Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also called the Battles for Leyte Gulf, and formerly known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, is generally considered to be the largest naval battle of World War II and, by some criteria, possibly the largest naval battle in history.
It was fought in waters near the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar and Luzon from 23–26 October 1944, between combined US and Australian forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy. On 20 October, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia, and in particular depriving its forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied invasion, but was repulsed by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets. The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never afterwards sailed to battle in comparable force. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of fuel, remained in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four separate engagements between the opposing forces: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
It was the first battle in which Japanese aircraft carried out organized kamikaze attacks. By the time of the battle, Japan had fewer aircraft than the Allied forces had sea vessels, demonstrating the difference in power of the two sides at this point of the war. ... More
Description On December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landinOn December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On January 9, 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles (64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on February 3, 1945, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry Regiment (organized as infantry) passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On February 16, paratroopers and amphibious units simultaneously assaulted the islet of Corregidor. It was necessary to take this stronghold because troops there can block the entrance of Manila Bay. The Americans needed to establish a major harbor base at Manila Bay to support the expected invasion of Japan, planned to begin on November 1, 1945. Resistance on Corregidor ended on February 27, and then all resistance by the Japanese Empire ceased on August 15, 1945, obviating the need for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands.
Despite initial optimism, fighting in Manila was harsh. It took until March 3 to clear the city of all Japanese troops, and the Japanese Marines, who fought on stubbornly and refused to either surrender or to evacuate as the Japanese Army had done. Fort Drum, a fortified island in Manila Bay near Corregidor, held out until 13 April, when a team of Army troops went ashore and pumped 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into the fort, then set off incendiary charges. No Japanese soldiers in Fort Drum survived the blast and fire.
In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest American campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France.... More
Criteria The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.... The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor. MoreHide
Comments Citation:
The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Radcliffe R. Denniston, Jr. (0-077788), Lieutenant, Junior Grade, U.S. Navy, for extraordinary he... Citation:
The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Radcliffe R. Denniston, Jr. (0-077788), Lieutenant, Junior Grade, U.S. Navy, for extraordinary heroism in operations against the enemy while serving as Pilot of a carrier-based Navy Torpedo Plane in Torpedo Squadron FIVE (VT-5), embarked from the U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CV-5), in action against enemy Japanese forces at Tulagi Harbor on 4 May 1942, and in the Battle of the Coral Sea on 7 and 8 May 1942. These attacks, vigorously and persistently pressed home in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire, and on 8 May opposed also by enemy fighters, resulted in the sinking or damaging of at least eight enemy Japanese vessels at Tulagi and the sinking of one carrier and the sinking or severe damaging of another in the Coral Sea. Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Denniston's conscientious devotion to duty and gallant self-command against formidable odds were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
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Criteria The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. ... The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. The performance must merit recognition by individuals in a key position which was performed in a clearly exceptional manner. MoreHide
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description Two carrier task forces (Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey and Rear Adm. F. J. Fletcher) and a bombardment group (Rear Adm. R. A. Spruance), totaling 2 aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers, and 10 destroyers, attack KwTwo carrier task forces (Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey and Rear Adm. F. J. Fletcher) and a bombardment group (Rear Adm. R. A. Spruance), totaling 2 aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers, and 10 destroyers, attack Kwajalein, Wotje, Maloelap, Jaluit, and Mili in the Marshall Islands and Makin, Gilbert Islands. United States naval vessels damaged: Carrier ENTERPRISE (CV-6), by suicide bomber, Marshall- Gilberts raid, Heavy cruiser CHESTER (CA-27), by dive bomber, Marshall- Gilberts raid,
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Memories Having safely covered that troop movement, Yorktown, in company with sister ship Enterprise, departeHaving safely covered that troop movement, Yorktown, in company with sister ship Enterprise, departed Samoan waters on 25 January. Six days later, TF8 (built around Enterprise), and TF17 (around Yorktown) parted company. The former headed for the Marshall Islands, the latter for the Gilberts, each to take part in some of the first American offensives of the war, the Marshalls-Gilberts raids. ... More
Description Lexington and Yorktown strike the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua
As Lexington and Yorktown, screened by a powerful force of eight cruisers (including HMAS Australia) and fourteen destroyers, steamed acLexington and Yorktown strike the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua
As Lexington and Yorktown, screened by a powerful force of eight cruisers (including HMAS Australia) and fourteen destroyers, steamed across the Coral Sea toward New Guinea, Vice Admiral Brown received word of the Japanese landings at Lae and Salamaua. This was welcome news, and caused an immediate cancellation of the plan to strike at Rabaul and Gasmata. The Allied task force could now strike the Japanese when they were most vulnerable - engaged in unloading their transports at the beachheads.
