Criteria The Distinguished Flying Cross may be awarded to military members who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism or outstanding achievement while participa... The Distinguished Flying Cross may be awarded to military members who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism or outstanding achievement while participating in aerial flight. MoreHide
Comments Awarded for actions during the World War II
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Flying Cross to Lieutenant Robert Harold Anderson (NSN: 0-106429... Awarded for actions during the World War II
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Flying Cross to Lieutenant Robert Harold Anderson (NSN: 0-106429), United States Naval Reserve, for extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight in operations against the enemy shipping off the coast of Indo-China on 10 January 1945. Leading a division of carrier based fighter planes against an enemy convoy, he personally scored a direct 1,000-pound bomb hit on a large tanker causing it to explode and later sink. His courage, skill and leadership, coupled with complete disregard for his personal safety, were at all times in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
Action Date: 10-Jan-45
Description On December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landinOn December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On January 9, 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles (64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on February 3, 1945, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry Regiment (organized as infantry) passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On February 16, paratroopers and amphibious units simultaneously assaulted the islet of Corregidor. It was necessary to take this stronghold because troops there can block the entrance of Manila Bay. The Americans needed to establish a major harbor base at Manila Bay to support the expected invasion of Japan, planned to begin on November 1, 1945. Resistance on Corregidor ended on February 27, and then all resistance by the Japanese Empire ceased on August 15, 1945, obviating the need for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands.
Despite initial optimism, fighting in Manila was harsh. It took until March 3 to clear the city of all Japanese troops, and the Japanese Marines, who fought on stubbornly and refused to either surrender or to evacuate as the Japanese Army had done. Fort Drum, a fortified island in Manila Bay near Corregidor, held out until 13 April, when a team of Army troops went ashore and pumped 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into the fort, then set off incendiary charges. No Japanese soldiers in Fort Drum survived the blast and fire.
In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest American campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.... More
Criteria The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.... The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor. MoreHide
Comments Awarded for actions during the World War II
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Lieutenant Robert Harold Anderson (NSN: 0-106429), United States... Awarded for actions during the World War II
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Lieutenant Robert Harold Anderson (NSN: 0-106429), United States Naval Reserve, for extraordinary heroism in operations against the enemy while serving as Pilot of a carrier-based Navy Bomber in Bombing Fighting Squadron EIGHTY (VBF-80), attached to the U.S.S. HANCOCK (CV19), while participating in an aerial flight against enemy forces on 14 December 1944, in the vicinity of the Philippine Islands. Lieutenant Anderson led a division of planes in an eight-plane formation and when an enemy formation of twenty-seven planes was encountered, he led the attack on the enemy formation despite the numerical odds and during the ensuing engagement shot down five enemy planes and probably shot down another enemy plane. When his wingman was under attack by an enemy plane and while he was almost out of ammunition, he dove on the enemy plane and forced the enemy plane to break off from the attack. His courage and skill were at all times inspiring and in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
General Orders: Commander 2d Carrier Task Force Pacific: Serial 0909 (January 13, 1945)
Action Date: December 14, 1944
Service: Navy
Rank: Lieutenant
Company: Bombing Fighting Squadron 80 (VBF-80)
Division: U.S.S. Hancock (CV-19) MoreHide
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. MoreHide
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II and, by some criteria, possibly the largest naval battle in history.
It was fought in waters near the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar and Luzon from 23–26 October 1944, between combined US and Australian forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy. On 20 October, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia, and in particular depriving its forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied invasion, but was repulsed by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets. The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never afterwards sailed to battle in comparable force. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of fuel, remained in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four separate engagements between the opposing forces: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
It was the first battle in which Japanese aircraft carried out organized kamikaze attacks. By the time of the battle, Japan had fewer aircraft than the Allied forces had sea vessels, demonstrating the difference in power of the two sides at this point of the war. ... More
Description The Battle of Samar (25 October 1944) was the nearest the Japanese came to success during the battle of Leyte Gulf and saw a powerful Japanese battleship force come close to destroying a force of AmerThe Battle of Samar (25 October 1944) was the nearest the Japanese came to success during the battle of Leyte Gulf and saw a powerful Japanese battleship force come close to destroying a force of American escort carriers.
The Japanese realised that an American invasion of the Philippines or of Formosa would cut their Empire in half and prevent vital supplies reaching the Home Islands from the south part of the empire. They decided to try and fight the 'decisive battle' of the war wherever the Americans attacked next. If the Americans attacked the Philippines then the Japanese hoped to use the scattered elements of their fleet in a coordinated attack that might allow them to get at the vulnerable invasion fleet. In the final version of the plan Admiral Ozawa's carriers, coming from Japan, were to drag the US 3rd Fleet away from the invasion beaches in Leyte Gulf, allowing three other Japanese fleets to advance through the central Philippines to attack the invasion fleets.
