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The USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) was a Casablanca class escort carrier of the United States Navy. Named for Gambier Bay on Admiralty Island in Southeast Alaska, she was originally classified AVG-73, was reclassified ACV-73 on 20 August 1942 and again reclassified CVE-73 on 15 July 1943; launched under a Maritime Commission Contract by the Kaiser Shipbuilding Company, Vancouver, Washington, 22 November 1943; sponsored by Mrs. H. C. Zitzewitz of Oswego, Oreg.; and commissioned at Astoria, Oregon, 28 December 1943, Captain Hugh H. Goodwin in command. The ship was informally referred to as Kaiser's "Bonus Baby" because she was built in a record 171 days. Early career After shakedown out of San Diego, the escort carrier sailed 7 February 1944 with 400 troops embarked for Pearl Harbor, thence to rendezvous off the Marshalls, guarded by the USS Norman Scott (DD-690), where she flew 84 replacement planes to the carrier Enterprise (CV-6). She returned to San Diego via Pearl Harbor, ferrying aircraft for repairs and qualified carrier pilots off the coast of Southern California. She departed 1 May to join Rear Admiral H. B. Sallada?s Carrier Support Group 2 (TG 52.11), staging in the Marshalls for the invasion of the Marianas. Gambier Bay gave close air support to the initial landings of Marines on Saipan 15 June 1944, destroying enemy gun emplacements, troops, tanks, and trucks. On the 17th her combat air patrol shot down or turned back all but a handful of 47 enemy planes headed for her task group and her gunners shot down 2 of the 3 planes that did break through to attack her. The following day, warning of another air attack sounded. As her fighters prepared to take off, they found intense antiaircraft fire of the entire task group covering their flight path. Captain Goodwin called the event "another shining example of the adaptability and courage of the young men of our country." Eight pilots of Composite Squadron 10 did take off to help repulse the aerial attack. Gambier Bay remained off Saipan, repulsing aerial raids and launching planes which strafed enemy troop concentrations, bombed gun emplacements, and supported marines and soldiers fighting ashore. Meanwhile, American carriers slashed the carrier air strength of the combined Japanese Mobile Fleet and turned it back in defeat in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Gambier Bay continued close ground support operations at Tinian (19 July?31 July), then turned her attention to Guam, where she gave identical aid to invading troops until 11 August. Invasion of the Philippines After a respite for logistics in the Marshalls, Gambier Bay spent 15 September to 28 September supporting the amphibious attack which drove ashore and captured Peleliu and Angaur, Southern Palaus. She then steamed by way of Hollandia (currently known as Jayapura), New Guinea, to Manus, Admiralties, where the invasion of the Philippines was staged. Screened by four destroyer escorts, Gambier Bay and Kitkun Bay (CVE-71) escorted transports and amphibious landing ships safely to Leyte Gulf before joining Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague's escort carrier task unit 19 September off Leyte. The task unit comprised six escort carriers, screened by three destroyers and four destroyer escorts, and was known by its voice radio call as "Taffy 3." Under the command of Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague, eighteen escort carriers, divided into three "Taffy" units, maintained air supremacy over Leyte Gulf and eastern Leyte. During the invasion their planes destroyed enemy airfields, supply convoys, and troop concentrations; gave troops driving inland vital close air support; and maintained combat air patrol over ships in Leyte Gulf. While "Taffy 1" and "Taffy 2" were respectively stationed off northern Mindanao and off the entrance to Leyte Gulf, "Taffy 3" steamed off Samar. Meanwhile, the Japanese threw their entire fleet against American naval power in a desperate gamble to destroy the large concentration of American shipping in Leyte Gulf. Powerful enemy forces, comprised of carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, converged on the Philippines in a three pronged attack to the south, center, and north. The Japanese Southern Force met disaster before dawn 25 October as it tried to drive through Surigao Strait to join the Center Force off Leyte Gulf. While steaming through the Sibuyan Sea en route to San Bernardino Strait, the Center Force was hit hard on the 24th by hundreds of planes from Admiral Halsey's fast attack carriers. After the Battle of Sibuyan Sea, Admiral Halsey no longer considered the Center Force a serious menace, and he sent the carriers north to intercept decoy carriers of the Japanese Northern Force off Cape Engano. Battle off Samar These swift moving events left the escort carriers of "Taffy 3" as lone sentinels off Samar, and unaware of the nighttime movement of the Center Force. However, shortly after sunrise 25 October, a gap in the morning mist disclosed the pagoda-like masts of enemy battleships and cruisers on the northern horizon. The still dangerous enemy force of more than 20 ships had slipped undetected through San Bernardino Strait and down the fog-shrouded coast of Samar, bound for Leyte Gulf. Despite the probable outcome of an engagement between two so unequal surface forces, the presence of enemy ships in Leyte Gulf was unthinkable; and "Taffy 3" turned to do battle against the enemy. Immediately, an urgent call for help went out from "Taffy 3" as the escort carriers steamed eastward and launched planes that tried to score hits with torpedoes, bombs, and strafe until their ammunition ran out, then make dummy runs to break the enemy formation and delay its advance. Smoke was laid down to cover their running fight as the destroyers ducked in and out of the mist and smoke to charge battleship, cruiser, and destroyer formations point-blank until ordered back to cover the escort carriers with more smoke. The lone 5 inch gun of Gambier Bay spat out at an enemy cruiser that was shelling her; and destroyer Heerman (DD-532) made an unsuccessful effort under the combined fire of the heavy enemy ships to save Gambier Bay. Gambier Bay was soon dead in the water as three cruisers closed to point blank range. Fires raged through the riddled escort carrier. She capsized and sank at 0907 on 25 October 1944 with the majority of her nearly 800 survivors rescued by landing and patrol craft dispatched from Leyte Gulf. Three other ships, fighting to the end, went down: Hoel (DD-533) ; Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) ; and Johnston (DD-557). The latter used only her 5 inch guns in a dummy torpedo run that thwarted the torpedo attack of an entire Japanese Destroyer Squadron led by a cruiser. Aircraft from "Taffy 2" joined in the epic battle off Samar. The events that followed were described by Admiral Sprague: "At 0925 my mind was occupied with dodging torpedoes when near the bridge I heard one of the signalmen yell 'They're getting away!' I could hardly believe my eyes, but it looked as if the whole Japanese fleet was indeed retiring. However, it took a whole series of reports from circling planes to convince me. And still I could not get the fact to soak into my battle-numbed brain. At best, I had expected to be swimming by this time." Gambier Bay and other ships of "Taffy 3," aided by planes of "Taffy 2," had stopped the powerful Japanese Center Force and inflicted a great loss. Two enemy cruisers were sunk, much damage inflicted on the other ships, and this overwhelmingly powerful surface fleet was turned back by the escort carriers and their screen of destroyers and destroyer-escorts. Gambier Bay received four battle stars for service in World War II and shared in the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to "Taffy 3" for extraordinary heroism in the Battle off Samar.
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. MoreHide
Comments "For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. Silhouetted against the dawn as the Central Japanese Force... "For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. Silhouetted against the dawn as the Central Japanese Force steamed through San Bernardino Strait towards Leyte Gulf, Task Unit 77.4.3 was suddenly taken under attack by hostile cruisers on its port hand, destroyers on the starboard and battleships from the rear. Quickly laying down a heavy smoke screen, the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy, swiftly launching and rearming aircraft and violently zigzagging in protection of vessels stricken by hostile armor-piercing shells, anti-personnel projectiles and suicide bombers. With one carrier of the group sunk, others badly damaged and squadron aircraft courageously coordinating in the attacks by making dry runs over the enemy Fleet as the Japanese relentlessly closed in for the kill, two of the Unit's valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy's heavy shells as a climax to two and one half hours of sustained and furious combat. The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service." MoreHide
Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be m... The Philippine Liberation Medal was awarded for service in the liberation of the Philippines from October 17, 1944, to September 2, 1945. In order to qualify, one of the following provisions must be met: Participation in the initial landing operation of Leyte and adjoining islands from October 7-20, 1944; or, Participation in any engagement against the enemy during the Philippine Liberation Campaign; or, Service in the Philippine Islands or in ships in Philippine wates for not less than 30 days during the period of October 17, 1944 to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Criteria The Philippine Presidential Unit Citation is a unit decoration of the Republic of the Philippines. It has been awarded to certain units of the United States military for actions both during and subseq... The Philippine Presidential Unit Citation is a unit decoration of the Republic of the Philippines. It has been awarded to certain units of the United States military for actions both during and subsequent to the Second World War. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Samar (25 October 1944) was the nearest the Japanese came to success during the battle of Leyte Gulf and saw a powerful Japanese battleship force come close to destroying a force of AmerThe Battle of Samar (25 October 1944) was the nearest the Japanese came to success during the battle of Leyte Gulf and saw a powerful Japanese battleship force come close to destroying a force of American escort carriers.
The Japanese realised that an American invasion of the Philippines or of Formosa would cut their Empire in half and prevent vital supplies reaching the Home Islands from the south part of the empire. They decided to try and fight the 'decisive battle' of the war wherever the Americans attacked next. If the Americans attacked the Philippines then the Japanese hoped to use the scattered elements of their fleet in a coordinated attack that might allow them to get at the vulnerable invasion fleet. In the final version of the plan Admiral Ozawa's carriers, coming from Japan, were to drag the US 3rd Fleet away from the invasion beaches in Leyte Gulf, allowing three other Japanese fleets to advance through the central Philippines to attack the invasion fleets.
The most important of these three fleets was Admiral Kurita's I Striking Force. Admiral Kurita began the battle of Leyte Gulf with a powerful fleet, containing five battleships, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Amongst the battleships were the Musashi and the Yamato, the biggest and most powerful battleships in the world. He also had the older battleships Kongo, Haruna and Nagato, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers. This force suffered grievous losses before reaching Samar. In the two day battle of the Sibuyan Sea (23-24 October 1944) the Musashi was sunk by American aircraft, two cruisers were sunk by two American subs and a third crippled. Kurita started the battle of Samar with four battleships, six cruisers and ten destroyers.
On the American side the bulk of the battle was fought by Admiral Sprague's Taffy Three, with six escort carriers, three destroyers and four destroyer escorts. The escort carriers carried modern aircraft, but these were armed for ground attack and so didn't have many of the armour piercing bombs needed against battleships. Twelve more escort carriers in two groups were in the area, but the 7th Fleet's six old battleships were away to the south defending the Surigao Strait. The powerful modern carriers and fast battleships of the 3rd Fleet had been lured away to the north to try and intercept Ozawa's carriers (Battle of Cape Engano). Admiral Kinkaid, commander of the 7th Fleet, believed that Halsey had left a powerful task force (Task Force 34, Admiral Lee) to watch Kurita, but in fact this force had accompanied the 3rd Fleet north.
On the night of 24-25 October Kurita passed through the San Bernardino Straits, turned south and headed for Leyte Gulf. Soon after this, at about 5.30, he learnt that Admiral Nishimura's force had been destroyed and Admiral Shima was retreating (battle of the Surigao Strait). He probably never received the messages Ozawa sent out announcing that the 3rd Fleet was chasing him. Kurita could justifiably believe that the main parts of both the US 3rd and 7th Fleets were somewhere in or close to Leyte Gulf.
At about dawn (6.30) Kurita found Admiral Sprague's Taffy 3, a task force made up of six escort carriers and seven escorts. Kurita believed that he had found a 'gigantic enemy task force' containing large carriers, cruisers, destroyers and possibly battleships. He decided to abandon the charge into Leyte Gulf and turned to attack Sprague's force. At 6.58 the Yamato's main guns opened fire on a surface target for the first time.
Sprague realised that he was in trouble. At 7.01 he issued a call for help in the clear, ordered his aircraft into the air and headed for a nearby rain squall. Under cover of the rain he decided to try and reach the support of Taffy 2, thirty miles to the south. His destroyers were ordered to attack the Japanese fleet while the carriers made their best speed south.
Sprague's aircraft had a limited potential to do serious damage to the Japanese battleships. The escort carriers didn't have enough storage space to carry both fragmentation bombs for ground support and a significant number of armour piercing bombs. The Japanese had no way to know that, and the American aircraft were able to force the Japanese heavy ships into frantic manoeuvres, slowing their pursuit of the carriers. The torpedo firing destroyers were equally effective.
Just after 7.20am the cruiser Kumano was hit by a torpedo from the US destroyer Johnston DD-557. Her speed was reduced, and at 9.45 she was detached from the main fleet and ordered back through the San Bernardino Strait. This brought her into range of aircraft from the US 3rd Fleet and at around 9.45 she was attacked by SB2C dive-bombers and TBM torpedo bombers from TF 38. They only managed to score one near miss. A second attack early on 26 October managed three bomb hits, but the cruiser could still make 10kts. The Kumano managed to reach safety at Manila where she underwent repairs before leaving for Japan on 5 November. Her luck now turned - her convoy was attacked by four American submarines and the cruiser was hit twice. She remained afloat and reached Dasol Bay on the Luzon coast, but on 25 November she was sunk by American aircraft.
This first destroyer attack cost the Americans dearly. The Johnston was hit by three 14in and three 6in shells and the Hoel by shells that disabled her main engine. The Hoel remained in the fight until she was unable to move and at about 8.30 her crew abandoned ship.
A little further south the escort carriers came under fire from the Japanese battleships. Kalinin Bay and Gambier Bay were both hit but managed to main their position until the Gambier Bay was hit in the forward engine room. The destroyer Johnston attempted to distract attention from the stricken carrier but without success and the Gambier Bay sank at around 8.45am. The Johnston then managed to break up a light cruiser attack on the carriers, but in the process she became their main target and was sunk. Only 141 of her 327 crewmen survived.
The cruiser Chikuma was hit by a torpedo at around 8.54. It was a sign that Sprague's men were getting closer to help that this torpedo was probably launched by an aircraft from Admiral Felix B. Stump's Task Group 77.4.2. The engine rooms flooded, and the ship came to a halt. She was unable to respond when Kurita decided to withdraw from battle, and was left alone. She sank during the day with the loss of most of her crew. Another 100 were rescued by the destroyer Nowaki, but that ship was lost on the night of 25-26 October with the loss of all hands.
The cruiser Chokai was hit by 500lb bombs at around 9.05am. The bombs caused heavy fires and damaged the forward engine room. The cruiser came to a halt, and couldn't be rescued. At around 10.30 the crippled cruiser was sunk by a spread of torpedoes from the destroyer Fujinami.
By this time Kurita was rather losing his grip on the battle. The Yamato was some way behind his cruisers and visibility was poor. He wasn't aware of the damage to three of his cruisers, and had lost sight of the carriers. At 9.11, believing that he had won a major victory over a squadron of fleet carriers, Kurita ordered his surviving ships to withdraw from the battle.
At about 10.50 the cruiser Suzuya suffered a near miss that detonated the torpedoes in the starboard forward torpedo tubes. This set off a fire made worse when more of her torpedoes exploded at around 11.00. Damage control measures failed and at about 12 noon a series of ammunition explosions began. The ship was abandoned at 1pm and sank twenty minutes later.
Taffy 3's ordeal wasn't yet over. At 10.50, just as the Suzuya was being attacked, nine kamikaze aircraft attacked the task group, in one of the first organised suicide attacks of the war. Most were destroyed or missed, but one hit the escort carrier St Lô, triggering explosions that sank her. A second kamikaze attack twenty minutes later did more damage but failed to sink anything.