The first hurdle facing Admiral Brown was how to avoid early detection of his task force by vigilant Japanese patrol planes of the kind that had defeated his attempt to strike Rabaul in February. The most direct route across the Solomon Sea and up the north-eastern coast of the New Guinea mainland posed a real risk of early detection by Japanese patrol planes flying from airfields on the island of New Britain.
Vice Admiral Brown resolved that TF-11 would mount its attack on the Japanese beachheads from the Gulf of Papua on the southern side of the New Guinea mainland. Although the actual flying distance was not great, this route would require the carrier attack groups to cross the towering central mountain feature of New Guinea - the rugged Owen Stanley Range. The many ridges of this range were cloaked by dense rain forest and often obscured by cloud or mist. Experienced New Guinea pilots regularly flew from Port Moresby to Lae by a carefully defined route. They took care to avoid being trapped in the mountains when cloud closed in.
Naval charts offered little guidance to the American pilots who were about to cross the Owen Stanleys, and the vital guidance needed to cross the massive range was ultimately provided to Commander William B. Ault, Lexington's air group commander, on 9 March by experienced Australian civilian pilots at Port Moresby. Vice Admiral Brown fixed the raid for the following day. To cover his flank to the east and the arrival of the American troop convoy at Noumea, Brown dispatched Rear Admiral Crace with four cruisers and four destroyers to the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern tip of New Guinea.
To cover their landings at Lae and Salamaua, the Japanese had bombed the Australian military airstrips at Port Moresby, Bulolo, and Wau. They met no Allied fighter opposition. Their long-range Kawanishi H6K flying boats had patrolled the Solomon Sea and Coral Sea intensively for American carriers, and had found nothing. They believed that they had nothing to fear from Allied aircraft, and had grown complacent. Admiral Brown's ruse had succeeded beyond his wildest expectations.
In the pre-dawn darkness of 10 March, as the two carrier task forces stood off the southern coast of Papua, Yorktown and Lexington went to general quarters. Lexington began launching her air group at 0749. Yorktown began launching her own air group at 0803. Both carriers launched fifty-two aircraft. By 0849, all aircraft were on their way with Commander Ault from Lexington in overall command, and having authority to proceed or abort the strike.
Lexington's attack group comprised eighteen Dauntless SBDs of VS-2, twelve Dauntless SBDs of VB-2, thirteen Devastator TBD torpedo bombers of VT-2, and an escort of eight Grumman Wildcat F4F fighters of VF-3 led by Lieutenant Commander John "Jimmy" Thatch.
Yorktown's attack group followed, and comprised seventeen SBDs of VB-5, thirteen SBDs of VS-5, twelve TBDs of VT-5, and ten F4F fighters of VF- 42.
While the strike was under way, the task force was protected in the Gulf of Papua by a combat air patrol of twelve fighters and nine SBDs flying an anti-torpedo patrol.
Having reached the vital gap in the range that gave access to the northern coast, Commander Ault circled to oversee and coordinate the passage of both air groups.
VS-2 from Lexington initiated the strike at Lae. The SBDs pushed over at 0922 and attacked two Japanese transports and an armed merchant cruiser. Fire from a shore battery downed one SBD, but escorting F4F Wildcats of VF-3 quickly put the battery out of action. Lexington's VB-2 followed VS-2 and attacked a mine-layer and third transport. Hampered by fogged windshields and telescopic sights, all SBD bombs missed their targets. Off Salamaua, three torpedo bombers from VT-2 had one success. A torpedo hit a Japanese transport which began to sink. The remaining torpedo bombers from Lexington attacked the transports off Lae, and holed one transport and the armed merchant cruiser. The escorting Japanese cruisers and destroyers weighed anchor, made smoke to provide cover, and headed for open water.
Yorktown's air group then took its turn at 0950. The SBDs of VB-5 concentrated on the fleeing Japanese escort cruisers and destroyers. One division from VB-5 attacked Rear Admiral Kajioka's flagship Yubari and claimed three hits on the cruiser. Another division from VB-5 attacked the destroyer Asanagi and knocked out her boilers. A bomb hit the destroyer Yunagi and damaged her engines. The SBDs from VB-5 then strafed a Japanese gunboat, and set it on fire.
At 1005, the SBDs of VS-5 struck the relatively unscathed transports at Lae. The Yorktown SBDs scored direct hits on three transports, leaving all three on fire and beached.
The twelve TBDs of Yorktown's VT-5, each armed with two 500-pound bombs came upon the seaplane carrier Kiyokawa Maru and an escort destroyer just north of Lae. The TBDs had been armed with bombs instead of torpedoes for this operation, and lacking experience in high level bombing, the air crews failed to score a direct hit on either ship. However, a near miss damaged the seaplane carrier, allowed water to enter the engine room, and left her dead in the water.
The Wildcats of VF-42 strafed ships and shore installations, drew fire away from the dive bombers, and dropped fragmentation bombs.
When the last of the attack group left the Japanese beachheads, the score was three transports on fire and beached at Lae, a seaplane tender damaged and dead in the water, the light cruiser Yubari damaged sufficiently to require dockyard repairs in Japan, two destroyers damaged and stopped in the water, one transport listing heavily and another sunk off Salamaua. The final score was four transports sunk. One American SBD was lost in the raids on Lae and Salamaua. The approach from the Gulf of Papua had provided security for the task force and ensured complete surprise. Japanese Zero fighters arrived over the beachheads from New Britain too late to protect their ships and shore installations.
Of the 104 aircraft launched by Lexington and Yorktown, 103 planes were back safely on board by noon. The raid on Lae and Salamaua provided many of the pilots with their first experience of action against warships and ground targets defended by anti-aircraft fire, and although the torpedo and bombing accuracy of some squadrons left a good deal to be desired, the raid gave the fliers valuable experience for later major actions at Coral Sea and Midway.
Although Rear Admiral Fletcher urged a second strike, Vice Admiral Brown considered that the strike had been highly successful and that it was time to withdraw. Task Force 11 retired on a south-easterly course until dark, when the ships turned eastward and joined Rear Admiral Crace's squadron of four heavy cruisers and four destroyers.
The Lae-Salamaua Raid in retrospect
Admiral Nimitz did not award the Lae-Salamaua raid the same high praise that he had lavished on the Marshall-Gilbert raid. Nimitz was disappointed that the attacks on Lae and Salamaua had failed to dislodge the Japanese from their beachheads on the New Guinea mainland. President Roosevelt did not share Nimitz's reservations, describing the Lae-Salamaua raid to Winston Churchill as "the best day's work we have had."
President Roosevelt's assessment of the Lae-Salamaua raid turned out to be the correct one. The raid produced deep alarm in Tokyo, especially at Navy General Headquarters where it was becoming apparent that the carriers of the US Pacific Fleet could punch holes in Japan's eastern and southern defensive perimeter at will and with impunity.
The American carrier raids in the first three months of 1942 were causing deep concern to Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet. He was particularly concerned by Vice Admiral Halsey's raids on Wake Island and Minami-tori Island (also known as Marcus Island). Minami-tori Island was only 700 miles (1,125km) from Japan, and Yamamoto feared that the American carriers had the capability to raid Tokyo. An American air raid on Tokyo was something that Japan's military leaders had assured their emperor could never happen. To ensure this did not happen, officers of the Combined Fleet began to plan a complex operation to destroy the American Pacific Fleet at Midway in the central Pacific.
For the Navy General Staff in Tokyo, the Lae-Salamaua raid reinforced its view that Japan's main strategic priority in the Pacific should be to cut the lines of communication between Australia and the United States. That plan had been assigned the code reference Operation FS, and involved Japan capturing and fortifying the chain of islands between New Guinea and Samoa. The Lae-Salamaua raid had demonstrated the urgent need for Japan to capture Port Moresby in the Australian Territory of Papua and Tulagi in the British Solomons as quickly as possible. On 15 March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters agreed that Operation FS was to be Japan's strategic priority in the Pacific and would commence with the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi. This initial operation was asigned the code reference MO.
In retrospect, it can be seen that the Lae-Salamaua raid was of vital importance to the Allies for a number of reasons. It was a severe blow to Japan's plan to isolate Australia from the United States as quickly as possible, because the Japanese had intended to use the sunk and damaged transports as part of the invasion force to capture Port Moresby and Tulagi in April 1942. The Japanese were forced to postpone the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi for one month to replace the sunk and damaged ships, and because they realised that these operations would require support from their own aircraft carriers. In this way, the Lae-Salamaua Raid set the stage for the Battle of the Coral Sea.
The Lae-Salamaua Raid also laid the foundations for Allied victories later in 1942 at Guadalcanal and Kokoda. By delaying for one month the capture of Tulagi, the establishment of a Japanese forward airstrip on the northern coast of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands was also delayed. The delay in establishing that airstrip on Guadalcanal provided the Americans with more time to prepare a landing force to capture the airstrip that later became famous as Henderson Field. Even so, the Americans barely made it in time. When the Americans landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, the Japanese were ready to bring this forward airstrip into operation. If the Americans had not seized that strategically vital Japanese airstrip when they did, the Guadalcanal operation could not have proceeded as it did, and would almost certainly have been deferred to much later, probably 1943.
