overwater reinforcements as well, alerted the 34th Infantry, then on Biak, to prepare for waterborne movement to Noemfoor on twenty-four hours notice. He requested and obtained from the VII Amphibious Force the use of ten LCI's, which were to stand by off Biak at Mios Woendi pending a decision on the necessity for moving the 34th Infantry to Noemfoor.
The CYCLONE Task Force had no specific reserve set aside as such for the landing. The Task Force Shore Party, however, consisting of engineer and quartermaster units, was to assemble the equivalent of three rifle companies for combat missions upon call from General Patrick. The reserve for the 158th Infantry was to be Company K, reinforced by a heavy machine gun platoon from Company M. The 1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company, once ashore, was to assemble to assist the attack of the 158th Infantry and, until needed for this task, could be considered as a mobile reserve.... More
Other Memories
The first attempt to operate a multi-carrier group as a strike force occured on August 23, 1943 when the carriers Essex (CV-9), Yorktown (CV-10), and Independence (CVL-22) along with ten destroyers, two cruisers and the battleship Indiana (BB-58) were grouped together to form Taskforce 15. By August 31st the taskforce was in striking posistion 130 miles north of Marcus Island. Home to a Japanese airfield and weather station, Marcus Island, was quickly desimated by the suprise air attack.
Following the Marcus Island raid INDIANA returned to Pearl Harbor, where she was drydocked for 16 days.
On 21 October 1943 she left Pearl Harbor with the support forces designated for the invasion of the Gilbert Islands, arriving in the Fiji Islands on 07 November 1943. Four days later, however, the battleship was again underway, with rear Admiral Lee now Commander, Battleships, Pacific, in company with other units of BatDivs 8 and 9. On the 16th, the battlewagons and their screens joined. Rear Admiral C. A. "Baldy" Pownall's TG 50.1, Rear Admiral Pownall flying his two-starred flag in Yorktown (CV-10), the namesake of the carrier lost at Midway. The combined force then proceeded toward the Gilbert Islands to join in the daily bombings of Japanese positions in the Gilberts and Marshalls- softening them up for impending assault. On the 19th, the planes from TG 50.1 attacked Mili and Jaluit in the Marshalls, continuing those strikes through 20 November, the day upon which Navy, Marine, and Army forces landed on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. On the 22d, the task group sent its planes against Mili in successive waves; subsequently, the group steamed to operate north of Makin.
It was at Tarawa that she shot down her first plane. She was with the northern group of our forces, near Makin Island, when enemy torpedo bombers from the Marshalls attacked. They came in at dusk from the east, leaving the ships of the task force silhouetted against the western sun, and against flares that other Japs had dropped. The torpedo planes came in low, just off the water, with INDIANA s guns sending up a terrific barrage. She made her first kill when one of the enemy planes made the mistake of coming too close to her.
Indiana rendezvoused with other carrier groups that composed TF 50 on 25 November and, during the reorganization that followed, was assigned to TG 50.4, the fast carrier task group under the command of Rear Admiral Frederick C. "Ted" Sherman. The carriers comprising the core of the group were Bunker Hill (CV-17) and Monterey (CVL-26); the battleships screening them were Alabama (BB-60), South Dakota (BB-57) in addition to the the Indiana. Eight destroyers rounded out the screen.
The group operated north of Makin, providing air, surface, and antisubmarine protection for the unfolding unloading operations at Makin, effective on 26 November. Enemy planes attacked the group on the 27th and 28th but were driven off without inflicting any damage on the fast carrier task forces.
