Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe aThe American Theater was a minor area of operations during World War II. This was mainly due to both North and South America's geographical separation from the central theaters of conflict in Europe and Asia. Thus, any threat by the Axis Powers to invade the mainland United States or other areas was considered negligible, allowing for American resources to be deployed in overseas theaters.
This article includes attacks on continental territory, extending 200 miles (320 km) into the ocean, which is today under the sovereignty of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and several other smaller states, but excludes military action involving the Danish territory of Greenland, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Aleutian Islands. The most well known battles in North America during World War II were the Attack on Pearl Harbor (the first attack on US soil since the Battle of Ambos Nogales), the Aleutian Islands Campaign, the Battle of the St. Lawrence, and the attacks on Newfoundland.... More
Memories How We Beat The Zero By Lieut. Comder. E. Scott McCuskey, USNR Flying Magazine September, 1944
(Note: THow We Beat The Zero By Lieut. Comder. E. Scott McCuskey, USNR Flying Magazine September, 1944
(Note: These words were from a combat pilot in 1944 and published in a popular American aviation magazine. Many of the terms and/or references may offend some e-budo members 56 years later.)
This story goes back to the day when the bad news of Pearl Harbor began to filter in over the radio of the old Yorktown. We heard that the Japs were hitting everywhere with their Zeros, and we tried toXevalXuate the fearsome reports of the unbelievable climb, speed, and fire- power of that mysterious airplane. We knew that our little lady, the Wildcat, was all we had. Before we started for the Pacific, plane crews worked day and night in Norfolk making the first installations of armor plate, self-sealing tanks, adding radio equipment and guns. Under the load, our poor little Wildcat lost much of her maneuverability, speed, and climb-the things for which she had been designed. However, we gained the protection that was to bring us back from many a battle.
Few fighters in the fleet realized that our planes weren't good enough to dogfight the Japs; the last we'd heard, the nips were far behind the times. Our tactics against fighters at the beginning of the war were built around individual combat and on the assumption of our superiority in this department. In training maneuvers we scored victories, technically, by turning inside our opponent and getting on his tail or by out-climbing him and pouncing down in a gunnery run, preferably from fore or aft. These tactics assumed the superiority of our own planes in turn, climb, and speed.
Moreover, such tactics assumed that we were better flyers and marksmen. This proved true, thank God! Unbelievably thorough drills on the gunnery sleeves, practicing deflection runs from every practical angle of fire- that?s how Lieut. Comdr. "Butch" O'Hare, Lieut. Comdr. "Swede" Vejtasa and some of the other high-score boys were able to cut down bombers the way they did.
They shot with deadly accuracy from wherever the enemy's free guns were blindest.
According to the "book" by which we got our early training, the fighting squadron had been organized around the three- lane section as a basic unit, maneuvering in six or nine-plane divisions. The three planes of the section flew in a V and one of the commonest formations was for the sections themselves to go into "V of V's"-the nine planes of the second section bringing up the rear to form double-header V, like a corporal's chevrons. On parade it was very very impressive.
For attack, six planes would string out in echelon, like half of a V of ducks. Fighter after fighter peeled off,, leader first, to dive on the enemy. From then on it was a matter of individual combat, each plane making a run on a plane in the enemy squadron until the fracas was over and all pilots in the division joined up on the leader again.
At the time the war began, some squadrons had gone over to the more flexible two-plane section, but there was still little conception of defensive teamwork as we know it now. The divisions usually flew as a string of four planes manipulated by the squadron leader. Their standard defensive tactic was for the leader to turn back and shoot any attacking fighter off the tail of the last plane in line the point where the enemy usually struck. This was a bit tough on "tail-end Charlie," we discovered in the Pacific. He had a way of not coming back.
Despite the combat reports we kept getting in the first few months of the war, most of us still believed that in a dog fight we could knock down anything the Japs brought out. We didn't really get the bad news until they jumped us in the Battle of the Coral Sea.
I got mixed up with three Zeros at Coral Sea. I was one of a pitifully small escort of four Wildcats conveying a squadron of torpedo planes in an attack on the Jap task force. Just as antiaircraft fire from the Jap ships began to rock our planes, I looked up to see three Zeros high above in 'perfect position to peel off and dive on one E. Scott McCuskey.
I turned into the first attacker as he dropped at me. But my slow Wildcat couldn't bring me about to face him, so I had to sit there and watch him open fire. A shock like electricity went through my body as his smoking tracers approached. How lazily they moved.
But the oncoming tracers began to drop astern; my attacker had underled me. Immediately, the second Zero came screaming at me but he, too, proved to be a poor marksman. At almost the same instant I saw the first Zero pull up in front of me in flames, shot down by a team-mate, Billy Woollen, as the Jap dived past me and pulled up for another attack. My second attacker made a tactical error of pulling up in front of me, and as he did I was able to bring my guns to bear: It was my first Zero!