The Guadalcanal Campaign had a direct impact on the equally bloody fighting between the Japanese and Australians on the Kokoda Track. The Japanese outnumbered the Australians by five to one, and had pushed them back to a ridge overlooking Port Moresby. Here the Australians dug in to make a final stand. Major General Horii's starving and exhausted South Seas Detachment on the Kokoda Track was in sight of Port Moresby and begging for reinforcements for the final push to capture the vital Allied base. Because of heavy Japanese losses at Guadalcanal, Major General Horii was denied reinforcements and he was forced to retreat to his beachheads with the Australians in hot pursuit.... More
Memories Yorktown accordingly set course northward at 27 knots (31 mph; 50 km/h). By daybreak on 4 May, she wYorktown accordingly set course northward at 27 knots (31 mph; 50 km/h). By daybreak on 4 May, she was within striking distance of the newly established Japanese beachhead and launched her first strike at 0701-18 F4F-3's of VF-42, 12 TBD's of VT-5, and 28 SBD's from VS and BY-5. Yorktown's air group made three consecutive attacks on enemy ships and shore installations at Tulagi and Gavutu on the south coast of Florida Island in the Solomons. Expending 22 torpedoes and 76 1,000 pound bombs in the three attacks, Yorktown's planes sank the destroyer Kikuzuki, three minecraft and four barges. In addition, Air Group 5 destroyed five enemy seaplanes, all at the cost of two F4F's lost (the pilots were recovered) and one TBD (whose crew was lost). ... More
Description The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought during 4–8 May 1942, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and naval and air forces from the United StaThe Battle of the Coral Sea, fought during 4–8 May 1942, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and naval and air forces from the United States and Australia. The battle was the first action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other, as well as the first in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon the other.
In an attempt to strengthen their defensive positioning for their empire in the South Pacific, Japanese forces decided to invade and occupy Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands. The plan to accomplish this, called Operation MO, involved several major units of Japan's Combined Fleet, including two fleet carriers and a light carrier to provide air cover for the invasion fleets, under the overall command of Japanese Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue. The US learned of the Japanese plan through signals intelligence and sent two United States Navy carrier task forces and a joint Australian-American cruiser force, under the overall command of American Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, to oppose the Japanese offensive.
On 3–4 May, Japanese forces successfully invaded and occupied Tulagi, although several of their supporting warships were surprised and sunk or damaged by aircraft from the US fleet carrier Yorktown. Now aware of the presence of US carriers in the area, the Japanese fleet carriers entered the Coral Sea with the intention of finding and destroying the Allied naval forces.
Beginning on 7 May, the carrier forces from the two sides exchanged airstrikes over two consecutive days. The first day, the US sank the Japanese light carrier Shoho, while the Japanese sank a US destroyer and heavily damaged a fleet oiler (which was later scuttled). The next day, the Japanese fleet carrier Shokaku was heavily damaged, the US fleet carrier Lexington was critically damaged (and was scuttled as a result), and the Yorktown was damaged. With both sides having suffered heavy losses in aircraft and carriers damaged or sunk, the two fleets disengaged and retired from the battle area. Because of the loss of carrier air cover, Inoue recalled the Port Moresby invasion fleet, intending to try again later.
Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk, the battle would prove to be a strategic victory for the Allies for several reasons. The battle marked the first time since the start of the war that a major Japanese advance had been checked by the Allies. More importantly, the Japanese fleet carriers Sokaku and Zuikaku – one damaged and the other with a depleted aircraft complement – were unable to participate in the Battle of Midway, which took place the following month, ensuring a rough parity in aircraft between the two adversaries and contributing significantly to the US victory in that battle. The severe losses in carriers at Midway prevented the Japanese from reattempting to invade Port Moresby from the ocean. Two months later, the Allies took advantage of Japan's resulting strategic vulnerability in the South Pacific and launched the Guadalcanal Campaign that, along with the New Guinea Campaign, eventually broke Japanese defenses in the South Pacific and was a significant contributing factor to Japan's ultimate defeat in World War II.... More
Memories On the morning of 6 May, Fletcher gathered all Allied forces under his tactical command as TF17. At On the morning of 6 May, Fletcher gathered all Allied forces under his tactical command as TF17. At daybreak on the 7th, he dispatched Crace, with the cruisers and destroyers under his command, toward the Louisiade archipelago to intercept any enemy attempt to move toward Port Moresby.
While Fletcher moved north with his two flattops and their screens in search of the enemy, Japanese search planes located the oiler USS Neosho (AO-23) and her escort, USS Sims (DD-409) and misidentified the former as a carrier. Two waves of Japanese planes â?? first high level bombers and then dive bombers â?? attacked the two ships. Sims, her antiaircraft battery crippled by gun failures, took three direct hits and sank quickly with a heavy loss of life. Neosho was more fortunate in that, even after seven direct hits and eight near-misses, she remained afloat until, on the 11th, her survivors were picked up by USS Henley (DD-391) and her hulk sunk by the rescuing destroyer. ... More
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Commanding Officer; assumed command on 25 Sep 43