As the Gilbert Islands campaign drew to a close, TG 50.8 was formed on 6 December 1943, under Rear Admiral Lee, in Washington. Other ships of that group included North Carolina (BB-55), Massachusetts (BB-59), Indiana (BB-58), South Dakota (BB-57), and Alabama (BB-60) and the Fleet carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey. Eleven destroyers screened the heavy ships. The group first steamed south and west of Ocean Island to take position for the scheduled air and surface bombardment of the island of Nauru, the rich little phosphate island the Japs had stolen from the British. Before dawn on 8 December, the carriers launched their strike groups while the bombardment force formed in column; 135 rounds of 16-inch fire from the six battleships fell on the enemy installations on Nauru; and, upon completion of the shelling, the battleships secondary batteries took their turn; two planes from each battleship spotted the fall of shot. After a further period of air strikes had been flown off against Nauru, the task group sailed for Efate, where they arrived on 12 December. On that day, due to a change in the highest command echelons, TF 57 became TF 37. 1944
On 19 January 1944 the battleship, along with the rest of the task group, put to sea to make rendezvous with elements of TF 58, the fast carrier task force under the overall command of Vice Admiral Marc A. "Pete" Mitscher. Becoming part of TG 58.1, Indiana screened the fast carriers in her group as they launched air strikes on Taroa and Kwajalein in the waning days of January 1944. Indiana, together with Massachusetts and Washington; left the formation with four destroyers as screen and shelled Kwajalein Atoll on the 30th. Further air strikes followed the next day
Description The Solomon Islands campaign was a major campaign of the Pacific War of World War II. The campaign began with Japanese landings and occupation of several areas in the British Solomon Islands and BougaThe Solomon Islands campaign was a major campaign of the Pacific War of World War II. The campaign began with Japanese landings and occupation of several areas in the British Solomon Islands and Bougainville, in the Territory of New Guinea, during the first six months of 1942. The Japanese occupied these locations and began the construction of several naval and air bases with the goals of protecting the flank of the Japanese offensive in New Guinea, establishing a security barrier for the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain, and providing bases for interdicting supply lines between the Allied powers of the United States and Australia and New Zealand.
The Allies, in order to defend their communication and supply lines in the South Pacific, supported a counteroffensive in New Guinea, isolated the Japanese base at Rabaul, and counterattacked the Japanese in the Solomons with landings on Guadalcanal (see Guadalcanal Campaign) and small neighboring islands on 7 August 1942. These landings initiated a series of combined-arms battles between the two adversaries, beginning with the Guadalcanal landing and continuing with several battles in the central and northern Solomons, on and around New Georgia Island, and Bougainville Island.
In a campaign of attrition fought on land, on sea, and in the air, the Allies wore the Japanese down, inflicting irreplaceable losses on Japanese military assets. The Allies retook some of the Solomon Islands (although resistance continued until the end of the war), and they also isolated and neutralized some Japanese positions, which were then bypassed. The Solomon Islands campaign then converged with the New Guinea campaign.... More
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description
Gilbert Islands Operation: 13 Nov-8 Dec 1943
Description The plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest PaciThe plan of the Pacific subseries was determined by the geography, strategy, and the military organization of a theater largely oceanic. Two independent, coordinate commands, one in the Southwest Pacific under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the other in the Central, South, and North Pacific (Pacific Ocean Areas) under Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, were created early in the war. Except in the South and Southwest Pacific, each conducted its own operations with its own ground, air, and naval forces in widely separated areas. These operations required at first only a relatively small number of troops whose efforts often yielded strategic gains which cannot be measured by the size of the forces involved. Indeed, the nature of the objectivesùsmall islands, coral atolls, and jungle-bound harbors and airstrips, made the employment of large ground forces impossible and highlighted the importance of air and naval operations. Thus, until 1945, the war in the Pacific progressed by a double series of amphibious operations each of which fitted into a strategic pattern developed in Washington.... More
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
Description The attack on Pearl Harbor, also known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor, the Hawaii Operation or Operation AI by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and Operation Z during planning, was a surpriThe attack on Pearl Harbor, also known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor, the Hawaii Operation or Operation AI by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and Operation Z during planning, was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory, on the morning of December 7, 1941. The attack led to the United States' entry into World War II.
Japan intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with military actions the Empire of Japan planned in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the next seven hours there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines, Guam and Wake Island and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
The attack commenced at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time. The base was attacked by 353 Imperial Japanese fighter planes, bombers, and torpedo planes in two waves, launched from six aircraft carriers. All eight U.S. Navy battleships were damaged, with four sunk. All but Arizona were later raised, and six were returned to service and went on to fight in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship, and one minelayer. 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed; 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were wounded. Important base installations such as the power station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) were not attacked. Japanese losses were light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 64 servicemen killed. One Japanese sailor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured.
The attack came as a profound shock to the American people and led directly to the American entry into World War II in both the Pacific and European theaters. The following day, December 8, the United States declared war on Japan. Domestic support for non-interventionism, which had been fading since the Fall of France in 1940,[19] disappeared. Clandestine support of the United Kingdom (e.g., the Neutrality Patrol) was replaced by active alliance. Subsequent operations by the U.S. prompted Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to declare war on the U.S. on December 11, which was reciprocated by the U.S. the same day.
From the 1950s, several writers alleged that parties high in the U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may have let it happen (or even encouraged it) with the aim of bringing the U.S. into war. However, this advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is rejected by mainstream historians.