In pulling up to shoot, I lost speed and the third Zero made a run on me. I rolled into a cloud and climbed for altitude. As I came out, I found the Zero and closed in on him for a shot, but he spotted me and pulled into a tight loop which I was unable to follow because of the superior maneuverability of his plane. So I ducked back into the cloud just as his tracer ripped my tail.
Coming out once more I nosed my Wildcat over and dived straight down to the water where I was safe from overhead runs, since my attacker would only have gone into the drink. Then I zig zagged rapidly from side to side to duck his tracer fire as he hung on my tail. Finally I reached a nearby rain squall.
My inglorious performance on this occasion illustrates the first step in the tactics we adopted against the Zeros. We simply dived away from them and ran away, taking advantage, of the one performance superiority of our planes, superior speed and control in a dive.
Low on gas, I had to take the nearest landing spot, which turned out to be the Lexington. When she was hit I couldn't fly off and had to abandon ship with her crew.
Soon I was back on the York bound for Pearl Harbor. There we got new planes and 18 of us in Fighting 42 joined forces with Fighting Three under Comdr. Jimmy Thach, to form a new Yorktown squadron.
At the Battle of Midway I had shot down three dive bombers and damaged three others when two of us broke the first wave of attackers, but four them fouled up the York's decks so she couldn't land us for gas and ammunition The whole situation brought home the need for more fighters, as well as planes with greater range and ammunition capacity. Ducking into clouds, diving and running, we ganged up in desperate little groups to fight our way back through the swarming Zeros. I had to land aboard the Enterprise. As plane after plane came back shot full of holes, punch-drunk and weary pilots stumbled into ready rooms and stood looking at each other in stunned silence.
The boys in all the air groups were pretty low. Though we'd turned back the Japs at Coral and again at Midway, we'd lost two carriers and a lot of airplanes. Torpedo Eight was gone and some' of the bombing squadrons were missing half their men. Moreover, in these two battles the fighters learned first hand that the Zeros could fly faster, out- climb and outmaneuver us.
After Midway, fighters all over the fleet went into huddles with their squadron leaders-such men as Comdr. Jimmy Flatley, Comdr. Jimmy Thach, and Comdr. Charles Fenton. We got our heads together on ways of bringing against the Zeros the best assets of our training and our planes.
The day of the dogfight was over for us because the Japs could run circles around us in single combat. Our first emergency defense was to dive for the water and "jink" away, skidding out of the path of the pursuers' tracer. But running away got tiresome; so we ganged up on them. In mass melees, we'd all stick together and buzz around "like bees in a bottle," to use the words of Comdr. Roy Simpler, formerly skipper of Fighting Five. We'd just swarm around, with every pilot getting the Zero on someone else's tail. If you got stuck with one, the idea was to swing around in front of another Wildcat so your pal could shoot -him off. It took plenty of self-control to let some Jap pepper away at your own tail while you went after the Zero on your wingman's tail.
This tactic was successful because the Zero couldn't take two seconds fire from a Wildcat while a Wildcat could take sometimes as high as 15 minutes fire from a Zero.
Our practice of swinging around in front of another plane when a Zero got on our tail was a natural step in the evolution of the maneuver known as the Thach Weave, one of the greatest contributions ever made to combat tactics. Based on the common experience of many squadrons, the weave was interpreted and crystallized as a tactic by Commander Thach after the Battle of Midway. He spread the gospel to the other squadrons and then went back to operational training headquarters to work out and teach a whole new system of fighter tactics.
So much for the defensive. On the offense, we always maneuvered for altitude, bearing down on the Japs in high speed runs, with our six .50-caliber machine guns. We hit and kept going, and then jockeyed into position for another run. We had the Japs with our marksman- ship, a product of 20 years of Navy stress on gunnery. Highly trained in deflection shooting, we did not have to depend, like the enemy, on a straight shot from fore or aft, but fired away from all angles abeam, leading our Nip targets like clay pigeons. Our little Wildcat, with her armor and leak-proof tanks, took everything the Japs could deal out and began to pile up a three to one ratio on the enemy.
It was apparent, however, that with the Wildcat we could fight only a defensive fight. Pilots were crying for a plane with more speed, climb and range- something that would take us out farther and carry a heavier load. Their plea was answered by the Hellcat and the Corsair, which embody the combined experience of flyers since Pearl Harbor. As a carrier-based pilot, I have been interested principally in the Hellcat, since this is the plane particularly adapted to carrier use.
While the Hellcat was in production, most of us who had been in Fighting 42 since Pearl Harbor were sent back to the states to pass on our experience to the new flyers so urgently needed. We had set up what I believe to be the high mark for planes shot down in those early days of the war, with a score of 54 Japs to only four of our own men. Seven of the Japs were mine, plus several assists and probables. Exhausted and jumpy from long combat duty, we boarded a ship for San Francisco, long overdue for a rest.
After a year of training Naval aviator at Jacksonville, Commander Co11ins invited me to join his squadron as tactic officer. Then began one of the stiffest workouts in my experience. At Norfolk during June, July and August, we poured on the heat from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.-seven days a week. Besides their previous flying as instructors, most of the new pilots in our squadron had over 200 hours in Hellcats before we ever hit the decks of our carrier. The Hellcat Squadron, as was called, shaped up rapidly into a polished combat machine.
Though it had the jump in flying experience, the squadron was to see mary more hundreds of hours in the air before it went out to combat, consisting for the most part of intensive gunnery training. Navy squadrons usually have around 4 hours of flying together before they hit combat and this extensive practice (of a squadron) is one secret of the fantastic combat ratios we are running up in the Pacific- ratios often as high as 10 to one but averaging more than four to one.
Having long since dropped the three-plane formation, our fighters now work in two-plane teams, the teammates flying abreast of each other to form a division of four.
To protect ourselves and the planes under escort from lurking Zeros, we fighters must keep a flawless lookout every minute we are in the air. Our present flight formation is very effective. Flying opposite each other, the lead and the wingman of each section watch in a semi-circle- each looking in the direction of the other- and there is no part of the surface, horizon or sky that is not under constant observation.
Though we fly the Hellcat and the Corsair, vastly superior to our old planes in speed, maneuverability and range, the backbone of our tactics is the same protective maneuver we developed in our Wildcats- the Thach Weave.
Simple in theory, the maneuver is difficult in practice and we really need those hundreds of hours of team practice to stick together continuously through long melee and maneuver violent enough to bring our guns to bear on the enemy without having his bear on us. If one plane in a section is shot down, the remaining plane flies as a section. If one section is lost, the remaining section splits and conducts the same tactics. Thus every man in the division must be able to act as a section leader.
So much for the defense. Going the offensive, the three primary jobs the fighters are:
1. Escorting bombers and torpedo planes. 2. Shooting down attacking bomber and torpedo planes. 3. Intercepting enemy fighters. 4. Strafing enemy ships and shore installations.
On escort, it is the unvarying duty the fighters to stay with their charges and not allow themselves to be draw off in mass dogfights with enemy interceptors during which other enemy planes might swoop down on their own bombers. When under enemy attack, the escorting fighter divisions weave back and forth over the bombers, the teams mutually protecting each other against attack from any quarter even though the enemy may have the altitude advantage.
Pilots are drilled endlessly on fundamental approaches, whether from overhead, aft, side, or below, but this is teamwork which makes these approaches count in the battle tally. Just as fighters work in teams on the defense, so they operate on the offence. The minimum team is two planes, although whole divisions team up under some circumstances.
?In modern aerial warfare,? says the Navy fighter manual, ?the lone eagle is a dead duck.?
The target of two-plane team is one enemy airplane. The two teammates gang up on the Zero and keep him under control until one or both fighters can shoot him out of the air. Larger units, such as the section or the division, may team up to attack an enemy formation; this is the usual routine when there is an enemy dive bomber squadron to be cut down. One unit feints while the other jabs, and the two vary their punches, always striking from the point of greatest vulnerability.
I?ve tried to give some idea of what teamwork really means to us in aerial combat.... More
Criteria The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.... The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor. MoreHide
Comments McCUSKEY, ELBERT SCOTT
(Second Award)
Synopsis:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting a Gold Star in lieu of a Second Award of the Navy Cross to Elbert Scott McCuskey, Lieutenan... McCUSKEY, ELBERT SCOTT
(Second Award)
Synopsis:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting a Gold Star in lieu of a Second Award of the Navy Cross to Elbert Scott McCuskey, Lieutenant, Junior Grade, U.S. Navy (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism in operations against the enemy while serving as Pilot of a carrier-based Navy Fighter Plane in Fighting Squadron THREE (VF-3), embarked from the U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CV-5), during the "Air Battle of Midway," against enemy Japanese forces on 4 June 1942. The outstanding courage and determined skill displayed by Lieutenant, Junior Grade, McCuskey were at all times inspiring and in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.... The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor. MoreHide
Comments The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Elbert Scott McCuskey, Lieutenant, Junior Grade, U.S. Navy (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism in operations against... The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Elbert Scott McCuskey, Lieutenant, Junior Grade, U.S. Navy (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism in operations against the enemy while serving as Pilot of a carrier-based Navy Fighter Plane in Fighting Squadron FORTY-TWO (VF-42), embarked from the U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CV-5), in action against the Japanese on 4 and 8 May 1942. On 4 May, in company with three other fighter planes forming the escort group for our own Torpedo Planes in an attack on Tulagi Harbor, Lieutenant, Junior Grade, McCuskey made a strafing attack on an enemy gunboat and destroyer, in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire and caused serious damage to both enemy vessels. On 8 May, as member of the fighter escort group protecting our own Torpedo Planes making an attack on an enemy carrier in the Coral Sea, he engaged enemy planes attempting to intercept our attack group and thus assisted materially in the success of our attack which resulted in sinking or severe damaging of the enemy carrier. On his return to our own force he encountered and destroyed an enemy Torpedo Plane. Throughout these engagements Lieutenant, Junior Grade, McCuskey showed courage and aggressiveness without regard for personal safety. His outstanding courage and determined skill were at all times inspiring and in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
Born: February 8, 1915 at Little Rock, Arkansas
Home Town: Stuttgart, Arkansas
Awards: 2@ Navy Crosses (WWII)
Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. MoreHide
Description The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought during 4–8 May 1942, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and naval and air forces from the United StaThe Battle of the Coral Sea, fought during 4–8 May 1942, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and naval and air forces from the United States and Australia. The battle was the first action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other, as well as the first in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon the other.
In an attempt to strengthen their defensive positioning for their empire in the South Pacific, Japanese forces decided to invade and occupy Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands. The plan to accomplish this, called Operation MO, involved several major units of Japan's Combined Fleet, including two fleet carriers and a light carrier to provide air cover for the invasion fleets, under the overall command of Japanese Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue. The US learned of the Japanese plan through signals intelligence and sent two United States Navy carrier task forces and a joint Australian-American cruiser force, under the overall command of American Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, to oppose the Japanese offensive.
On 3–4 May, Japanese forces successfully invaded and occupied Tulagi, although several of their supporting warships were surprised and sunk or damaged by aircraft from the US fleet carrier Yorktown. Now aware of the presence of US carriers in the area, the Japanese fleet carriers entered the Coral Sea with the intention of finding and destroying the Allied naval forces.
Beginning on 7 May, the carrier forces from the two sides exchanged airstrikes over two consecutive days. The first day, the US sank the Japanese light carrier Shoho, while the Japanese sank a US destroyer and heavily damaged a fleet oiler (which was later scuttled). The next day, the Japanese fleet carrier Shokaku was heavily damaged, the US fleet carrier Lexington was critically damaged (and was scuttled as a result), and the Yorktown was damaged. With both sides having suffered heavy losses in aircraft and carriers damaged or sunk, the two fleets disengaged and retired from the battle area. Because of the loss of carrier air cover, Inoue recalled the Port Moresby invasion fleet, intending to try again later.
Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk, the battle would prove to be a strategic victory for the Allies for several reasons. The battle marked the first time since the start of the war that a major Japanese advance had been checked by the Allies. More importantly, the Japanese fleet carriers Sokaku and Zuikaku – one damaged and the other with a depleted aircraft complement – were unable to participate in the Battle of Midway, which took place the following month, ensuring a rough parity in aircraft between the two adversaries and contributing significantly to the US victory in that battle. The severe losses in carriers at Midway prevented the Japanese from reattempting to invade Port Moresby from the ocean. Two months later, the Allies took advantage of Japan's resulting strategic vulnerability in the South Pacific and launched the Guadalcanal Campaign that, along with the New Guinea Campaign, eventually broke Japanese defenses in the South Pacific and was a significant contributing factor to Japan's ultimate defeat in World War II.... More
Description The Battle of Midway in the Pacific Theater of Operations was one of the most important naval battles of World War II. Between 4 and 7 June 1942, only six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, The Battle of Midway in the Pacific Theater of Operations was one of the most important naval battles of World War II. Between 4 and 7 June 1942, only six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the United States Navy (USN), under Admirals Chester W. Nimitz, Frank Jack Fletcher, and Raymond A. Spruance decisively defeated an attack by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chuichi Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondo on Midway Atoll, inflicting irreparable damage on the Japanese fleet. Military historian John Keegan called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare." It was Japan's first naval defeat since the Battle of Shimonoseki Straits in 1863.
The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War and thus ensure Japanese dominance in the Pacific.
The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' aircraft carriers into a trap. The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo. This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself.
The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions.Most significantly, American codebreakers were able to determine the date and location of the attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to set up an ambush of its own. Four Japanese aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu, all part of the six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlier—and a heavy cruiser were sunk at a cost of one American aircraft carrier and a destroyer. After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's shipbuilding and pilot training programs were unable to keep pace in replacing their losses, while the U.S. steadily increased its output in both areas.... More
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
