This Military Service Page was created/owned by
Michael D. Withers (Mike), OSCS
to remember
Sause, Bernard Jacob, Jr., ADAN.
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The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31) saw early Vietnam war action. A World War II Essex-class carrier, she was on station participating in combat action against the Communists as early as August 1964. Her aircraft carried the first Walleye missiles when they were introduced in 1967. In November 1970, the BON HOMME RICHARD completed its sixth combat deployment and was scheduled for decommissioning by mid-1971.
LT Litchfield P. Huie was a pilot assigned to Helicopter Support Squadron 1, Detachment LIMA onboard the aircraft carrier USS BON HOMME RICHARD in 1967. On February 27 of that year, Huie launched from the aircraft carrier with his crew: LTJG Edward N. Letchworth, Airman Ronald L. Zempel, and Airman Bernard J. Sause, Jr. Airman Zempel was an aircrew survival equipmentman, and it is assumed that this crew normally conducted pilot rescue operations.
As the UH2B flown by Huie was launched from the carrier, it lifted tail high, flipped and partially recovered just prior to striking the water. Upon striking the water the helicopter broke apart on impact. A search helicopter was immediately over the scene and was later aided by two Navy destroyers. The search was terminated with negative results.
Huie, Zempel, Sause and Letchworth were declared Killed/Body Not Recovered. They are listed among the missing because no bodies were found to return home. Their accident is listed as non-combat related.
Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase II Campaign (66-67)
From Month/Year
July / 1966
To Month/Year
May / 1967
Description This Campaign period was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. The growing Coastal Force devoted most of its attention to amphibious raids, patrols of shallow inlets and river mouths, troop lifts, and blocking support for allied ground sweeps. For instance, during Operation Irving in October 1966, ground forces and junk units in II Coastal Zone killed 681 Viet Cong troops. In addition, the junkmen established a government presence among the fishermen and provided them with medical services and other assistance. Sometimes the Coastal Force sailors convinced Communist soldiers to desert their units.
The enemy, who often attacked the 27 vulnerable Coastal Force bases, overran the triangular-shaped fortifications of Coastal Group 15 at Cua An Hoa in July 1965 and of Coastal Group 16 at Co Luy in August 1967. Other bases, however, withstood repeated assaults. In doing so, these facilities played a part in the allied effort that denied the enemy easy access to the coastal regions.
Viet Cong mines also took their toll of the command's MLMS fleet, which worked to keep open the shipping channel to Saigon. In August 1966 and again in January 1967, enemy mines sank an MLMS in the Rung Sat. The River Force did not fully employ its strength. The political troubles of 1965 and 1966 in the Republic of Vietnam, in which high-ranking River Force officers figured prominently, damaged morale and distracted personnel from their military mission.
The navy and the army rarely launched joint amphibious assaults against the Viet Cong. Operations reflected the River Force's lack of technically skilled crewmen, the poor maintenance and repair of river craft, and the absence of inspired leadership. Usually, only half of the command's units were ready for combat action, and many of these boats were committed by the army to static guard, resupply, troop lift, or other nonoffensive duties.
The reliance on defense over offense reflected the historic Vietnamese strategy of husbanding resources until there was clear advantage over an enemy. The Vietnamese Navy's River Force sailors often fought hard and bravely, killing many of the enemy and suffering heavy losses of their own, but their valor and sacrifice was not rewarded with strategic success.
