How The 'Surge' Brought Stability to US Forces In Iraq

The years following the 2003 U.S.-led Invasion of Iraq did not bring the stability or rebuilding of the country that the United States had hoped for. Instead, it led to widespread lawlessness, resistance, and sectarian conflict throughout Iraq. Within a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, al-Qaeda linked insurgents and sectarian militias engaged in armed conflict against each other, with Coalition forces caught in the middle. 

In 2006, violence between armed Shia and Sunni Muslim groups broke out into open civil war when the Al-Askari Shrine, a revered Shia holy site, was bombed by Sunnis. Bomb and mortar attacks became frequent, along with suicide bombings, death squads, and attacks on other places of worship. After the 2006 U.S. Elections brought Democrats to power in the House of Representatives and the Senate, pressure on the administration of George W. Bush forced the president to reconsider the United States strategy in Iraq. 

The Iraq Study Group report, the U.S. Department of State, the CIA, and a panel of expert historians and former military leaders all concluded that the U.S. needed to increase its troops significantly to stabilize Iraq. On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced the deployment of 20,000 Americans to areas around Baghdad. The strategy became known as "The Surge," and even its fiercest critics were forced to admit it succeeded.

The Surge didn't just send in six brigades of U.S. troops. It also changed the commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq. General David Petraeus, a noted counterinsurgency expert, had actually written the Counterinsurgency Field Manual used by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The general laid out his plan before Congress on January 23, 2007, a plan that focused on securing BBaghdad by maintaining a presence in the most affected neighborhoods while empowering the Iraq government to manage its infrastructure and economy, especially in terms of employment and security. 

By mid-June, troop numbers in Iraq had indeed surged, and major combat operations were underway. American soldiers were now focused on protecting civilian populations rather than chasing and killing insurgents, but the insurgent group still met with severe losses. Petraeus reported to Congress that the Surge dealt major blows to Sunni groups like al-Qaeda In Iraq. Americans and local Iraqi populations began to work closer together, even sharing spaces away from major U.S. installations throughout the capital. 

Violence initially increased in response to the troop surges, but it wasn't long before Petraeus' plan began to bear fruit. By the end of 2007, the monthly number of Iraqi civilians killed in fighting had been cut by more than half, security incidents were in decline, and the U.S. had captured the leadership of many Iran-backed Shia militia groups. Even the most effective Shia leader, the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, had told his Mahdi Army to stand down that year. Even the monthly death rate for U.S. troops was the lowest it had been since 2004. 

Within a year, the Iraqi government met most of the benchmarks set by American forces, benchmarks that allowed the Americans to finally withdraw from Iraq entirely. This stability led to Sunni groups recognizing the authority of Iraq's government, increased oil production, and positive economic forecasts from the International Monetary Fund. 

The Surge didn't end the Iraq War; American forces would not fully leave the country until 2011. However, it did provide the relative stability necessary for the new Iraqi government to begin governing, creating a widespread belief that the central authority in Baghdad was in control and that the Iraqi people could safely lead their lives.