There were numerous historical precedents for unannounced military action by Japan. However, the lack of any formal warning, particularly while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to proclaim December 7, 1941, "a date which will live in infamy". Because the attack happened without a declaration of war and without explicit warning, the attack on Pearl Harbor was judged by the Tokyo Trials to be a war crime.... More
Criteria The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American... The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in European Russia between November 12, 1918, and August 5, 1919; or for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia between November 23, 1918, and April 1, 1920. MoreHide
The first attempt to operate a multi-carrier group as a strike force occured on August 23, 1943 when the carriers Essex (CV-9), Yorktown (CV-10), and Independence (CVL-22) along with ten destroyers, two cruisers and the battleship Indiana (BB-58) were grouped together to form Taskforce 15. By August 31st the taskforce was in striking posistion 130 miles north of Marcus Island. Home to a Japanese airfield and weather station, Marcus Island, was quickly desimated by the suprise air attack.
Following the Marcus Island raid INDIANA returned to Pearl Harbor, where she was drydocked for 16 days.
On 21 October 1943 she left Pearl Harbor with the support forces designated for the invasion of the Gilbert Islands, arriving in the Fiji Islands on 07 November 1943. Four days later, however, the battleship was again underway, with rear Admiral Lee now Commander, Battleships, Pacific, in company with other units of BatDivs 8 and 9. On the 16th, the battlewagons and their screens joined. Rear Admiral C. A. "Baldy" Pownall's TG 50.1, Rear Admiral Pownall flying his two-starred flag in Yorktown (CV-10), the namesake of the carrier lost at Midway. The combined force then proceeded toward the Gilbert Islands to join in the daily bombings of Japanese positions in the Gilberts and Marshalls- softening them up for impending assault. On the 19th, the planes from TG 50.1 attacked Mili and Jaluit in the Marshalls, continuing those strikes through 20 November, the day upon which Navy, Marine, and Army forces landed on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. On the 22d, the task group sent its planes against Mili in successive waves; subsequently, the group steamed to operate north of Makin.
It was at Tarawa that she shot down her first plane. She was with the northern group of our forces, near Makin Island, when enemy torpedo bombers from the Marshalls attacked. They came in at dusk from the east, leaving the ships of the task force silhouetted against the western sun, and against flares that other Japs had dropped. The torpedo planes came in low, just off the water, with INDIANA s guns sending up a terrific barrage. She made her first kill when one of the enemy planes made the mistake of coming too close to her.
Indiana rendezvoused with other carrier groups that composed TF 50 on 25 November and, during the reorganization that followed, was assigned to TG 50.4, the fast carrier task group under the command of Rear Admiral Frederick C. "Ted" Sherman. The carriers comprising the core of the group were Bunker Hill (CV-17) and Monterey (CVL-26); the battleships screening them were Alabama (BB-60), South Dakota (BB-57) in addition to the the Indiana. Eight destroyers rounded out the screen.
The group operated north of Makin, providing air, surface, and antisubmarine protection for the unfolding unloading operations at Makin, effective on 26 November. Enemy planes attacked the group on the 27th and 28th but were driven off without inflicting any damage on the fast carrier task forces.
As the Gilbert Islands campaign drew to a close, TG 50.8 was formed on 6 December 1943, under Rear Admiral Lee, in Washington. Other ships of that group included North Carolina (BB-55), Massachusetts (BB-59), Indiana (BB-58), South Dakota (BB-57), and Alabama (BB-60) and the Fleet carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey. Eleven destroyers screened the heavy ships. The group first steamed south and west of Ocean Island to take position for the scheduled air and surface bombardment of the island of Nauru, the rich little phosphate island the Japs had stolen from the British. Before dawn on 8 December, the carriers launched their strike groups while the bombardment force formed in column; 135 rounds of 16-inch fire from the six battleships fell on the enemy installations on Nauru; and, upon completion of the shelling, the battleships secondary batteries took their turn; two planes from each battleship spotted the fall of shot. After a further period of air strikes had been flown off against Nauru, the task group sailed for Efate, where they arrived on 12 December. On that day, due to a change in the highest command echelons, TF 57 became TF 37. 1944
On 19 January 1944 the battleship, along with the rest of the task group, put to sea to make rendezvous with elements of TF 58, the fast carrier task force under the overall command of Vice Admiral Marc A. "Pete" Mitscher. Becoming part of TG 58.1, Indiana screened the fast carriers in her group as they launched air strikes on Taroa and Kwajalein in the waning days of January 1944. Indiana, together with Massachusetts and Washington; left the formation with four destroyers as screen and shelled Kwajalein Atoll on the 30th. Further air strikes followed the next day