The most important of these three fleets was Admiral Kurita's I Striking Force. Admiral Kurita began the battle of Leyte Gulf with a powerful fleet, containing five battleships, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Amongst the battleships were the Musashi and the Yamato, the biggest and most powerful battleships in the world. He also had the older battleships Kongo, Haruna and Nagato, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. This force suffered grievous losses before reaching Samar. In the two day battle of the Sibuyan Sea (23-24 October 1944) the Musashi was sunk by American aircraft, two cruisers were sunk by two American subs and a third crippled. Kurita started the battle of Samar with four battleships, six cruisers and ten destroyers.
On the American side the bulk of the battle was fought by Admiral Sprague's Taffy Three, with six escort carriers, three destroyers and four destroyer escorts. The escort carriers carried modern aircraft, but these were armed for ground attack and so didn't have many of the armour piercing bombs needed against battleships. Twelve more escort carriers in two groups were in the area, but the 7th Fleet's six old battleships were away to the south defending the Surigao Strait. The powerful modern carriers and fast battleships of the 3rd Fleet had been lured away to the north to try and intercept Ozawa's carriers (Battle of Cape Engano). Admiral Kinkaid, commander of the 7th Fleet, believed that Halsey had left a powerful task force (Task Force 34, Admiral Lee) to watch Kurita, but in fact this force had accompanied the 3rd Fleet north.
On the night of 24-25 October Kurita passed through the San Bernardino Straits, turned south and headed for Leyte Gulf. Soon after this, at about 5.30, he learnt that Admiral Nishimura's force had been destroyed and Admiral Shima was retreating (battle of the Surigao Strait). He probably never received the messages Ozawa sent out announcing that the 3rd Fleet was chasing him. Kurita could justifiably believe that the main parts of both the US 3rd and 7th Fleets were somewhere in or close to Leyte Gulf.
At about dawn (6.30) Kurita found Admiral Sprague's Taffy 3, a task force made up of six escort carriers and seven escorts. Kurita believed that he had found a 'gigantic enemy task force' containing large carriers, cruisers, destroyers and possibly battleships. He decided to abandon the charge into Leyte Gulf and turned to attack Sprague's force. At 6.58 the Yamato's main guns opened fire on a surface target for the first time.
Sprague realised that he was in trouble. At 7.01 he issued a call for help in the clear, ordered his aircraft into the air and headed for a nearby rain squall. Under cover of the rain he decided to try and reach the support of Taffy 2, thirty miles to the south. His destroyers were ordered to attack the Japanese fleet while the carriers made their best speed south.
Sprague's aircraft had a limited potential to do serious damage to the Japanese battleships. The escort carriers didn't have enough storage space to carry both fragmentation bombs for ground support and a significant number of armour piercing bombs. The Japanese had no way to know that, and the American aircraft were able to force the Japanese heavy ships into frantic manoeuvres, slowing their pursuit of the carriers. The torpedo firing destroyers were equally effective.
Just after 7.20am the cruiser Kumano was hit by a torpedo from the US destroyer Johnston DD-557. Her speed was reduced, and at 9.45 she was detached from the main fleet and ordered back through the San Bernardino Strait. This brought her into range of aircraft from the US 3rd Fleet and at around 9.45 she was attacked by SB2C dive-bombers and TBM torpedo bombers from TF 38. They only managed to score one near miss. A second attack early on 26 October managed three bomb hits, but the cruiser could still make 10kts. The Kumano managed to reach safety at Manila where she underwent repairs before leaving for Japan on 5 November. Her luck now turned - her convoy was attacked by four American submarines and the cruiser was hit twice. She remained afloat and reached Dasol Bay on the Luzon coast, but on 25 November she was sunk by American aircraft.
This first destroyer attack cost the Americans dearly. The Johnston was hit by three 14in and three 6in shells and the Hoel by shells that disabled her main engine. The Hoel remained in the fight until she was unable to move and at about 8.30 her crew abandoned ship.
A little further south the escort carriers came under fire from the Japanese battleships. Kalinin Bay and Gambier Bay were both hit but managed to main their position until the Gambier Bay was hit in the forward engine room. The destroyer Johnston attempted to distract attention from the stricken carrier but without success and the Gambier Bay sank at around 8.45am. The Johnston then managed to break up a light cruiser attack on the carriers, but in the process she became their main target and was sunk. Only 141 of her 327 crewmen survived.
The cruiser Chikuma was hit by a torpedo at around 8.54. It was a sign that Sprague's men were getting closer to help that this torpedo was probably launched by an aircraft from Admiral Felix B. Stump's Task Group 77.4.2. The engine rooms flooded, and the ship came to a halt. She was unable to respond when Kurita decided to withdraw from battle, and was left alone. She sank during the day with the loss of most of her crew. Another 100 were rescued by the destroyer Nowaki, but that ship was lost on the night of 25-26 October with the loss of all hands.