It took Kurita about two hours to regroup. He then turned south with his remaining fifteen ships in an attempt to reach Leyte Gulf, the original target of his operation. At 11.40 one of his lookouts reported sighting a battleship and destroyers. The fleet turned aside to chase this phantom before turning south again. At around 12.30, when only forty five miles from Leyte Gulf, Kurita decided that it wasn't worth risking the destruction of his fleet just to sink empty transport ships. He had also received reports that an American carrier task force had been sighted 113 miles north of the gulf, and he now decided to turn north to deal with this
In fact Halsey's carriers were still far to the north. All morning he had been receiving urgent calls for help, but had refused to turn back. In the resulting battle of Cape Engano Halsey sank all four of Ozawa's carriers. At around 11 he ordered one of his carrier groups to turn south, and his fourth carrier group, which was some way to the east, was also directed towards Kurita. This fourth task group was first to come into range and during the afternoon it launched two attacks on Kurita's fleet. After spending all afternoon looking for the American carriers Kurita retired to the eastern end of the San Bernardino Strait at 6pm. He was under orders to wait for dark and try and fight a night battle, but at 9.25, with fuel short, he decided to retreat west through the straits. He would suffer further air attack on 26 October, but the main fighting in Leyte Gulf was over.
Kurita has since been blamed for his decisions to withdraw from combat at 9.11 and to turn back from Leyte Gulf at 12.30. Both can be defended using the information available to Kurita at the time, but he later believed the second decision to have been a mistake. If Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf then his fleet would almost certainly have been destroyed - if not by Kinkaid's escort carriers and old battleships then by the 3rd Fleet. All he could have achieved was the destruction of empty transport ships, and perhaps a damaging bombardment of the US troops on Leyte, but neither would have altered the eventual course of the fighting in the Philippines.
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Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
The USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) was a Casablanca class escort carrier of the United States Navy. Named for Gambier Bay on Admiralty Island in Southeast Alaska, she was originally classified AVG-73, was reclassified ACV-73 on 20 August 1942 and again reclassified CVE-73 on 15 July 1943; launched under a Maritime Commission Contract by the Kaiser Shipbuilding Company, Vancouver, Washington, 22 November 1943; sponsored by Mrs. H. C. Zitzewitz of Oswego, Oreg.; and commissioned at Astoria, Oregon, 28 December 1943, Captain Hugh H. Goodwin in command. The ship was informally referred to as Kaiser's "Bonus Baby" because she was built in a record 171 days. Early career After shakedown out of San Diego, the escort carrier sailed 7 February 1944 with 400 troops embarked for Pearl Harbor, thence to rendezvous off the Marshalls, guarded by the USS Norman Scott (DD-690), where she flew 84 replacement planes to the carrier Enterprise (CV-6). She returned to San Diego via Pearl Harbor, ferrying aircraft for repairs and qualified carrier pilots off the coast of Southern California. She departed 1 May to join Rear Admiral H. B. Sallada?s Carrier Support Group 2 (TG 52.11), staging in the Marshalls for the invasion of the Marianas. Gambier Bay gave close air support to the initial landings of Marines on Saipan 15 June 1944, destroying enemy gun emplacements, troops, tanks, and trucks. On the 17th her combat air patrol shot down or turned back all but a handful of 47 enemy planes headed for her task group and her gunners shot down 2 of the 3 planes that did break through to attack her. The following day, warning of another air attack sounded. As her fighters prepared to take off, they found intense antiaircraft fire of the entire task group covering their flight path. Captain Goodwin called the event "another shining example of the adaptability and courage of the young men of our country." Eight pilots of Composite Squadron 10 did take off to help repulse the aerial attack. Gambier Bay remained off Saipan, repulsing aerial raids and launching planes which strafed enemy troop concentrations, bombed gun emplacements, and supported marines and soldiers fighting ashore. Meanwhile, American carriers slashed the carrier air strength of the combined Japanese Mobile Fleet and turned it back in defeat in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Gambier Bay continued close ground support operations at Tinian (19 July?31 July), then turned her attention to Guam, where she gave identical aid to invading troops until 11 August. Invasion of the Philippines After a respite for logistics in the Marshalls, Gambier Bay spent 15 September to 28 September supporting the amphibious attack which drove ashore and captured Peleliu and Angaur, Southern Palaus. She then steamed by way of Hollandia (currently known as Jayapura), New Guinea, to Manus, Admiralties, where the invasion of the Philippines was staged. Screened by four destroyer escorts, Gambier Bay and Kitkun Bay (CVE-71) escorted transports and amphibious landing ships safely to Leyte Gulf before joining Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague's escort carrier task unit 19 September off Leyte. The task unit comprised six escort carriers, screened by three destroyers and four destroyer escorts, and was known by its voice radio call as "Taffy 3." Under the command of Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague, eighteen escort carriers, divided into three "Taffy" units, maintained air supremacy over Leyte Gulf and eastern Leyte. During the invasion their planes destroyed enemy airfields, supply convoys, and troop concentrations; gave troops driving inland vital close air support; and maintained combat air patrol over ships in Leyte Gulf. While "Taffy 1" and "Taffy 2" were respectively stationed off northern Mindanao and off the entrance to Leyte Gulf, "Taffy 3" steamed off Samar. Meanwhile, the Japanese threw their entire fleet against American naval power in a desperate gamble to destroy the large concentration of American shipping in Leyte Gulf. Powerful enemy forces, comprised of carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, converged on the Philippines in a three pronged attack to the south, center, and north. The Japanese Southern Force met disaster before dawn 25 October as it tried to drive through Surigao Strait to join the Center Force off Leyte Gulf. While steaming through the Sibuyan Sea en route to San Bernardino Strait, the Center Force was hit hard on the 24th by hundreds of planes from Admiral Halsey's fast attack carriers. After the Battle of Sibuyan Sea, Admiral Halsey no longer considered the Center Force a serious menace, and he sent the carriers north to intercept decoy carriers of the Japanese Northern Force off Cape Engano. Battle off Samar These swift moving events left the escort carriers of "Taffy 3" as lone sentinels off Samar, and unaware of the nighttime movement of the Center Force. However, shortly after sunrise 25 October, a gap in the morning mist disclosed the pagoda-like masts of enemy battleships and cruisers on the northern horizon. The still dangerous enemy force of more than 20 ships had slipped undetected through San Bernardino Strait and down the fog-shrouded coast of Samar, bound for Leyte Gulf. Despite the probable outcome of an engagement between two so unequal surface forces, the presence of enemy ships in Leyte Gulf was unthinkable; and "Taffy 3" turned to do battle against the enemy. Immediately, an urgent call for help went out from "Taffy 3" as the escort carriers steamed eastward and launched planes that tried to score hits with torpedoes, bombs, and strafe until their ammunition ran out, then make dummy runs to break the enemy formation and delay its advance. Smoke was laid down to cover their running fight as the destroyers ducked in and out of the mist and smoke to charge battleship, cruiser, and destroyer formations point-blank until ordered back to cover the escort carriers with more smoke. The lone 5 inch gun of Gambier Bay spat out at an enemy cruiser that was shelling her; and destroyer Heerman (DD-532) made an unsuccessful effort under the combined fire of the heavy enemy ships to save Gambier Bay. Gambier Bay was soon dead in the water as three cruisers closed to point blank range. Fires raged through the riddled escort carrier. She capsized and sank at 0907 on 25 October 1944 with the majority of her nearly 800 survivors rescued by landing and patrol craft dispatched from Leyte Gulf. Three other ships, fighting to the end, went down: Hoel (DD-533) ; Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) ; and Johnston (DD-557). The latter used only her 5 inch guns in a dummy torpedo run that thwarted the torpedo attack of an entire Japanese Destroyer Squadron led by a cruiser. Aircraft from "Taffy 2" joined in the epic battle off Samar. The events that followed were described by Admiral Sprague: "At 0925 my mind was occupied with dodging torpedoes when near the bridge I heard one of the signalmen yell 'They're getting away!' I could hardly believe my eyes, but it looked as if the whole Japanese fleet was indeed retiring. However, it took a whole series of reports from circling planes to convince me. And still I could not get the fact to soak into my battle-numbed brain. At best, I had expected to be swimming by this time." Gambier Bay and other ships of "Taffy 3," aided by planes of "Taffy 2," had stopped the powerful Japanese Center Force and inflicted a great loss. Two enemy cruisers were sunk, much damage inflicted on the other ships, and this overwhelmingly powerful surface fleet was turned back by the escort carriers and their screen of destroyers and destroyer-escorts. Gambier Bay received four battle stars for service in World War II and shared in the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to "Taffy 3" for extraordinary heroism in the Battle off Samar.