The cruiser Chokai was hit by 500lb bombs at around 9.05am. The bombs caused heavy fires and damaged the forward engine room. The cruiser came to a halt, and couldn't be rescued. At around 10.30 the crippled cruiser was sunk by a spread of torpedoes from the destroyer Fujinami.
By this time Kurita was rather losing his grip on the battle. The Yamato was some way behind his cruisers and visibility was poor. He wasn't aware of the damage to three of his cruisers, and had lost sight of the carriers. At 9.11, believing that he had won a major victory over a squadron of fleet carriers, Kurita ordered his surviving ships to withdraw from the battle.
At about 10.50 the cruiser Suzuya suffered a near miss that detonated the torpedoes in the starboard forward torpedo tubes. This set off a fire made worse when more of her torpedoes exploded at around 11.00. Damage control measures failed and at about 12 noon a series of ammunition explosions began. The ship was abandoned at 1pm and sank twenty minutes later.
Taffy 3's ordeal wasn't yet over. At 10.50, just as the Suzuya was being attacked, nine kamikaze aircraft attacked the task group, in one of the first organised suicide attacks of the war. Most were destroyed or missed, but one hit the escort carrier St Lô, triggering explosions that sank her. A second kamikaze attack twenty minutes later did more damage but failed to sink anything.
It took Kurita about two hours to regroup. He then turned south with his remaining fifteen ships in an attempt to reach Leyte Gulf, the original target of his operation. At 11.40 one of his lookouts reported sighting a battleship and destroyers. The fleet turned aside to chase this phantom before turning south again. At around 12.30, when only forty five miles from Leyte Gulf, Kurita decided that it wasn't worth risking the destruction of his fleet just to sink empty transport ships. He had also received reports that an American carrier task force had been sighted 113 miles north of the gulf, and he now decided to turn north to deal with this
In fact Halsey's carriers were still far to the north. All morning he had been receiving urgent calls for help, but had refused to turn back. In the resulting battle of Cape Engano Halsey sank all four of Ozawa's carriers. At around 11 he ordered one of his carrier groups to turn south, and his fourth carrier group, which was some way to the east, was also directed towards Kurita. This fourth task group was first to come into range and during the afternoon it launched two attacks on Kurita's fleet. After spending all afternoon looking for the American carriers Kurita retired to the eastern end of the San Bernardino Strait at 6pm. He was under orders to wait for dark and try and fight a night battle, but at 9.25, with fuel short, he decided to retreat west through the straits. He would suffer further air attack on 26 October, but the main fighting in Leyte Gulf was over.
Kurita has since been blamed for his decisions to withdraw from combat at 9.11 and to turn back from Leyte Gulf at 12.30. Both can be defended using the information available to Kurita at the time, but he later believed the second decision to have been a mistake. If Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf then his fleet would almost certainly have been destroyed - if not by Kinkaid's escort carriers and old battleships then by the 3rd Fleet. All he could have achieved was the destruction of empty transport ships, and perhaps a damaging bombardment of the US troops on Leyte, but neither would have altered the eventual course of the fighting in the Philippines.
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_samar.html... More
Description The Battle of Arawe was fought between Allied and Japanese forces during the New Britain Campaign of World War II. The battle formed part of the Allied Operation Cartwheel, and had the objective of seThe Battle of Arawe was fought between Allied and Japanese forces during the New Britain Campaign of World War II. The battle formed part of the Allied Operation Cartwheel, and had the objective of serving as a diversion before a larger landing at Cape Gloucester in late December 1943. The Japanese military was expecting an Allied offensive in western New Britain, and was reinforcing the region at the time of the Allied landing in the Arawe area on 15 December 1943. The Allies secured Arawe after about a month of intermittent fighting with the outnumbered Japanese force.
Initial Allied goals for the landing at Arawe included securing a base for American PT boats and diverting Japanese forces away from Cape Gloucester. The PT boat base was subsequently deemed unnecessary and was never built. Only a small Japanese force was stationed at Arawe at the time, although reinforcements were en route. The main Allied landing on 15 December was successful, despite a failed subsidiary landing and problems coordinating the landing craft. American forces quickly secured a beachhead and dug in. Japanese air units made large-scale raids against the Arawe area in the days after the landing, and in late December Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops unsuccessfully counterattacked the American force. In mid-January 1944 the American force, reinforced with additional infantry and tanks, launched a brief offensive that pushed the Japanese back. The Japanese units at Arawe withdrew from the area towards the end of February as part of a general retreat from western New Britain.
There is no consensus among historians on whether the Allied offensive at Arawe was necessary. While some have argued that the landing served as a useful diversion ahead of the Cape Gloucester operation, others believe that the entire campaign in western New Britain was unnecessary, and that the force employed at Arawe could have been better used elsewhere. ... More
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide